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Abstract 
A wide variety of 'translocal' forces - diasporic peoples, transnational social movements, global 
& migratory cities, post-national institutions, information technologies - are challenging the 
traditional state-centrism of International Relations' political imaginary. Moreover, just as people 
are translocal, so are their theories. This thesis analyses Islam as a form of 'travelling theory' in 
the context of the global transformations outlined above. It seeks to understand how globalising 
processes are manifested as lived experience through a discussion of debates over the meaning of 
Muslim identity, political community and the emergence of something like a 'critical Islam. ' 
After a critique of state-centric thinking in International Relations, the thesis goes on to suggest 
that more sophisticated treatments of translocal politics can be found in the literatures of 
anthropology, postcolonial and cultural studies. A non-essentialist conception of Islam is 
introduced, followed by a discussion of the conditions under which Muslim discourses on the 
umma (the world community of believers) have historically been produced. Three key theoretical 
tropes - travelling theory, hybridity and diaspora - are then discussed as framing devices for 
understanding translocal politics. Two case study chapters, one on the politics of Muslim 
diaspora communities and the other on Muslim uses of communications and information 
technologies, are presented. The first focuses on debates within Muslim communities as to the 
nature and meaning of modern Islam, the reformulation of Muslim thought on politics, 
community and gender and the implications of travelling Islam's return journey to its various 
original settings. The second case study highlights the changing boundaries of religious 
knowledge by demonstrating how information technologies have been deployed as a means by 
which to contest traditional sources of Islamic authority. In the concluding chapter it is argued 
that translocal forces are leading to the emergence of a wider Muslim public sphere. 
Furthermore, the critical discourses enabled by this translocal space amount to a 
reconceptualisation and reimagining of the umma. 
Had God pleased, He would have united you into one nation. But He 
confounds whom He will and gives guidance to whom He pleases. 
You shall be questioned about all your actions. 
The Holy Qur'an (16: 93) 
It is therefore, a source of great virtue for the practised mind to learn, 
bit by bit, first to change about in visible and transitory things, so that 
afterwards it may be able to leave them behind altogether. The person 
who finds his homeland sweet is still a tender beginner; he to whom 
every soil is as his native one is already strong; but he is perfect to 
whom the entire world is as a foreign place. The tender soul has fixed 
his love on one spot in the world; the strong person has extended his 
love to all places; the perfect man has extinguished his. 
Hugo of St. Victor, Didascalion, 12°i Century CE 
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A Note on Transliteration and Style 
At its first appearance, each Arabic word is italicised and transliterated according to the system 
used by the International Journal of Middle East Studies. Thereafter, the word will appear in 
regular type without any diacritics. Arabic nouns have been pluralised simply by adding an 's' to 
the singular form, except in those cases where the reference term is itself already plural (e. g. 
`ulamd'). Where a person or group is known to have a preferred English spelling of their name 
this has been used. Dates throughout are given in the common era. A short glossary has also 
been appended to further assist the reader. 
Prologue 
"We are currently engaged in transnational operations which defy traditional means of influence. " 
- U. S. Secretary of Defense William Cohen, 20 August, 1998. 
In 1992, a group of distinguished Muslim scholars met at Chateau Chinon in France to consider 
the problems faced by Muslim communities in Europe. They decided that Islamic political theory 
could no longer classify non-Muslim states as dar al-barb (the domain of war); instead, the West 
was to be considered dar a! - `ahd (the domain of treaty), signifying a willingness towards greater 
dialogue. ' In the spring of 1996, Citicorp announced the launching of an Islamic banking unit 
which would cater to "investors and businesses requiring special financial services conforming to 
Islamic law. "z They were hoping to tap into the estimated $120 billion currently on deposit in 
various Islamic banks around the world. 
These symbiotic images - the West adjusting its economic practices to account for Islam, and 
Islam changing the boundaries of its political community to enable dialogue with the West - are, 
in part, the product of various global sociocultural transformations which are currently modifying 
conventional conceptions both of world politics and of what it means to 'relate internationally. ' 
Unprecedented global flows of peoples and cultures, transnational social movements, the rise of 
world cities, supranational political forms and globalising media technologies: all are calling into 
question the hegemony of national and statist forms of political identity, and also giving rise to 
discrepant visions of non-Western politics and polities. As one observer notes, "the networks and 
circuits in which transnational migrants and refugees are implicated constitute fluidly bounded 
transnational or globalized social spaces in which new transnational forms of political 
organization, mobilization, and practice are coming into being. "3 These developments challenge 
our conventional conceptions of how and where to locate the political. 
This thesis is therefore motivated by two central concerns. One is to account for and provide 
better ways of thinking about politics and political identity under the transformative conditions 
highlighted above. The second is to provide an alternative reading of'political' Islam, focusing 
not on militant movements and their struggles against 'the West' and/or various state 
governments, but rather on the politics which constitute the daily lives of the vast majority of the 
world's Muslims. To be certain, the 'debate' between Islam and the West is important, but we 
have allowed it to so overdetermine our perceptions of Islam that crucial contestations and 
negotiations within Islam go unnoticed. My purpose in this thesis is to provide, through a 
discourse of what I call translocal politics, an account of the new forms of politics emerging from 
the Muslim world's experience of globalisation. This line of inquiry, in which Muslim politics 
are understood as an aspect of'lived' Islam under globalising conditions, can provide us with a 
much richer picture of how Muslims come to define and experience their political identities in the 
contemporary world. Much has been written about manifestations of political Islam in various 
national, historical and sociopolitical contexts. Several 'grand theories' about Islam's place in a 
' Ataullah Siddiqui, "Muslims in the Contemporary World: dialogue in perspective, " World Faiths 
Encounter, No. 20, July 1998. 
2 Chris Sulavik, "Citicorp to launch Islamic banking unit, " Reuters, April 9,1996. 
3 Michael Peter Smith, "Can You Imagine? Transnational Migration and the Globalization of Grassroots 
Politics, " Social Text, No. 39, Summer 1994, p. 15 
1 
global scheme have also been advanced; sadly, however, too many of these have been fairly 
crude, essentialising hypotheses of the 'clash of civilisations' variety. What is missing from the 
literature is any attempt to provide a political sociology of Islam, theoretically informed by wider 
developments in social theory related to migration, diaspora and translocal politics. What follows 
can be read as an attempt to offer exactly this. 
I begin with a critique of dominant conceptions of the political in International Relations and 
argue that the authority of statist politics is currently under threat from a variety of global 
sociocultural transformations which serve to disembed political identities from national contexts 
and also to stretch social relations across time and space. After reviewing the contributions which 
critical approaches to international theory are making towards accounting for these changes, I 
suggest that International Relations would do well to supplement its discourse by engaging in 
dialogue with debates and developments in other disciplinary projects - namely, postcolonial 
studies, cultural studies and, especially, anthropology. These other fields, working as they do 
with richer conceptions of the linkages between culture and political identity, have been able to 
provide sophisticated accounts of how post-national, post-territorial and translocal idioms of the 
political are emerging out of globalising processes. 
In the second chapter I argue for a non-essentialist definition of Islam which focuses on the 
notion of Muslim subjectivity rather than on 'Islam' in the sense of a given culture. This is 
crucial, I argue, for recognising the multiple articulations of Muslim identity found in translocal 
space. I then go on to situate contemporary Muslim discourse in the context of debates on 
modernity, postmodernity and the West, arguing that the same shifting configurations of 
hegemony which enable Islamist voices to articulate alternative visions of modernity also open 
spaces for the rearticulation and renegotiation of Islam itself. A key titular trope of the thesis then 
comes into play as I examine two historical contexts in which the umma (world community of 
Muslims) has been elaborated as an 'alternative' political order. The founding community of 
Muslims under Muhammad in seventh-century Medina helps us to understand the normative 
vision which motivated early Islam, and the anti-colonial discourses of the nineteenth and early 
twentieth century Pan-Islamic reformers provide us with a political context in which the Muslim 
world - from North Africa to Southeast Asia - was for the first time in centuries able to mobilise 
the umma as a discrepant idiom of political community in the face of a common 'other, ' the West. 
Both of these periods are important in that they represent key reference points for contemporary 
translocal Muslim discourse. 
I return in Chapter III to the concept of translocality and outline three theoretical themes which I 
see as the primary mediators of culture and politics in translocal space. The notion of travelling 
theory helps us to understand what happens to peoples, cultures and ideas when they move across 
and between various sociopolitical settings. Hybridity theory, I suggest, offers a conceptual 
language with which to analyse the innovative cultural interminglings which emerge from 
translocal encounters both between and within particular traditions. I then argue that postcolonial 
and metropolitan conceptions of diaspora which celebrate the de-centred, 'free floating' nature of 
migrant identities assume a certain ironic standpoint which politicised and antagonised identities 
(e. g. Islam) find difficult to assume. Travelling theory, hybridity and diaspora, I claim, all help us 
to account for the ways in which translocal identities "[defy] assimilation into conventional 
political discourses and practices-and challenge conventional modes of interpreting the world 
within specific territories. 0 
a John Eade, "Reconstructing Places: Changing images of locality in Docklands and Spitalfields" in John 
Eade (ed. ), Living the Global City: Globalization as local process, London: Routledge, 1997, p. 128 
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Chapter IV seeks to provide a detailed case study of the Muslim diaspora in the West, focusing on 
how Islam 'travels' and on the debates about authority and authenticity which emerge from these 
translocal process. While considerable work has been done on Muslim communities in the West, 
none has so far attempted to situate the Muslim diaspora within a wider framework of post- 
national, translocal politics. The empirical material is organised according to three themes: 
debates with the Muslim 'other'; rethinking politics, community and gender in translocality; and 
transnational diasporic networks. I suggest that diasporic Muslims can be seen to possess a form 
of interstitial identity which fully participates neither in the politics of the majority non-Muslim 
society nor in the politics of the country of origin. John Eade puts it well: 
They navigate the disjunctures between different political and cultural formations and 
attempt to make sense of these differences in ways which do not necessarily conform to a 
specific tradition. Their journey is largely an imaginative, reflexive movement where 
they can draw on traditions in other parts of the world and in the process construct their 
own translation. 5 
Chapter V examines the ways in which Muslims have been making use of media and information 
technologies. I first look at how the rise of print technology in the nineteenth century helped to 
diminish the traditional scholars' monopoly over religious knowledge. I then argue that this 
process is being further radicalised in the present era by the widespread availability of 'Islamic' 
CD-ROMS and the Internet in the Muslim diaspora. These resources and forums provide 
Muslims with new modes of communications and interaction across distance (i. e. 'reimagining 
the umma'), and new public spheres in which novel forms of authority and 'authentic' Islam are 
able to emerge. I then look briefly at the 'relocalisation' of the Internet in the Arab Gulf states as 
an example of what happens when these translocal public spheres enter specific sociopolitical 
contexts. Related to all of these developments has been the rise of a new breed of Islamist 
intellectual whose political programmes are more likely to be found on an audio cassette or 
printed in a pamphlet rather than heard in the mosque. The populist discourse of this new 
intellectual is often explicitly anti-statist and emanates from spaces and places beyond the reach 
of institutionalised, formal political power. 
In the Conclusion, I draw together the two narrative strands of the thesis - travelling Islam and 
translocal politics - in order to more explicitly illuminate the relationship between them. I argue 
that largely under the influence of translocality, political Islam - often depicted as a retrograde 
form of pre-medieval (un)reason - has actually become a far more complex entity in terms of the 
sociology of knowledge. New explorations in what we might term a'critical Islam' are emerging 
through a reassessment and reinterpretation of traditional textual sources. Going back to the early 
traditions is hence not a throwback to 'fundamentalism, ' but, in the case of these new Muslim 
discourses, an attempt to critically reread the ethical core of the founding texts directly into 
contemporary contexts without the mediation of centuries of dogmatic theology. The emergence 
of a new Muslim public sphere has also meant a significant change of personnel in terms of who 
is authorised to undertake this critical renewal of Islam. 
Finally, I outline the three key mechanisms through which translocality is changing the 
boundaries of Muslim political community. The first of these relates to the disembedding 
qualities of global sociocultural change which were analysed in the first chapter. In these 
transformations, Muslims are removed from particular national settings and resettled as minority 
groups such that their political identities become configured in relation to multiple locales, but 
also in relation to a discrepant normative vision (all the while inverting traditional conceptions of 
Ibid., p. 129 
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political community). Second, encounters with the 'Muslim other' in translocality relativise a 
Muslim's sense of identity and cause him or her to reassess the boundaries of inclusion/exclusion 
which determine who and what counts as 'authentic' Islam. Third, debates over the political 
imperatives of translocal Islam - and also over who can legitimately set this agenda - serve to 
create new Muslim public spheres in which formerly disenfranchised voices (e. g. 'deviants, ' 
'moderates, ' and women) are empowered to articulate alternative interpretations of Islamic 
authenticity. 
My main argument, therefore, is that under translocality the process of reimagining the umma 
becomes one of reconceptualising the umma. Many Muslims do not see global processes simply 
as a means by which to bridge the differences and distances between them, but rather as an 
opportunity to critically engage with the question of who, what, and where Muslim political 
community can be in the time of translocality. Their efforts can be seen as an example of how 
one particular set of identities is experiencing globalisation as a new form of transnational 
grassroots politics. Undoubtedly, as translocality becomes more and more invasive, other 




Beyond Disciplinary Borders: International Relations and Translocal Politics 
If the social world... is not entirely defined in terms of repetitive, sedimented practices, it is because the 
social always overflows the institutionalized frameworks of'society', and because social antagonisms 
show the inherent contingency of those frameworks. Thus a dimension of construction and creation is 
inherent in all social practice. The latter do not involve only repetition, but also reconstruction. 
- Ernesto Laclau, The Making of Political Identities 
It is necessary to ask how it has become so easy to believe that movements act 'down there' among the 
locales, among those forms of life that are contained within the grander structures 'above. ' Social 
movements that work entirely within the modem reification of spatiotemporal relations simply affirm 
the limits of their ambition. 
- R. B. J. Walker, "Social Movements/World Politics" 
The aim of this first chapter is to construct the broad theoretical architecture of the thesis. I 
will begin by arguing that the conception of politics found in dominant strains of 
International Relations (IR) theory - and neo-realism in particular - is incapable of 
accounting for forms of politics enabled by the current climate of rapid, global sociocultural 
change. By locating'the political' within the state, conventional IR theory reproduces a set of 
political structures unsuited for circumstances in which political identities and processes 
configure themselves across and in-between bounded forms of political community. After 
reviewing some of the (infra)structural transformations which have been affecting world 
politics in an increasingly globalised - or "translocal" - era, I go on to look at the progress 
which critical approaches to IR theory have made towards comprehending alternative notions 
of the political. I then suggest that IR has much to gain from engaging with debates going on 
within other disciplinary projects - namely postcolonial studies, cultural studies, and, 
especially, anthropology. These fields, I argue, have been better placed to anticipate these 
transformations and have consequently been able to provide considerably more sophisticated 
treatments of these issues. Transnational anthropology, in particular, has begun to develop 
various modes for theorising post-statist forms of politics. After a critical review of some of 
this thinking, I go on to develop a conception of translocality as an increasingly important 
form of political space. I see the translocal as an abstract category denoting sociopolitical 
interaction which falls between bounded communities; that is, translocality is primarily about 
the ways in which people flow through space rather than about how they exist in space. It is 
therefore a quality characterised in terms of movement. I will argue that the 'travelling' which 
takes place in translocality serves to enact forms of politics which challenge sedentary 
notions of community and identity. 
International Relations: a limited political imagination? 
The majority of International Relations theory is effectively blind to a great deal of political 
activity in the world today. The purpose of this first section is to explain why this is so and 
also to argue that IR's limited imagination of the political prohibits its appreciation of 
important new forms of 'international' politics located outside the traditional realm of the 
state. 
There is a strong sense in which IR has been going by the wrong name since its institutional 
inception in 1919. Whether styled "International Relations, " "International Politics" or 
I 
"International Studies, " the implication has been the same, namely that what interests the 
scholars of these fields are relations between nations. A quick glance at the "classic texts" of 
the discipline - and even the majority of current research in the field - reveals, however, that 
the IR envisaged by many of its most eminent students would have more properly been 
labelled "interstate politics. " State-centrism, usually identified as a fetish of realist thought, 
actually predates the latter insofar as the state was already coded as the centre of gravity for 
international political life well before the disillusionment of the inter-war years that gave rise 
to what we recognise today as classic realism. The argument that state-centrism in IR is 
merely a by-product of realism therefore misses the point, for the nexus of state and politics 
has exercised hegemony over our political imaginations since long before anyone thought to 
theorise IR as an autonomous sphere of activity. It was taken for granted that what we 
understood by "international relations" were really relations between state governments 
which, according to the modern ideal of the nation-state, were supposedly representative of 
their constitutive nations. 
Defining the nation has proved one of the most contentious tasks of the social sciences in 
recent years, and the present study will not attempt or pretend to make any contribution to 
this ongoing melee. It will be necessary, however, in developing the post-statist framework 
in which this thesis is situated, to make some comments as to the distinction between nation 
and state. As regards the nature of the nation, I am broadly sympathetic to Benedict 
Anderson's notion of the "imagined community. "' By his use of the idiom 'imagination, ' 
Anderson is not trying to suggest that nations are fictional figments, or somehow "not real. " 
Rather, his is a much more complex argument about how people become cognisant of 
themselves as part of a social collective. In this sense, then, the construction of the nation is 
first and foremost about understanding the self as part of a greater whole, but one which 
possesses boundaries -a clear sense of inside and out. Indeed, if we examine the various 
sociohistorical contexts in which nations have been elaborated, we find many in which the 
act of creating a nation is as much about saying who one is not, as it is about saying who one 
is. It is therefore an inherently political process in the sense that it constructs boundaries of 
inclusion and exclusion. Furthermore, the nation exists in more than just space, it also 
endures in time. It is a life-world which requires reproduction in order to survive. Insofar as 
the nation is a discursive formation (as opposed to a corporeal construct) it requires 
reiteration in order to sustain itself. The nation is a story of identity, memory and belonging 
which needs to be told and told again. It is this dimension of the nation which leads Homi 
Bhabha to speak of its "narration. " Z The nation is hence a living thing: the reification of 
culture (language, morality, memory, experience, "forms of life") into an exclusive 
community. 
I understand the contemporary state, on the other hand, more as a technology of governance, 
a bureaucratic apparatus for the organisation of power and control. Like the nation, the 
contemporary state is also an historically-constituted, sociocultural construct. People (often 
in the guise of nations) produce and define state forms. The state is, however, the product of 
a particular political culture (European modernism) whose hegemony (in the sense of an 
historical particularity masquerading as the universal) has permitted its political imagination 
to assume tangible, institutional form. In this regard, the fact that we find a great deal of 
isomorphism within the modern state system is more a reflection of the history of power 
relations between its constituent members than a testament to the intrinsic durability of the 
European state model. And while the state is therefore a product of human - perhaps even of 
national - agency, it cannot however be denied that state hegemony has also served to 
structure and define the range of possibilities which we as political agents possess. 
Benedict Anderson, Imagined Communities, London: Verso, Revised Edition, 1991. 
2 See Homi K. Bhabha (ed. ), Nation and Narration, London: Routledge, 1990. 
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My major complaint about dominant theories of international relations such as neo-realism is 
that they persist in working with a relatively unproblematised understanding of the nation- 
state despite the veritable upheavals in citizenship, ethical capacity and sovereignty 
highlighted above. Where these transformations are recognised, they tend to be marginalised 
in favour of an image of IR which reproduces political realism's 'timeless wisdom. ' More 
specifically, traditional modes of theorising IR see the nation-state as the focal point of 
international politics and, indeed, operate with an understanding of the political as something 
which only legitimately emanates from the state. In doing so, however, realism and its more 
recent incarnations effectively ignore the fact that there are many other layers and spaces of 
politics. Indeed, within the unproblematised nation-state that IR sees as central there are at 
least three complex political dynamics at work: (1) a politics of inclusion, exclusion and 
national narration; (2) a politics in which the state attempts to distil national identit(ies) into a 
(usually singular) "national interest"; and (3) a meta-politics which seeks to maintain the 
fusion of nation and state as the most effective logic by which to order the international 
system. 
A critique of IR's state-centric nature is, of course, nothing new. Realism has had its 
vociferous critics for many years. 3 Other normative visions, from Burton's 'world society' to 
the World Order Models Project (WOMP) have been voiced. 4 Theorists of complex 
interdependence have sought to downplay state hegemony. ' Indeed, many IR theorists today 
would tell you that we have moved beyond our obsession with the state, citing important 
work being done in areas such as gender, ecology and international political economy in 
which the state, when present, tends to play the antagonist. The spectre of the state, however, 
is still very much with us. We tend to slip easily into realist-type language when asked to 
explain some aspect of contemporary world politics to someone outside the discipline. 
Indeed, part of IR's problem - as I will argue later - is the image those outside the discipline 
hold of it. It is expected that an international relations specialist will have something to say 
about what the United States is doing in the Gulf, or the intrigues of a vote in the UN 
Security Council. In short, it is expected that IR should be able to account for interstate 
politics. And for good reason. The state is still a very important actor in world politics - one 
would, I think, be foolish to claim otherwise at the present time. My argument, however, is 
not simply that we need to ask questions about the existence of other actors in world politics 
(for I take this as given), but rather that we need to ask questions about the nature and 
location of the political within what we understand as world politics. By this I mean that 
theories of international relations have tended to assume that "proper" politics is something 
involving particular forms of decision-making by particular actors within specific 
institutional spaces (e. g. diplomats voting on trade agreements in the GATT). I do not deny 
that these are important aspects of world politics. However, there are other forms of world 
politics to which IR theory is effectively blind because it has only been taught to recognise a 
limited range of shapes and colours as political. In this sense, the question of what IR can 
and cannot "see" is central to this thesis. This line of inquiry becomes all the more important 
when we begin to realise that the world is undergoing transformations which threaten further 
alienation in the relationship between world politics and the ways we think about the nature 
and location of the political. Thus I wholeheartedly agree with Rob Walker when he writes: 
3 See John Vasquez, The Power of Power Politics, London: Pinter, 1983; and Justin Rosenberg, 
"What's the Matter with Realism? " Review of International Studies, Vol. 16, No. 4, October 1990, pp. 
285-303. 
° See John Burton, World Society, London: Cambridge University Press, 1972; and Richard Falk, The 
Promise of World Order, Brighton: Wheatsheaf, 1987. 
5 See Robert O. Keohane and Joseph S. Nye Jr., Power and Interdependence, Boston: Little Brown, 
1977; and Stephen Krasner (ed. ), International Regimes, Ithaca: Cornell University Press, 1983. 
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My concern with the limits of the modern political imagination is informed both by a 
sense of the need for alternative forms of political practice under contemporary 
conditions and a sense that fairly profound transformations are currently in progress. 
But it is also informed by a sense that our understanding of these transformations, 
and the contours of alternative political practices, remains caught within discursive 
horizons that express the spatiotemporal configurations of another era. b 
Before I go any further something needs to be said about the nature of the 'political 
imagination' which I am attributing to state-centric forms of IR theory. Up to this point I 
have been speaking of the state as the location of 'the political' and using terms such as 
politics, political identity and political community without explaining how I understand them. 
This is particularly important insofar as one of the primary objectives of this thesis is to 
explain how certain global transformations currently underway are forcing us to reassess how 
we think about 'the political. ' My major complaint is that the vast majority of international 
theory has allowed what it understands by 'the political' to be determined by where it sites the 
political. Rather than asking questions about the particular qualities of politics and political 
relationships (i. e. what makes them 'political'), many theorists have equated politics with 
those activities which fall within the remit of state structures (i. e. politics = the state). When 
extra-statist relations are occasionally recognised as political in nature, they tend to be 
dismissed as insignificant. This is because the dominant discourse sees institutionalised 
procedures, offices and formal bureaucratic frameworks (e. g. elections, presidents and 
parliaments) as the only 'real' way to practice politics. In my understanding of the political, 
however, there are political aspects to countless other daily social practices (e. g. sexuality, 
employment and religion), and these are not politics which can simply be dismissed as 
irrelevant. Furthermore, I want to argue that the current globalising climate serves to amplify 
these practices by disrupting the disciplining mechanisms of state sovereignty (see below) 
and by opening up new public spaces in which alternative political views can be articulated. 
Before I get on with the task of theorising these changes in political space, let me first make a 
short but crucial detour and say something about what I understand the political to be. 
Politics is first and foremost a social activity; it is about relationships between people(s). Not 
all relationships are inherently political, although non-political relationships can at times 
assume political qualities. So what is the particular quality of a political relationship - or, in 
other words, what makes it 'political'? On my reading, the political can be characterised by 
two different sorts of claims: identity claims and ethical claims. I will deal with identity first. 
Drawing on the work of Ernesto Laclau and Chantal Mouffe, I want to suggest that social 
antagonism is one possible root of the political. Antagonism refers to a condition in which 
the differentiation of identity - the split between us and them - begins to appear as something 
more than just difference. In an antagonistic situation, one identity (the 'self) comes to see 
the other as a force seeking to negate its identity. "From that moment on, " writes Mouffe, 
"any form of us/them relationship - whether it be religious, ethnic, economic or other - 
becomes political. 0 The example often employed by Laclau and Mouffe is that of the 
peasant whose use of the land is under threat from a landlord. If the identity of peasant is 
premised upon working the land, then any force which threatens to remove this capacity also 
threatens the very existence of peasant identity. Antagonism is therefore the product of a 
politics of identity. In this sense 'the political' is not a sharply demarcated sphere of activity 
unto itself, but rather it describes a mode of interaction - one characterised by the negotiation 
of identity. According to Mouffe: 
6 R. B. J. Walker, Inside%utside: International Relations as Political Theory, Cambridge, Cambridge 
University Press, 1993, p. ix-x. 
' Chantal Mouffe, "For a politics of nomadic identity, " in George Robertson et al. (eds. ), Travellers' 
Tales: Narratives of home and displacement, London: Routledge, 1994, p. 108 
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Looking at the issue of identity in this way transforms the way we think of the 
political. The political can no longer be located as present only in a certain type of 
institution, as representative of a sphere or level of society. It should rather be 
understood as a dimension inherent in all human society which stems from our very 
ontological condition. ' 
The ontological dimension of the political is related to one's assertion of a particular identity 
because that assertion is, in effect, a claim to 'be' - to exist according to one's construction of 
a particular identity - and, furthermore, to have that existence recognised by the other. 
Antagonism arises when this recognition is withheld, or when the other attempts to force a 
discrepant identity. Without this constitutive recognition, an identity cannot survive, or, at 
the very least, will always fail to become social in the sense of allowing one to relate to the 
other in terms of that identity. In this sense the political is primarily a mode rather than a 
description of a specific practice. It is a form of social relationship characterised by 
contestation. 
The second possible manifestation of the political involves ethical claims. Politics is often 
about the assertion of a particular vision of what constitutes 'the good' in the face of other 
competing claims. This is a conception of the political which focuses on its normative 
aspects, the ways in which different political practices reflect particular ethical agendas. 
Thus the political pertains not only to claims about who we are, but also claims about what 
we think is right. That there is a close relationship between these two claims is self-evident. 
Identity claims will often overlap quite significantly with ethical claims, especially when 
particular identities are seen to be closely related to certain ethical projects. This emphasis 
on the ethical component of the political leads me to another important distinction that needs 
to be made between political identity and politicised identity. I need to elaborate this 
difference in order to point out that I am not simply conflating politics and political identity. 
On my reading, a political identity refers to a particular normative vision, a set of beliefs 
about the nature of 'the good' and how one should go about achieving it. A politicised 
identity, on the other hand, is a political identity which has been placed in a situation of 
antagonism such that its ethical claims are challenged by counter-claims from other political 
identities. Therefore (to employ an analogy from physics) political identity refers to 
'potential' politics, while the politicisation of identity marks a conversion into 'kinetic' form, 
or the actuality of the political. It is important to make this semantic distinction so that my 
deployment of the term 'political identity' throughout this thesis will not be taken to imply the 
presence of a political relationship. When I speak of political identity, therefore, I am 
referring to identities possessing particular normative visions. However, I do not want to 
refer to these various ethical conceptions simply as different 'worldviews, ' 'values' or'culture. ' 
As I will argue later, the alternative political spaces of translocality are sites where these 
different 'cultural' forms - and particularly the conversations between them - fulfil important 
political functions. This is why it is also crucial to understand the dialectical relationship 
between political identity and the politicisation of identity. The politicisation of identity is 
very often the process which constructs (new) political identities. In other words, it is often 
the encounter with 'the other' that engenders the shifts, negotiations and debates which 
produce new ethical claims and hence new political identities. Translocal political space 
emerges as a particularly rich site of both political identities (i. e. different conceptions of'the 
good') and politicised identities (i. e. dialogue between these differing conceptions). 
I need to say something now about what I understand by political community, and this will 
start us on our return journey to (re)considerations of political space. Taken at face value 
'political community' would seem to refer simply to those communities in which a particular 
a Ibid. 
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form of politics is practised, reflecting a common conception of 'the good'. State institutions 
and their related structures - from the local council to the dynastic realm - would all, in this 
sense, constitute forms of political community, as would various religious establishments and 
their associated organisations. The concept of political community which I intend to develop 
in this study, however, places its emphasis elsewhere. Rather than to identify political 
community with institutions representing particular ethical claims - such as churches and 
states - my understanding of political community concentrates instead on the contestations 
and counterclaims of those who are on the 'receiving end' of such politics. I am interested in 
those peoples who are subject to a particular form of politics - or, put another way, those 
who constitute the objects of a given ethical claim (e. g. the relationship between 'Islam' and 
'Muslims'). My emphasis here, then, is on those political identities which inhabit spaces 
outside formal institutions - thus allowing us to account for important forms of popular 
politics. This approach facilitates an understanding of the subjectivities of a given political 
order, those whose lives are mediated by and who themselves attempt to mediate, the 
influence of various political actors and hegemonies. Where before those actors have 
primarily tended to be states, I will be arguing that political communities are increasingly 
coming to be figured around sources of 'the good' other than the state. 
A political community is hence a system composed of a set of ethical claims and its subject 
constituency, both of which are to some extent predicated on one another. I make this latter 
point in order to emphasise that neither the nature of these claims (e. g. Islam) nor the 
identities which populate a political community (e. g. Muslims) are prior to the political (i. e. 
negotiational) processes which constitute them (as per above). A vital component of all 
political communities, and the one which will be emphasised throughout the account of Islam 
which follows, is the `public space, ' or the area where normative interventions are received, 
mediated and contested by those who are subject to them. This public space, as we will see, 
can take on many different forms and can exist in varying strengths from context to context, 
and from culture to culture. The 'public' nature of this discourse is, however, particularly 
salient in the case of Islam because according to conventional accounts of modernity, religion 
has been relegated to the domain of the private. By re-asserting itself in public space, Islam 
is hence disrupting the modernity which lies at the root of the state. To the extent that 
translocality fosters the presence of Islam in the public sphere - and I will be arguing later 
that it does - it would appear to challenge the conventional dualism between public and 
private. In summary, we can say that European modernity has represented political 
community through a particular configuration of state and society. The hegemony (i. e. 
universalising tendencies) of this conception is, however, currently under threat from a 
variety of transformative forces, some of which I detail below. Most important among them 
is the emergence of new forms of public space whose boundaries do not conform to those of 
the territorial state. These spaces are translocal in the sense that they refer to activities which 
occur in the interstices between bounded communities, yet these activities are increasingly 
immune to the ethical claims of the state. In this sense they represent discrepant forms of 
political community. 
Before I go on to describe the emergence of translocality, however, I need to say something 
more about the state. It would be impossible to dismiss this form of political community as a 
mere historical accident born to those with power. The state has acted (and in many respects 
continues to do so) as the primary subject of international theory and has also fulfilled a 
number of vital functions as regards territorial governance, the maintenance of order and 
international justice. Even when seeking to move beyond the state, we must first necessarily 
pass through it. In particular I want to draw attention to the ways in which the state has acted 
as the primary bearer of three key aspects of international life - ethical political identity 
(citizenship); ethical accountability (the state as a legal instrument and a site of the 'good'); 
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and the legitimising principle of political autonomy (state sovereignty) - and how these roles 
are changing or being challenged in the current era. I will take them in order. 
Citizenship provides a framework for political identity, usually envisaged as a mutually 
constitutive package of rights and obligations defining the legal parameters of the ethical self. 
The citizen is intrinsically linked to the state insofar as it is only the state which can bestow 
this status upon an individual. One might argue that the employee of a corporation is usually 
empowered by a certain legal status. Yet in the sense that all employers are based within the 
boundaries of the political space of the state and insofar as any claim made by an employee 
against his or her employer passes through the legal bureaucracy of the state, even the status 
of 'employee' (if it is to be legally meaningful) must somehow be linked to notions of 
citizenship - or at least to some 'official' status bestowed by the state. This infrastructure is 
currently under strain due to a number of forces. One is an increasingly global market which 
does not respect state borders. Corporations are able to identify and recruit labour from 
beyond the borders of the state in which their operations are based, yet there is no guarantee 
that the relevant state will allow 'non-citizens' to participate in its labour market. This 
phenomenon is prevalent from one end of the employment spectrum to the other, from the 
'illegal' Mexican migrant worker in the United States to the information technology specialist 
in Southeast Asia. The point I want to draw from this is the fact that increasingly today there 
is a disjuncture between one's legal identity as a citizen and one's political identity as an actor 
in the public sphere. Benedict Anderson makes the point well when he alludes to the 
'counterfeit' quality of passports: 
[I]n our age, when everyone is supposed to belong to some one of the United 
Nations, these documents have high truth claims. But they are also counterfeit in the 
sense that they are less and less attestations of citizenship, let alone of loyalty to a 
protective nation-state, than of claims to participate in labor markets. Portuguese 
and Bangladeshi passports, even when genuine, tell us little about loyalty or habitus, 
but they tell us a great deal about the relative likelihood of their holders being 
permitted to seek jobs in Milan or Copenhagen. The segregated queues that all of us 
experience at airport immigration barricades mark economic status far more than any 
political attachments. 9 
Traditional conceptions of citizenship are also facing other threats. Experiments with 'supra- 
national' - and again, it would be more accurate to say 'supra-state' - forms of political 
community, such as the European Union, are forcing us to rethink citizenship's exclusive 
relationship with the nation-state. Some theorists have started to work towards envisaging 
more inclusive forms of citizenship whose criteria for membership are not limited by the 
spatial extension of the modern state. 10 Particularly important in the present context is the 
fact that citizenship, at least in its liberal variants, has always implied an implicit 
universalism - i. e. an assumption that the same rights and obligations should and do apply to 
all peoples. There is a sense in which this apparent inclusivity is highly democratic. 
However, there is also a sense in which such 'universalism' can be read as a form of exclusion 
which, by its assumption of homogeneity, negates difference. This aspect of citizenship was 
first queried by feminist writers who noticed that the classic conception of the citizen tended 
to refer to white, property-owning men. 11 Their argument was that citizenship requires the 
capacity to account and provide for the needs of specific identities. Because the nation-state 
is based on this more traditional conception of the citizen, its integrity is challenged by those 
9 Benedict Anderson, "Exodus, " Critical Inquiry, Vol. 20, Winter 1994, pp. 323-24 
10 See Andrew Linklater, The Transformation of Political Community, Cambridge: Polity Press, 1998. 
Linklater outlines what he terms a 'post-Westphalian' conception of the citizen. 
11 See e. g. Mary Dietz, "Context Is All: Feminism and Theories of Citizenship" in Chantal Mouffe (ed. ), 
Dimensions of Radical Democracy, London: Verso, 1992. 
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groups - genders, sexualities, religions, ethnicities - seeking to devise idioms of citizenship 
whose inclusivity is not premised on a particular preconception of the citizen-subject. 
The state has also traditionally served an important function as the site of the ethical. That is 
to say, the state has been understood as an apparatus whose core function is to provide 
protection and social justice for its citizens. Democratic, participatory politics and the right 
to due legal process have served as the cornerstones of this ethical identity. In traditional 
communitarian forms of normative theory, the state serves as the sine qua non of ethical life, 
and as the primary institutional context in which individuals are constituted as rights-holders. 
However, there have been moves by some recent communitarian theorists to reconstitute 
political community beyond the state within a wider 'global civil society. '12 This is a 
response, in part, to the creation of a public sphere beyond the confines of the state, a space 
populated by a variety of globalised media and a plethora of multinational corporate entities. 
We also see a wide range of transnational non-governmental actors pursuing particular 
ethical agendas. These organisations - groups such as Amnesty International, Greenpeace 
and Medecins Sans Frontieres - see themselves as addressing normative issues which are 
somehow larger than and beyond the state. In fact, their activities are often explicitly critical 
of state activities such as torture, detainment without trial, nuclear testing and refusal to grant 
access to those offering humanitarian aid. 
The latter issue, refusal by a state to grant access to its territory, brings us to a principle at the 
very foundation of the international system: state sovereignty. This capacity, which involves 
the recognition of a particular state identity's control over a spatial extension, has 
traditionally been seen as the criteria by which one's efficacy as an international political 
actor (at least legally) has been judged; sovereign states are very much the key players in the 
system. Although we must view it as an historical construct, state sovereignty has in the 
modem era assumed something of a mythical quality, and is often represented in 
contemporary international political discourse as the end all and be all of international life. 13 
It places within the competence of a recognised state the capacity to claim the right of non- 
interference, to deny the right of any other political actor to intervene within its territorial 
space. It is the legal embodiment of autonomy and the exercise of self-determination, with a 
decided emphasis on the self; 'the self defined here as the collective state. It is therefore not 
difficult to understand why tension arises between sovereign states and NGOs seeking to 
challenge the legitimacy of the state. In the eyes of the latter, state sovereignty is an ethical 
capacity as well as a politico-legal one. It involves commitment on the part of a state to 
uphold the 'rule of law' (another problematic notion) within its territory as part and parcel of 
its sovereign jurisdiction. State sovereignty is currently facing a host of challenges. Borders 
have been rendered more permeable by non-corporeal expressions of political agency (e. g. 
satellite television and computer-mediated communication); multinational corporations are 
increasingly taking on competences usually seen to fall within the remit of the state (e. g. 
hiring armies); and people live their lives across and between territories rather than within the 
'little boxes' of official state space. "As fissures emerge among local, translocal, and national 
space, " writes one commentator, "territory as the ground of loyalty and national affect is 
it 14 increasingly divorced from territory as the site of sovereignty and state control... 
12 See e. g. Mervyn Frost, Ethics in International Relations: A Constitutive Theory, Cambridge: 
Cambridge University Press, 1996 and Michael Walzer (ed. ), Toward A Global Civil Society, 
Providence: Berghahn Books, 1995. 
13 See Cynthia Weber, Simulating sovereignty: Intervention, the state and symbolic exchange, 
Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1995; Jens Bartelson, A genealogy of sovereignty, 
Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1995; and Thomas J. Biersteker and Cynthia Weber (eds. ), 
State sovereignty as social construct, Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1996. 
14 Arjun Appadurai, "Sovereignty Without Territoriality: Notes for a Postnational Geography" in 
Patricia Yaeger, The Geography of Identity, Ann Arbor: University of Michigan Press, 1996, p. 47 
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Global sociocultural change and the political 
So what are these changes which force us to rethink conventional categories of politics and 
community? Following on from the challenges to state-centric politics alluded to above, I 
want now to outline the ongoing global sociocultural transformations which I take to be 
salient to the arguments I will be making in this thesis about the emergence of translocal 
spaces. The prominence of political realism in international theory, I have argued, has 
ensured that the state remains the pre-eminant site of the political and, consequently, that 
other locations of political discourse - no matter how long they have been with us - stay off 
our political maps. The flux and transformation of world politics in recent years has, 
however, occurred with unprecedented velocity and invasiveness. Changes in modes of 
social (and hence political) organisation have been more rapid and deep-reaching in the 
present era than ever before. While these processes have existed for several centuries, 
various sociocultural and technological transformations during the past fifty years - some of 
which I review below - have sharply boosted its intensity. It is this changing climate, I 
believe, which requires us to rethink our categories of political analysis. 
The sorts of transformations to which I am referring are usually analysed under the rubric of 
'globalisation'; this term has, however, acquired so much ideological and sensationalist 
baggage in recent years as to become almost analytically meaningless. I will further clarify 
my dissatisfaction with the discourse of globalisation in a later section, but suffice it to say 
for the moment that some of the dynamics I have in mind are often much less than global in 
scope; indeed, many of them are better understood as particularly 'local' phenomenon albeit 
ones which sometimes operate across vast distances - hence my emphasis on the notion of 
translocality. So while I may make use of some of the theories and ideas about globalisation, 
I am not convinced that they actually pertain to 'the globe' as a single space. Rather, I am 
seeking to understand the ways in which changes in how we and our ideas/theories interact 
between and across social spaces (often separated by great distances) constitute new 
locations for the construction of political identity and also new spaces of political discourse. 
Thus I am primarily interested in two sorts of transformation. One concerns changes to the 
ways in which social relations exist in space (more specifically, the reconfiguration of 'here' 
and 'there'; see below), while the other pertains to alterations in our understanding and 
constitution of political identity. There is, however, a motif which runs through the dynamics 
of both these aspects, that of movement. On the one hand I am interested in how movement 
creates new political space, and on the other in those sites (and sorts) of politics which travel. 
By the latter I mean the ways in which competing identity and ethical claims are transformed 
when they move between sociocultural contexts. Let me go on now to review some of the 
developments which I see as constitutive of these translocalising processes: 
First, there has been a phenomenal growth in the movement of peoples: from labour 
diasporas, guest workers and economic migrants to political exiles and the refugees of 
humanitarian disasters. Lives (and lifestyles) are increasingly mobile for a variety of reasons. 
In the latter cases (refugees, exiles, etc. ) movement is often a life and death imperative, while 
in the former situations (e. g. economic transmigrants) movement is usually the result of 
global labour divisions and transnational capital flows. One analyst, for example, speaks of 
"forms of international migration that emphasise contractual relationships, intermittent 
postings abroad, and sojourning, as opposed to permanent settlement and the exclusive 
adoption of the citizenship of a destination country. "" There are clear implications here for 
our theories about citizenship, and also for how we think about political identity. The 
15 Robin Cohen, "Diasporas, the Nation-State, and Globalisation" in Wang Gungwu (ed. ), Global 
History and Migrations, Boulder: Westview Press, 1997, p. 135. Emphasis added. 
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configuration of lives and identities across and between multiple political spaces ensures that 
the construction of the 'political' self will be a much more intricate process than if one existed 
solely within bounded political space. Even when actual physical travel does not take place, 
people are increasingly aware of activities and politics in other parts of the world. Popular 
imaginations travel well today. Media technologies are largely responsible for this 
development. They permit us to reproduce and sustain forms of communal identity across 
great distances. While the distinction between 'here' and 'there' may still endure, 'there' is no 
longer very far away. In the present thesis, the movement of peoples is crucial in that the 
'travelling Muslims' which constitute its object of inquiry are for the most part participants in 
transnational patterns of labour and migration. The ways in which movement has 
transformed their ideas about Muslim identity and political space will be examined in depth 
in Chapter IV. 
Second, we have seen the emergence of transnational social movements which occupy a 
particular political space (in the sense of an agenda dealing with gender issues, human rights, 
religious and/or ethnic identity) but not necessarily a specific place. By this I mean that 
many of these movements operate across borders and without exclusive reference to a 
specific state, nation or region. Moreover, they often engage in activities which are explicitly 
critical of state regimes and/or traditional aspects of state sovereignty. Human Rights Watch, 
for example, monitors and reports the use of violence within states (torture, extrajudicial 
execution, etc. ), and a group such as Medecins sans Frontieres questions the inviolability of 
state borders in times of humanitarian emergency (e. g. environmental disasters, the suffering 
of civilians during wartime). 
It should be noted that we tend to understand the term 'transnational social movement' as 
referring primarily to Western 'progressive' agendas (e. g. gender, the environment, human 
rights) - indeed, this is the sense in which the term is used in much of the literature devoted 
to social movements, especially that dealing with so-called 'new social movements . '"6 
However, we also need to recognise the existence of many other such transnational interest 
groups - ones whose concerns are easily overlooked because they do not fall into the range of 
activities we usually associate with the political. These are groups whose activities do not 
address the state, or even explicitly recognise its existance. Many such organisations, of all 
shapes and sizes, operate across and between bordered spaces. They represent a diverse 
range of interests, often related to the sustenance/advancement of various ethnic and/or 
religious identities. One relevant example is the Muslim Jama'at al-Tabligh movement, a 
group we will look at more closely in a later chapter, whose annual gatherings attract over 
one million attendees. Its activities are inherently transnational in that it is devoted to Islamic 
missionary activity on virtually every continent. Movement is hence the groups's key 
dynamic. The Jama'at is also avowedly apolitical in the sense that it refuses to become 
engaged in debates relating to the activities of states. It does, however, possess a clear 
normative agenda. Members seek to reform society through the production of devout, ethical 
individuals, and not through what would be considered conventional political channels (e. g. 
setting up a political party and contesting state-run elections). So although the group is in 
one sense 'apolitical, ' there is another sense in which it is actually taking a very political stand 
by denying conventional notions and sites of the political. Given that groups such as the 
Jama'at feature quite heavily in the daily lives of their adherents, they must also be accounted 
for in our analyses of the ways in which globalising forces are embedded in lived experience. 
As an eminently mobile community, the Jama'at and other groups like it must be seen as 
forces which serve to translocalise particular notions of the (a)political. As Walker notes, 
16 See Doug McAdam, John D. McCarthy and Mayer N. Zald (eds. ), Comparative Perspectives on 
Social Movements, New York: Cambridge University Press, 1996; and Enrique Larafta, Hank Johnston 
and Joseph K. Gersfield (eds. ), New Social Movements: from ideology to identity, Philadelphia: Temple 
University Press, 1994. 
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This is not least because whatever they are... social movements are usually 
designated precisely as social movements, as phenomena that are explicitly at odds 
with the spatial framing of all ontological possibilities, of greater and lesser, higher 
and lower, inner and outer, that have made it so difficult to envisage any form of 
politics other than that associated with the modern state and its self-identical 
subjects. " 
In this sense we have two different types of social movements here. There are those for 
whom the state is still the primary object of their politics, despite the fact that they mobilise 
across its borders. On the other hand there are those such as the Jama'at al-Tabligh - and 
these are the ones which most interest me - who do their best to ignore the state, or to operate 
as if it did not exist. That is, transnational movements who understand the location and 
legitimacy of the political and the ethical to be elsewhere. This is a theme which I will 
develop further below. 
Third, experiments with supranational political forms - such as the European Union - 
provide an institutionalised forum for thinking beyond the nation-state. One observer sees 
the EU as the first "multiperspectival polity" to emerge in the modern era. For him, "it is 
increasingly difficult to visualize the conduct of international politics among community 
members, and to a considerable measure even domestic politics, as though it took place from 
a starting point of [fifteen] separate, single, fixed viewpoints. " 18 In this sense, the identity of 
each member state is in part constituted by the other fourteen. Modes of organisation and 
interaction increasingly require Europeans to look beyond the particularity of their national 
identities in order to prosper. In its present form the EU is still very much an 
intergovernmental (i. e. inter-state) organisation. Even if the logic of integration were 
followed through to its most extreme form, the complete dissolution of all national 
boundaries, it is very likely that a European federation (which itself still implies the existence 
of constituent members) would institutionally be nothing more than the state writ large. 
However, what would be interesting and relevant here would be the social (and necessarily 
political) processes by which people come to see themselves as part of or in relation to a 
European identity - e. g. education, polylinguality, trans-European residence, etc. There are 
also obvious implications here for citizenship, as discussed above, and also for state 
sovereignty. The politics of supranational membership are in fact often discussed largely in 
terms of ('losing') the latter. In the context of Islam, the notion of a supranational form has 
great resonance with the concept of the umma, a term which refers to the world community of 
Muslims. This notion, as we will see in the next chapter, has important political and ethical 
functions in Islam, representing as it does a 'global' or translocal community of believers in 
which racial, ethnic or national differences are irrelevant. 
Fourth, the rise of global cities has meant the emergence of spaces that are particularly rich 
in transnational significance. The cities in question (London, Hong Kong, Singapore, New 
York) are often lynchpins in the global world economy and hence their inhabitants are often 
implicated in the transnational labour processes alluded to above. Analysts of global cities 
have identified the existence of new "transterritorial economies" and innovations in the 
spatial expression of capital mobility. '9 These polyglot metropoles also bear witness to 
extraordinary processes of identity (re)formation and sociocultural melange - as well as 
providing an abundance of material for the morphology of cultural dynamics. Other writers 
have emphasised the role global cities play in the disjunctures of national identity and 
" R. B. J. Walker, "Social Movements/World Politics, " Millennium, Vol. 23, No. 3,1994, p. 673 
18 John Gerard Ruggie, "Territoriality and beyond: problematizing modernity in international relations, " 
International Organization, Vol. 47, No. 1, Winter 1993, p. 172 
19 Saskia Sassen, The Global City, Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1991. 
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citizenship, 20 and speculated about the role these sites play in the elaboration of new forms of 
what one author has termed "transnational grassroots politics. i21 In addition to the global 
city, I think we can today meaningfully speak of a second and closely related form of urban 
space, the migratory city. This term refers to those settings which have received large 
numbers of immigrants, migrant workers and various other groups covered under the generic 
idiom of 'movement of peoples. ' Migratory cities are often also global cities. They share 
many of the same qualities as regards the intermingling of culture and identity. However, 
migratory cities do not always necessarily possess the same diversity of transnational flows 
that might be found in, say, Tokyo or London. Migratory cities are sometimes created by 
historical labour patterns. The English city of Bradford, for example, received a great influx 
of immigration from the Indian subcontinent in the years following India's independence. 
Much of this was due to an increased demand for miners and factory workers. In many ways, 
migratory and global cities are today the very best example of what is referred to by the 
notion of "translocal space, " and, as sites in which large numbers of Muslims are settled in 
Europe, will feature heavily in later chapters. 
Finally, phenomenal developments in the technologies of travel and communication have 
played a crucial role in enabling many key features of these transformations. By allowing 
people to move across distances and to communicate far more easily, they have effectively 
led to the compression of space and time. Furthermore, our very notions of distance and 
chronology have been relativised such that we begin to perceive our relationships within 
space and time differently. This relates again to the sense in which the boundaries between 
'here' and 'there' become blurred and eroded. Air travel and various media technologies 
(telephone, fax, satellite television, e-mail, etc. ) are perhaps the most relevant here, 
facilitating on the one hand very rapid transport and on the other near instantaneous 
communications. In the context of Islam, these technologies have had important 
transformative effects on politics in the sense that they have permitted a wider range of 
voices to enter the public sphere and to articulate different understanding of Islam. 
Furthermore, they have brought Muslims from different sociocultural backgrounds together 
within translocal spaces, hence leading to a 'politics of authenticity' centred around the 
question of who represents the 'real' Islam. By bridging distances, these technologies have 
also led some Muslims to begin reimagining the umma as a renewed form of political 
community. Both of these development will be examined more closely in Chapter V. 
These five themes can all be related to my emphasis on the political implications of 
movement. For example, supranational political forms represent a shift in political space 
while transnational social movements allow for politics to become mobile. In the same way, 
a global city can become the site of profound shifts in identity, and new dynamics of 
migration and diaspora give rise to travelling identities. Technologies of information and 
travel are obviously implicated across the board. In summary, these changes have brought 
about two mutually constitutive developments: deterritorialised, mobile forms of political 
space and displaced, hybridised ("travelling") identities. Travelling identities challenge 
notions of political/space time while shifts in political space/time allow for the emergence of 
new forms of identity. It is in this sense, as concurrent and overlapping processes, that these 
developments need to be seen as mutually constitutive. 
It is part of my contention that for the most part International Relations has not been very 
effective in accounting for these various transformations. There are, of course, some 
exceptions. Certain trends of international theory have recently put the relationship between 
20 James Holston and Arjun Appadurai, "Cities and Citizenship, " Public Culture, Vol. 8,1996, pp. 182- 
204 
21 Michael Peter Smith, "Can You Imagine? Transnational Migration and the Globalization of 
Grassroots Politics, " Social Text, No. 29, Summer 1994, pp. 15-33. 
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politics and space under intense scrutiny. This critical literature has been the result of two 
inter-related phenomena. The first factor which motivates this critical project is an increased 
awareness of the questions posed by the transformations I have identified above, political 
forces which are trans-, anti- or post-territorial in nature. How should we account for forms 
of politics which increasingly transcend (or which never ever really fit into) the limits of the 
state in the sense of a bounded, fixed space? Or, to put it another way, how can we escape "a 
politics of little boxes"? 22 The second is a growing appreciation of the fact that many of our 
seemingly natural and unproblematised categories of political thought have been constituted 
as such only through various processes of discursive hegemony, processes which are 
themselves deeply political in nature. By abandoning what it regards as the ahistorical 
essentialism of traditional political analysis, the critical turn in international theory seeks to 
investigate the socio-political and historical contexts which have produced (and reproduced) 
particular forms of knowledge as'political theory. ' 
Problematising the political in International Relations 
Various figures within mainstream International Relations have offered theories, models and 
explanations of the sorts of changes I mention above. John Ruggie, for example, presents an 
historical sociology of bounded political space in order to ask whether we might now be 
moving "beyond territoriality, i23 while James Rosenau describes these developments as a 
form of "turbulence in world politics. "24 Although these theorists have made significant 
contributions to this discourse, there is still a sense in which their work fails to engage with 
the problematic of the political per se. What I mean by this is that they seem to work with an 
unproblematised notion of what (and where) politics is. Rather than seeking to understand 
how we have come to associate politics with a limited range of activity within a specific 
location - and by so doing to "de-naturalise" the state - Ruggie and Rosenau do not move 
much beyond questioning how current dynamics might effect the state; therefore they also do 
not question whether the state is the best point of departure from which to understand the 
political. 
Other theorists have been more radical in their analyses. These writers have been 
contributing to a rapidly growing literature on critical international theory. 25 Borrowing from 
Habermasian sociology, for example, Andrew Linklater is engaged in a normative project 
which seeks to map the contours of what he terms a 'post-Westphalian order. '2" Linklater 
focuses on the question of citizenship and asserts the need to uncouple this category from 
those of sovereignty, nationality and territoriality. "The practical task, " he argues, "is to 
envisage forms of citizenship which are appropriate to the post-Westphalian condition of 
multiple political authorities and allegiances. "27 To this end, he examines new categories of 
transnational and cosmopolitan citizenship. Modifying citizenship means more than simply 
22 R. B. J. Walker, "International Relations and the Concept of the Political, " in Ken Booth and Steve 
Smith (eds. ), International Relations Theory Today, Cambridge: Polity Press, 1995,, p. 324 
23 Ruggie, op. cit. 
24 James N. Rosenau, Turbulence in World Politics: A Theory of Change and Continuity, Princeton: 
Princeton University Press, 1990. 
25 Several recent examples of this genre can be found in the series Borderlines, edited by David 
Campbell and Michael Shapiro for the University of Minnesota Press. See for example Thom Kuehls, 
Beyond Sovereign Territory: The Space of Ecopolitics, Minneapolis: University of Minnesota Press, 
1996 and Michael J. Shapiro and Hayward R. Alker (eds. ), Challenging Boundaries: Global Flows, 
Territorial Identities, Minneapolis: University of Minnesota Press, 1996. 
26 Andrew Linklater, Men and Citizens in the Theory of International Relations, London: Macmillan, 
1990; Beyond Realism and Marxism: Critical Theory and International Relations, London: Macmillan, 
1990; The Transformation of Political Community, Cambridge: Polity Press, 1998. 
27 Linklater, The Transformation of Political Community, p. 200 
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loosening the parameters of the term; rather it requires a reconceptualisation of what it means 
to be a citizen. Given the increasing plurality of political authorities to which Linklater 
refers, the question surfaces as to what exactly one is a citizen of. Where before the term 
tended to bear a connotation of monism (i. e. one's affiliation was to a single state) the new 
global market for political loyalties is such that it becomes increasingly difficult to think of 
citizenship in such exclusionary terms. Linklater's understanding of political community is 
also crucially linked to moral boundaries. Indeed, his vision of politics relates to the 
boundaries of particular ethical practices. In this regard, his analysis of the post-Westphalian 
order considers the ways in which the sites and institutions of ethical political practice and 
accountability (i. e. states) are changing. He has an interest in experiments with supra- 
national political forms - and the European Union in particular. 
The point I want to draw from this is the following. While Linklater does have important 
things to say about the future of political identity qua citizenship, he concentrates primarily 
on transformations taking place within conventional political spaces (states) and does not 
give much attention to the plethora of alternative sites - often informal and 
uninstitutionalised - which are rapidly becoming important loci of political loyalty and 
activity. I am not seeking to characterise Linklater's work as somehow 'conservative, ' nor am 
I accusing him of not going far enough. I believe his project to be immensely valuable in 
itself, but would like to suggest that a better understanding can accrue by combining it with 
an examination of alternative spaces and notions of the political. It is at this juncture that I 
want to turn to the work of two other critical thinkers in international relations, R. B. J. Walker 
and Warren Magnusson. Their work has raised a number of questions about the efficacy of 
the modern state and has also begun to recognise the emergence of new alternative political 
spaces. In a sense, the present thesis can be read as an attempt to illustrate how IR might go 
about unpacking their observations within the context of a particular post-statist political 
community. 
Walker's recent work has been motivated by two central concerns. The first of these relates 
to the reification of political modernity and its concomitant spatio-temporal arrangements. 
Walker is concerned to understand how it is that political forms (e. g. the state) born of a 
particular European historical experience have managed to bequeath so strong a legacy to 
contemporary international relations theory. He seeks to question the neat and tidy order 
which modernity has sought to fix upon politics, and to challenge prevailing understandings 
of the relationship between sovereignty and territory. Walker's work is all the more relevant 
to the present context in that he posits his inquiry against a backdrop of global 
transformation: 
What is at stake in the interpretation of contemporary transformations is not the 
eternal presence or imminent absence of states. It is the degree to which the 
modernist resolution of space-time relations expressed by the principle of state 
sovereignty offers a plausible account of contemporary political practices... [W]e 
should expect to experience increasingly disconcerting incongruities between new 
articulations of power and accounts of political life predicated on the early-modern 
fiction that temporality can be fixed and tamed within the spatial coordinates of 
territorial jurisdictions. 28 
Here he alludes to the second of his theoretical concerns, an investigation into how it is that 
the category we refer to as 'the political' has come to be monopolised by the state and its 
various apparatuses. Walker believes that the search for wider understandings of politics and 
political identity/community are hindered by the fact that our conceptual language is so 
28 Walker, Insideloutside, p. 14 
14 
thoroughly permeated with early modern conceptions of space-time and sovereignty. 29 He 
acknowledges that "there are good reasons both in our experiences and in our selective 
memories to be impressed by the resilience of the spatial politics of both polis and state, " but 
then goes to argue that "it requires a fair degree of historical myopia to give much credit to 
the claim that these experiences and memories tell us what and where the political must be, or 
even what and where it is now. " 3° 
The transformations which Walker identifies are relatively analogous to those I have 
enumerated above. With respect to the question of political community, he observes three 
major themes: first, the existence of a complex multitude of global connections in the present 
era; second, that the existence of these global connections does not necessarily entail some 
form of universalism; and third, that despite the global nature of these connections, peoples' 
daily lives are embedded in a myriad of particular locations and circumstances. "These three 
themes converge, " he argues, "on a recognition that in the modem world, communities and 
solidarities have to be grasped as a dialectical moment, as a sense of participation both in 
large scale global processes and in particular circumstances. 01 
As regards international relations theory, Walker adopts an epistemological position which 
views IR theory not as an explanation of international relations, but as a constitutive aspect of 
world politics itself . 
32 He is particularly interested in the strong distinction which most 
political and international theory tends to make between 'domestic' and 'inter-state' levels of 
analysis - or as Walker styles it, between inside and outside: a "distinction 
[which]... continues to inform our understanding of how and where effective and progressive 
political practice can be advanced. 03 He notes that we possess a rich variety of language for 
the description and analysis of political life within state boundaries, but that our lexicons tend 
to run dry when we seek to characterise relations between states. This latter realm (the 
'outside') is seen to be somehow profoundly remote, a space in which entirely different rules 
apply. This symptom is most strongly manifest in those IR theories which read the core 
dynamic of international political life as anarchy rather than community. 34 Walker, in turn, 
seeks to read these same theories as "expressions of an historically specific understanding of 
the character and location of political life in general. 05 It is his dissatisfaction with 
conventional IR theory that leads him to call for a re-orientation of the discipline from 
international relations -a barren landscape of (largely 'anarchical') interaction between 
integral, 'sovereign' state identities - to world politics. The latter designation is seen to be 
more capable of rendering the whole planet as a single political space, unencumbered by 
obsessions with state, sovereignty or cleanly demarcated "levels of analysis. " 
Walker's attempt to locate political spaces other than the state has led him to consider the 
increasingly important role played by various transnational social movements -a topic 
touched upon briefly above. His consideration of social movements is closely linked to the 
questions he asks about the nature and location of the political. Walker argues that social 
movements are usually treated as relatively insignificant irritants who do no more than throw 
the occasional spanner into the machinations the state; in other words, as I have alluded to 
above, they do not constitute 'real' politics. However, this view only arises from a conception 
of the political in which the state and state processes remain the central units of analysis. 
Related to this same discourse is the tendency to understand social movements as merely 
29 Ibid., p. 17 
30 R. B. J. Walker, "International Relations and the Concept of the Political, " p. 308 
31 R. B. J. Walker, One World, Many Worlds, Boulder: Lynne Rienner, 1988, p. 102. Emphasis added. 
32 Walker, Inside%outside, p. 6 
33 Ibid., p. 13 
34 Ibid., p. 164 
3s Ibid., p. 5 
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'social'; that is, as not truly political either because they tend to be confined to those spaces 
which the state labels society, or because they concern themselves with 'social issues. '
Walker, on the other hand, insists that "[i]t is futile to try to gauge the importance of social 
movements without considering the possibility that it is precisely the criteria of significance 
by which they are to be judged that may be in contention. "36 Or, as I would want to ask, is 
the social not also sometimes the political? 
Of particular relevance to the present study is the way Walker seeks to emphasise movement 
as a vital aspect of social movements, arguing that it is actually this very quality which lends 
them their force. Where conventional politics requires its subjects to be pinned down and 
static (i. e. statist) - or at least to provide an illusion of inertia, for states themselves are 
constantly moving - transnational social movements provide both alternative political spaces 
and alternative conceptions of the political: 
It is in this context. . . that one might 
begin to read some social movements as 
practices in search of the political rather than simply as sociological phenomena 
working within a particular account of what and where the political must be. It is in 
this context, furthermore, that one might read highly specific local struggles in 
relation to broader, even global, processes without assuming that one must bow down 
to the sovereign state as the only intermediary between local and global or here and 
37 there. 
The present thesis and Walker's work are both particularly interested in the experiences of 
social movements outside the European context. He wisely warns against the dangers of 
applying the criteria of political modernity when attempting to assess the significance of such 
movements elsewhere. "[T]he experiences of the so-called new social movements or 
attempts to revitalise the civil societies of modern states do not always translate easily into 
accounts of what are taken to be social movements elsewhere. 08 Walker presents a reading 
of the Swadhyaya movement in India, a group which is also very active amongst expatriot 
communities in the West. He argues that this movement has managed to avoid embroiling 
itself in the party politics of the Indian state by setting up alternative forms of social 
organisation -a discrepant idiom of politics which affects the lives of up to four million 
people. 39 By focusing on non-European perspectives, he suggests, it becomes possible to 
"give a reading of the emergence of similarities elsewhere, of the diffusion of ideas or an 
elaboration of diasporas... but also to become more acutely aware of the specificity of 
locations and traditions. 114o Furthermore, it can be argued, such perspectives might provide 
more inclusive conceptions of the nature and location of politics. The reading of 
transnational Islam which I will elaborate in later chapters can be seen as attempt to do just 
this. 
A second writer within IR closely linked with Walker is Warren Magnusson. His work has 
also focused on the problem of modernity and its location of legitimate political activity. His 
work helps us to begin moving beyond bounded political territory by looking at what goes on 
in the 'gaps' between societies and states. By doing so, Magnusson seeks to identify forms of 
"global popular politics, " or what I would want to see as alternative forms of political 
community: 
36 Walker, "Social Movements/World Politics, " p. 672 
37 Walker, "International Relations and the Concept of the Political, " pp. 322-3 
38 Walker, "Social Movements/World Politics, " p. 684 
39 Ibid., pp. 684-90 
40 Ibid., p. 690 
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My claim is that popular politics occurs at the juncture of localities and movements, 
and that state-centric theories conceal the character of politics by reifying localities 
and movements as dimensions of the state or of prepolitical civil society... Mine is a 
worm's-eye view, which focuses on realities at the margin between "the state" and 
"civil society, " or between formalized politics and social actions. At first sight, these 
realities seem far removed from international relations, but in fact they are the 
presence of popular politics in the global domain. 41 
On Magnusson's reading, many contemporary political scientists and sociologists still see 
society as an entity defined in relation to the state, and politics as a process of government 
which links civil society to the state - and certainly only within the state. In this regard, both 
disciplines tend to ignore political processes which do not fit into a cybernetic dynamic of 
state-civil society relations 42 Like Walker, Magnusson's dissatisfaction with conventional 
idioms of the political also leads him to consider the role of social movements. He makes the 
important point that social movements tend to be considered political only when they become 
institutionalised - that is, when pinned down and made to wear the garb of proper politics. 
"This suggests that the collective activities of ordinary people, in working out new 
understandings of themselves and bringing those understandings into the world, are 
themselves prepolitical. Thus, the creative social activity in which ordinary people are most 
likely to be engaged appears beyond or outside politics. "43 He goes on to argue that this 
distorted view of social movements arises from a political imagination constrained by state- 
centric conceptions of what it means to act politically. "If we begin with popular political 
activity, " he argues, "rather than from the enclosure imposed upon it, another dimension of 
reality emerges. "44 Magnusson sees social movements as the cutting edge of a creative 
politics embedded in the minutiae of daily life, and emphasises the important role of 
localities in providing a socio-cultural context for the elaboration of popular politics: 
Localities are the venues for such politics. They are the places where the various 
practices of domination meet with the practices of political resistance and invention. 
Politics as a creative popular activity thus occurs at the junctures of localities and 
movements. These junctures are obscured by the reification of political community 
as the state and political theory as the theory of the state. To focus on these junctures 
is to open two analytic dimensions: first, locality as the place where movements arise 
and where they meet; and, second, movement as a mode of action that redefines 
political community, and hence connects localities to one another. In exploring these 
dimensions, we become acutely conscious of the fact that the state never fully 
contains the everyday experience of politics or political community. 45 
It is the fusion of locality and movement that constitutes what I want to call translocality. 
My usage of this term will be elaborated below, as will the arguments I wish to make on its 
behalf. My claim, in short, is that these interstices, junctures and 'gaps' (i. e. spaces between 
bounded communities) are replete with international relations but not of a sort which 
International Relations would recognise. Because the state never fully contains the everyday 
experience of politics or political community, conventional IR theory fails to account for a 
great deal of political activity. As the relationship between political identity and those 
categories closely associated with the state (e. g. citizenship and nationality) becomes 
41 Warren Magnusson, "The Reification of Political Community, " in R. B. J. Walker and Saul H. 
Mendlovitz (eds. ), Contending Sovereignties: Redefining Political Community, Boulder: Lynne 
Rienner, 1990, p. 45 
42 Ibid., p. 51 
43 Ibid., p. 52. Emphasis added. 
44 Ibid. 
45 Ibid., p. 55 
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increasingly tenuous, the conceptual language with which we read and write political identity 
requires rethinking. "[T]he politics of 'patriotism' may, " suggests Walker, "need to be 
grasped in a rather different way. 06 This is not to argue, it should be reiterated, that the 
absence of the state is immanent. Only that political identities are increasingly likely to find 
themselves "caught between an affirmation of forms of political life constituted through the 
principle of state sovereignty... and a recognition of the need to challenge the principles that 
make those forms of political life possible. , 47 
Thus in addition to the rearticulation of political space generated largely by global 
economic and technological processes, it seems reasonable to expect as well a 
rearticulation generated by struggles to rethink the possibilities of "local" identity on 
the basis of novel cultural explorations and community practices. 8 
Within the context of international relations, I want to make the point that what follows is not 
simply an argument for a different "level of analysis. " For, as Walker points out, "[t]he 
brutal chasm between inside and outside is too easily rewritten as an inclusive metaphysics of 
above and below. "49 One recent commentator on the levels of analysis debate within IR 
points out that there has been relatively little work done on the ways in which various levels 
of analysis are reflected in the standard practice of delineating distinct spheres of political, 
economic, military and societal activity in IR. 50 He does not seem to recognise, however, that 
this scheme of classification is itself a highly political activity. It implies, for instance, that 
we have a set of criteria which tells us what counts as 'political' or 'societal' - and 
international theory, I have argued above, tends to work within predetermined limits of what 
can legitimately be called politics. Therefore I am not simply putting forward a case for 
concentrating on "low" rather than "high" politics, for to adopt such a scheme would do 
nothing but reinforce that dichotomy; my aim, rather, is to question the nature of politics and 
not simply to relocate it in a pre-existing, overdeterminate scheme. In this sense, then, I am 
interested in finding new idioms of what politics can be - or, indeed, must be - under 
conditions of rapid and profound social transformation. 
In this section I have argued that conventional international relations theory fails to take 
account of many forms of politics, community and identity thrown up by the tensions of a 
turgid late modernity. Intense social transformations - the key features of which I identified 
above - cause us to problematise our received notions of the political and to recognise new 
spaces and sites in which politics takes place. Furthermore, the state-centric nature of 
traditional IR theory has blinded it to any political form which does not conform to the 
requirements of political science qua state science. Even those theorists who do take account 
of "alternative" actors in international relations still tend to use the state as a benchmark by 
which to evaluate the efficacy of these politics. As Yosef Lapid puts it: 
[A]s an "inter-" type discipline long dominated by political realism, the IR field 
should have been doubly well prepared to deal with issues of diversity. Instead, 
recent events have rendered apparent IR's inability to encompass vastly accelerated 
and co-occurring dynamics of integration and disintegration at both sub- and supra- 
state levels. It seems as if lR's fascination with sovereign statehood has greatly 
46 R. B. J. Walker, "Sovereignty, Identity, and Community, " in R. B. J. Walker and Saul H. Mendlovitz 




49 Walker, "Social Movements/World Politics, " p. 699 
50 Barry Buzan, "The Levels of Analysis Problem in International Relations Reconsidered, " in Ken 
Booth and Steve Smith, op. cit., p. 214 
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decreased its ability to confront complex issues of ethnic nationhood and political 
otherhood. 51 
I have also argued that certain trends in critical IR theory offer potent analyses of the 
discipline's failings in this regard. Writers like Walker and Magnusson, but also figures such 
as Michael Shapiro, David Campbell, Andrew Linklater and Robert Cox, have all challenged 
the foundations upon which IR constitutes politics and political identity and have begun to 
investigate forms of "post-Westphalian, " "post-national, " or "post-international" politics. 
One of the most sustained attempts to rethink 'the political' in International Relations has 
come from feminist writers. Cynthia Enloe and Christine Sylvester, for example, have both 
been arguing for several years now that we need to pay more attention to and appreciate the 
important political function of locations such as factories, rural collectives, border crossings 
and diplomatic cocktail parties. 52 
Having recognised the value of the critical turn in IR and taking much of its insight as a 
departure point, I want to now go on to suggest that an awareness of these developments can 
and should be supplemented by an examination of various 'translocal' debates going on within 
other disciplinary projects. Sociology and anthropology have in recent years provided 
important new ways of thinking about political identity in the wake of globalised structures 
and processes. Furthermore, it is in these fields that we find the most cogent analyses of 
transnational identities, new idioms of citizenship and "travelling cultures. " Where critical 
IR has mostly identified key problematiques, sociology and anthropology have offered wide- 
ranging theoretical and empirical investigations. My aim in the following section is to survey 
developments in these fields and to suggest that sociology and anthropology have extremely 
important things to say about (and to) International Relations - particularly given the present 
climate of global sociocultural transformation. 
The anthropology of "relating internationally" 
As world structures change, so the disciplinary components of the social sciences also adjust 
themselves. Nowhere have these transformations been more dramatic - and, I would argue, 
more productive - than in the field of anthropology. Over the last ten or 
fifteen years the 
literature(s) of this discipline have been witnessing an increasing diversification in their 
ontological and epistemological perspectives. Ontologically, we find that the anthropological 
world is now concerned to take account of an ever-widening array of peoples, places, 
processes and "things. " This phenomenon is in many cases closely related to the global 
sociocultural transformations alluded to above. In others cases it is also linked to a greater 
epistemological sophistication in the field, and the posing of new questions about what it 
means to be, quite literally, "in the field. " There seems now to be a wider vision as to what 
counts as anthropological knowledge, and also a greater sense of self-reflexivity in the 
discipline. Drawing on critical and post-structuralist thought, a number of anthropologists 
have recently embarked on projects which seek to problematise the self/other and 
subject/object distinctions which have traditionally served as the discipline's ordering 
principles. Anthropology has long been concerned with writing difference, that is of 
constructing the borders that separate an observing (and somehow universal) "we" from a 
"they" dwelling in a particular, local place distant from us in both time and space. 
51 Yosef Lapid, "Culture's Ship: Returns and Departures in International Relations Theory" in Y. Lapid 
and F. Kratochwil (eds. ), The Return of Culture and Identity in IR Theory, Boulder: Lynne Rienner, 
1996, p. 10 
S2 See Cynthia Enloe, Bananas, Beaches and Bases: Making Feminist Sense of International Relations, 
London: Pandora, 1989 and Christine Sylvester, Feminist Theory and International Relations in a 
Postmodern Era, Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1994. 
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It is particularly interesting in this regard to note that the relationship between anthropology 
and the state possesses a special pedigree. Edward Said, among others, has argued that the 
origins of the anthropological enterprise were intimately connected with the maintenance of 
colonial apparatuses. 53 Anthropological knowledge is in this sense representative of a 
Foucaultian power/knowledge equation in which a colonising state provides patronage for 
those academic activities which produce forms of knowledge conducive to the subjugation 
and control of colonised peoples. Even after decolonisation, the argument goes, the 
methodologies and categories of anthropology continued to bear the markings of its colonial 
origins. It is therefore not surprising to find that some of the most hard-hitting attacks on 
classical anthropology come from the environs of postcolonial studies, particularly from 
those influenced by the many and various forms of critical theory. Aside from these 
important epistemological critiques, there is also a somewhat more "organic" logic behind the 
contemporary transformation of the field. "Anthropology, as an official discipline, " writes 
Michael Kearney, "is a constituent of the state, and as the boundaries and construction of the 
nation-state change so should we expect to find a restructuring of anthropology as a scientific 
field. 04 Peoples and cultures are spilling over state borders, and in the process of doing so 
reconstruct anthropological borders. Locales, as anthropological sites, have become 
problematic. It has become increasingly difficult - if indeed it was ever possible - to study 
them as isolated, bounded spaces: people are on the move and therefore anthropology must 
become mobile. In this sense "international relations" is becoming a way of life rather than a 
form of state science. 
What, then, we may ask, have students of peoples and students of states had to say to each 
other? Surprisingly little actually. Instances of interaction between anthropology and 
international relations have been far and few between. This can be explained to a large 
extent by the ways in which these disciplines have been represented. International relations 
is supposedly concerned with the lofty heights and intrigues of intergovernmental forums, 
that is with various forms of "important" "high" politics. Anthropology, on the other hand, 
functions to provide us with "academic" accounts of strange and exotic peoples living in far- 
away villages - places which are somehow without politics, where instead we find only kin- 
groups, rites of passage, and violent rituals. There is, however, actually a great deal of 
discursive overlap between anthropology and international relations in that they are both 
fields whose more traditional variants specialise in the construction of "Others" - exotic 
cultures in one case, and enemies of the nation-state in the other. 
Among the official academic disciplines anthropology is unusual in the degree to 
which it has been assigned responsibility for articulating differentiation, and thus 
engaging in the intellectual/symbolic reproduction of differentiation, on a global 
scale, with respect to 'less developed peoples' as compared with 'us. '55 
This statement also functions as a remarkably accurate description of what goes on in much 
of International Relations. There is a striking resemblance, for example, between the 
anthropological categories of 'the home' and 'the field' and IR's construction of 'the domestic' 
and 'the foreign. ' Fieldwork (or the 'diplomatic mission') allows 'us' to venture forth and gain 
information about 'them. ' In a recent book, one feminist anthropologist has suggested that 
more time should be spent on'homework' and less on fieldwork. 56 The suggestion here is that 
53 See Edward Said, Orientalism, London: Penguin, 1995. 
54 Michael Kearney, "Borders and Boundaries of State and Self at the End of Empire, " Journal of 
Historical Sociology, Vol. 4, No. 1,1991, p. 53 
ss Ibid., p. 64 
56 Kamala Viswesvaran, Fictions of Feminist Ethnography, Minneapolis: University of Minnesota 
Press, 1994. 
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anthropologists (and, by extension, foreign ministries) should be willing to engage with and 
problematise their own positionalities and situatedness before presuming to position and 
describe others. 
Some have argued that in certain contexts anthropology is particularly well-placed to 
undertake political analysis, functioning as it does with a more holistic understanding of what 
and where the political is. One of the few writers to encourage dialogue between 
anthropology and IR, Dale Eickelman, notes that: 
[a]nthropologists have a notion of politics more applicable to many Third World 
situations than those disciplines that identify the "political" primarily with formal 
institutions. One strength of anthropology is that the discipline is attuned to 
discerning the political voices and roles of... "social actors less talkative than the 
elite, " even if their significance is denied, ignored, or suppressed by the state elite or 
by political leaders. Anthropologists take seriously the views of the non-elite on 
politics, economic development, state authority, nation, and religion and how these 
are perceived in the context of ordinary lives and implicitly limit what political 
leaders can successfully propose and accomplish. " 
He goes on to emphasise that official policy-making circles prefer to consume forms of 
knowledge which have been produced as clearly defined, unambiguous "facts" - even in 
situations where information is sparse. This is an environment in which the over-riding 
imperative is to know in order to control. But, of course, "brief reports are not always 
sufficient for 'thinking the unthinkable' or challenging accepted ways of doing things. 08 
Ambiguity and the need to interpret is to be avoided at all costs. Anthropology is hence 
useful only in so much as it can provide information about the Other, but loses all utility as 
soon as it asks us to consider the Other. 
Eickelman offers some strong criticisms of the ways in which foreign policy makers go about 
constructing the objects of their policies, but his "programme" for the incorporation of 
anthropological perspectives into IR does not go nearly far enough. To some extent we can 
put this down to the late Cold War context in which he was writing. For example, he 
suggests that anthropology provides a superior analysis of political dynamics in a country 
such as Oman. He notes that it is one of the few states to have countered a Communist 
insurgency and regained popular support. What jars slightly today, however, is his assertion 
that "for this reason alone" the country merits further inquiry. 59 Eickelman's account of 
anthropology and IR also does not touch on the question of how the two disciplines should 
respond to the rapid increase in globalising and transnational processes. He does not 
encourage a widening of his own discipline, nor is he sufficiently vocal about the need for a 
shift of emphasis in international relations. His preference seems to be more for the 
application of anthropological methods to the categories and spaces of traditional IR. He 
suggests, for example, that an anthropology of the intelligence community might be 
undertaken in order to complement more conventional analyses of foreign-policy making. 60 
While the projects he proposes are undoubtedly interesting, Eickelman's text does not seem to 
57 Dale F. Eickelman, "Anthropology and International Relations, " in Walter Goldschmidt (ed. ), 
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recognise the many epistemological critiques of the ways in which both anthropology and 
international relations construct knowledge. 
This sort of self-reflexivity was, coincidentally, arriving in anthropology at about the same 
time Eickelman was writing his piece on anthropology and IR. The seminal book in this 
regard is undoubtedly James Clifford and George Marcus' edited volume Writing Culture: 
The Poetics and Politics of Ethnography. This project drew together a number of 
anthropologists (and commentators on ethnography) who for several years had been 
experimenting with critical and intertextual methodologies in their own work. The essays in 
Writing Culture "see culture as composed of seriously contested codes and representations; 
they assume that the poetic and the political are inseparable, that science is in, not above, 
historical and linguistic processes. '61 The book seeks to problematise the ways in which 
peoples are represented through ethnographic activity. The anthropologist is deprived of his 
Archimedian privilege and re-situated as an active agent (rather than a passive observer) in 
the construction of peoples and cultures. 
There is no longer any place overview (mountaintop) from which to map human 
ways of life... Mountains are in constant motion. So are islands: for one cannot 
occupy, unambiguously, a bounded cultural world from which to journey out and 
analyze other cultures. Human ways of life increasingly influence, dominate, parody, 
translate, and subvert one another. Cultural analysis is always enmeshed in global 
movements of difference and power. How [then]... can ethnography-at home or 
abroad-define its object of study in ways that permit detailed, local, contextual 
analysis and simultaneously the portrayal of global implicating forces? 
62 
I take this to be the central problem of the social sciences at the present time. How can we 
understand the ways in which particularities stretch and reshape themselves over distances? 
What happens to culture when it travels? I want to argue that a richer appreciation of these 
phenomena can be gained by adopting what we might call "ontologies and epistemologies of 
unboundedness. " A number of writers in transnational sociology and anthropology have 
already begun to deploy these modes. Their work is motivated by a recognition of the rapid 
sociocultural transformations I have outlined above. It is also - and to varying degrees - 
informed by the insights of critical and textual methodologies, of which Writing Culture is 
but one well-known example. What do these approaches have to offer? Can international 
relations travel along some of the same routes? 
I want now to look more closely at the literatures of sociology and transnational anthropology 
in order to help us build a picture of how globalising processes are changing the nature and 
meaning of sociopolitical activity. I will begin the discussion by looking at how several 
prominent sociologists have theorised globalisation. I will suggest that while much of the 
conceptual language here is useful for thinking about broad globalising themes, the high 
levels of abstraction involved prevent us from gaining any meaningful sense of globality as a 
signifier in daily life. I go on to argue that transnational anthropology, by shifting the 
discourse away from supposedly global processes and looking instead at transnational - or 
translocal - forms of life, is better placed to provide us with effective ways of thinking about 
a world politics marked by profound sociocultural transformation. 
61 James Clifford, "Introduction: Partial Truths, " in James Clifford and George E. Marcus (eds. ), 
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The sociology of globalisation: distanciation, globality and glocalisation 
Anthony Giddens' sociology of globalisation calls for a rejection of the notion of society as a 
cleanly demarcated entity, and a reformulation of social theory which instead seeks to 
analyse the ways in which spatio-temporality orders social life. For him, a key feature of late 
modernity (an era which he also terms "post-traditional") is the overbearing presence of the 
quality of `time-space distanciation. ' This framework, argues Giddens, 
directs our attention to the complex relations between local involvements 
(circumstances of co-presence) and interaction across distance (the connections of 
presence and absence). In the modern era, the level of time-space distanciation is 
much higher than in any previous period, and the relations between local and distant 
social forms and events become correspondingly "stretched ...... Globalisation can thus 
be defined as the intensification of worldwide social relations which link distant 
localities in such a way that local happenings are shaped by events occurring many 
miles away and vice versa. 63 
Modernity itself, according to Giddens, is an inherently globalising force. Distanciation and 
the `disembedding' of subject consciousnesses from local contexts are seen to be its most 
salient features. A recurrent theme in many sociological accounts of globalisation is that 
physical presence or proximity is no longer a prerequisite for the practice of community. 
"Globalisation concerns the intersection of presence and absence, " writes Giddens, "the 
interlacing of social events and social relations `at distance' with local contextualities. "64 
Giddens is referring here to the idea that under globalising conditions any 'here' must 
necessarily take account of a great many 'theres. ' In a recent piece on large-scale social 
organisation and the creation of community, Craig Calhoun identifies similar qualities: 
A world knit together by indirect relationships poses three challenges in the realm of 
everyday personal existence: to make sense through abstract concepts of forms of 
social organization for which everyday experience gives us misleading preparation, 
to establish a sense of personal rootedness and continuity of existence where 
connections across time are mainly impersonal, and to establish a sense of place and 
social context when the coordination of action-and the action of our own lives- 
constantly transcends locality. 65 
The latter two (inter-related) issues have perhaps the most relevance for the present work in 
the sense that they relate to the tangible experiences of displacement, alienation, and 
antagonism which characterise the individual's experience of globality. In the present 
context I want to implicate distanciation in the ability of certain groups to engage in, sustain, 
or reproduce particular forms of community across great distances and in the face of 
competing traditions -a phenomenon I wish to call 'distanciated community. ' This 
designation alludes to those groups who make use of the infrastructural trappings of 
globalisation (e. g. telecommunications, electronic information transfer, and air travel) in 
order to bypass the geographical barriers to social interaction. Migrant, exiles, and diaspora 
groups are obvious examples here. 
While the idea of distanciation is undoubtedly useful, there are also problems with the ways 
Giddens theorises the notion of locality. In earlier work on the subject, he defined 
63 Giddens, The Consequences of Modernity, Oxford: Polity Press, 1990, p. 64 
64 Anthony Giddens, Modernity and Self-Identity, Cambridge: Polity Press, 1991, p. 21 
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globalisation as "the intensification of worldwide social relations which link distinct 
localities in such a way that local happenings are shaped by events occurring miles away and 
vice versa. "66 This account fails, however, to address the fact that processes of globalisation, 
as our anthropologists know only too well, actually render the existence of such a thing as 
`distinct localities' almost impossible. In this sense Giddens veers dangerously close to that 
model of globalisation which posits an inherently Western (or Westernising) project, seeking 
to nullify any sense of local culture or difference by universalising all societies under the 
sanitised efficiency of Adam Smith's invisible hand - an approach which has also been 
termed the `homogenisation thesis. '67 Unfortunately, this discourse on globalisation ignores 
the myriad complexity of intercultural relations which necessarily arises from the very 
processes it identifies. The trajectory of globalisation, I want to argue, is not merely a one- 
way path from the West to the rest, nor does the popular dichotomy local/global carry much 
analytical weight unless very precisely elaborated within specific contexts. I would suggest, 
then, that it is pointless to speak of `distinct localities' with regard to those societies most 
heavily implicated in the processes of globalisation. This is not due, however, to the logic of 
homogenisation, in which a universalising Western culture negates any sense of local 
`difference. ' Rather, those locales most touched by globalisation are by their very natures 
anything but distinct - in the sense of being culturally 
homogenous or unique - because they 
are already imbued with the cultural differences propagated by globalisation. Indeed, it is 
this very quality which makes them global - or translocal - spaces. 
While Giddens does speak of a realm of cultural globalisation which overlays or forms a 
backdrop for other components (nation-state system, world economy, labour divisions, 
military orders), he tends to downplay its relevance and confines his comments only to the 
intervention of global media in the phenomenon of time-space distanciation. Giddens' 
apparent neglect of sociocultural forces often features heavily in critiques of his work, as 
does the question of the viability of the rubric 'modernity = distanciation = globalisation. ' 
"[H]e has to make distanciation, disembedding and reflexivity central to modernity in order 
to protect the thesis that globalization is a consequence of modernity, " argues one critic. 
"Yet he obviously cannot say that [these] are entirely unique to modernity. "68 Furthermore, 
by neglecting explicitly to account for questions of culture Giddens' theory of globalisation 
fails to address the core of the issue: 
While [Giddens] may claim that globalization does not involve the crushing of non- 
Western cultures he does not seem to realize that such a statement requires him to 
theorize the issue of `other cultures. ' His suggestion that there is no Other in a 
globalized world apparently absolves him from undertaking such a task. He fails to 
understand that it is only in a (minimally) globalized world that a problem of `the 
Other' could have arisen. What he apparently doesn't see is that a view of the world 
as marked by unicity can coexist with a view of the world as a place of others - 
indeed that such recognition is central to the conceptual mapping of the global 
circumstance. 69 
Giddens theory of modernity and self-identity does however offer several themes which I 
believe to be relevant to the thrust of my argument in this thesis. The `facilitating conditions' 
of disembedding and distanciation have particular consequences with regard to the ways in 
which the modern consciousness situates itself phenomenologically and reflexively. 
According to Giddens, the increasingly impersonal and remote nature of social relations 
66 Anthony Giddens, The Consequences of Modernity, p. 64, emphasis added. 
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forces us rely upon notions of abstract currency (e. g. money, shared symbols) in order to 
ensure the reproduction and validity of value across space and time. When I travel, for 
instance, I rely on the fact that someone in, say, Japan will be willing to give me a number of 
yen equivalent to the value of pounds sterling I wish to exchange. We also count on certain 
bodies of specialist knowledge, what Giddens terms `expert systems', in order to provide 
infrastructures of security which allow us to go about what we view to be our own 
personalised, individual agendas with the assurance that someone somewhere is regulating 
and servicing the more mundane aspects of existence such as transportation, nourishment, 
financial management, etc. According to Giddens, these expert systems also "extend to 
social relations themselves and to the intimacies of the self. The doctor, counselor and 
therapist are as central to the expert systems of modernity as the scientist, technician or 
engineer. "70 Interpersonal relations, and especially the translocal, in so complex and unsure a 
social environment are thus seen to encompass the qualities of risk and trust. 
The condition of globality, I would argue, in turn conditions the self to move instinctively 
towards whatever system or idiom of identity and association can offer relative coherence, 
surety, some semblance of the absolute and - most importantly in the case of political Islam - 
a sense of authenticity. In this view, then, late modernity can be seen as a search for 
epistemological security. I will return to this idea later in the context of my discussion of 
globalised religion and Islam. In summary, while Giddens provides crucial themes for our 
understanding of the ways in which personal identities are formed under conditions of 
amplified distanciation, the thesis fails - as his critics points out - by not continuing into an 
exploration of cultural mediations of the self. "Giddens's overall argument... boils down, in 
spite of some useful insights, to an updated and overly abstract version of the convergence 
thesis - homogenized `modern man' injected with a special dose of phenomenological 
reflexivity. "" This distinct absence of an understanding of culture would seem to be imply 
Giddens' acceptance of the globalisation-as-homogenisation approach. Globalisation is, 
however, best understood for the purposes of this study by shifting the axis of our analysis 
such that its defining features become instead the encounter with difference and the 
possibility of cultural heterogeneity coming to terms with itself. I mean by this that globality 
provides not only the conditions under which disparate societies and symbols converge, but 
also the space in which traditions are forced to hold a mirror up to the difference and 
diversity contained within their (supposedly immutable) interiors. 
The other sociologist whose work I want to consider, Roland Robertson, can probably most 
legitimately lay claim to the emergence of globalisation as a distinct field of social theory, 
and it is also perhaps he who has put forward the most comprehensive theory of this 
phenomenon to date; a special interest in culture and religion makes Robertson's work all the 
more relevant to the present thesis. 
A central motif running throughout Robertson's work is something which we might read as 
an attempt to reconcile sociology and international relations. Informed by the legacies of 
Weber, Parsons, and Simmel, his starting point is a concern with the `classic' problems of 
social and political philosophy. The place of the individual vis ä vis society, the state, and 
the wider system of societies and states is hence the key problematic here. In seeking to 
understand these relations, Robertson has devised an apparatus which he refers to as the 
`global field. ' Its component pieces are the individual self; the national society; the 
international system of societies; and humankind in general. The mediation of relationships 
between these elements constitute the primary problematics of globality. In Robertson's 
approach to the global field, which might in some respects be seen as a large-scale version of 
systems theory, the realm of the cultural is held to be the predominant subsystem. 
70 Anthony Giddens, Modernity and Self-Identity, p. 18 
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Historically, cleavages within this subsystem were seen to prevent its globalisation, the most 
important of these rifts being the `religious' - but 
here the focus is not on religious denominations per se but on general views of life 
and the world in terms of cognition and values; the cleavage is expressed in such 
distinctions as inner-directedness versus other-directedness, this-worldliness versus 
other worldliness, theoreticism versus aestheticism, rationalism versus traditionalism, 
and linear conceptions of time versus cyclical conceptions... Religion, in the most 
general meaning of that term, is therefore the critical factor in globalization. 72 
The contemporary condition of `globality' therefore provides the most conducive 
circumstances yet to the overcoming of these cleavages. This assertion, however, should not 
be read as a defection to the globalisation-as-homogenisation formula. To quote Robertson 
himself: 
It has also to be said that in speaking of globalization, in its most general sense as the 
process whereby the world becomes a single place, I do not mean that globalization 
involves in and of itself the crystallization of a cohesive system. Yet I do maintain 
that globalization involves the development of something like a global culture - not 
as normatively binding, but in the sense of a general mode of discourse about the 
world as a whole and its variety. 73 
It is not being claimed, therefore, that globalisation entails universal convergence around a 
common set of norms, ideals and a shared system of meaning. Rather, globalisation is seen 
to be a state of mind which comprehends the world as a single social space or system through 
the recognition of diversity rather than the imposition of similarity. In Imagined 
Communities, Benedict Anderson was concerned with tracing the historical processes which 
led to the emergence of the national imagination, and in a similar way Robertson seeks to 
understand the historical developments which have given rise to a global consciousness. It is 
the emergence of this `state of mind' which leads Robertson to the term `globality' - 
"defined in the immediate context as consciousness of the (problem of) the world as a single 
place. 1774 This evolution is seen to have occurred within the framework of a longue duree 
which began approximately six hundred years ago. Robertson identifies five distinct phases 
in the history of globalisation. The most recent of these began at the close of the 1960s and 
is termed `The Uncertainty Phase'; like Giddens and a number of other contemporary 
sociologists such as Ulrich Beck, 75 Robertson also recognises the social environment of the 
current age as one characterised by an absence of certitude. 
Robertson's recent writing on globalisation has tended to focus on what at face value appears 
to be the inverse of globalisation, the phenomenon he terms `glocalisation. ' This somewhat 
contrived merger between `global' and `local' is set up as a deliberate counterpoint to the 
homogenisation thesis which views the global and the local as mutually exclusive in that the 
latter is there seen to be swallowed by the former. In line with Robertson's own thinking on 
globalisation, however, the idea of glocalisation shifts the emphasis onto an analysis of the 
ways in which the universal (or global) is modified and domesticated by the particular (or 
local) setting which receives it. Rather than perpetuating the tension between the global and 
the local, the `glocalisation' approach reveals instead that these seemingly incongruous 
aspects are in fact two sides of the same coin. In fact, argues Robertson, "[e]ven though we 
are.. . 
likely to continue to use the concept of globalization, it might well be preferable to 
72 Malcolm Waters, Globalization, London: Routledge, 1995, p. 41 
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replace it for certain purposes with the concept of glocalization. , 
76 The central thrust of 
globalisation theory hence becomes not the eradication of the local by the global, but rather 
the processes by which global material is tamed, localised, and made relevant to a particular 
set of sociocultural practices. In a sense, this involves a process of translation in which a 
system of meaning which originates from the `outside' is integrated into the symbolic 
framework of a receiving society. It is at this juncture - the recoding of imported global 
culture - that hybridity becomes an issue (see Chapter III). For what else 
is the resulting 
construction (be it a commodity, slogan, or ideograph) if not hybrid? 
Where Robertson's analysis runs into trouble (at least semantically), I believe, is in his 
distinction between the `universal' and the `particular' with the latter denoting the local and 
the former the global. It is not the substance of his distinction here so much as his choice of 
words which cause confusion. I don't take Robertson to be asserting that what he calls 
`universal' is actually universal in the sense of being applicable to everyone everywhere. On 
my reading he is referring to that material which enters the global stream and thereby 
acquires the potential to be received - although not necessarily accepted - universally. If we 
invest the abstract constructs of cultural production with some form of consciousness then we 
are speaking at most of those ideas and commodities which aspire to universal relevance, but 
which are actually nothing more particularisms - albeit ones which have been made 
artificially omnipresent by the networks of global distribution. Robertson is himself fully 
aware that what he terms universal is in fact merely another form of the particular. Indeed, 
his designation `universal' can be read simply as a shorthand for what he has previously 
called the "universalization of particularism. i77 Robertson's emphasis on glocalisation 
therefore lends considerable support to those who seek to read globalisation as primarily as a 
process of hybridisation. 
In summary, then, part of the difficulty in theorising the concept of globalisation stems from 
the fact that the processes which it purports to describe often appear to contradict one other. 
In the homogenisation thesis, for example, the term would seem to imply the global adoption 
of certain modes of interaction with regard to international politics, business, and law, 
increased economic interdependence, and the rise of a global culture. Simultaneously, 
however, the same mechanisms which permit (or demand) this homogeneity of practice also 
produce a curious inverse side-effect: localising the global can also at times serve to globalise 
the local. The channels which open spaces of local political community to the global outside 
can also be appropriated by those communities in order to export their own notions of the 
particular. As Appadurai puts it: 
The globalization of culture is not the same as its homogenization, but globalization 
involves the use of a variety of instruments of homogenization (armaments, 
advertising techniques, language hegemonies, clothing styles and the like), which are 
absorbed into local political and cultural economies, only to be repatriated as 
heterogeneous dialogues of national sovereignty, free enterprise, fundamentalism, 
etc. 
78 
In the notion of 'heterogeneous dialogues' we find yet another allusion to hybridity. This 
model questions the common idiom of globalisation which tends to portray the wholesale 
bulldozing of "traditional" local cultures by the rampaging juggernaut of late Western 
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capitalism. A claim is not being made here that the exchange of materials is equal in both (or 
all) directions, only that the popular monoflow paradigm of a globalising Western modernity 
is a severe misrepresentation. Several sociological treatments of this phenomenon have, 
fortunately, been far more nuanced in their analyses. 79 Missing from the literature, however, 
is an extended study of those "traditions" seeking to appropriate the mechanisms of 
globalisation to their own ends, and in the process of doing so to articulate an authentic local 
response to the "Other" value systems of which the incoming cultural material is the 
embodiment. To be sure, a great deal of transnational traffic does flow from the West to the 
rest. I want to argue, however, that this particular velocity is not altogether hegemonic. 
Significant exchange also occurs between the Rest and the west and - above all - important 
processes of globalisation are certainly at work within the Rest. Indeed, the very categories 
`West' and `Rest' become almost analytically useless under the condition of globality: the 
Rest is already in the West, and vice versa. In later chapters I will be illustrating the ways in 
which globalising processes bring the Rest into the West through an examination of diasporic 
Muslim communities in Europe and North America. 
Globalisation theory therefore makes a far more useful contribution when it is "interested in 
accounting for heterogeneity, without reducing it to a new homogeneity. " 
S0 It is this notion 
of globalisation as a means by which to understand the global situation which gives rise to 
`globality'. My usage here, like Robertson's, is intended to designate a condition or state of 
consciousness rather than a set of processes -a worldview which suggests wider sets of 
possibilities or the potential for society to stretch itself across space. In my understanding, 
there is an important connection between the concept of globality and my earlier emphasis on 
movement. Insofar as globality represents a widening of vision, it also enables movement. I 
am speaking here of movement not only in the sense of physical displacement, but also 
conceptual movement. Globality erodes theoretical inertia, causing people to encounter new 
forms of thought and to reassess their own taken-for-granted categories. In this sense there is 
also an important linkage to be made to the concept of 'travelling theory' which will be 
elaborated in Chapter III. While we may not have reached a point at which we are all aware 
of the globe as a single space, we have certainly reached a state of affairs in which we are 
beginning to conceive of the world as an increasingly compressed space -a notion most 
popularly captured in Marshall McLuhan's hyperbolic metaphor of the "global village. " It is 
within this 'smaller' world that the trope of movement is activated as a political force. 
Politics no longer happens in one place, but rather across a multitude of spaces. We see, 
hear, know, believe, emote and reach out to an ever-increasing range of sites and locales. 
People travel and their political convictions travel with them; but these peoples and their 
convictions are also mediated by globality and travel. So how is this condition of globality 
experienced by individuals and the societies in which they go about their daily lives? What 
impact has globalisation had upon the ways in which people conceive and imagine their 
senses of community and culture? 
It is when we attempt to answer these sorts of questions that the discourse of globalisation 
leaves me dissatisfied. My major complaint would be that most of the conversation is far too 
abstract - that globalisation is often rendered in very generalising and/or facile terms. Talk 
of "McDonaldization" or "Cocacolonisation" tells us very little, and even categories such as 
'centre' and 'periphery' become increasingly tenuous. The historical sociologist Janet Abu- 
Lughod argues that we need to transcend this sort of "global babble. "" Her preference is for 
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an approach which "[tries] to capture the ambiguities and nuances of the concrete, as they are 
embedded in the lives of people. "82 In other words, how does globalisation manifest 
itself in 
our day to day existence? While notions such as 'distanciation' and 'glocalisation' are useful 
for understanding the dynamics of contemporary globalisation, the theorists who propose 
them do not make much effort to demonstrate how they manifest themselves. I am not simply 
speaking here about an absence of empirical corroboration. The high levels of abstraction, 
particularly in the case of Giddens, unfortunately leaves us with the impression that 
globalisation is something that is taking place 'out there'; we do not come to appreciate the 
senses in which peoples and cultures are intimately implicated in globalising processes. It is 
also the case that trying to analyse a 'global' field can create a discursive economy of scale 
which quickly runs away from our grasp. Hyperbole easily runs amok. Simply put, many of 
the things we tend to call globalisation are in actual fact very rarely global in their impact. 
Flows and processes may indeed span great distances, but this fact alone does not make their 
jurisdiction global. This false sense of scale only exacerbates the abstracted quality I 
mention above. Because we are rarely encouraged to examine the particular embeddedness 
of distanciated processes, globalisation remains an analytical category and not a 
daily 
experience. 
For these reasons I do not feel that globalisation - at least in its sociological rendering - is 
the most productive discursive arena in which to discuss the cultural transformations which 
mark the present era. I want to suggest that transnational anthropology, with its greater 
emphasis on micro-processes, contextuality and lived experience - what Ulf Hannerz calls 
"forms of life"83 - can provide us with a richer conceptual 
language for thinking about 
peoples and identities located in and between nations, states and territories - in short, to help 
us recognise and appreciate salient new forms of world politics. A review of recent 
contributions from the field of anthropology will help to illustrate this point. 
Transnational anthropology and political "forms of life" 
I mentioned earlier how critical approaches to anthropology have contributed to our 
understanding of the translocal by recognising the increasing unboundedness of community. 
I also want to say something, though, about how anthropology contributes to this endeavour 
through its own particular conception of the political. Anthropologists have not been 
predisposed to look for politics in the form of the state. Traditionally, they have seen 
themselves as working in a social space well 'below' and far removed from the state. The 
peoples they have studied have not been represented as possessing the sorts of political 
cultures that produce and sustain state forms. The tendency of anthropologists to constitute 
the anthropological 'field' as a space devoid of politics and unconnected to wider political 
contexts has recently been criticised by those ethnographers working in the critical genre of 
Clifford and Marcus' Writing Culture. However, one positive implication of this limited 
vision has been, I would argue, that anthropologists have learned to recognise'the political' in 
other forms of life. Given its particular expertise, anthropology is capable of offering 
considerable insight into the politics of culture and cultural identity. Given that a great deal 
of the politics in translocal space relates, as we will see, to culture, it is not surprising that 
anthropology has been at the forefront of theorising the translocality of culture. Before I go 
on to look at some of these contributions, I need to say something about culture and, more 
specifically, how I see its relationship with politics. 
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While culture is certainly one of the most widely (ab)used concepts in social analysis, what it 
actually means is usually far from clear. For some analysts it is a safeguard behind which to 
retreat when some phenomenon escapes easy explanation. Culture is sometimes whatever is 
left over when all other explanations have been exhausted. However, to conceive of culture 
as some form of explanatory variable is to miss the point. Culture is not a thing. Despite its 
grammatical function, I would not even want to see it is a noun. Like the political, culture is 
more a way of being, a mode. It refers first and foremost to the negotiation, articulation, and 
inscription of meaning within and between social contexts. Several anthropologists have 
deployed culture in ways which hint at this connotation. Take for example Clifford Geertz's 
classic definition of culture as "an historically transmitted pattern of meanings embodied in 
symbols, a system of inherited conceptions expressed in symbolic forms by means of which 
men communicate, perpetuate, and develop their knowledge about and attitudes toward 
life. i8' While this is useful, it is still lacking in many respects. It gives the impression that 
one might go out into the world collecting specimens of 'meaning' and then be able to write 
something about the various cultures which produce these meanings. That is to say, the 
implication seems to be that there are meanings out there which belong to particular cultural 
systems conceived as bounded entities. Furthermore, Geertz's notion of an "historically 
transmitted pattern" tells us very little about the temporal aspects of meaning. To be sure, 
symbols endure. But to speak only of historical transmission does not help us to understand 
how meanings shift, implode and/or disappear over time. There are serious normative 
implications here as well. To focus on the historical transmission of meaning is to allow 
cultures to be dictated by those who write their "official" histories, masking complex 
structures of power/knowledge in the public elaboration of meaning. In my study of Muslim 
communities in translocal spaces, for example, there is a great deal of emphasis on how 
cultural forms change over time and how they are (often drastically) modified through the act 
of moving from one social context to another. 
Ulf Hannerz's rendering is somewhat more succinct. For him culture is "the social 
organisation of meaning. "85 He makes no claims about systems or histories, and his idiom 
emphasises ongoing, active ('organising') processes. Again, though, we don't get any sense of 
how meanings change or the uses to which they are put. This is why I prefer not simply to 
make the linkage culture=meaning, but rather to emphasise the ways in which culture 
emerges from the negotiation of meaning. It is here that the political begins to appear. Arjun 
Appadurai recognises this when he stresses the notion of "situated difference" in relation to 
culture. For him culture is not a thing in itself, but rather a dimension: 
Culture is not usefully regarded as a substance but is better regarded as a dimension 
of phenomena, a dimension that attends to situated and embodied difference. 
Stressing the dimensionality of culture rather than its substantiality permits our 
thinking of culture less as a property of individuals and groups and more as a 
86 heuristic devise that we can use to talk about difference. 
Appadurai recognises, however, that not all differences in the world are related to culture. In 
the context of his ideas about cultural globalisation (post-national politics, translocal identity) 
there is a need to focus on the production of political identity; hence, he suggests that "we 
regard as cultural only those differences that either express, or set the groundwork for, the 
84 Clifford Geertz, The Interpretation of Cultures, London: Fontana Press, 1993, p. 89 
85 Ulf Hannerz, Cultural Complexity: Studies in the Social Organization of Meaning, New York: 
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mobilization of group identities. "87 This is commensurate with what I have described above 
as the politicisation of identity. In other words, in what Appadurai sees as culture, I 
recognise the difference which engenders political antagonism and contestation. 
What is not fully elaborated in Appadurai's thinking, however, is this notion of the "group" - 
i. e. the'culture. ' Any analysis of'identity, ' or 'community' can easily stray into an essentialist 
mode which involves constructing boundaries around some social phenomenon (person, 
nation, culture, religious community, etc. ) and assigning them certain timeless characteristics 
or traits. It is, quite literally, to impute an essence. According to Pnina Werbner, this sort of 
analysis "obscures the relational aspects of group culture or identity, and valorise[s] instead 
the subject in itself, as autonomous and separate, as if such a subject could be demarcated out 
of context, unrelated to an external other or discursive purpose.. . It is to imply an 
internal 
sameness. ""' What must be stressed above all is the sense in which the construction of group 
identity is inherently a sociopolitical process, involving as it does dialogue, negotiation and 
debate as to "who we are" and, moreover, what it means to be "who we are. " 
Seeking to distinguish between essentialist and non-essentialist modes of thought, Gerd 
Baumann speaks of the difference between 'dominant' and 'demotic' discourses on culture and 
community. The dominant discourse, he points out, aims towards closure. It seeks to reduce 
cultural complexity to the simple equation: 'Culture = community = ethnic identity = nature = 
culture. '89 The demotic discourse, on the other hand, problematises the boundaries of culture 
and community. It sees cultural identity as contingent and negotiable. It should be pointed 
out that these two modes are not deployed solely by ethnographers; that is, they are not 
simply descriptions of how analysts objectify and study culture. Communities and "cultures" 
often vacillate in their own self-representations between dominant and demotic modes of 
identification, and this is usually indicative of the politics within those communities. 
Werbner summarises the point nicely: 
The argument about ethnic naming highlights the fact that it is not only Western 
representations of the Other which essentialise. In their performative rhetoric the 
people we study essentialise their imagined communities in order to mobilise for 
action. Within the spaces of civil society, the politics of ethnicity in Britain are not 
so much imposed as grounded in essentialist self-imaginings of community. Hence, 
ethnic leaders essentialise communal identities in their competition for state grants 
and formal leadership positions. But - equally importantly - such leaders narrate and 
argue over these identities in the social spaces which they themselves have created, 
far from the public eye. 90 
She is referring here to a politics which takes place not in the public spaces of formal 
institutions, but within spaces and forums that we do not usually see. Award ceremonies, 
weddings and mosques are all important instances of such spaces. These places do not relate 
to activities which we would normally consider to be political, but all are examples of 
practices which can and often do involve the narration and appropriation of political identity. 
This is why it has become all the more important to emphasise the dialogic nature of 
community. As Werbner continues: "A moral community is not a unity. It is full of conflict, 
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of internal debate about right and wrong... Such debates... involve competition for the right to 
name: Who are we? What do we stand for? What are we to be called? Are we Muslims? 
Democrats? Pakistanis? Socialists? Blacks? Asians? i91 The dominant discourse of identity 
which arises out of such situations is often quite literally the "dominant" discourse in that it 
represents the strongest voices within any community: those who have managed in the 
demotic debate to impose a discursive hegemony which negates dissenting voices of internal 
difference. "Instead of seeing the different forms of identity as allegiances to a place or as a 
property, " argues Chantal Mouffe, "we ought to realise that they are the stake of a power 
struggle. 02 This will become apparent later when we go on to look at Islam in translocal 
spaces. I will be arguing that encounters between the Muslim and his Muslim 'other' give rise 
to competing discourses as to what Islam is and who may speak on its behalf. 
According to Lila Abu-Lughod, one method of avoiding essentialist modes of analysing 
culture to 'write against culture. ' By this, she means that we need to move away from 
conceptions of culture as something that can be fixed, measured off and described - in short, 
we need to stop using culture as an ascriptive category. Looking at traditional 
anthropological discourse, Abu-Lughod has noted that culture has often functioned primarily 
to "make other. " However, she warns of the dangers inherent in taking the particular 
situatedness of a few individuals as representative of an entire culture: 
When one generalizes from experiences and conversations with a number of specific 
people in a community, one tends to flatten out differences among them and to 
homogenize them. The appearance of an absence of internal differentiation makes it 
easier to conceive of a group of people as a discrete, bounded entity who do this or 
that and believe such-and-such. .. The erasure of time and conflict make what 
is inside 
the boundary set up by homogenization something essential and fixed 93 
Instead, Abu-Lughod suggests that we might more usefully write what she terms 
"ethnographies of the particular. " By this she means that we need to pay close attention not 
only to peoples' situatedness in particular sociocultural contexts, but also to their situatedness 
within these contexts. What power relationships obtain in any given community, and where 
are individuals positioned vis ä vis these structures? What individual meanings do 
subjectivities derive from the signifying practices of a culture? 
In writing 'against' culture (or ethnicity) we thus seek to discover more hidden forms 
of identification and to highlight the arguments of identity within ethnic collectivities 
about who 'they' are and thus who may legitimately represent 'them' and 'their' 
interests or loyalties in the public arena. 94 
Incoherence therefore needs to be stressed as much as, if not over, coherence. We need to 
understand the ways in which people "are confronted with choices, struggle with others, 
make conflicting statements, argue about points of view on the same events... and fail to 
predict what will happen to them or those around them. "95 A great strength of Abu-Lughod's 
argument is that she does not see her concentration on 'particularity' as simply a privileging of 
micro over macro processes. For her, the particular is by no means synonymous with the 
local: 
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[A] concern with the particulars of individuals' lives [need not] imply disregard for 
forces and dynamics that are not locally based. On the contrary, the effects of 
extralocal and long-term processes are only manifested locally and specifically, 
produced in the actions of individuals living their particular lives, inscribed in their 
bodies and their words. What I am arguing for is a form of writing that might better 
convey that 96 
In this she reflects the insight - already touched upon briefly above - that 'the field' and 'the 
village' no longer exist (if indeed they ever did) as closed, bounded spaces. An emphasis on 
translocality hence emerges as an effective route away from essentialist conceptions of 
culture. Let us move on to look at some of the ways in which recent anthropological thought 
has contributed to our understanding of translocal political identities and the unboundedness 
of community. 
The traditional methodologies of anthropology have assumed that peoples and cultures 
inhabit more or less bounded spaces - and relatively small ones at that - and therefore one 
needed only to visit the 'village' in question in order to gain knowledge of a given people or 
culture. This is the classic model of the participant-observer anthropologist at work in 'the 
field. ' It is an approach which suffers from two major shortcomings. First of all, it does not 
by and large recognise that supposedly rooted peoples are usually being "studied" by a very 
unrooted and displaced observer, that the act of moving between, say, a home university and 
the field is actually a constitutive act in the ethnographic process. In this regard greater self- 
reflexivity on the part of anthropologists is required. Second, and more importantly, "the 
time-worn anthropological tradition of viewing culture in terms of separate, spatially 
incontiguous entities, each placed in their own territories, bears little resemblance to the 
mobile and culturally complex lives that people can be seen to lead today. "97 It is becoming 
increasingly apparent that one cannot so easily map peoples and cultures today by reference 
to static, fixed localities. As people move, the meaning of locality can itself shift such that it 
comes to refer to more than just a geographic notion of "here. " Identity and place 
increasingly travel together. Uprooted and diasporic cultures reconstitute homes away from 
home, and hence the imagination of new distanciated communities means that "the local" can 
spread itself across and between bounded spaces. As Olwig puts it, "important frameworks 
of life and sources of identification should. .. 
be sought in the cultural sites which have 
emerged in the interstices between local and global conditions of life. "98 Her work on the 
people of the West Indian island of Nevis is a prime example of how anthropology becomes 
transnational. In order to gain a better picture of contemporary Nevisian life, Olwig found 
that she had to carry out her fieldwork in four separate "fields": Nevis itself; New Haven, 
Connecticut, a key destination of early twentieth century Nevisian migration; Leeds, 
England, which received many Nevisians in the 1950s and 60s; and the US Virgin Islands. 
She alludes to the sense in which her presence in any one of these fields could only tell part 
of the story: 
Even though the field work of necessity was grounded in specific locations, it took 
place within a non-local cultural space related to the network of ties which connected 
individual Nevisians residing in these separate locations. Thus a great deal of the 
Nevisians' daily life was oriented towards activities and concerns of relevance to 
96 Ibid., p. 151 
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people and places in other points in the global network, giving me the feeling that 
Nevisian culture kept escaping me -- it always seemed to be where I was not. 
99 
Transnational anthropology seems to better appreciate the fact that people are increasingly 
mobile and that their identities are now configured in relation to more than one locality - or 
towards localities which have been effectively "stretched" across space. Peoples and cultures 
are therefore not to be understood solely by reference to what is taken to be their "place, " but 
rather by the ways in which they define themselves between and across such places. The 
general orientation to which I refer might then be summarised as follows: 
Anthropologists... [are] beginning to critique the idea that settled life in particular 
places necessarily is a "normal" state of being. A great deal of attention is therefore 
now being directed at the cultural and social significance of moving in space and the 
transnational communities which may result from this. '°° 
These people(s) and place(s) dynamics become even more interesting when we begin to 
consider how they mediate political identity. How do these processes affect and/or change 
nations and states? If we take these two categories to be representative of traditional notions 
of the political then an emphasis on transnational relations allows us to move beyond the 
boundaries of conventional politics. This task has a vital normative component insofar as the 
peoples and cultures involved are often "invisible" because they do not conform to the 
modern political imaginary. Official radars do not see them as participants in transnational 
networks and members of distanciated communities, but rather as objects attempting to cross 
state borders. Consequently there are anthropologists who emphasise the ways in which 
transnational subjectivities are subjugated by the hegemony of state borders: 
It is in this border area that identities are assigned and taken, withheld and rejected. 
The state seeks a monopoly on the power to assign identities to those who enter this 
space. It stamps or refuses to stamp passports and papers which are extensions of the 
person of the traveler who is `required' to pass through official ports of entry and 
exit. 101 
Other writers see the relationship between state and political identity as more ambiguous. 
Ulf Hannerz, for example, argues that "[c]ontemporary state forms, and contemporary ideas 
of nation and nationalism, are themselves in large part items of transnational diffusion. i102 In 
this regard the state can often play an important role as a "broker" between locality and the 
transnational; and here it is often the nation - an amorphous form of community (or at least 
less institutionalised than civil society) constructed as simultaneously 'of the state' and'of the 
people' - which "mediates between state and form of life. "'o3 
The nature and role of the nation in the context of transnationalism is especially problematic. 
On the one hand there is a sense in which the nation is an integral aspect of transnationalism. 
Many anthropologists stress the extent to which transnational processes are a vital 
constitutive aspect (rather than a negating force) of the national groups they have studied. 104 
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On the other hand, however, we can always point to many ways in which the rise of 
transnational processes challenge the hegemony of national identity - at least in its monist 
forms. Hannerz suggests that we can increasingly find people today with whom the nation 
finds little purchase as a "source of cultural resonance. " He argues that there are those who 
partake in largely "transactional" relationships with the nation, such that they become 
capable of activating the national aspect of their identities when and if it suits them, but then 
abandon the nation when it no longer serves any useful purpose. 105 Transnationalism, 
according to Hannerz, largely runs against the grain of the nation: 
These [transnational] relationships are sensed not to fit perfectly with established ideas 
of the nation, and in this way the latter become probably less pervasive, and even 
compromised. The feeling of deep historical rootedness may be replaced by an equally 
intense experience of discontinuity and rupture, as in the case of the transcontinental 
migrant... such [transnational] ties may entail a kind and a degree of tuning out, a 
weakened personal involvement with the nation and national culture, a shift from the 
disposition to take it for granted; possibly a critical distance to it. In such ways, the 
nation may have become more hollow than it was. 106 
Khachig Tololyan concurs, arguing that "the nation's aspiration to normative homogeneity is 
challenged not just by immigration but also by various forms of cultural practice and 
knowledge production. "107 It is however difficult, as Hannerz points out, to detect the 
emergence of any social form which could play the role of a successor to the nation. In this 
regard, he feels that the nation may be changing rather than simply withering. What though 
would it mean to speak of changes to the nation, or of an emerging post-national politics? In 
order to begin answering this question we need to first recognise that the transnational is 
itself a site of national politics. As Basch et al. argue: 
Both the transnational processes that challenge bounded thinking and the pressures on 
transmigrants to reconstitute their identities in terms of nation-states and race reflect 
ongoing hegemonic contention within which constructions of identity are constantly 
being reformulated, transformed, and modified... Consequently the newly 
reconceptualised categories represent simultaneously both resistance to domination and 
new hegemonic categories that perpetuate domination. 108 
We can get a sense of this politics just by looking at the connotations which various writers 
associate with the term `transnationalism. ' Thomas Faist, for example, seems to yearn for a 
modicum of scientific rigidity in his definition of "transnational social spaces"; these are sites 
which he sees as "combinations of social and symbolic ties, positions in networks and 
organizations and networks of organizations that can be found in at least two geographically 
and internationally distinct places. "109 Similarly, Basch et al. define transnationalism as: "the 
processes by which immigrants forge and sustain multi-stranded social relations that link 
together their societies of origin and settlement ... [they] take actions, make decisions, and 
develop subjectivities and identities embedded in networks of relationships that connect them 
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simultaneously to two or more nation-states. "10 Neither of these sources appears to 
recognise the epistemological problems associated with speaking about "internationally 
distinct places" or clearly-defined "societies of origin and settlement. " Part of the point is 
precisely that these processes render the existence of "distinct places" almost impossible, and 
that the sharp distinction between societies of "origin" and societies of "settlement" no 
longer obtains. One is no longer simply "from" one (bounded) place; rather, identities are 
oriented in relation to complex translocal flows. "Although there may be a tendency in the 
new work merely to widen the object, shifting from [bounded] culture to nation as locus, " 
writes Lila abu-Lughod, "ideally there would be attention to the shifting groupings, identities, 
and interactions within and across such borders as well. ""' 
Michael Kearney provides us with a more useful idiom when he notes the ways in which 
contemporary transnational processes "blur" the social, cultural and epistemological 
categories of modernity. For him, transnationalism has two meanings: "One is the 
conventional one having to do with forms of organization and identity which are not 
constrained by national boundaries, such as the transnational corporation. But I also wish to 
load onto the term the meaning of transnational as post-national in the sense that history and 
anthropology have entered a post-national age. i 112 He is alluding here to that quality of 
transnationalism which I find most promising, but which is also the most difficult to theorise: 
the possibility of new forms of post-national politics. It is in this context, I want to argue, 
that we should view transnationalism as a space of resistance in that it allows us to re- 
imagine the boundaries of political community and to question hegemonic notions of the 
political. As Basch et al. argue: 
[B]y conceptualizing transnationalism, not as flows of items and ideas, but as social 
relations constructed by subordinated populations, we may be contributing to social 
movements that think beyond what is deemed thinkable.. . 
Transnational spaces, 
overflowing with daily life experiences that are not congruent with hegemonic 
boundaries of identification, provide a terrain for new and different subjectivities and 
public descriptors. 113 
It is in this sense that we might begin to think of transnationalism as possessing certain 
emancipatory qualities which allow us to move towards a political imaginary beyond the 
categories and requirements of the territorial state. The quality of emancipation derives from 
being able represent oneself and to be recognised as speaking with a legitimate voice within 
public spheres that do not conform to the fixed boundaries of the state. This is necessary 
because transnationalism creates forms of political identity which do not fit the taxonomies 
of political modernity. Hybridity and cultural melange often feature heavily in these spaces, 
and such syncretisms often give rise not only to new post-national forms but also to 
reformulated understandings of what and where the nation can be. Thus I disagree with Faist 
when he asserts that in addition to novel supra-national identities, transnational diffusion 
"encompasses ... [the] resurgence of ethnic and national 
identities. " 114 The notion of 
"resurgence" would seem to suggest that there exist given forms of ethnicity and nationality 
which are somehow lying dormant, waiting to be reactivated by transnational activity. As I 
understand it, however, the transnational - or, in my terms, the translocal - is a space in 
which new forms of (post)ethnic and (post)national identity are constituted, and not simply 
one in which prior identities assert themselves. Forms of political identity are heavily 
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contingent, and hence the boundaries of our imagined communities can be shifted through 
reimagination. 
So what happens when these shifts occur? What might a post-national politics look like, and 
how can we theorise it? I want to point to the importance of what Arjun Appadurai calls 
ethnoscapes in the emergence of post-national political forms. By this term he refers to "the 
landscape of persons who constitute the shifting world in which we live: tourists, immigrants, 
refugees, exiles, guest workers, and other moving groups and individuals [which] constitute 
an essential feature of the world and appear to affect the politics of (and between) nations to 
a hitherto unprecedented degree. "' 15 I would go further and argue that these ethnoscapes do 
much more than simply 'affect' politics between nations; they actually constitute forms of 
politics unto themselves. These post-national politics question the boundaries of statist 
political community by giving rise to political identities disembedded from the context of the 
territorial nation-state. For Appadurai, a key dynamic in the emergence of post-national 
politics is to be found in the relationship between these ethnoscapes and the increasing 
prevalence of "deterritorialising" processes. This is a notion which covers more than the 
obvious cases of transnational corporations and capital flows. It also refers to flows of 
people and forms of identity which are increasingly capable of transcending the boundaries 
of state and territory. Furthermore, the fragmenting qualities of transnational processes are 
such that disparities between place and purpose become features of daily life: "For many 
national citizens, the practicalities of residence and the ideologies of home, soil and roots are 
often disjunct, so that the territorial referents of civic loyalty are increasingly divided for 
many persons among different spatial horizons: work loyalties, residential loyalties, and 
religious loyalties may create disjunct registers of affiliation. " 116 In other words, the state 
becomes relativised: increasingly these days, political life is elsewhere. 
Asserting that the hyphen which links nation and state "is now less an icon of conjuncture 
than an index of disjuncture, " Appadurai goes on to examine the ways in which these 
disjunctures in the imagination of political community might be seen as a constitutive aspect 
of post-national politics. He does so by relating the uncoupling of nation and state to 
deterritorialisation: "One major fact that accounts for the strain in the union of nation and 
state is that the nationalist genie, never perfectly contained in the territorial state, is now 
itself diasporic [and] is increasingly unrestrained by ideas of spatial boundary and territorial 
sovereignty. " 117 One might be tempted here to point out the extent to which so many 
contemporary political movements state their goals in nationalist terms. Appadurai's 
preference, however, is to read situations such as those found in Serbia, Sri Lanka, Punjab or 
Nogorno Karabakh as "trojan nationalisms. " He means by this that avowedly "nationalist" 
projects such as these are so heavily permeated with sub-, trans- and even non-national 
elements as to render it almost impossible to speak of a nationalism outside 
transnationalism. "' "Territorial nationalism, " he claims, "is the alibi of these movements 
and not necessarily their basic motive or final goal. " 119 This point is then further elaborated 
in connection with a critique of the limits of our current national imaginaries: 
Although many antistate movements revolve around images of homeland, soil, place, 
and return from exile, these images reflect the poverty of their (and our) political 
languages rather than the hegemony of territorial nationalism. Put another way, no 
idiom has yet emerged to capture the collective interests of many groups in translocal 
solidarities, cross-border mobilizations, and postnational identities. Such interests are 
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117 Appadurai, Modernity at Large, p. 160-1 
118 Ibid., p. 165 
119 Ibid. 
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many and vocal, but they are still entrapped in the linguistic imaginary of the territorial 
state. 120 
There are thus "actually existing social forms and arrangements that might contain the seeds 
of more dispersed and diverse forms of transnational allegiance and affiliation. " 
121 
Appadurai argues that there exist formations of finance, recruitment, co-ordination, 
communication and reproduction that go beyond mere transnationalism to verge on the truly 
postnational. 122 In this regard he cites the importance of various Christian, Hindu, and 
Muslim organisations (the latter of which I will examine more closely in Chapter IV) as 
examples of "full-service global movements that seek to alleviate suffering across national 
boundaries while mobilizing first-order loyalties across state boundaries. "123 Rather than 
conforming to stereotypified media images of fundamentalism, perhaps these are "more 
humane motives for affiliation than statehood or party affiliation and more interesting bases 
for debate and cross-cutting alliances. " 124 In this regard, I would also argue that these sorts of 
affiliations need to be seen as important forms of politics in their own right. A central 
purpose of this thesis will be to demonstrate why this is the case. 
In summary of his thinking on the post-national, Appadurai offers the following: 
It remains now to ask what transnations and transnationalism have to do with 
postnationality and its prospects... As populations become deterritorialized and 
incompletely nationalized, as nations splinter and recombine, as states face intractable 
difficulties in the task of producing "the people, " transnations are the most important 
social sites in which the crises of patriotism are played out... [I]t is possible to detect in 
many of these transnations (some ethnic, some religious, some philanthropic, some 
militaristic) the elements of a postnational imaginary ... [T]ransnational social 
forms 
may generate not only postnational yearnings but also actually existing postnational 
movements, organizations, and spaces. In these postnational spaces, the incapacity of 
the nation-state to tolerate diversity (as it seeks the homogeneity of its citizens, the 
simultaneity of its presence, the consensuality of its narrative, and the stability of its 
citizens) may, perhaps, be overcome. 
'25 
A worthy cause certainly, but what shortcomings can we identify in Appadurai's approach? 
Several writers have pointed to limitations here. Basch et al., for example, offer an indirect 
but valid criticism of theorists such as Appadurai who celebrate the unboundedness of 
community. An approach which stresses the contingency of cultural boundaries, they 
suggest, runs the risk of ignoring the importance which boundaries can play in many political 
contexts: 
To develop a perspective that emphasizes the constructed nature of bounded units is 
not to deny the significance of boundaries once they are constructed... Boundaries, 
whether legally created borders, as in the case of nation-states, or socially forged 
created boundaries, as in instances of group ethnicities, once conceptualized, are given 
meaning and sentiment by those who reside within them. They acquire a life of their 
own. Conceived as culturally distinct, these social constructions persist and therefore 
shape and influence people's behavior and daily practices. 126 
120 Ibid., p. 166 
121 Ibid, p. 20 
122 Ibid., p. 167 
123 Ibid., p. 168 
124 Ibid., p. 176 
125 Ibid., p. 176-7 
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Karen Fog Olwig has also raised questions about certain aspects of Appadurai's work. She 
worries that a mere reorientation of anthropology from the village to transient sites may lead 
us "focus on the more short-lived and flimsy contexts of modem life and therefore risk 
exaggerating its transient and `uprooted' character. ""' While she undoubtedly has a point 
here, there is a sense in which Olwig is also missing the point. As I read them, most 
transnational anthropologists - and certainly those sympathetic to Clifford and Marcus - are 
not arguing for a simple reorientation of anthropology from "local" village to transnational 
space. Rather, their argument is that increasingly today all localities, be they island villages 
or world cities, need to be viewed as spaces of movement and transnational diffusion. "[T]he 
importance of embedding large-scale realities in concrete life-worlds, " writes Appadurai, "[is 
to] open up the possibility of divergent interpretations of what locality implies. " 128 
It is this emphasis on the changing nature and vital importance of locality which distinguishes 
Appadurai's approach to sociocultural globalisation -a term which, as will become 
increasingly clear, I see as interchangeable with sociopolitical globalisation: "[i]n such a 
theory, it is unlikely that there will be anything mere about the local. "' 29 In his recent work 
Appadurai has given even greater weight to locality, talking more of "translocality" and less 
of "transnationalism. " This seems to me an intuitive extension of postnationalism's logic, for 
to speak incessantly of transnationalism is only - at least semantically - to perpetuate the 
nation rather than move beyond it. For this reason I prefer in the chapters that follow to 
designate translocal spaces as my primary object of inquiry. In doing so my intention is to 
emphasise the ways in which sociocultural globalisation is about the mediation of 
distanciated communities, which increasingly take non-national forms, across and between 
locality/translocality. As will be made clear later, I do see certain spaces (e. g. migratory or 
global cities) as more translocal than others. For the time being, however, I am simply 
concerned to point out that almost every locality today possesses some aspect of translocality. 
Conclusion: lR as translocal politics 
Let me conclude by recapping the key arguments I have made in this chapter. I began with a 
critique of state-centrism in IR and highlighted some of the key sociocultural transformations 
which question the hegemony of this structure. I suggested that we need to question today 
the extent to which the imagination of political identity remains nationalised - that is, 
whether political identity remains the exclusive reserve of a single national-territorial 
referent. The approach I would endorse involves re-orientating the trajectory and widening 
the arc of analysis in international relations such that its emphasis lies less on the 
examination of bordered, bounded and fixed entities and concentrates instead on the ways in 
which international socio-political life manages increasingly to escape the constraints of the 
territorial nation-state. This would be commensurate with Giddens' focus on time-space 
distanciation; that is, seeking to move beyond the undue reliance which has been placed on 
understanding society as a bounded system and positing instead a "starting point that 
concentrates upon analysing how social life is ordered across time and space. " 130 This 
involves the reconceptualisation of international relations such that 'the political' is not 
understood as a practice or set of practices which pertains only to relations between given 
(that is, prior and self-evident) actors within specific territorial units, but rather as a space of 
interaction situated across and between many territories - interaction which is itself 
127 Olwig, "Cultural sites, " p. 35 
128 Appadurai, Modernity at Large, p. 55 
129 Ibid., p. 199 
10 Giddens, The Consequences of Modernity, p. 64 
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constitutive of new political identities. It is when the nexus of globalisation and political 
practice is viewed in this sense that the possibility of translocal politics begins to emerge. 
Translocal spaces are hence constituted by those technologies and infrastructures which 
allow peoples and cultures to cross great distances and to transcend the boundaries of closed, 
territorial community. Translocality does not refer simply to a 'place, ' nor does it denote a 
collectivity of places. Rather it is an abstract (yet daily manifest) space occupied by the sum 
of linkages and connections between places (media, travel, import/export, etc. ). The notion 
of locality is included within the term in order to suggest a situatedness, but a situatedness 
which is never static. Translocality can be theorised as a mode, one which pertains not to 
how peoples and cultures exist in places, but rather how they move through them. 
Translocality is hence a form of travel. Furthermore, I want to argue that translocality 
disrupts traditional constructions of political identity and gives rise to novel forms of political 
space. In this sense we can claim that certain spatial extensions (i. e. 'places') such as 
migratory or global cities are characterised by a high degree of translocality. In other words, 
translocality can be used to refer to places which peoples and cultures occupy, but in doing so 
it seeks to draw attention to the dynamics of distanciation at work within such locales rather 
than to the 'locatedness' of these places. In summary, under globalising conditions we see 
that political identities are becoming increasingly disembedded from the context of the 
territorial nation-state. What I am seeking is a conceptualisation of this fact which does not 
address the political subject's alienation from the nation-state simply by attempting to 
produce a new, more inclusive model of the state. Rather, I am trying to refigure the scope of 
international political theory such that it becomes more capable of recognising and 
accounting for new political spaces and the identities they construct. As William Connolly 
puts it: 
Instead of defining the most basic problem as one of general alienation or 
fragmentation and the most fundamental response as one of achieving a more 
harmonious collective identity [i. e. a new version of the state], one may define the 
problem as an intensification and territorial extension of pressures for normalization 
that, ironically enough, then produce fracturing and fragmentation by defining an 
enlarged variety of types that do not or cannot conform to established standards of 
normality. 131 
Translocality is hence about recognising forms of politics situated not within the boundaries 
of a territorial space, but rather configured across and in-between such spaces. It is - as I 
have said - about studying what flows through localities rather than what is 'in' them. 
My core thesis, then, might be stated as follows. In an increasingly globalised environment, 
the rigidity of bureaucratic and institutional structures such as the nation-state have allowed 
mounting pressures to produce a certain amount of cracking and fragmentation in their 
frameworks. The inherent fluidity of political identities, however, has allowed them to now 
into, through, and out of these crevices - merging and syncretising as they go - thus creating 
new forms of politics whose dynamics hinge on spatial distanciation rather than on the 
persistence of a fixed territorial space. The multifaceted nature of identity has, under 
translocality, brought forth a diverse new set of political practices. These involve the 
possibility that any given individual may have ties and identity claims which pertain to more 
than one nation or state. Furthermore, the activities of such individuals are not limited to a 
single political space, either in terms of territory or discourse. One's presence in a particular 
territorial state does not restrict one from engaging in transnational relations which seek to 
politicise a component of self-identity which is not "of' the territory from which these 
131 William E. Connolly, Identity/Difference: Democratic Negotiations of Political Paradox, Ithaca: 
Cornell University Press, 1991, p. 172 
40 
activities emanate. The empowering paradox of diaspora, " writes James Clifford, "is that 
dwelling here assumes a solidarity and connection there. But there is not necessarily a 
single place or an exclusivist nation. i132 In other contexts the meaning of the 'translocal' 
becomes richer still. Instead of referring to dynamics and politics which operate across and 
between distinct, bounded nations, the idea of the translocal comes to refer to political 
practices which are simultaneously configured in relation to multiple spaces. A translocal 
identity does not belong to a single, distinct community or locale which, say, happens to be 
talking with, negotiating with, or buying from a (single) other; rather, both localities can be 
seen as constitutive of the single individual. This is what we mean when we speak of 
hybridity - the presence of melange and syncretism in the construction of self-identity. For 
Homi Bhabha, this hybrid 'third space' "displaces the histories that constitute it, and sets up 
new structures of authority, new political initiatives, which are inadequately understood 
through received received wisdom. " 133 The political implications of these hybrid spaces will 
become evident when I go on to look at Muslim translocalities in later chapters. 
In this chapter I have been concerned to map the conceptual ground upon which translocal 
identities are constructed under globalising conditions, and to frame some of the dynamics 
which underpin new forms of post-statist political space. In doing so I have also sought to 
critique some of the ways in which International Relations has traditionally configured 
relations that are inter-, tran- or post-national. In this regard I would echo David Campbell 
when he asks whether International Relations, in its present form: 
... 
is adequate as a mode of understanding global life given the increasing irruptions of 
accelerated and non-territorial contingencies upon our political horizons, irruptions in 
which a disparate but powerful assemblage of flows-flows of people, goods, money, 
ecological factors, disease, ideas, etc. -contest borders, put states into question (without 
rendering them irrelevant), rearticulate spaces, and re-form identities. 134 
Can IR produce a post-national geography based not on horizontally-arranged and 
contiguous, exclusive territories but rather on multiple, overlapping allegiances and post- 
territorial politics? The various processes of cultural displacement surveyed in the chapter 
are constitutive of new forms of political identity and translocal spaces which locate the 
political outside the normative boundaries of the territorial state. We need to write IR so that 
it speaks to this fact. 
The same forces which have brought about translocal spaces have also given rise to 
phenomenal increases in the extent to which people communicate and encounter each other 
across the boundaries of cultures, ethnicities, nations and other communities - indeed, 
translocality has been responsible for bringing about significant changes in the nature and 
shape of these boundaries as well. In addition, the processes of decolonisation and a 
changing international labour environment have resulted in new dynamics of migration which 
have challenged (if not eradicated altogether) the very possibility of the homogenous nation- 
state. The era of translocality has hence radicalised our encounters with difference in such a 
way that we are increasingly forced to recognise the contingency of our own conceptions of 
society in the face of `the others. ' As Mike Featherstone puts it, "[t]hings formerly held apart 
are now brought into contact and juxtaposition. Cultures pile on top of each other in heaps 
132 James Clifford, Routes: Travel and Translation in the Late Twentieth Centwy, Cambridge, MA: 
Harvard University Press, 1997, p. 269 
133 "The Third Space: Interview with Homi Bhabha" in Jonathan Rutherford (ed. ), Identity: Community, 
Culture, Difference, London: Lawrence and Wishart, 1990, p. 211 
134 David Campbell, "Political Prosaics, Transversal Politics, and the Anarchical World" in Michael J. 
Shapiro and Hayward R. Alker (eds. ), Challenging Boundaries: Global Flows, Territorial Identities, 
Minneapolis: University of Minnesota Press, 1996, p. 9 
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without any obvious organizing principles. There is too much culture to handle and organise 
into coherent belief systems, means of orientation and practical knowledge. " 135 Over the last 
fifty years or so, globalising processes have also given birth to translocal actors on a scale 
which is historically unprecedented; ethnic minorities, diaspora groups, and migrant workers 
are all examples of this phenomenon. When bodies travel, so obviously do cultures. But 
what is the nature of a `travelling culture' and what metamorphosis does it undergo in the 
process of transit? 
135 Mike Featherstone, Undoing Culture: Globalization, Postmodernism and Identity, London: SAGE, 
1995, p. 6 
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Chapter II 
'Islam, ' Muslims and the Umma: Before, During and After the West 
The sheikh [of the land of Halba] removed his turban and rubbed his hand across his head, then put it 
back and said, "Freedom is the sacred value accepted by everyone. " 
I protested. "This freedom has overstepped the boundaries of Islam. " 
"But it is also sacred in the Islam of Halba. " 
Frustrated, I said, "If our Prophet were to be resurrected today he would reject this side of your Islam. " 
"And were he, may the blessings and peace of God be upon him, to be resurrected, " he in turn inquired, 
"would he not reject the whole of your Islam? " 
- Naguib Mahfouz, The Journey of Ibn Fattouma 
Theory is no longer naturally "at home" in the West -a powerful place of Knowledge, History, or 
Science, a place to collect, sift translate and generalize. Or, more cautiously, this privileged place is 
now increasingly contested, cut across, by other locations, claims, trajectories of knowledge articulating 
racial, gender, and cultural differences. But how is theory appropriated and resisted, located and 
displaced? How do theories travel among the unequal spaces of postcolonial confusion and 
contestation? What are their predicaments? How does theory travel and how do theorists travel? 
Complex, unresolved questions. 
- James Clifford, "Notes on Theory and Travel" 
In the first chapter of this thesis I sought to explain why International Relations needs to 
engage more closely with literatures that offer a sophisticated political sociology of 
globalisation. To this end I suggested that IR might be able to interact profitably with fields 
such as anthropology, postcolonial studies and transnational sociology. I also argued for an 
expansion of the theoretical parameters of 'the political' within international relations as a 
means to better understanding the political dynamics of what I termed translocal space. I 
concluded the chapter by submitting a query about the nature of the 'travelling' cultures and 
politics we find in translocality. In the rest of the thesis I will go about providing an answer 
to this through an exploration of the changing boundaries of Muslim political community. 
Obviously I could never hope to offer a comprehensive study of globalisation and political 
Islam within the space available to me here. Rather, in the context of this thesis I will focus 
on two important aspects of translocality identified in Chapter I, the movement of peoples 
and the rise of communication and information technologies, and examine how they are 
experienced by a selection of political communities within the contemporary Muslim world. 
I want to suggest that by studying the 'grass-roots' impact of globalisation in this way, we can 
perhaps discover important things about how transnational and globalising forces affect the 
configuration of Muslim political identity in relation to other identities, both Muslim and 
non-Muslim. Furthermore, I want to argue that these same processes are also helping to 
transform the boundaries of political community in Islam. In essence I am seeking to 
understand what happens to Islam when, as a theory, it travels. Islam is particularly 
interesting here in that as a religion it is already, at least in theory, a non-territorial force. As 
a normative code Islam is equally valid wherever a Muslim might find himself. At the same 
time, however, throughout history different territories - or "places" - have significantly 
mediated Islam and continue to do so today. We also find here a very strong, and, as I will 
later argue, overdetermining sense of what Edward Said would call Islam's "point of origin. " 
The specific questions I asked at the end of the previous chapter about what travelling 
cultures look like and what happens to them in translocality will be held in stasis for the 
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duration of the present chapter. In this chapter I want to explain how I understand Islam's 
discursive function in the context of debates on religion and politics. I will first explain why 
I think an emphasis on Muslim subjectivity rather than on something called 'Islam' will be 
more helpful in our explorations of shifting identities in translocal space. In order to 
illuminate the wider context into which Muslim politics are articulated today I will review 
Bobby Sayyid's theory on Eurocentrism and the emergence of Islamism. I will suggest that 
he offers a powerful account of how the decentring of the West has allowed non-Western 
voices - and Islam in particular - to be heard, but then fails to give adequate attention to 
competing discourses within Islam as to what Islamism should be. It is my argument that 
such debates and negotiations over Muslim authenticity and authority are particularly rich 
when they take place in translocality - especially when compared to the Islam of various 
territorially and discursively bounded lifeworlds. I then go on to look at one important 
elaboration of Islamic political community, the notion of the umma, in two historical 
settings: the early years of Islam in Medina, and the colonial environment of the late 
nineteenth and early twentieth centuries. Both are contexts in which the umma had particular 
salience as a political category, and both play important roles in animating contemporary 
Muslim political imaginaries and discourses. 
The metatheoretical parameters of Islam 
I want to begin with some comments about a particular choice of terminology. In the context 
of this study, I will assign a connotation to the term `Muslim' which is somewhat different 
from the seemingly synonymous designation `Islamic. ' On my understanding, to speak of a 
muslim (in Arabic, "one who surrenders") is simply to speak of a subject-consciousness 
which considers itself to possess or practice a form of identity which derives from something 
called Islam, regardless of what form one's consciousness of the latter takes. I choose to 
emphasise the `Muslim, ' then, in order to orient this study towards exploring the self- 
descriptions of those who consider themselves to be practising something called Islam. That 
is not to say, however, that I am advocating a form of methodological individualism. Indeed, 
I fully realise that individuals only exist as such through constitutive interaction with wider 
communities and normative systems. Rather, I am seeking to avoid the essentialism which 
can so easily be engendered by speaking about a single (absolute) system called Islam. In the 
same way, the term Islamic is problematic in that it would appear to suggest that there exists 
a body of thought or discursive practice which can be identified as 'authentic' or 'real' Islam. 
I wish the reader therefore to be aware that when I do use the term 'Islamic, ' I mean it to be 
seen within the context of a particular community's (or individual's) understanding of Islam. 
Occasionally, I will also use the term 'Islamism' which I take to refer to the attempt to 
articulate a political order based around Islam. My aim is to emphasise the multiple, cross- 
cutting interpretations which produce and reproduce various understandings of this religion 
across an equally diverse range of sociocultural contexts. So I enter this discourse with 
caution and fully cognisant of the fact that, as Edward Mortimer states, "[f]or me, in my 
condition of jahiliyya [pre- or non-Islamic ignorance], there is no Islam, in the sense of an 
abstract, unchangeable entity, existing independently of the men and women who profess it. 
There is only what I hear Muslims say, and see them do. "' It is therefore only possible to 
work within the confines of the various discursive fields which Muslim communities 
produce, and without recourse to any Archimedian perspective from which 'Islam' as a 
totality can be observed. At the same time, however, I do not want to suggest that those 
Muslims who claim that there is only one Islam are wrong in their convictions. Indeed, there 
is a very strong sense in which there is only one Islam. I see the signifier Islam in its 
singular, universal manifestation as playing a very particular (and vitally constitutive) role in 
1 Edward Mortimer, Faith and Power: The Politics of Islam, London: Faber, 1982, p. 396 
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Muslim political communities. Like Bobby Sayyid, I would suggest that Islam can be most 
usefully viewed as a form of master signifier: 
The master signifier functions as the most abstract principle by which any discursive 
space is totalized. In other words, it is not that a discursive horizon is established by 
a coalition of nodal points [e. g. 'Islamic' practices], but rather by the use of a signifier 
that represents the totality of that structure. The more extensive a discourse is, the 
less specific each element within it will be: it will become simply another instance of 
a more general identity. The dissolution of the specificity and concreteness of the 
constituent elements clears the path for a master signifier becoming more and more 
abstract, until it reaches a limit at which it does not have any specific manifestations: 
it simply refers to the community as a whole and it becomes the principle of reading 
that community. 2 
I take this to mean that Islam does not refer to a specific set of beliefs or practices, but rather 
that it functions as a totalising abstraction through which meaning and discourse can be 
organised. 
Some writers have tried to come to terms with the diversity of the Islamic world by speaking 
of 'Islams' in the plural. 3 Their motivation is usually to escape the essentialising practices of 
Orientalism which on the one hand seek to impute some essence or immutable quality to 
Islam and on the other to avoid confirming the discourses of those contemporary Islamist 
ideologues who wish to portray their interpretation of the religion as the one and only "true" 
Islam. By positing the existence of a multitude of 'Islams', however, these writers risk 
reproducing the very essentialism they wish to combat and also severely relegating Islam's 
legitimacy as a religious doctrine. This is an approach which flies in the face of the fact that 
the vast majority of Muslims, despite a clear cognisance of their religion's diversity, see 
themselves as adhering very firmly to a single Islam. 4 To speak of 'Islams' is to be haunted 
by a sense of boundaries; it gives the impression that there is some point where one Islam 
leaves off and another picks up. I prefer to think of Islam as something far more fluid. This 
is why when speaking of Islam, I prefer to see different aspects of a single master signifier, 
with each aspect becoming "another instance of a more general identity. " Islam can hence be 
seen as a single discursive field -a 'lifeworld' perhaps - yet one whose borders are 
constantly changing. In this sense there is only one Islam, but this does not necessarily have 
any direct correlation with the lived experience of being (or making oneself to be) a Muslim, 
nor does it have to impart any essence or teleology to the religion. Islam is narrated, yet the 
multiple forms of this narration do not destroy but rather build a greater whole. Talal Asad 
captures this well when he writes: 
While narrative history does not have to be teleological, it does presuppose an 
identity [e. g. "Islam"] that is the subject of that narrative. Even when that identity is 
analyzed into its heterogeneous parts (class, gender, regional divisions, etc. ), what is 
done, surely, is to reveal its constitution, not to dissolve its unity. The unity is 
maintained by those who speak in its name, and more generally by all who adjust 
their existence to its (sometimes shifting) requirements. 5 
2 Bobby S. Sayyid, A Fundamental Fear: Eurocentrism and the Emergence of Islamism, London: Zed 
Books, 1997, p. 47 
3 See e. g. Abdul Hamid M. el-Zein, "Beyond Ideology and Theology: The Search for the Anthropology 
of Islam, " Annual Review ofAnthropology, Vol. 6,1977, pp. 227-54 and Aziz al-Azmeh, Islams and 
Modernities, London: Verson, 2"d Edition, 1996. 
a Dale Eickelman, "The Study of Islam in Local Contexts, " Contributions to Asian Studies, Vol. 17, 
1982, p. I 
5 Talal Asad, Genealogies of Religion, Baltimore: Johns Hopkins University Press, 1993, pp. 16-17 
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The singularity of Islam does not, therefore, have to be seen as inimical to the social 
construction of Islam. It offers to its believers a set of meanings, but as Veena Das argues, 
these meanings are "not to be interpreted once, and correctly, but continually reinterpreted, 
for meanings assigned to the word of God by human efforts can only be approximations. 116 
Once we have recognised the plurality of meaning derived from Islam, we will want to go on 
to ask something about the nature of these meanings. What does Islam 'mean' to the Muslim? 
In what form does its significance manifest itself? As Aziz al-Azmeh notes, "Islam appears 
as an eminently protean category. " According to him, Islam refers variously to a religion, a 
history, a community, a culture, an 'exotic' object and a complete political programme. 7 So 
while Islam is a product of discourse and social construction, it is also usually seen to fall 
within one of several conceptual categories - most commonly perhaps, that of religion. The 
point I wish to make here is that when we observe Islam from within an epistemology which 
assigns it to a distinct sphere of activity then we have already to some extent delineated the 
limits of what Islam can or cannot be. That is, in so far as we invest the concept of religion 
with a particular significance or set of meanings (which inevitably derive from our own 
experiences of it, e. g. seeing religion as primarily concerned with founding myths, the 
transcendental and questions of eschatology), we necessarily bring traces of that same 
template of meaning to any other phenomenon whose outward form leads us to give it the 
label 'religion. ' 
I am not seeking here to argue that we are somehow unjustified in treating Islam as a 
religion, nor am I advocating the point of view of those writers - usually Orientalists8 or, 
ironically, some of the more extreme Islamists - who have a vested interest in arguing that 
Islam is far more than a religion and hence that one cannot make any meaningful distinctions 
between categories such as religion and politics in Islam. Rather, I simply wish to point out 
that when we calibrate our discursive horizons with reference to totalising categories, we 
inevitably view our chosen object of observation through a particular lens. For example, if 
we commence our analysis with a presumption that these things called 'religions' inhabit a 
realm called 'the private, ' this will necessarily mediate our perception of any religion which 
assumes a very prominent public role (i. e. it will be seen as somehow 'out of place'). Talal 
Asad argues that there can be no universal definition of the category religion because "not 
only [are] its constituent elements and relationships historically specific, but that definition is 
itself the historical product of discursive processes. "9 I wish, therefore, in the present context 
to treat Islam not merely as one example of the more general category religion, but rather as a 
discursive construct which operates as an important bearer of social meaning within 
particular communities. What we must be careful of, however, is the tendency in much 
writing to allow the appellation "Islamic" to overdetermine the meanings we assign to 
objects, ideas and people - as if something is suddenly wholly transformed when it becomes 
associated with Islam. Again it is usually those standing to gain the most from emphasising 
the exceptionalism of Islam (Orientalists and the more extreme Islamists) who engage in this 
sort of descriptive practice: 
[For them] there are "Islamic cities" unlike all other cities, "Islamic economies" to 
which economic reason in inapplicable, "Islamic politics" impenetrable to social 
sciences and political sense, "Islamic history" to which the normal equipment of 
historical research is not applied. Facts are disassociated from their historical, 
6 Veena Das, "For a folk-theology and theological anthropology of Islam, " Contributions to Indian 
Sociology, Vol. 18, No. 2,1984, p. 296 
al-Azmeh, p. 65 
8 See Edward Said, Orientalism, London: Penguin, 1995. 
9 Asad, Genealogies of Religion, p. 29 
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social, cultural and other contexts, and reduced to this substantive Islamism of the 
European [and extremist] imagination. 10 
Likewise the ease with which Islam becomes the explanatory variable of any given 
sociocultural condition. For example, when women are discriminated against in 
predominantly secular societies (e. g. the United States or the United Kingdom) the culprit is 
usually seen to be something called "patriarchy" (i. e. an historical-structural explanation is 
given); however, similar discrimination in predominantly Muslim societies is usually 
immediately ascribed to Islam. In this sense, Islam often offers the easy way out, both for 
analysts seeking a quick explanation and for the policy-makers of the societies in question 
who want to sidestep the structural causes of gender inequality and the mistreatment of 
women by referring to 'cultural' causes which are conveniently "out of their hands. " I do not 
want to go too far with this, however. I do not want to suggest that an object is wholly 
untouched by its association with Islam, nor do I wish to claim that Islam has nothing to do 
with the ways in which Muslim women are treated. Any object is at least partially 
constituted through conjunction with a discursive field such as Islam. Islam cannot therefore 
be dismissed as nothing more than a "secondary element. " Rather, what needs to be asked is 
why the language of Islam is used for the articulation of various socio-political projects: 
Enumerating the variety of functions of Islam does not answer the question of why it 
is that its name is evoked. For anti-orientalists its importance is due to merely to its 
use as a source of symbolic authority and validation - in other words its 
instrumentality. They, for the most part, do not enquire why it is that Islam is being 
used in this way. Islam matters. Therefore, it needs to be theorized. ' 1 
Hence while "Islamic economies" or "Islamic histories" do not possess uniquely "Islamic" 
ontologies, the coupling of history and Islam does have an important discursive function 
related to the production of authority and authenticity. This will be made more clear when I 
go on to discuss the nature of politics and religion in the context of Islam. 
I have already mentioned the problems associated with taking Islam simply as an example of 
the category we call religion without attending to the political implications of doing so. 
When one sets out to write about political communities within an ostensibly "religious" 
tradition, the question of the distinction between religion and politics - and whether such a 
thing even exists - becomes vital. This issue is particularly pertinent in the case of Islam 
because it is often claimed that in this context there is no distinction to be made between 
religion and politics. Many commentators subscribe to the formula al-islam din wa dawla 
("Islam is both religion and state") which they claim has been a core assumption of Islamic 
thought since the medieval period, 12 although there are other writers who suggest that this 
particular creed began appearing in Islamist writings only very recently. 13 Either way, it 
certainly is not true to say that there have been no historical divisions between the 'clergy' 
and structures of the Islamic state - much the same way that it would be ridiculous to 
maintain that there has never been any overlap between Church and Emperor in the European 
Christian tradition. The terms din and dawla may not correspond exactly to what is usually 
understood by religion and state in conceptual terms, but the very fact that we have separate 
lexemes to distinguish din and dawla means that there is some notion of difference in 
operation here. While Islamic political history has indeed seen cases of symbiotic, mutually- 
1° al-Azmeh, pp. 177-8 
" Sayyid, p. 40 
12 James Piscatori, Islam in a World of Nation-Stales, Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, p. 11 
13 According to the research of Reinhard Schulze, for example, this set phrase is less than two hundred 
years old. See his "Islam und Herrschaft. Zur politischen Instrumentalisierung einer Religion" in M. 
Luders (ed. ), Der Islam im Aufbruch? Perspektive der arabischen Welt, Munich: Piper Publ., 1992. 
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legitimising alliance between 'ulamä' (religious scholars, sing. 'alim) and various temporal 
dynasties, it has also given us periods of bitter acrimony and open conflict between the two. 
But this is not the point. The question of a distinction between religion and politics is not 
one that can be answered simply by identifying the agents of each ("clergy" and "state") and 
then looking for overlap or disjuncture between them. What we are faced with here is rather 
a question about whether 'the religious' and 'the political' are modes which occupy the same 
discursive space. My claim is that, in fact, they do occupy the same discursive space in the 
sense that they can both be seen as forms of social authority. I want to make this argument 
by referring back to how I defined 'the political' and 'political community' in the previous 
chapter. We recall that one important aspect of the political involves ethical claims or the 
assertion of a normative vision. In this regard there is a great deal of overlap between 
politics and religion in that they both posit a particular idea of 'the good. ' I want to define 
social authority by linking it to these normative projects. On my reading, authority does not 
refer to one's power to control or coerce behavior, but rather to one's capacity to command 
allegiance to a particular set of ethical claims (e. g. Islam or Marxism). In the same way that I 
have defined political community as the object of a particular mode of politics (i. e. a 
normative project), we can also now define the same community as the constituency of a 
given social authority. By emphasising the ethical components of religion and politics we 
are able to read both as forms of social authority rather than as modes which occupy 
disparate spaces. When I speak of Muslim political community, however, I am not seeking to 
imply that the ethical claims of 'the political' take precedence over those of 'the religious' in 
Islam. Rather, my aim is to emphasise the political (i. e. negotiational or dialogic) aspect of 
this community. In this sense a Muslim political community 
relate[s] to widely shared, although not doctrinally defined, traditions of ideas and 
practice.. . 
[T]he forms of political contest and discourse as well as the meanings of 
traditions vary widely, but a constant across the Muslim world is the invocation of 
ideas and symbols [i. e. an ethical code], which Muslims in different contexts identify 
as ̀ Islamic, ' in support of their organized claims and counterclaims. 14 
In summary, I believe that contemporary debates about the compatibility of religion and 
politics in the modern world - the sort often waged today between Islamists and 'liberal 
secularists' - need to be viewed not as instances of modernity confronting premodernity (ä la 
Orientalism) or as wholly incommensurable woridviews (according to the extreme Islamists), 
but rather as an encounter between two forms of social authority - both eminently modern - 
reified by the passing of Western modernity's totalising reign over the discursive field of the 
modern. This latter claim, borrowed from Bobby Sayyid, will have to be substantiated, and 
this I will do in the next section. My point in doing this is to recognise that we cannot say 
anything meaningful about Muslim political discourse in translocality without first 
understanding something of how Islam fits into the 'wider picture' of debates about Western 
hegemony, modernity and postmodernity. This is especially important insofar as many of the 
Muslim communities we will be examining in later chapters live in and are confronted by the 
West on a daily basis. Their conversations with the West, I will be arguing later, play an 
important role in defining who they are as Muslims and also what Islam is in the face of the 
West. 
Islam, modernity and the West 
As I have said, it is impossible to comprehend contemporary Muslim political discourse 
without first situating it in a complex set of debates about Western hegemony, modernity 
14 Dale Eickelman and James Piscatori, Muslim Politics, Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1995, 
p. 4 
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and, to some extent, postmodernity. The literature here is vast and I could never hope to 
cover it comprehensively in the space available. I will therefore focus only on those aspects 
of the debate which are necessary for developing a reading of Islamism as a form of post- 
hegemonic discourse. Although the emphasis of this thesis is primarily on conversations 
taking place within Islam, it is vital that I also give some attention to the relationship between 
Islam, modernity and the West, especially since much of the "internal" debate within 
translocal Islam is about how to respond to the West. We encounter an immediate difficulty, 
though, in that the labels 'West' and 'Islam' are themselves highly problematic. One of the 
first questions we might be tempted to ask concerns the commensurability of the two 
categories which these words describe; that is, we might want to assert that because Islam 
and the West are words that refer to totally different types of things, they simply cannot be 
compared - end of story. If, however, we look carefully at each of them as instances of 
political discourse, then dialogue is enabled. 
Taken at face value, 'Islam' is the name of a religion while 'the West' is a geographic signifier 
conventionally used in reference to those cultural spheres in which power, social 
organisation and logos are legitimised and explained in terms of a master signifier derived 
from the history of European reason. In this sense, then, the West is purely a discursive 
creation and something that does not so easily correspond to one category or another (e. g. 
religion, ideology, etc. ) of the standard taxonomy of analytical abstractions which the West 
has created for its own use. So how can we best characterise the relationship between these 
two discursive constructs, Islam and the West? The opinions on this issue in the literature 
are numerous and diverse. Some see inherent, irreconcilable tension and hostility between 
the two, while others claim them to be entirely compatible. We also find every possible 
position between these two poles. This vast spectrum of opinion can be explained in part by 
the fact that different writers work with very different conceptions of what constitutes Islam 
and the West, and also at varying levels of essentialism/abstraction. There is often a 
tendency in the literature, as I mentioned earlier in this chapter, to posit a monolithic Islam 
and to then compare it with an equally undifferentiated West. Aside from the production of 
severely stereotyped images on both sides, there is a much more serious problem with this 
kind of analysis. It would seem that the goal here is usually one of determining whether 
Islam and the West are harmonious - that is, the extent to which they can 'go together. ' They 
are treated as two given (or predetermined), separate objects, and the task is to see if they are 
compatible. 
This line of inquiry, I would argue, is wholly unproductive. On the one hand it is pointless in 
so far as the high level of abstraction involved - 'Islam' vs. the 'West' - prevents us from 
determining the extent to which the socially embedded manifestations of these phenomena 
actually correspond to the master signifiers (which is not the point anyway), and hence 
whether or not the latter are 'compatible. ' This method also tells us very little about the 
ontologies of Islam and the West, about the extent to which they might actually have 
important influences on each other's very existence. 
The anthropologist Talal Asad has remarked on a certain asymmetry in exchange between 
the West and the non-West, namely that "people from non-Western countries feel obliged to 
read the history of the West.. . and 
Westerners in turn do not feel the same need to study non- 
Western histories. "15 As a generalisation this is a fair point, but the nature of "cross-reading" 
between the West and the non-West has, of course, been far more complex. There are 
various ways to view this relationship. An Orientalist reformulation of Asad's statement 
would most likely read something like this: "People from non-Western countries have been 
obliged by the West to read and indoctrinate themselves with the history of the West, but 
's Asad, Genealogies of Religion, p. 1 
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Westerners do not feel the need to study non-Western histories except to confirm that non- 
Western histories are heading in the wrong direction. " This sort of discourse is usually 
constructed by using a set of binary oppositions - e. g. reason vs. dogma, democracy vs. 
despotism, civilization vs. medievalism, modernity vs. tradition - with the first component of 
each pair corresponding to the West, and the second to the non-West. " I am most interested 
in this last pair, "modernity vs. tradition, " because modernity seems to me the most general 
or abstract quality of all those on offer, the one which best subsumes the others (reason, 
democracy, civilisation) and is often seen to be most intimate, if not actually synonymous, 
with the West. 
Modernity, though, is somewhat ambiguous in character. Part of the problem seems to be 
that no one is quite sure exactly what "modernity" means. Is it simply a description of certain 
qualities, or is it a normative project? At various points throughout its discursive history 
modernity seems to have been associated with almost every intellectual trend since the 
European Renaissance: humanism, secularism, enlightenment, liberalism, capitalism, etc. 
What we should note here is the crucial qualifier "European. " The implication is that 
modernity is something produced by and constitutive of the West. Despite the fact that 
references to this latter appellation are ubiquitous, 'the West' - as I have noted above - is 
itself a highly problematic concept. It is one of those terms which everyone seems to know 
and understand, yet which is most difficult to define with any kind of analytic precision. It is 
a space (both physically and discursively) which contains an enormous corpus of thought, 
history and culture. Although it ostensibly refers to a place, or put another way, a "where", I 
believe we gain a better understanding of the discursive function of the West if we view it 
more as something that describes variously a "who", a "what", a "when", and a "why. " In 
other words, there tends to be an assumption that certain people are Westerners (the "who"), 
that these people embody norms and ideals which derive from a particular Western history 
(the "what"), that this history reaches its maturity during the phase we call modernity (the 
"when") and that the entire Western project is underpinned by the logic of a particular telos 
(the "why"). 
It is more difficult, however, to define the substance of each of these categories. Different 
writers choose to define and deploy the West in different ways within the various schemes 
and frameworks they construct. Very often readers consulting the indices of recent grand 
treatises on social or historical theory for an entry on'the West' will find themselves referred 
elsewhere - advised perhaps to'see Europe, ' or'see capitalism. ' These re-routings can offer 
us a few hints as to the discursive space occupied by the West. It could also be said that in 
attempting to trace the origins of the West as a discursive category what we really want to 
know is something about how the West is thought. Stuart Hall contends that our discourses 
on the West act in four main ways: (i) as instruments of classification which permit us to 
define various societies according to a binary opposition, West or non-West. In this sense 
they "set a certain structure of thought and knowledge in motion. "17; (ii) as sets of images or 
systems of representation which serve to associate (both verbally and visually) particular 
cultures, peoples and traits with various normative categories - e. g. Western democrats = 
good, non-Western 'oriental despots'= bad. These are similar to the binary oppositions I 
referred to above; (iii) as abstract standards of comparison which allow us to determine the 
extent to which societies and cultures are distinct from one another. "Non-western societies 
can accordingly be said to be 'close to' or 'far away from' or 'catching up with' the West. It 
helps to explain difference. " 1s; and (iv) as determinants of the criteria according to which 
16 Mahmut Mutman, "Under the Sign of Orientalism: The West vs. Islam, " Cultural Critique, Winter 
1992-93, p. 165 
17 Stuart Hall, "The West and the Rest: Discourse and Power" in Stuart Hall and Bram Gieben (eds. ), 
Formations of Modernity, Cambridge: Polity Press, 1992, p. 277 
1' Ibid. 
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societies are ranked and judged - that is, they "produce a certain kind of knowledge about a 
subject and certain attitudes towards it. " 19 
It should be pointed out that the typology of Western discourse outlined by Hall above is 
most prevalent within Western societies themselves. The process of 'Westernisation' can 
perhaps therefore be thought of as the attempt by the West to propagate these discourses 
about itself (i. e. as the criteria for the'good life') beyond its own borders. Furthermore, at the 
discursive level the West has sought to acquire hegemony, to represent itself as a "universal" 
and "natural" mode. By doing so it has set itself up as the benchmark by which any and 
every theory (or community) is to be judged. For example, there is often this idea that Islam, 
in order to be seen as valid, must first experience the same sequence of epistemological 
progression found in Western self-descriptions: secularisation leading to Enlightenment 
leading to democracy, capitalism and all the other'good stuff - in short, "modernity. " In this 
sense Islam remains trapped within the West's hegemonic description of the history of 
knowledge. The West, in order to evaluate Islam, needs to place it somewhere along the 
timeline of European epistemology and more often than not this becomes a process of what 
Johannes Fabian has termed "pushing the other back in time. 1'20 This is where descriptions of 
Islam as "medieval" or "traditional" enter the picture. Islam becomes yet another object to be 
catalogued, categorised and named? ' 
The problem here is the way in which the West dehistoricises itself. Europe wants to claim 
the particularity of its own historical experience as a universal, as a set of ideas and values 
that should be binding on all humankind. What it fails to acknowledge is that what it 
represents as universal is nothing more than another particularity, albeit one which has 
succeeded in acquiring hegemonic status. In this sense there is no sharp distinction to be 
drawn between modernity and tradition because modernity is revealed as a form of tradition. 
As Asad writes: 
When people talk about liberalism as a tradition, they recognise that it is a tradition 
in which there are possibilities of argument, reformulation, and encounter with other 
traditions, that there is a possibility of addressing contemporary problems through 
the liberal tradition. So one thinks of liberalism as a tradition central to modernity. 
How is it that one has something that is a tradition but that is also central to 
modernity? Clearly, liberalism is not a mixture of the traditional and the modern. It 
is a tradition that defines one central aspect of Western modernity. It is no less 
modern by virtue of being a tradition than anything else is modern.. . 
Once we set that 
grand narrative [of "Western" modernity], that normative history aside, we can start 
asking not, "What should such-and-such a people be doing? ", but "What do they aim 
at doing? And why? ". We can learn to elaborate that question in historically specific 
terms. This certainly applies to our attempts to understand politico-religious 
movements, especially Islamic movements. It is foolish, I think, to ask: "Why are 
19 Ibid. 
20 Johannes Fabian, Time and the Other: How Anthropology Makes its Object, New York: Columbia 
University Press, 1983. Quoted in Mutman, op. cit. 
21 Perhaps even quite literally "named. " Citing Wilfred Cantwell Smith's remarks on the absence of the 
term 'Islam' in the titles of books written by Muslims in the late eighteenth and early nineteenth century, 
Armando Salvatore argues that "through the consolidation of transcultural dynamics between the 
"West" and "Islam" the originally endogenous process of reification of the latter became ineluctably 
heteronomous and no longer in pace with its subjectification. As a side-effect, Western Orientalists 
gained increasing legitimation for their view according to which Islam as such is the vehicle of a 
communal ethos and a collective identity that are, nonetheless, virtually devoid of any subjective labour 
comparable to the modem Western one. " See Armando Salvatore, Islam and the Political Discourse of 
Modernity, Reading: Ithaca Press, 1997, p. 76 
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these movements not moving in the direction History requires them to? ". But that is 
precisely what is being asked when scholars say: "What leads the people in these 
movements to behave so irrationally, in such a reactionary manner? " 
22 
In other words, we have to stop asking the sorts of questions in which the "correct" answers 
are already predetermined by the interrogatory act. What Asad is arguing for here is a form 
of inquiry which moves beyond a paradigm in which the particularity or "tradition" of 
Western norms are allowed to masquerade as a form of objective "science. " In terms of 
methodology, he gives us some indication as to what kinds of questions need to be asked. 
Where we run into problems, however, is at the level of conceptual discourse. If a 
concomitant of Western universality is that it becomes impossible to engage in any sort of 
theorising without resorting to Western conceptual categories then it would seem that we are 
trapped. Even the act of advancing "non-Western" claims becomes yet another instance of 
Western discourse. Is there any escape from this paradox? Some think so. In the next 
section I want to look at one such argument developed by Bobby Sayyid. Through a series of 
adroit theoretical manoeuvres he seeks to free Islam from Western hegemony by refiguring 
the condition of post-modernity as one in which the West is de-centred and Europe 
provincialised. 
Islam beyond Eurocentrism 
In his A Fundamental Fear: Eurocentrism and the Emergence of Islamism, Bobby Sayyid 
seeks to read political Islam as a discourse which emerges out of cracks in Western 
hegemony. His first move in this process is to establish the modern character of Islamist 
thought. Taking Imam Khomeini as his representative Islamist, Sayyid argues - with 
supporting evidence from a variety of political sociologists - that despite the conventional 
depiction of Khomeini as an archaic extremist, his political theory can in fact only be 
understood in the context of modernity. Because Khomeini's writing relies heavily on 
categories associated with Western political thought, e. g. 'the people' as political agents and 
the legislative properties of the state, we must understand him as a thoroughly modern 
theorist. Nowhere in his principal treatise, however, does Khomeini refer to Western 
political theory. He writes as if it does not exist. Most commentators, Sayyid notes, are 
unimpressed by this. They tend to see the modernity of Khomeini's thought as sufficient 
evidence of its Western character (i. e. modernity and the West are effectively conflated). 
What these writers are claiming, in effect, is that Khomeini's non-Western credentials are 
weak. What he proposes as 'authentic tradition' is actually Western theory dolled up in 
Islamic garb. Talal Asad, however, takes issue with this line of thought. For him it 
reproduces an essentialist dichotomy between tradition and modernity which, as we have 
seen above, simply does not exist: 
[M]any writers describe the movements in Iran and Egypt as only partly modern and 
suggest that it is their mixing of tradition and modernity that account for their 
"pathological" character. This kind of description paints Islamic movements as 
being somehow inauthentically traditional on the assumption that "real tradition" is 
unchanging, repetitive, and non-rational. In this way, these movements cannot be 
understood on their own terms as being at once modern and traditional, both 
authentic and creative at the same time. 23 
22 Talal Asad, "Modern Power and the Reconfiguration of Religious Traditions, " Stanford Electronic 
Humanities Review, Vol. 5, Issue 1: Contested Politics, 1996, pp. 1/4-5 
23 Ibid., p. 1 
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The largest problem with this conventional discourse on modernity, according to Sayyid, is 
that modernity and the West are used interchangeably, as if they are the same thing. He goes 
on to argue that within the West, modernity operates as a tautological structure which 
constructs itself as the West: "Modernity positions itself as a ruptural moment which divides 
history in two. It is this rupture that gives birth to the West and marks it off as being 
unique. i24 Sayyid is therefore faced with the following problem. He has established that 
Islamism is something modern and wants to maintain this characterisation. At the same time, 
however, he realises that the Eurocentrism of modernity dooms it to be a quality associated 
exclusively with the West. Consequently, by asserting that Islamism is modern he is also 
saying that it is Western (for if Islamism=modernity and modernit)=the West then 
Islamism=the West). He is now faced with a range of options. He could affirm the Western 
nature of Islamism, but believes that this would severely dilute the efficacy of the West as an 
analytical concept. He could retract his claim that Islamism is modern but is loathe to do this 
because he is fully convinced by the argument that Islamist theory (at least in its Khomeinist 
form) contains elements that did not exist before the modern age. So he decides to go the 
ambitious route: 
A third option would be to see in Islamism an attempt to articulate a modernity that 
is not structured around Eurocentrism. That is, to take seriously the Islamists' claims 
to being a movement dedicated to a denial of the West, but not to read in this 
rejection of the West an attempt to re-establish 'traditional' agrarian societies. To do 
this means renegotiating the identity of modernity as well as that of the West. 25 
The project here is to construct an Islamic modernity, one which retains modern features but 
which elaborates them without reference to or in conjunction with Western political theory, 
a modernity divorced from the West. 26 Sayyid's strategy here is complex. He does not reach 
his destination by describing a specifically 'Islamic' form of modernity, or by enumerating the 
various features which such an entity might possess. Rather, he concentrates his efforts on 
the crucial task of decoupling modernity from the West. It is here that the notion of 
Eurocentrism becomes important in his argument. 
I define eurocentrism as the discourse that emerges in the context of the decentring 
of the West; that is, a context in which the relationship between the western 
enterprise and universalism is open to disarticulation and re-articulation. The 
discourse of eurocentrism is an attempt to suture the interval between the West and 
the idea of a centre (that is, a universal template). Eurocentrism is a project to 
recentre the West, a project that is only possible when the West and the centre are no 
longer considered to be synonymous. It is an attempt to sustain the universality of 
the western project, in conditions in which its universality can no longer be taken for 
granted. 27 
24 Sayyid, p. 103 
2-Ibid., p. 105 
26 Interestingly, Reinhard Schulze argues that a variation on this theme can be found in certain breeds of 
Islamist thinking where "modernity is seen not as the negation of Islam but as its predecessor. All that 
is not Islamic is necessarily modern, and on the other hand, all that is truly Islamic perfects the Modern. 
Consequently, Islam and modernity did not form an antithesis, but rather a historical chain: modernity 
would inevitably flow into Islam. " This reads almost like an Islamist reformulation of Lenin's ideas on 
imperialism and capitalism: "Islam, the highest form of modernity. " See Reinhard Schulze, "How 
Medieval is Islam? Muslim Intellectuals and Modernity" in Jochen Hippler and Andrea Lueg (eds. ), 
The Next Threat. - Western perceptions of Islam, London: Pluto Press, 1995, p. 61 
27 Sayyid, p. 128 
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Sayyid links this trend with the rise of a post-modern condition in the sense of a scepticism 
towards metanarratives ä la Jean-Francois Lyotard. The West is seen to be gradually losing 
its discursive monopoly on all that is good, and Eurocentrism functions to preserve the 
linkage between the West and universality. It is in this light that Sayyid would want to read 
a text such as Francis Fukuyama's claims about the 'End of History. ' Other writers confirm 
that Sayyid is not alone in his assessment. Mehrzad Boroujerdi, for example, informs us that 
many intellectuals in Iran interpreted the downfall of Soviet-style communism not as a 
victory for the Western model, but rather as an indication of Western weakness. For them, 
Marxism and Liberalism are both 'Western' ideologies, and share a great deal of conceptual 
presumptions. "These presumptions manifest themselves, " he writes, "in realms such as the 
stripping of nature's divine essence, the advocacy of science and secular knowledge, and the 
privileging of mind and body over the soul. i28 On this reading the events of 1989 are seen as 
a precursor to further decline in the rest of the West. Eurocentrism thus operates as a form of 
'genetic engineering' in which the West seeks to maintain the integrity of its genealogies. 
What this means is that the denunciation of Islamists for using Western categories is 
actually the reconstruction and maintenance of particular genealogical traces. It is 
not that Khomeini uses concepts which are themselves western, but that the 
description of the concepts as western retroactively constructs them as such. It is not 
only that Islamists are engaged in an operation of fabrication - that is making up 
stories about their authentic selves, 'pretending' that the clothes they wear are 
'Islamic' - but also that those who reject Islamist narratives of authenticity do so by 
making up stories about the West. 29 
In order to maintain its hegemony, the West needs to make a claim to cultural copyright on 
any form of non-Western thought by insisting that Islamist discourse, for example, is nothing 
more than a rehearsal of ideas whose "authentic" origins are to be found in the history of the 
West. 30 In this sense Eurocentrism is an attempt by the West to assimilate all would-be 
competitors, to police and discipline them within its own "universal" jurisdiction. It would 
seem that on Sayyid's reading, Islamic voices are not getting louder but rather Western voices 
are getting weaker. The West is experiencing a crisis of representation, no longer able to 
posit itself as the sole guardian of universality. This attenuation of Western discourse is 
allowing non-Western voices, such as those of the Islamists, to be heard; for when the West 
is relatively quiet, the rest of the world seems louder. The West responds to this in one of 
two ways. Either it seeks to portray these newly amplified Islamist voices as part of a 
dangerous global Islamic revival (and here begin discourses on Islam's irrationality, 
despotism, and 'medieval' social attitudes) or it claims that the Islamists are simply 
rearticulating Western ideas in Islamic language, and hence constitute nothing more than an 
isolated protest movement within the West. Sayyid, though, argues that as we move further 
away from modernity - totalised at its zenith as a purely Western narrative - and into some 
form of postmodernity, the West is effectively decentred. A metaphor of lunar eclipse 
springs to mind, all the more appropriate because the crescent moon is a symbol of Islam. It 
is as if the moon (the "non-West") has been eclipsed by the shadow of the earth ("the West") 
for the last several centuries. The decentring of the earth ("postmodernism") allows the 
moon to be seen again. Obviously there are complicating factors here - important questions, 
for example, about who revolves around whom - but the general image I think holds true. 
28 Mehrzad Boroujerdi, "Iranian Islam and the Faustian Bargain of Western Modernity, " Journal of 
Peace Research, Vol. 34, No. 1,1997, p. 2. Of course we also need to ask whether any of these 
presumptions can actually be linked to the downfall of the Soviet Union. 
9 Sayyid, p. 148 
30 Ibid., p. 149 
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There is much of merit in Sayyid's argument; it is well-developed and theoretically 
sophisticated. Yet I fear also that in some respects it suffers from its own forms of 
reductionism and essentialism. In the first chapter of A Fundamental Fear, Sayyid expresses 
his dissatisfaction with the ways in which most Western commentators have attempted to 
account for Islamism. Having reviewed the relevant literature, he identifies five explanatory 
paradigms that tend to dominate Western scholarship on Islam: in (i) Islamism is due to the 
failure of nationalist secular elite governments in predominantly Muslim countries; (ii) sees a 
lack of meaningful political participation as the main catalyst for pro-Islamist sentiment; in 
(iii) a disenfranchised petty bougeoisie turns to political Islam in a quest for power; (iv) 
offers an explanation based on the flow of petro-dollars and uneven economic development; 
and finally (v) sees Islamism as a nativist response to cultural erosion, the protest of 
weakened Muslim identities in the face of a Western global system. 31 "These narratives on 
the causes of 'Islamic Fundamentalism, "' Sayyid writes, "assume that it is possible to 
understand what emerges from a crisis by understanding the nature of the crisis itself. "32 In 
other words, he does not believe that these explanations tell us anything about why it is that 
Islam becomes the specific language of political (re)articulation. Arguing a similar point, 
one writer notes that "Islam is treated as an explanatory phenomenon rather than a 
phenomenon which has to be 'explained. m33 So Sayyid wants to obtain an explanation for the 
emergence of Islamism not through Western objectifications of Muslim societies but rather 
by focusing on transformations in the status of the West itself. It is this which leads him to 
focus on Eurocentrism and a postmodernity in which the West has become decentred. 
Now I see two problems with this argument. First of all I think it too Eurocentric - not in the 
sense of reflecting European concepts or values, but because Sayyid seems to want to 
understand the emergence of Islamism exclusively by reference to changes in the West. In 
doing so he neglects the role of theorising within Islam which, as I will argue later, has also 
been undergoing some profound transformations in recent years. Ironically, we might even 
say that his argument is too structural or "infrastructural" in that it focuses on how something 
called 'the West' is shifting in relation to other 'non-Western' units; that is, it concentrates 
primarily on changing configurations of hegemony. I agree with Sayyid that the usual 
explanations offered by Western commentators do not help us to answer the question "Why 
Islam? " At the same time, though, there is more to the story than Sayyid's account of a 
decentred West would have us believe. On my reading, there is another element that needs 
to be included. At first glance it probably bears a passing (although false) resemblance to 
explanation (v) - and perhaps also (i) - above, which sees Islamism as a response from 
"weakened" Muslim identities to a Western-dominated global system. While I certainly do 
not see Islamism as a'nativist' response to Muslim cultural erosion - indeed, I will be arguing 
later that in many ways Islam is flourishing today, or at least has the potential to do so -I do 
see in Islamism (and read in Islamist discourses) a response to Western hegemony. This is 
why I believe we also have to leave room for reading Islamism as a form of post-colonial 
discourse. As it became obvious that the various projects of decolonisation and national 
self-determination (premised on the almost sacrosanct model of the autonomous nation-state) 
which unfolded in the 1960s and 70s were no panacea, and that if anything, the new nation- 
states were simply once again trapped within a structurally-determined system in which 
Western dictates - economic, political and cultural - reigned supreme, a new language was 
sought. One with no ties to the West, something "of our own making, " something beyond the 
Western matrix. Marxist experiments did not count for they were only local variations on 
yet another Western ideology. So Islam emerges as the most coherent, non-Western 
31 Ibid., pp. 19-22 
32 Ibid., p. 23 
33 Th. Sunier, "Islam and Ethnicity among Turks: The Changing Role of Islam and Muslim 
Organizations" in W. A. R. Shadid and P. S. van Koningsveld (eds. ), Islam in Dutch Society, Kampen: 
Kok Pharos, 1992, p. 144 
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alternative. Although he does not explicitly link the term to Islamism, Sayyid's account is 
haunted by the notion of authenticity. What emerges from this discourse on authenticity, 
however, is not an anachronistic, medieval throwback but an Islam which speaks itself in 
terms of rejuvenation: nahda (renaissance), isldh (reform), tajdid (renewal). Muslim 
identities are not "eroded" by the West, but rather it is the decentring of the latter - which 
Sayyid has so persuasively established - that allows Islam to be articulated in new ways. 
Political Islam is an attempt to articulate a different modernity - or what James Clifford has 
referred to as a'discrepant modernity. ' 
The second problem with Sayyid's thesis is related to this last point about the articulation of 
Islam in new ways. By focusing on Khomeini, which he needs to do in order to establish the 
non-Western character of Islamism, Sayyid falls into the trap of essentialising political Islam. 
He neglects the enormous diversity of opinion within the Muslim world about what an 
Islamic political order should look like - and, more particularly, what its relationship with 
the West should be. There are those who believe that Islam desperately needs to reform 
itself - not because Muslims no longer consider its values to be superior to those the West, 
but because the world is changing (see Chapter 1), and hence Islam needs to change with it. 
Sayyid recognises that the world is changing, and that one of the consequences of this is the 
relativisation of the West. He sees this as a precondition which allows Islamism to emerge, 
but does not inquire into the nature of this Islamism except to assert its modern and non- 
Western character. Arguing strongly against this mode of depicting the non-West, Revathi 
Krishnaswamy writes: 
The complex "local" histories and culture-specific knowledges inscribed in post- 
colonial narratives get neutralized into versions of postmodern diversity, allowing 
"others" to be seen, but shorn of their dense specificity. Class, gender, and 
intellectual hierarchies within other cultures, which happen to be at least as elaborate 
34 as those in the West, frequently are ignored. 
Thus while I believe Sayyid makes an effective set of arguments for explaining the 
circumstances under which the discursive field of modernity (or postmodernity) becomes 
open to non-Western - and in this case, Islamist - voices, he does not go far enough in 
examining the implications of this vicissitude for Islamism itself. Although it is fair to say 
that Islamism refers to the attempt to articulate Islam to a political order, such attempts are 
made in a variety of shapes and colours. To take Khomeinist discourse as representative of 
Islamism is to mask a variety of alternative Islamist imaginaries - many of which have been 
enabled by the very same transformations Sayyid identifies, but which would nevertheless 
advocate a path to Islamist reform significantly different from Khomeini's. So while he is 
correct to argue that the de-centring of the West opens up universality to disarticulation, he 
also needs to recognise that by the very same token, Islam is now open to rearticulation. 
In order to gain an understanding of some of the other ways in which Islam is being 
articulated as a political project today we first need to trace the history of the concepts and 
ideas deployed by contemporary Muslim political theorists. What sources of social authority 
(i. e. ethical claims) do they turn to in order to legitimate their politics? What has it meant to 
speak of political community in Islam and how do Muslims conceive this community? I 
propose to answer these questions by undertaking a brief historical investigation of sorts. It 
will constitute an attempt to reconstruct the course of an intellectual journey which began in 
Medina, 622 AD, and whose most recent detours and re-routings (call them decolonisation 
and translocality) have landed it firmly in late twentieth century Europe and North America. 
34 Revathi Krishnaswany, "Mythologies of Migrancy: Postcolonialism, Postmodernism and the Politics 
of (Dis)location, " ARIEL: A Review ofInternational English Literature, Vol. 26, No. 1, January 1995, 
p. 129 
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The two periods with which I will concern myself here are of paramount importance in the 
global history of Islam. I have chosen them because they both represent instances in which a 
particular notion of community, the umma, was mobilised as a politicised identity (i. e. an 
identity constructed in the face of antagonism) and as an alternative political order. The two 
periods studied here are doubly important in that they also provide the intellectual resources 
upon which a great many contemporary Muslim theorists draw. The first account, that of the 
early Muslim community in Medina explores the "point of origin" for a very well-travelled 
set of ethical claims and demonstrates how Islam constituted a new form of politics and 
social authority in the context of seventh century Arabia. The second account reveals how 
Muslim thinkers in a wide variety of sociocultural and regional settings collectively turned to 
Islam and the umma as a form of anti-colonial discourse during the nineteenth and early 
twentieth centuries. It is the 'global' nature of this response which particularly interests me, 
seeing in it as I do the first modern expression of Muslim translocality. 
Migration into community: the umma of Medina 
The first meaningful expression of Islamic polity occured in the Hijazi (Western Arabian) 
oasis of Medina - then called Yathrib - in the third decade of the seventh century. 
35 The year 
622 marks both the origin of the Muslim community and year one of its calendar. In that 
September, Muhammad - as God's Messenger and Prophet of a "new" religion36 - followed 
several dozen of his followers from their native city of Mecca on the h/ra (migration) to 
Medina. Notables from among the feuding clans of the latter settlement had agreed to 
recognise Muhammad's prophethood and to accept his arbitration in settling their disputes. 
This invitation allowed the Prophet and his followers to escape a Mecca which was becoming 
increasingly hostile towards his monotheistic message. With the large Jewish population in 
Medina perhaps more predisposed to Muhammad's form of monotheism, the early Muslims 
were provided with the opportunity to regroup while establishing an entirely new political 
base. 37 The dispute with Mecca was, however, to continue for almost a decade until victory 
over the city was finally consolidated in 630. 
The following account will seek primarily to understand how the first Muslim community 
came to be constituted at Medina. In essence, the normative model which developed in these 
early years eventually came to form the very basis of the shari'a (Islamic law). The 
authoritative deeds and dictums of the Prophet (his sunna) have, along with the Qur'dn, come 
to constitute the two primary sources of social authority in Islam. The traditions of the first 
emigrants and their supporters in Medina have been recorded, interpreted, and coded as 
sources of jurisprudence which carry a mythical warrant even today. The themes, events, and 
personages of these years are both constantly referred to - and aspired to - in contemporary 
35 My account of the early period in Medina relies heavily on the standard works by W. Montgomery 
Watt (Muhammad at Medina, Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1956) and Maxime Rodinson (Muhammad, 
London: Penguin, 2"d English Edition, 1996) as well as al-Tabari's Ta'rikh ar-Rusul wa'l-Muluk. The 
reader should also be aware of competing accounts of this early period of Islamic history, most notably 
Patricia Crone, Slaves on Horses: the Evolution of the Islamic Polity, London: Cambridge University 
Press, 1980; Michael Cook and Patricia Crone, Hagarism: the Making of the Islamic World, 
Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1977; and Fred M. Donner, 'The Formation of the Early 
Islamic State, ' Journal of the American Oriental Society, Vol. 56,1986, pp. 283-296. The fact that we 
do not know for sure what life in Medina was like only serves to reinforce the importance of its 
discursive construction in contemporary accounts, Muslim and non-Muslim alike. 
36 I use the 'scare quotes' here because Muhammad sought quite explicitly to link his religion with the 
two older Abrahamiac faiths, Judaism and Christianity. For him, Islam was the culmination of this 
tradition rather than a new religion unto itself. 
37 Ira Lapidus, A History of Islamic Societies, Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1988, p. 27; W. 
Montgomery Watt, Muhammad at Medina, Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1956, p. 1 
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Muslim discourse. In the context of Medina I will not be dealing with a particular set of texts 
or a single author; rather, I will be presenting this oasis society in its totality as a model, a 
source of emulation for later generations of Muslims. We start the clock, then, with the 
decisive break, the founding of the community: we begin with the hijra. 
The first migration has become an enduring symbol and its resonance can be heard today in 
the names of several Islamic movements such as Takfir Wal-Hyra in Egypt or al-Muhajirun 
("The Emigrants") in London. The hijra has taken on a significance much wider than the 
specific historical event itself. It has come to symbolise deliverance from oppression and 
jähiliya (pre-Islamic ignorance), and the institution of a new social paradigm in which `the 
good life' would accrue from submission to the will of a single divine source. As Ira Lapidus 
puts it: "For Muslims the word has come to mean not only a change of place, but the adoption 
of Islam and entry into the community of Muslims. The hijra is the transition from the pagan 
to the Muslim world - from kinship to a society based on common belief. 
08 In theory, then, 
the hijra represented an idiomatic shift with regard to the manner in which community was to 
be imagined. Social cohesion based purely on clan and kin was seen as a source of constant 
strife and feuding, whereas a `community of believers' could strive to transcend this base 
tribalism in the name of a greater unity. In Islam, the core doctrine of tawhi'd (unity of and in 
God) reflects this concern. For those who participated in the first migration, then, it was not 
the geographic move from Mecca to Medina which mattered, but rather the much more 
dramatic (and initially, one would imagine, disorienting) split from their tribal kin-groups. 
These affiliations had been the crux and core of social solidarity in Arabia at the time, and to 
leave them behind in the name of Islam signified a major break with traditional practice. The 
umma, or world community of Muslims, therefore had its initial incarnation in the original 
group which accompanied Muhammad on the hijra in 622. 
It is difficult for the modern commentator to discern exactly what was implied by the term 
umma in the context of Muhammad's new Medinan society. As it occurs in both the Qur'an 
and other primary source material from the period, we may attribute several possible 
meanings ranging anywhere from Muhammad's closest followers to all living creatures (Sura 
vi. 38). The etymology of the word is also ambiguous. The instinctive tendency has been to 
connect it with the Arabic umm, meaning "mother, " but it seems more likely that the term is 
derived from analogues in Hebrew and Aramaic, both of which refer to "community. " It has 
even been speculated that the word is ultimately Sumerian in origin. 39 In modern discourse, 
umma often appears as a central normative concept which appeals for unity across the global 
Muslim community. Its evolution in early Islamic society, however, was somewhat more 
particular. 
The umma of Medina was originally a sort of `defence pact' which united the city's clans in 
a pledge to protect Muhammad and his followers. This alliance system was codified in a 
document usually referred to as the Constitution of Medina. In essence, this'treaty' provided 
an overarching sense of authority for the anarchic settlement. Because it demanded complete 
loyalty from all factions it also effectively prevented the formation of unstable alliances 
between clans. Just who was included in its initial jurisdiction is however not easy to 
determine -a situation made all the more ambiguous by the fact that the documents we have 
from this period appear to contain several disparate usages of the term, reflecting various 
modifications and amendments during the Medinan years. Does it refer to relations of 
38 Lapidus, A History of Islamic Societies, p. 27. Another useful survey of the classical doctrine of hUra 
can be found in Muhammad Khalid Masud, "The obligation to migrate: the doctrine of hijra in Islamic 
law" in Dale F. Eickelman and James Piscatori (eds. ), Muslim Travellers: Pilgrimage, Migration, and 
the Religious Imagination, Berkeley: University of California Press, 1990. 
39 H. A. R. Gibb and J. H. Kramers (eds. ), Shorter Encyclopedia of Islam, Leiden: E. J. Brill, Third 
Impression, 1991, p. 603; Watt, p. 240 
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kinship, religion, or territory? It would appear that the umma as it was conceived at the time 
of Muhammad's arrival included elements of all three. Certainly it was initially confined to 
the major clans of Medina and several local Jewish and Christian groups, in addition to the 
Muslim Emigrants themselves. In this sense its connotation is not significantly different 
from that of the large tribe. As the Prophet managed to consolidate his authority in Medina, 
however, the character of the umma began to evolve. It is likely that Muhammad became 
increasingly capable of demanding a commitment to his religion (or at least a renunciation of 
idolatry) on the part of those who would seek to enter into confederacy with his community. 
Impressed by the success of his raids against Meccan caravans, it soon became obvious to 
neighbouring nomadic tribes that the political winds were blowing Muhammad's way and 
many were anxious to pledge their loyalty to him in return for the shelter of his expanding 
dhimma, or "security system. "40 
If we want to speculate as to the character of the umma of Medina we would perhaps best 
view it as a conglomerate of various communities - tribal, confessional, and confederal. 
Certainly a good deal of traditional practice with regard to the formation of alliances and 
kinship ties was preserved in Muhammad's new mini-state, with the overtly "religious" 
aspects of the community being confined largely to Muhammad's close followers. As far as 
Allah's Messenger was concerned, the main imperative at this point was to bolster his 
numbers and to widen the basis of his popular support. If this involved the occasional pact 
with a pagan clan, so be it. The realisation of the religious universal would come gradually. 
The basis of social solidarity was, to some extent, still based on the traditional tribal idiom 
albeit with a new focus of collectivity that could (and did) prevent a return to civic conflict 
and factionalism. Although references to the umma seem to disappear from the Qur'an after 
the first years following the hijra, we can still see from early Medinan verses that Allah 
envisaged a unique role for his community 4' As the propagation of Islam by conquest began 
in earnest following the death of the Prophet, so did the notion of a wider umma naturally 
regain its currency. Indeed, so venerated is this early period in Muslim thought that its 
precedents have been recorded in copious detail so that they may be passed on to future 
generations as an authoritative example of how Islam is meant to be practised. The political 
community of Medina has no equal in its influence. For forty years, from 622 to 661, Islam, 
in the eyes of its adherents, attained near purity. Although schisms began to form from the 
day the Prophet died (and probably even before), the reign of the first four caliphs - 
Muhammad's successors as leaders of the Muslim community - is considered to be a period 
of enlightenment, justice, and prosperity. It is under these leaders, collectively known as the 
r-ashidfin or "rightly-guided" caliphs, that Islam began its incredibly rapid expansion. It is 
also under them that the first authoritative edition of the Qur'an was produced and the 
various sources of social authority were systematised into religious law, the shari'a. 
Since the death of the Prophet, Islam has never recovered the special circumstances 
permitting its double expression as symbol and politics: Muhammad put a political 
order in place by designing immediately and quite adequately a process of 
40 W Montgomery Watt, Islamic Political Thought, Edinburgh: Edinburgh University Press, 1987, pp. 
7-14; 49-50 
41 Sura ii. 43: "We have made you a community [ummal in the middle so that you may bear witness 
against mankind... " All and Arberry render "in the middle" as, respectively, "justly balanced" and 
"just", a translation which I find disatisfying since it ignores the spatial implications of the Arabic 
was at, "middle or center. " Various interpretations regard this as implying that Islam is to be seen as a 
religion in between Christianity and Judaism (Montgomery Watt) or as the religion of Arabia which "is 
in an intermediate position in the Old World" (Yusuf Ali). It may also refer to the mediatory position 
which Muhammad's community occupied in Medina. 
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symbolization by which every judicial-political decision took its justification and 
az finality from a living relationship with God 
Did Muhammad and his close followers know that in an attempt to preserve this "living 
relationship" their every act would be scrutinised, interpreted, reinterpreted and later codified 
infiqhi (jurisprudential) literature? Did they know that the stories told about them, as passed 
down through a secure chain of transmitters, would become the basis for an entire legal 
system? Medina is a memory, distant yet tangible, pulling at the modern Muslim mind like a 
magnet. We might invoke here Lawrence Durrell's description of Alexandria in the 1930s as 
"a city half-imagined, yet wholly real. " It is a vivid model, something to be desired. 
Muslims today, and especially those who constitute the diasporic communities examined in 
later chapters, are increasingly returning to the sources of this early period for guidance as to 
where 'real' Islam can be found. Returning to our history, though, there are questions that 
need to be answered about the politics which emerged from the Medina period. What of the 
debates which ensued after Muhammad's death over who was to succeed him as leader of the 
Muslims? Did these contestations signify the birth or the death of a political community? 
We could perhaps suggest the following; that with the passing of the Prophet, Islamic 
political community ceased to exist and Muslim political community - as a space of 
negotiation - came to take its place. The very fact that today we find competing accounts of 
the Medinan period - in both Western and Muslim histories - bears testimony to its 
importance in the Islamic imagination. In this sense, the social construction of Medina in 
contemporary Islamist discourse can be seen to constitute a vital form of Muslim politics. 
We rapidly lose track of tiny Medina in the years following the Prophet's death. A system of 
political succession, embodied in the institution of the caliphate, was established. However, 
through a series of assassinations, conspiratorial machinations and eventually, open civil 
war, the locus of political power in the Muslim community began to shift quite significantly. 
Factions and breakaway groups (such as the shi'a and the khawdrij) began to multiply, and 
the first of Islam's many territorial dynasties was established. Over the coming centuries, 
"Islamic" capitals were declared in locales as diverse as Baghdad, Damascus, Cordova, 
Cairo, Nishapur, Samarqand, and Constantinople, among others. This geographic plurality 
was accompanied by a new diversity in religious thought. Islam's initial schism, that 
between Sunni and Shi'a, became more complex as subdivisions within these approaches 
began to develop. In the Sunni tradition, for example, there eventually emerged four distinct 
systems of jurisprudence, each with its own founding father and chain of disciples. A 
complex religio-political system emerged during the medieval period, composed of a class of 
religious scholars - the ulama, a shari'a-based judiciary and its courts, and the political 
dynasty, where the caliph ruled in theory as the leader of both a religious and a political 
community. The centuries following the death of Muhammad, then, saw a phenomenal 
expansion of Islam as it came to claim territories from the edge of Western Europe right 
across to the archipelagos of Southeast Asia. In the process of this diffusion the Prophet's 
umma was split into a myriad range of dynasties, sects and ethno-national regimes, with the 
caliphate moving continuously between the various power centres identified above. 
In my historical account I will be omitting the thousand years between Medina and the 
nineteenth century for a number of reasons. Although it is a fascinating period, I do not 
consider it particularly germane to the arguments I wish to make in this study. First of all the 
expansion and accompanying fragmentation of the Muslim community makes it difficult to 
speak of the umma in any sense other than its most minimal description of the world 
community of believers. Second, I do not see the umma's relevance during this period as a 
form of politicised community in the sense of collective mobilisation against an external 
42 Mohammed Arkoun, Rethinking Islam, Boulder: Westview Press, 1994, p. 21 
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antagonism. One may wish to interject that Islam's struggles during the Crusades or against 
various invasions from Central Asia can be viewed as such a collective mobilisation. While 
it is undoubtedly true that these conflicts clearly had their non-Muslim 'others, ' I am choosing 
not to include them in my account because there is a strong sense in which they were 
confined to particular regions of the Muslim world and did not serve to constitute the umma 
(in the sense of the wider multicultural, multi-regional Muslim world) as a single political 
community. As Ira Lapidus points out: 
The first Muslim reaction [to the Crusader states] was, by and large, indifference. 
Syria was so fragmented as to preclude any unified opposition to the intruders; 
several more little states among many did not much disturb existing interests. The 
fact that these new states were Christian was not exceptional - the Byzantines had 
also ruled northern Syria, and there was a substantial, if not a majority, local 
Christian population. 43 
Relatively large populations of Christians has already been living peacefully in Muslim lands 
for several centuries as protected peoples of the book (ahl al-kitäb). There is therefore a 
very strong sense in which during the Crusades, the Christians had a much stronger notion of 
the Muslim as 'other' than the Muslims did of the Christians. My thousand-year leap into the 
colonial era of the nineteenth century is therefore justified, I believe, in that this latter period 
marks the re-emergence of the umma as a key concept in Muslim political discourse in the 
face of the challenge posed to Islam by the West. Furthermore, the case of the colonial 
period is one in which a common threat (European imperialism) affected more or less the 
entire Muslim world from Morocco to India and even Indonesia and Malaysia. During this 
period, Muslim anti-colonial activists travelled widely throughout the Muslim world seeking 
to inspire their fellow believers to throw off the yolk of European colonialism in the name of 
a greater umma. In this regard, the early modern struggles of the colonial era serve as a key 
point of reference for Muslims today, many of whom view the continued dominance of the 
West as the perpetuation of European imperalism. There is thus an intrinsic link between the 
Muslim voices of the early colonial period and the contemporary Muslim post-colonial 
discourse referred to above. 
Pan-Islam and the colonial umma 
Let us begin this second set of historical discourses by noting that by and large their "points 
of origin" lie not in the nominal centre of the Muslim world, the Sultanate and Caliphate of 
Istanbul, but in Persia and the Indian subcontinent - hence offering what Richard Bulliet has 
termed "the view from the edge. i44 The rise of European imperialism had a profound effect 
on many Muslim minds, and proved to be the catalyst for several generations of thinkers 
whose primary occupation was the removal of the unbelievers from Muslim lands. This 
could only be accomplished they believed through a concerted effort towards pan-Islamic 
unity and a `reawakening' of the Muslim conscience. Hence an intellectual agenda was to be 
combined with a programme of organised political activism. It is not surprising that some of 
the loudest voices in this cause came from those regions in which the European presence was 
strongest. Another important factor which distinguished these activities from previous 
attempts to reform the Muslim body politic - and one which will be explored more fully in 
Chapters IV and V- relates to the nature of the personalities involved. Where before the 
religious establishment, that is the ulama and legal scholars, had held a virtual monopoly over 
the ability to interpret, formulate, and propound legitimate political causes in the name of 
Islam, this was quickly changing. The lay Muslim was increasingly invested with a new 
43 Lapidus, p. 351. Emphasis added. 
°A Richard Bulliet, Islam: the view from the edge, New York: Columbia University Press, 1994. 
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religio-political efficacy. Rapid increases in literacy rates and the proliferation into these 
regions of what Benedict Anderson has termed `print-capital ism'45 were undoubtedly 
contributing factors. As we will see, the ideologues of the Islamic revival in the nineteenth 
and twentieth centuries, often came from outside the exclusive circles of religious scholars, 
having their origins instead in the educated, professional, middle classes. 
'Pan-Islam' as a form of anti-colonial discourse had already been proposed in India in the 
eighteenth century by writers such as Shah Waliullah (1703-62), but did not become a 
political ideology in that region until later. 6 The first exponent of a full-blown Pan-Islamic 
political project was Jamal al-Din al-Afghani (1838-97), an Iranian-born intellectual, 
journalist, activist and travelling-theorist par excellence who spent time in Calcutta, Cairo, 
Istanbul and Paris during his active career. Al-Afghani's major life concern was the presence 
of foreign powers - and most specifically, Britain - in Muslim countries. He believed that 
the Muslim peoples would never manage to remove the Europeans unless they were united, 
and it is this conviction which led him to develop his Pan-Islamic programme. The Islamic 
world, he asserted, had fallen into decline through lack of unity and a loss of religious 
consciousness. Al-Afghani's charisma and oratory powers ensured him an influential 
position wherever he went. He often managed to gain access to the highest echelons of 
power in the various destinations of his travels, finding favour with Emirs, Shahs, Khedives, 
and Sultans alike. So controversial were his views, however, that he almost always found 
himself out of favour (and usually expelled from or detained in the country in question) 
within months of his arrival. Al-Afghani spent time in Europe as well, editing influential 
Muslim newspapers and journals in Paris, where he also engaged in debate with leading 
French intellectuals such as Ernest Renan. The intrigues which governed imperial politics in 
the late nineteenth century ensured that the Pan-Islamic union of Muslim countries which al- 
Afghani had envisaged (centred most likely in Istanbul) never came to fruition. His message 
of unity, the rejuvenation of the umma in its widest sense, did however resound throughout 
much of the Muslim world, earning him a devoted following and producing several 
influential disciples along the way. 47 
One such adherent was the Egyptian Muhammad Abduh (1849-1905), a pioneer of Islamic 
reform in the Arab world who early in his career had been closely associated with al-Afghani. 
Abduh had received a religious education at home and was later a student at the eminent al- 
Azhar university, the oldest institution of religious learning in the Muslim world. The 
pedantic rote system of empty memorisation which he found at al-Azhar severely 
disillusioned Abduh, and led him to take on educational reform as a dominant theme 
throughout his life. 48 When al-Afghani arrived in Egypt, Abduh quickly fell in with his circle 
and the two of them later ended up together in Paris, editing an influential Arabic newspaper. 
After several years of teaching in Beirut, Abduh returned to Cairo. He then proceeded to 
hold a number of senior positions both in the state legal system and on the administrative 
council of al-Azhar. Several years before his death he was promoted to the position of Grand 
Mufti of Egypt, using the authority of this position to institute both educational and social 
reforms - in the latter case, expounding comparatively liberal attitudes towards the role and 
rights of women and stressing the need for education, science and modernisation. 
45 See Benedict Anderson, Imagined Communities: Reflections on the Origin and Spread of 
Nationalism, London: Verso, Revised Edition, 1991, pp. 44-46 and passim. 
46 Jacob Landau, The Politics of Pan-Islam, Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1994, p. 183 
47 Landau, pp. 183-5; Nikki Keddie, "Sayyid Jamel al-Din'al-Afghani, "' in Ali Rahnema (ed. ), Pioneers 
of Islamic Revival, London: Zed Books, 1994. 
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Abduh mourned the passing of Muslim supremacy from the world, and in his writings often 
invoked the golden age of Islamic military power and Muslim achievements in the fields of 
science and philosophy. Indeed, part of his message was a claim that the Europeans 
had 
managed to gain the upper hand by appropriating and developing Muslim knowledge. He 
also vociferously sought to refute popular European arguments which asserted that the 
decline of the Arab world had something to do with Islam. 
49 The revival of the umma ideal 
was also an important element in Abduh's thought. Like many before him and many who 
came after, Muhammad Abduh looked back to the early community at Medina as a source of 
inspiration, a model of civic unity. His emphasis on the notion of shüra (consultation) is 
quite telling. Abduh sought to emphasise the need for Muslims to take their political fate 
into their own hands. Resistance to European domination, according to Abduh, was a duty of 
all Muslims. A community of believers could never be properly constituted, he wrote, so 
long as foreign powers prevented the implementation of the shari'a, and so long as Muslims 
were willing to blindly imitate foreign ways. 
50 With its emphasis on grassroots activism, 
Abduh's message later became an important inspiration for many Islamic movements in the 
Arab world - not least of which was the enormously 
influential Muslim Brotherhood, 
founded by Hassan al-Banna in 1928. For our own purposes, the salience of the Pan-Islamic 
reformers of the late nineteenth century, such as al-Afghani and Abduh, lay in their call for 
Islam to wake to its plight, and for Muslims to engage with and to shape their futures 
themselves, free from foreign domination. This, then, represented a politicisation of the 
umma - and a new challenge to colonial authority. According to 
Reinhard Schulze: 
After 1870, the colonial situation created completely new conditions in most Islamic 
countries: many Islamic citizens felt culturally separated from 'their' state. First, in 
certain areas of control such as law or education, there were attempts to reclaim 
sovereignty or to defend the existing sovereignty. After 1900, an Islamic macrocosm 
was created in which people tried to uphold their civil identity in the fact of the 
colonial states. Here in the virtual space of Islam, they found it possible to articulate 
their civil identity even though their influence on real state power was minimal. A 
characteristic of this macrocosm was the reference to the wholeness of the Islamic 
community (umma), which Islamic intellectuals wanted to represent politically. In 
this they were able to practise the sovereignty which had been denied them in the 
colonial states. 51 
The notion of Pan-Islam was by its very nature implicitly anti-national. It asked Muslims to 
place their loyalties beyond the nation-state, and to look to a greater collective, the umma. 
The political realities of many countries with large Muslim populations was such, however, 
that tensions inevitably arose between both desires, the national and the religious. Colonial 
resistance in India, for example, had its strongest base in nationalist sentiments. Those with 
religious aspirations, however, identified the nation-state with Europe and foreign influence 
and sought an indigenous source of solidarity instead; this, at least for the Muslims, took the 
form of the umma. The difficulty for many Islamic sympathisers lay in reconciling religious 
and national aspirations. Freedom was of course the paramount goal, and these two 
tendencies represented rival methodologies. Certainly the nationalists could claim that their 
approach was more likely to succeed, and more likely to be perceived as legitimate on the 
international stage. Those who advocated the umma, however, sought to emphasise the 
authenticity of their option and to portray it as an autonomous alternative with no European 
ideological baggage (i. e. a non-Western form of modernity). Indeed, they claimed, 
nationalism had been the root of endless suffering and conflict throughout history. The 
49 See his al-A'mal al-Kamila, Beirut: al-Mu'assasa al-'Arabiya li'l-Dirasat wa'l-Nashr, 1972. 
50 Albert Hourani, Arabic Thought in the Liberal Age, 1798-1939, Cambridge: Cambridge University 
Press, 1983, pp. 130-60 
51 Schulze, "How Medieval is Islam?, " p. 64 
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spiritual nature of solidarity in the umma would ensure that it remained free from the 
concomitant malignancies of nationalism. Underlying these approaches, then, were two very 
different normative models for the constitution of community, one based on territorial history 
and the other on religious heritage. One approach asked that the country be imagined as 
autonomous and Indian. The other, transcending borders, sought autonomy by imagining the 
Muslims of India into a union with their co-religionists. In this regard it was a schizophrenic 
time for India's peoples, and for its Muslims in particular. 
One prominent figure, who in his long and productive career ranged from nationalist 
sympathiser to Pan-Islamic activist (and everywhere in between), was Abu'l A`la Mawdudi 
(1903-79). Mawdudi's family background had prejudiced him against British rule from a 
very young age. The family were Muslim notables who had served the court of the Moghul 
dynasty in its dying years and, following the Great Mutiny, had found their social standing 
significantly reduced. 52 Deeply steeped in his classical Indian heritage, Mawdudi's father 
made sure that his children received a traditional primary education, which excluded modern 
subjects such as English and the sciences. Mawdudi did eventually take up these subjects for 
several years before his formal education was brought to a halt at the age of sixteen upon the 
death of his father. He moved to Delhi and took up journalism, writing enthusiastically for a 
number of pro-nationalist causes. Much of his effort at this time was focused on trying to 
rally Muslims behind the pro-national Congress Party. After some time he attracted the 
attention of prominent figures within the Jami'at-i `Ulama-i Hind (Society of Indian Ulama) 
who invited the young Mawdudi to edit their official newspaper. It was under their influence 
that he first became active in Muslim politics, although his interests in this regard were 
initially oriented towards the Muslim community in India rather than towards Pan-Islamic 
doctrine. Mawdudi also underwent the prescribed course of religious training which would 
licence him as an alim (religious scholar) -a fact which did not emerge until after his death 
since he never sought to publicise this status or to make use of it politically. 53 
How would we characterise Mawdudi's approach to political community? During the 1920s 
his increasingly cordial relations with the Muslim movement brought him closer to the 
doctrine of Pan-Islam. Twice during his career, in the 1930s and again in the late 60s, 
Mawdudi was a vocal advocate of this ideal. He repeatedly appealed for religion to be made 
the primary source of social solidarity in the Muslim world. In the context of the Cold War, 
this call was tantamount to an alternative form of non-alignment. Mawdudi sought the 
establishment of an international union of Muslim states in order to rejuvenate Islam's 
efficacy in world politics. He pointed to similar organisations such as the British 
Commonwealth and the Organisation of African Unity. In particular, Mawdudi cited the case 
of the European Communities. If a region as disparate as Europe could move towards greater 
union, he argued, then there was no reason why the Muslims should not be able to do so as 
well. 54 Mawdudi bemoaned the ambivalence and lack of religio-political consciousness in 
the Muslim world: 
What is regrettable is that all these Muslim countries are following the same doctrine 
of nationalism that they had imbibed from their Western masters.. . 
They are not even 
fully conscious of the revolutionary rule of Islam, because of which they are linked 
to each other, which can unite their Muslim populations into one umma, [and] 
promote goodwill and co-operation among them... " 
52 Seyyed Vali Reza Nasr, "Mawdudi and the Jama'at-i Islami: The Origins, Theory and Practice of 
Islamic Revivalism" in Rahnema, p. 99 
53 Ibid., p. 101 
54 Landau, p. 271-2 
55 Abul A'la Mawdudi, Unity of the Muslim World, Lahore: Islamic Publications, Fifth Edition, 1992 
(org. 1967), p. 19 & 34 
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For Mawdudi, the existence of an Islamic state was absolutely necessary for the achievement 
of social justice. He believed, therefore, that Islamic reform had to come from the top down. 
He did not see violent revolution as a viable option, seeking instead to bring about 
Islamisation from within existing state structures. 56 That is not to say, however, that 
Mawdudi advocated Islamic authoritarianism. Rather, he had his own particular take on 
khildfa (the caliphate), one which sought to invest this concept with an essentially 
democratic character. Mawdudi took as his starting point the Qur'anic stipulation that 
sovereignty belonged to God alone (al-hukm 17l-allah), and hence no temporal institution or 
ruler could ever be anything more than a vicegerent of God. 57 Further, Mawdudi argued, 
because God promises authority to the entire community of believers in the Qur'an, every 
member of the umma is therefore implicated in the caliphate: "Every believer is a Caliph of 
God in his individual capacity. By virtue of this position he is individually responsible to 
God. The Holy Prophet has said: `Everyone of you is a ruler and everyone is answerable for 
his subjects. ' Thus one Caliph is in no way inferior to another. "58 In Mawdudi's scheme the 
virtue of shura (consultation) is paramount. This method is to be used first and foremost in 
the selection of a head of state in order to prevent the establishment of a dictatorship or other 
autocratic regime. 59 In theory, this principle is also to be extended such that it covers every 
aspect of governance, rendering state authorities answerable to the people and in effect 
functioning as a form of "check" on authoritarianism: 
The position of a man who is selected to conduct the affairs of the state is no more 
than this: [someone to whom] all Muslims (or, technically speaking, all caliphs of 
God) delegate their caliphate for administrative purposes. He is answerable to God 
on the one hand and one the other to his fellow 'caliphs' who have delegated their 
authority to him. 60 
Mawdudi's theory amounts to a popularisation of the caliphate, an attempt to remove its 
elitist connotations and to place it firmly in the hands of the people. Rather than 
emphasising the political community's subordination to the caliph (or head of state), he 
instead emphasised the caliph's subordination: first to God, and then to those co-caliphs (i. e. 
'the people') who have placed their trust in him. Mawdudi coined the term `theodemocracy' 
to describe this model. 6' 
Mawdudi's "party, " the Jama'at-i Islami, can to some extent be seen as a successful 
expression of these principles. With its intervention in Pakistani politics, a new socio- 
political force was added to the equation. In the years following the partition of India, the 
nature of the Jama'at was somewhat ambiguous. It was neither a conventional political party 
per se, nor an affiliate of the ulama. It could perhaps best be described as a powerful 
lobbying group which depended heavily on its grassroots legitimacy for much of its 
influence. In this sense it acted as a mediating force between the state, the ulama and the 
people - an attempt to articulate Islam according to public opinion and to reinvest of the 
umma with social authority. These tendencies in Mawdudi's thought can be seen as a 
continuation of the aforementioned disenfranchisement of the ulama, the disintegration of 
their monopoly on religious authority. For while Mawdudi as an alim was technically one of 
56 Nasr, p. 108 
57 Abul A'Ia Mawdudi, First Principles of the Islamic State, Lahore: Islamic Publications, Third 
Edition, 1967, p. 26 
58 Abul A'la Mawdudi, Political Theory of Islam, Lahore: Islamic Publications, 1960, p. 35 59 Charles J. Adams, "Mawdudi and the Islamic State" in John L. Esposito (ed. ), Voices of Resurgent 
Islam, New York: Oxford University Press, 1983, p. 117 60 Mawdudi, Political Theory of Islam, p. 37. Emphasis in original. 61 Ibid., p. 22 
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them, he made a point of never using this fact to grant himself greater religious authority on 
the political platform. And though he undoubtedly did grant the ulama a privileged place 
with regard to the determination of constitutional questions, 
62 he also clearly denied them any 
exclusive jurisdiction over religious matters: 
Nobody can.. . claim 
in Islam to enjoy spiritual monopoly and the "Mulla" or "'Alim" 
is not a titular head claiming any inherent and exclusive rights of interpreting 
religious laws and doctrines. On the contrary, just as anybody may become a judge 
or a lawyer or a doctor by properly qualifying for these professions, similarly 
whosoever devotes his time and energy to the study of the Qur'an and the Sunnah 
and becomes well-versed in Islamic learning is entitled to speak as an expert in 
matters pertaining to Islam. 3 
Abul A'la Mawdudi's thought has had an enormous impact on successive generations of 
Islamist intellectuals, perhaps most notably on the Muslim Brotherhood's Sayyid Qutb 
(1906-66). Qutb had read much of Mawdudi's work and often referred to him in his own 
writings. Qutb's Ma'alim fl al-Tariq ("Signposts on the Road") was banned by the Egyptian 
authorities as a subversive work, and based on its contents he was convicted of attempting to 
overthrow the Egyptian state and hanged in 1966. Qutb's reputation as a `radical' was 
further reinforced when his ideas turned up in a rehashed format in the writings of the 
ideologue whose group, al-Jihad al-Islami, assassinated Egyptian President Anwar Sadat in 
1981. 
It is via figures such as Mawdudi and Qutb, then, that we reach the personalities and 
discourses of late twentieth century political Islam. It is these thinkers who have taken on 
the responsibility of theorising Muslim political community into an era of rapid 
globalisation. Unprecedented media coverage, rumours about a `clash of civilisations', and 
repeated calls for them to justify their beliefs in the face of a universal trend towards liberal 
democracy are some of the challenges they face. During the colonial era (and even more so 
today) Muslims developed a greater sense of'globality, ' an awareness of the world as a single 
political space and their position within its configurations of hegemony. Until this time 
Islam had been largely introverted in its attitude towards intellectual developments in the 
non-Muslim world. The rise of the West hence served as an important wake-up call by 
forcing Muslims to relativise their senses of identity in the context of a wider, global picture 
in which the West held the upper hand. Although this thesis will seek to analyse 
contemporary Muslim political community from a different viewpoint - stressing Islam's 
internal conversations within translocal space - an examination of the Islam/West nexus in 
modern history and the early years of the umma are vital for gaining some insight as to how 
Muslims are imagining their political communities today, especially as these early periods 
serve as key reference points for contemporary Muslim political discourse. 
We can also see from these brief historical interludes that religion and politics are not 
irreducible concepts by any means, and therefore characterising their relationship in such 
dichotomous generalisations (separation or union) really tells us very little about how they 
are actually experienced as sources of social authority. Religion, by its very nature, often is a 
form of politics. It constructs antagonisms and friend/enemy images structured through 
discourses about believers and unbelievers, orthodoxy and heterodoxy. At this point I should 
reiterate that the realm of the political is by no means coterminous with the state; politics can 
often have nothing whatsoever to do with structures of territorial power. Rather, "the key to 
understanding the intricate and intersecting relationships between religion and politics 
62 See Mawdudi, First Principles of the Islamic State, p. 7 
63 Ibid., p. 13 
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lies... in the nature of authority. "64 Sources of social authority are received and understood 
in a variety of ways by a given political community, and often this reception will be 
dependent on where they (community and authority) are located within the social discourse 
of a particular time and place. Social authority is hence never immutable. In fact, it is 
necessarily always contingent in that it depends on the continued existence of the social 
environment which produced it in the first place. As social environments are changed, so are 
structures of authority transformed. In the case of Islam this has manifested itself in the 
present era by a decline in the efficacy of the religious scholars, and an increased confidence 
on the part of individual Muslims to (re)interpret the ethical claims of Islam for themselves. 
The consistent efficacy of authority, then, has been the exception rather than the rule 
throughout our histories. Religion and politics, I would thus argue, must be analysed within 
a scheme which views them as complex, mutually constitutive sources of social authority, 
rather than as simply either `unified' or `separate' from one another. Translocal spaces, as 
we will see in the following chapters are particularly interesting in the case of Islam because 
they often form the sites in which competing Muslim claims to authority are played out. 
Conclusion: Reading the Muslim translocale 
I began this chapter by saying something about what I understand Islam to be at the level of 
metatheory. I focused on its role as the master signifier for a variety of discourses and 
suggested that we can most usefully understand political Islam today by focusing on 
'Muslims, ' that is, those subjectivities which understand themselves to believe in and practice 
something called Islam. I then went on to examine how we might go about understanding the 
relationship between religion and politics in the context of Islam. I suggested that rather than 
seeing religion and politics as two separate categories, each with its own area of jurisdiction, 
we view them instead as forms of social authority. In order to explain the wider political 
context in which Muslims imagine the umma today I reviewed Bobby Sayyid's theory on 
Eurocentrism and the emergence of Islamism. I found his account of how non-Western 
voices are amplified in the wake of a declining Western hegemony convincing. I was less 
satisfied, however, with his treatment of Islamism as an example of this phenomenon. By 
failing to differentiate between competing models of Muslim political order, Sayyid misses 
one of the most important aspects of this new discursive latitude: the fact that Islam can itself 
now be renegotiated within a translocal 'public sphere. ' In order to gain a better 
understanding of contemporary discourses on political community in Islam I then undertook 
a survey of how the notion of the umma has been elaborated in two historical contexts which 
often serve as key points of reference for contemporary Muslim political discourse: the early 
years of Islam in Medina, a source of emulation and enlightenment for Muslims both today 
and throughout Islamic history; and the pan-Islamic responses of Muslim thinkers during the 
colonial era of the late nineteenth and early twentieth century, a period marked by Western 
hegemony in which the umma was reconstituted as an important form of political community 
in the wider Muslim world. 
Crucially, though, I want to make the point that the politics of 'Islam and the West' is but one 
side of the story. Another politics, that of Islam and its own 'internal others, ' is becoming 
increasingly important in the present translocal climate. Hegemony in its Western guise is 
not the only obstacle contemporary Islam needs to negotiate; there is also hegemony within. 
Across the plurality of Islamist thought Islam is still undoubtedly the master signifier but 
there is an enormous conceptual diversity as to the proper relationship between this signifier 
and its signified(s). It is for this reason that I have argued for an emphasis on the 'Muslim' 
rather than on 'Islam. ' Furthermore I want to argue that it is within what I have termed 
64 Eickelman and Piscatori, p. 57. Emphasis added. 
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translocal spaces that a great deal of internal Islamist debate takes place. Many of these 
contestations are found in various sections of the Muslim diaspora, a set of communities 
constantly overshadowed by the presence of the West. In these contexts the parameters of 
the umma are in flux: a community longing for the purity and stability of Medina's golden 
age, but one that also realises - like the pan-Islamists of the colonial era - that contemporary 
circumstances are very different. 
In the first chapter 1 provided some examples of the ways in which translocality challenges 
traditional statist notions of politics and political identity. The present discussion has 
provided us with a framework for thinking about Islam and I want to go on now to provide a 
similar set of tools for conceptualising translocality. In the next chapter I will focus on the 
new forms and spaces of politics that emerge in translocality and explain why they are 
relevant for our exploration of diasporic Muslim communities. 
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Chapter III 
Modes of Translocality: Travelling Theory, Hybridity, Diaspora 
It may well be that writers in my position, exiles or emigrants or expatriates, are haunted by some sense 
of loss, some urge to reclaim, to look back, even at the risk of being mutated into pillars of salt. But if 
we do look back, we must also do so in the knowledge-which gives rise to profound uncertainties-that 
our physical alienation from India almost inevitably means that we will not be capable of reclaiming 
precisely the thing that was lost; that we will, in short, create fictions, not actual cities or villages, but 
invisible ones, imaginary homelands, Indias of the mind. 
- Salman Rushdie, Imaginary Homelands 
I'm not saying there are no locales or homes, that everyone is-or should be-traveling, or cosmopolitan, 
or deterritorialized. This is not nomadology. Rather, what is at stake is a comparative cultural studies 
approach to specific histories, tactics, everyday practices of dwelling and traveling: traveling-in- 
dwelling, dwelling-in-traveling. 
- James Clifford, Traveling Cultures 
On three occasions between 1649 and 1661 the Moroccan traveler, scholar and (undoubtedly) 
theorist Abu Salim 'Abdullah al-'Ayyashi plied the deserts between North Africa and the 
Hijaz region of western Arabia. His routes led him through Islam's holiest cities and several 
of its most renowned places of learning. All his itineraries - citing extended stays in both 
Cairo and Jerusalem - and a full gamut of impressions from joy to disillusion were faithfully 
recorded in his two volume Ma' al-Mawa'id. ' In it, Abu Salim never hesitates to mention 
(and critique) local variations of Islamic practice at the many junctures of his journey, or to 
detail accounts of his debates with scholars of diverse Islamic religio-juridical traditions. 
From the somatics of prayer to contesting genealogies of religious authority, each new 
idiosyncrasy is digested and reflected upon. All the while, of course, Abu Salim's own 
"strange" idiom of Islam was carefully entered into the catalogues of his various hosts. The 
observer becomes the observed, the curator is himself curated... 
Or consider the young Ali Shariati, future ideologue of Iran's Islamic Revolution, as a student 
in the Paris of the early 1960s. 2 Repulsed by the urban hedonism of the French capital yet at 
the same time captured by the vigor of its intellectual life, Shariati's transformation during 
these years was considerable. In Paris his Islam becomes eclectic. The Shi'ism of his 
homeland loses its monopoly over his religious imagination; soon non-Shi'ite and even 
Western interpretations of Islam begin to find their way into his thought and writing. 
Religion is now a sociopolitical imperative rather than a source of dogmatism: Shariati's 
journey becomes Islam's journey... 
And so theory travels. That which "is" in one place elsewhere becomes undone, translated, 
reinscribed; this is the nature of translocality: a cultural politics of becoming. But what does 
it mean for theory and culture to travel? Now that I have clarified my understanding of how 
A. S. al-Ayyashi, Ma' al-Mawa'id, Fez: 1989-9,2 Volumes. See also Abderrahmane El Moudden, 
"The ambivalence of rihla: community integration and self-definition in Moroccan travel accounts: 
1300-1800, " in Dale F. Eickelman and James Piscatori (eds. ), Muslim Travellers: Pilgrimage, 
Migration, and the Religious Imagination, Berkeley: University of California Press, 1990. My own 
account is largely derived 
from this latter source. 
2 My comments on Shariati rely heavily on Ali Rahnema, "Ali Shariati: Teacher, Preacher, Rebel, " in 
Ali Rahnema (ed. ), Pioneers of Islamic Revival, London: Zed Books, 1994. See also Rahnema's book- 
length study of Shariati, An Islamic Utopian: A Political Biography ofAli Shari'ati, London: I. B. 
Tauris, 1998. 
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Islam and its various corollary terms function at the level of metatheory, and also given some 
representative historical examples of how Muslims have imagined political community, I 
want to move on to look at some of the broad issues raised today by the encounter between 
Islam and the set of processes we have called translocality. In so far as I will be aiming to 
identify the key, overarching features of this encounter, the discussion which follows might 
best be viewed as a backdrop against which the more empirical explorations of the next two 
chapters will take place. In the first chapter I looked briefly at some of the ways in which an 
alternative reading of globalisation allows us to recognise the complexity of transnational 
cultural flows. I argued that far from representing the universalisation of Western culture, 
translocality actually serves to open up new spaces of discourse in which travelling theory, 
hybridity and shifting idioms of identity are the most salient characteristics. In the present 
chapter I want to engage in a more in-depth exploration of several aspects of translocality, 
explaining briefly how each is relevant in the context of translocal Islam. I will first look 
generally at the notion of 'travelling theory, ' a set of ideas which helps us to understand how 
cultures and ideas are transformed through movement from one social context to another. 
Notions of travelling theory, I want to suggest, are particularly relevant in regard to those 
political identities - discussed in Chapter I- which move through and across translocal 
space. This in turn leads to a discussion and critique of hybridity theory. Various tropes 
referring to the fusion and intermingling of cultures and tradition are examined here, and I 
argue that in the context of Muslim translocality hybridity theory is particularly useful for 
understanding the nature of encounters and dialogue between different interpretations of 
Islam. The chapter then concludes with some general comments on the nature of 
translocal/diasporic identity claims. I suggest that the celebration of diaspora and migrancy 
found in much of the postcolonial literature tends to assume a very particular (and 
Eurocentric) form of ironic subjectivity, and therefore has difficulty dealing with those 
identities which predicate themselves on what is perceived as an "authentic rootedness. " 
Returning to the notion of culture, I claim that we need to pay careful attention to structures 
of power/knowledge and differentiation within various cultural contexts. The translocal 
politics of travelling cultures such as Islam, I suggest, are a particularly rich object of inquiry 
in this regard. 
Travelling theories 
Translocal spaces, I have argued, represent sites through which a great many cultures travel. 
Not only do peoples and their "theories" pass through trans localities, they also travel within 
these spaces. I mean by this that the cultural complexity of translocal space is such that it 
often becomes easy for meaning to move, shift or slip. I want to begin by exploring how we 
can conceptualise such a thing as travelling theory. In other words, what happens to ideas 
when they become portable? In the first section of this chapter I will discuss travelling 
cultures and will be seeking to demonstrate the ways in which the movement of theories can 
often lead to movement within those theories. 
"Traveling Theory" is the title of an essay by Edward Said that first appeared in his 1984 
collection The World, the Text and the Critic. Said takes as his point of departure the fact 
that like peoples and institutions, ideas and theories also travel: "from person to person, from 
situation to situation, from one period to another. i3 For him, cultural and intellectual life are 
dependent on this circulation of ideas. In this sense the movement of theory is often a 
precondition for intellectual creativity. Said's main concern is with the ways in which 
theories change when they become translocal. He is keenly aware that ideas have to 
negotiate borders in much the same way that people do: "Such movement into a new 
' Edward Said, The World, the Text and the Critic, London: Faber and Faber, 1984, p. 226 
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environment is never unimpeded. It necessarily involves processes of representation and 
institutionalization different from those at the point of origin. This complicates any account 
of the transplantation, transference, circulation, and commerce of theories and ideas. t14 
Said identifies four stages which he believes are common to how most theories travel. The 
first of these he calls a point of origin ("or what seems like one") where a set of ideas are first 
elaborated or enter discourse. In the case of travelling Islam, the point of origin can be 
understood in two ways. In one sense it refers to the sociocultural contexts of the countries 
from which diasporic Muslims originate, but at the same time I also think we need to view 
the mythical period of early Medina as a form of 'point of origin' in Islam. The seventh 
century umma draws the Muslim imagination so strongly that nearly all forms of travelling 
Islam, even after they have been significantly transformed, still refer back to this point of 
origin. The second component of Said's scheme is the "distance traversed" - the act of 
traveling itself - in which a theory or set of ideas moves from the point or origin into a 
different time and space. The medium through which this occurs can be almost anything, but 
we might usefully think here of "vessels" such as migrant communities, exiled intellectuals, 
transnational publishing houses or electronic media. In the case of translocal Islam, all of 
these have played a significant role in bearing tradition across great distances. Third, our 
itinerant theory will necessarily encounter a set of conditions which mediates its acceptance, 
rejection or modification in a new time and place. For travelling Muslims these are usually 
the European and North American societies in which they settle; but, as we will see, there is 
also the factor of the 'Muslim other' to take into consideration. In other words, the conditions 
which Islam as a travelling theory encounters are not only determined by non-Muslim 
cultures, but also by competing interpretations of Islam. What finally emerges in the fourth 
stage of Said's process is an idea which has been transformed by its new uses; in short, a new 
(albeit well-traveled) theory. In our case what emerges is a 'new Islam, ' often invested with a 
greater critical capacity and a sense of its own contingency. It is this final stage of theory 
traveling which seems to most interest Said: 
What happens to it when, in different circumstances and for new reasons, it is used 
again and, in still more different circumstances, again? What can this tell us about 
theory itself - its limits, its possibilities, its inherent problems - and what can it 
suggest to us about the relationship between theory and criticism, on the one hand, 
and society and culture on the other? 5 
These are all questions which will be examined in the next chapter when we look at the ways 
in which translocal spaces bring about shifts in the meaning and significance of various 
Muslim practices. 
Some writers have, however, questioned the universal relevance of Said's depiction of 
travelling theory. James Clifford, for example, wonders whether this four-stage scheme is 
appropriate for those theories which travel in post-colonial contexts: 
[Said's four] stages read like an all-too-familiar story of immigration and 
acculturation. Such a linear path cannot do justice to the feedback loops, the 
ambivalent appropriations and resistances that characterize the travels of theories, 
and theorists, between places in the "First" and "Third" worlds. (I'm thinking about 
the journey of Gramscian Marxism to India through the work of the Subaltern 
Studies group, and its return as an altered, newly valuable commodity to places like 
a Ibid. 
5 Ibid., p. 230 
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Durham, North Carolina or Santa Cruz, California in the writings of Ranajit Guha, 
Partha Chatterjee, Dipesh Chakravorty, etc. )6 
Despite his apparent concern to redress the Eurocentrism of Said's formulation, Clifford 
seems to fall into a version of the same trap himself with this. The dialogue is still too one- 
way, from the West to the Rest and vice versa. It ignores theories and ideas that travel 
between and within regions of the so-called "Third World. " The implicit 'us' (First World) 
and 'them' (Third World) logic here seems to exclude the possibility that 'we' are not 
necessarily involved in some of the conversations that 'they' have amongst themselves. What 
is interesting in the case of Islam is the ways in which reformulated interpretations of religion 
are sometimes enabled through translocality to travel back to their points of origin, in other 
words re-enacting the travelling process in order to bring 'home' revised theories which then 
go on to travel within the'Third World. ' 
In his essay Said traces the development of Lukacsian Marxism from Lukacs himself in the 
Hungary of 1919, through the elaborations of his disciple Lucien Goldmann in post-World 
War II Paris and on up to Raymond Williams' uses of Goldmann in Cambridge during the 
1970s. What emerges from this is a sense of ideas shifting, twisting and learning to fit new 
contexts. Said puts emphasis on the need for a critical capacity on the part of those who 
"receive" travelling theories. For him there is no point in simply reiterating time and time 
again those aspects of a theory which were radical at the point of origin. To do so would be 
to risk turning a methodological breakthrough into a methodological trap. "Once an idea 
gains currency because it is clearly effective and powerful, " he notes, "there is every 
likelihood that during its peregrinations it will be reduced, codified, and institutionalized. "' 
The environment in which an idea was conceived becomes almost mythological and those 
who commit themselves to this "originary" source become intransigent: 
[The] original provenance... dulls the critical consciousness, convincing it that a once 
insurgent theory is still insurgent, lively, responsive to history. Left to its own 
specialists and acolytes, so to speak, theory tends to have walls erected around itself, 
but this does not mean that critics should either ignore theory or look despairingly 
around for newer varieties. 8 
In other words, there is every likelihood that through extensive travel a theory will lose its 
radical (i. e. transformative) edge. This does not mean, however, that all is lost. When a 
theory travels it can also sometimes take on a new critical consciousness - towards both itself 
and other theories. The intransigence of acolytes can be countered by theorist-reformers 
willing to take their theories on the road again. These last points are particularly complex in 
the case of travelling Islam. In this case, the original theory has become fragmented. There 
are those Muslims who 'soften' their Islam in order to more successfully blend in with the 
values and norms of their new society, while others adopt extremely hardline political 
positions in an attempt to differentiate themselves and their religion from its new 
surroundings. These various political responses to translocality will be explained further in 
Chapter IV. 
According to Said, what matters above all in travelling theory is the continual presence of a 
critical discourse: "the... recognition that there is no theory capable of covering, closing off, 
predicting all the situations in which it might be useful. "9 Furthermore, he wants to disallow 
the possibility of privileged, free-floating or "objective" readers. "No reading is neutral or 
6 James Clifford, "Notes on Travel and Theory, " Inscriptions 5,1989, p. 5 
Said, The World, the Text and the Critic, p. 239 
Ibid., p. 247 
9 /bid., p. 241 
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innocent, " Said argues, "and every reader is to some extent the product of a theoretical 
standpoint, however implicit or unconscious such a standpoint may be. "10 When a theory 
travels it splits, multiplies, and reproduces such that what we eventually end up with is many 
theories. Within any set of ideas, then, there will be multiple and often competing discourses 
on the nature of the "true" (or originary) idea. Part of traveling theory's task is to capture this 
sense of fragmentation. Muslims in translocal spaces often come into contact with other 
Muslims who interpret and practise Islam in disparate fashions. There often ensue debates 
about the nature of 'real' Islam and about who is licensed to speak on Islam's behalf. 
Communications and media technologies, as we will see in Chapter V, also serve to intensify 
these translocal politics. 
Towards the end of "Traveling Theory" Said also deals with another way in which theory can 
travel. This is the sense in which the meaning(s) of a given concept can often be seen to 
cover great distances when charted through the oeuvre of its author(s). As an example of 
this, Said traces the development of Michel Foucault's ideas on power and resistance. He 
finds that the early Foucault has very little engagement with the concept of power. By the 
middle of his career, however, the power/knowledge nexus has become very much the 
foundation of his thinking. In his later career the possibility of engaging with power 
disappears once again since Foucault - at least on Said's reading - has become convinced that 
"power is everywhere" and any attempt to resist hegemony would only be founded on a false 
consciousness serving to reproduce pre-existing power structures. 
The disturbing circularity of Foucault's theory of power is a form of theoretical 
overtotalization superficially more difficult to resist because, unlike many others, it is 
formulated, reformulated, and borrowed for use in what seem to be historically 
documented situations. But note that Foucault's history is ultimately textual, or 
rather textualized; its mode is one for which Borges would have an affinity. 
Gramsci, on the other hand, would find it uncongenial. He would certainly 
appreciate the fineness of Foucault's archeologies, but would find it odd that they 
make not even a nominal allowance for emergent movements, and none for 
revolutions, counterhegemony, or historical blocks. In human history there is always 
something beyond the reach of dominating systems, no matter how deeply they 
saturate society, and this is obviously what makes change possible, limits power in 
Foucault's sense, and hobbles the theory of that power. " 
We find similar discourses in travelling Islam surrounding concepts such as ijtihäd 
(independent reasoning). Traditional sources of religious authority such as the ulama often 
attempt to maintain a monopoly on the capacity to engage in this practice or, in some cases, 
to claim that this kind of thinking is no longer permitted. Many of the new Islamist 
intellectuals, as we will see, dispute the ulama's totalisation of the discursive field and assert 
instead that any and all Muslims are vested with the capacity to practise ijtihad. The very 
fact that they are able to find a discursive space in which to subvert genealogies of power - 
powerful forms of active critique in their own right - shows that hegemony is never 
complete. The presence of the theoretical other, which discursive identity always necessarily 
implies, means however that the discursive conditions for the erasure of theoretical identity 
are also present. Antagonism, if not immanent, is therefore at least possible. Furthermore, 
and to reiterate a point that has been made above, the antagonists of any discursive field are 
not necessarily always to be found outside that field. The imagined boundaries of any such 
space are teeming with a politics from within; hence debate and negotiation must be seen as 
vital constitutive elements in the discourse. 
10 Ibid. 
" Ibid., pp. 246-7 
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One obvious weakness in Said's explication of traveling theory is his hesitation to more fully 
elaborate the mechanisms through which meanings shift as theory travels. The readers of 
Said's essay, argues Abdul JanMohamed: 
... wait to see what specific modifications 
in the situation are responsible for this 
[shift in meaning], what kind of border has in fact been crossed, [and] what are the 
socio-political differences between the two locations that can bring about such 
changes. Perhaps because he senses the reader's expectations, Said insists several 
times that relocation in itself precipitates the transformation. " 
To be fair, it is doubtful whether Said ever intended to provide anything like a comprehensive 
study of the various technologies - discursive and otherwise - which enable theories to 
change through travel. Surely his intention was simply to offer a metaphor for reading 
certain aspects of intellectual life. JanMohamed does however draw our attention to 
questions which must be asked (and answered! ) if anything like a thorough understanding of 
those theories which travel is ever to be achieved. In this respect, Chapters IV and V (the one 
dealing with discursive technologies, the other with electronic technologies) of the present 
thesis might be read as an attempt to do just that. In them, we will examine the specific 
mechanisms - such as intergenerational conflict, minority status, and the intellectual 
challenges of the West - which prompt meanings to shift in translocal Islam. 
While most of what I have written above stresses the senses in which travel transforms 
theory, it should also be mentioned that there exists another politics of traveling theory, one 
which concerns itself primarily with the establishment and maintenance of hegemony. This 
relates to the fact that theories need to be made mobile by their authors if they are to have any 
pretense to universality. Propagation is imperative. If a theory aspires to the hearts and 
minds of all wo(men) then it must make itself appear to belong to all wo(men). Its 
applicability must be seen to be universal and it must lodge itself in our imaginations as 
something like a 'natural state of affairs. ' In this sense a theory must do its utmost to avoid 
being associated too closely with what Said would term the "point of origin, " for the wearing 
of local colours can easily taint cosmopolitan credentials. As James Clifford puts it: 
Conventionally, theory has been associated with big pictures - trans-cultural and 
trans-historical. Localization undermines a discourse's claim to "theoretical" status. 
For example, psychoanalysis loses something of its theoretical aura when it is found 
to be rooted in bourgeois Vienna of the turn of the century and in a certain male 
subjectivity for which woman is object and enigma. " 
This aspect of traveling theory has for obvious reasons been most prevalent in the post- 
colonial literature. It seeks to prohibit any theoretical hegemony, be it a discourse on 
colonialism, capitalism or democracy, from articulating and representing itself as somehow 
"natural" and/or rootless. It demands that any theory - and especially those wandering out of 
the West - declare their origins. Any set of ideas must be located in the particular 
sociocultural context in which it was elaborated, with all structures of power/knowledge 
clearly displayed. This is as true for liberal democracy and 'Muslim hegemony' (see below) 
today as it was for the colonialisms and ideologies of yesteryear. The younger generation of 
diasporic South Asian Muslims, for example, often questions the Islam of its parents, 
regarding the latter as tainted with the 'local culture' of the subcontinent and therefore not 
'true' Islam. This has in many cases prompted a return by the younger generation to another 
12 Abdul R. JanMohamed, "Worldliness-without-World, Homelessness-as-Home: Toward a Definition 
of the Specular Border Intellectual, " in Michael Sprinker (ed. ), Edward Said: A Critical Reader, 
Oxford: Blackwell, 1992, p. 100 
13 Clifford, "Notes on Travel and Theory, " p. 2 
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point of origin, Muhammad's Medina, which it regards as a source of 'pure' Islam. In this we 
see that theories travel not only in space, but also in time. 
Travelling theory hence provides us with useful ways of thinking about the politics of 
translocal space. It does so mainly in two ways. First, traveling theory allows us to 
conceptualise distanciating processes as a source of cultural politics in which meanings are 
transplanted and rearticulated from one context to another. Second, in so far as this transition 
implies a pluralisation of theory, we can see that the notion of traveling theory also helps to 
explain how competing interpretations of a given culture come to exist - and how they seek 
hegemony by gaining a monopoly of the discursive field. In the next section, I will elaborate 
a more specific quality of translocal/traveling cultures, namely their tendency towards 
hybridity, the intermingling of disparate discourses and cultures. 
Dialogic politics: hybridity and internal difference 
The literature is currently replete with references to the fusion and melange of cultures. 
Multiculturalism, it seems, reigns supreme - if not as an ethos then at the very least as an 
ontological condition. Creolisation, syncretism, hybridity: all variations on the polyglot self. 
While it might ostensibly seem that these tropes refer to the same general phenomenon, 
closer scrutiny reveals that they have somewhat different connotations associated with them. 
When we examine their situatedness in the literatures we find strong normative components 
in each. In the case of one rendering, hybridity, we find a veritable political manifesto. This 
latter rubric is hence particularly interesting. In what follows I want to look at some of the 
claims that have been made on behalf of hybridity. I will accept several and reject others. I 
then want to develop my own idiom of hybridity, one which captures some of the very 
particular features of cultural melange in travelling Islam. 
The term hybridity has its origins, of course, in biology but the connotations associated with 
the term have changed quite significantly over the last hundred years. It was originally seen 
to represent a loss of purity, an authenticity compromised by the insertion of an alien element 
which tainted the whole. However, the rise of Mendelian genetics in the mid nineteenth 
century signaled a shift in this conventional wisdom. Hybridity increasingly came to be seen 
as a desirable condition, one in which the cross-fertilisation of different gene pools produced 
stronger, richer offspring. 14 Social attitudes and the social sciences were both slow to pick up 
on this new rendition of the cross-breeding trope, and it has only been in the present decade 
that writers have begun to use the term with any regularity. 
One notable exception here is Mikhail Bakhtin. His linguistic rendition of hybridity was 
elaborated as early as the 1930s and became a major influence on later hybridity theorists - 
particularly, as we will see, those working in a postcolonial mode. Bakhtin's thinking is 
worth briefly examining, constituting as it does the first important attempt to understand 
hybridity in relation to language and society. Bakhtin begins with a direct answer to the 
obvious question: "What is a hybridization? It is a mixture of two social languages within the 
limits of a single utterance, an encounter, within the arena of a single utterance, between two 
different linguistic consciousnesses, separated from one another by an epoch, by social 
differentiation or by some other factor. " 15 He then goes on to draw a distinction between 
what he calls the conscious, "intentional" hybrid and the unconscious or "organic" hybrid. 
The former he sees as an artistic device in which an author deliberately juxtaposes two 
languages so that they might both unmask each other, coming together, as he puts it, " [to] 
14 Jan Nederveen Pieterse, "Globalization as Hybridization" in Mike Featherstone, Scott Lash and 
Roland Robertson (eds. ), Global Modernities, London: SAGE, 1995, p. 171 
15 M. M. Bakhtin, The Dialogic Imagination, Austin: University of Texas Press, 1981, p. 358 
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consciously fight it out in the territory of the utterance. " 16 The point here is to use the one 
language to illuminate the other by bringing them (unexpectedly) face to face within a single 
space (e. g. Islam): "Therefore an intentional... hybrid is a semantic hybrid; not semantic and 
logical in the abstract (as in rhetoric), but rather a semantics that is concrete and social. " 17 
The "organic" hybrid, on the other hand, is a far more passive creature. There is no 
deliberate or strategic placement of language here, no use of "conscious contrasts and 
oppositions. " This organic hybrid seems to be more about the accidental collusion of 
different languages and woridviews within the same utterance. That is not to say, however, 
that the unintentional hybrid possesses no creative or revelatory properties. On the contrary. 
"[U]nconscious hybrids, " Bakhtin writes, "have been... profoundly productive historically: 
they are pregnant with potential for new world views, with new "internal forms" for 
perceiving the world in words. i18 For him, this kind of hybridisation is one of the primary 
motors of historical and linguistic change. Traveling cultures naturally bump into one 
another. For our own purposes it will be most useful to read the intentional hybrid as a 
'political' hybrid in the sense that intentional hybridity involves the manufacture of 
antagonism by deliberately placing two disparate conceptual languages together within a 
single discursive space. There are implications here, I will argue later, for the nature of the 
encounter between the Muslim and his 'internal other' (i. e. also Muslim) in translocality. 
For me the most problematic aspect of Bakhtin's theory is the question of the boundary 
between the two languages (or cultures, theories, worldviews) which encounter each other 
within the hybrid. It seems tempting, at least initially, to accuse Bakhtin of essentialising the 
components of his hybrid utterances in the sense that he seems to be suggesting we can 
identify two languages which are somehow "separate. " I will be returning to this problem 
later when I develop an idiom of hybridity linked to my earlier discussion of culture and 
politics. I want to go on now though to look at some of the ways in which other 
contemporary theorists have used hybridity theory. 
Various notions of hybridity can be found in the contemporary literature, each with its own 
strategic logic. In post-colonial theory, for example, the term has a metaphorical function 
within a wider political discourse. All accounts, however, speak of hybridity as a form of 
encounter, a coming together of disparate cultural forms into a new fusion or melange. Some 
view this process as highly desirable while others are mixed in their assessments; often this 
depends on the larger normative scheme in which a writer is situated: 
Hybridity evokes narratives of origin and encounter. Whenever the process of 
identity formation is premised on an exclusive boundary between `us' and `them', the 
hybrid, born out of the transgression of this boundary, figures as a form of danger, 
loss and degeneration. If, however, the boundary is marked positively - to solicit 
exchange and inclusion - then the hybrid may yield strength and vitality. Hence the 
conventional value of the hybrid is always positioned in relation to the value of 
purity, along axes of inclusion and exclusion. In some circumstances, the `curse' of 
hybridity is seen as a mixed blessing. 19 
The idiom of hybridity found in post-colonial and cultural studies tends to view the subject- 
self as a juncture for multiple cross-currents of identity. In this sense hybridity is a 
description of simultaneous difference. It becomes a metaphor for the post-colonial 
condition itself, and is celebrated as a means by which to resist the totalising assignations of 
16 Ibid., p. 360 
" Ibid. Emphasis in original. 
18 Ibid. 
19 Nikos Papastergiadis, "Tracing Hybridity in Theory" in P. Werbner & Tariq Modood (eds), Debating 
Cultural Hybridity, London: Zed Books, 1997, p. 259 
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identity and value which emanate from hegemonic centres. This line of thought is often 
heavily informed by terminology borrowed from literary criticism such as W. E. B. Dubois' 
notion of `double consciousness' or Bakhtin's `dialogic imagination. ' 
20 One of the most 
prominent exponents of post-colonial hybridity is Homi Bhabha. His explication functions 
well as a summary of the post-colonial approach: 
In my own work I have developed the concept of hybridity to describe the 
construction of cultural authority within conditions of political antagonism or 
inequity. Strategies of hybridization reveal an estranging movement in the 
authoritative, even authoritarian inscriptions of the cultural sign. At the point at 
which the precept attempts to objectify itself as a generalized knowledge or a 
normalizing, hegemonic practice, the hybrid strategy or discourse opens up a space of 
negotiation where power is unequal but its articulation may be equivocal.... Hybrid 
agencies find their voice in a dialectic that does not seek cultural supremacy or 
sovereignty. They deploy the partial culture from which they emerge to construct 
visions of community, and versions of historic memory, that give narrative form to 
the minority positions they occupy; the outside of the inside: the part in the whole. 
21 
Bhabha thus seeks to actualise the latent political potential of Bakhtin's intentional hybrid, 
translating it into a manifesto of active post-colonial agency. Colonial authority depends on 
the imagined integrity of a single voice in order to subjugate and in this sense hybridity is its 
greatest threat. If colonial discourse is brought into a hybrid articulation, that is a situation in 
which the language of colonial authority can be unmasked by the language of an other, then 
the monologism on which its power is based will be undermined. Hybridity demonstrates to 
colonial authority that it cannot be what it claims. "[It] intervenes in the exercise of authority 
not merely to indicate the impossibility of its identity but to represent the unpredictability of 
its presence. 1122 Authority is hence revealed as a contingent rather than natural force through 
an encroachment into the homogenous space of authority which requires this contingency to 
articulate itself. 
Hybridity is the sign of the productivity of colonial power, its shifting forces and 
fixities; it is the name for the strategic reversal of the process of domination through 
disavowal (that is, the production of discriminatory identities that secure the 'pure' 
and original identity of authority)... [C]olonial hybridity is not a problem of 
genealogy or identity between two different cultures which can then be resolved as an 
issue of cultural relativism. Hybridity is a problematic of colonial representation and 
individuation that reverses the effects of the colonialist disavowal, so that other 
'denied' knowledges enter upon the dominant discourse and estrange the basis of its 
authority - its rules of recognition. 
23 
In Bhabha's work, hybrid identities are seen to inhabit what he calls a `third space', an area 
of discourse which is neither here nor there but rather interstitial. Within these spaces 
hybridity is seen to be an anti-hegemonic force which seeks to force any would-be totalising 
narrative to come face to face with a challenge to its own supposed purity: the absolute 
rendered contingent by the positing of a dialogic difference. "Such assignations of social 
differences, " writes Bhabha, "where difference is neither One nor the Other but something 
else besides, in-between, find their agency in a form of the `future' where the past is not 
20 See Paul Gilroy, The Black Atlantic: Modernity and Double Consciousness, London: Verso, 1993 
and M. M. Bakhtin, op. cit. 
21 Homi Bhabha, "Culture's In-Between" in Stuart Hall (ed. ), Questions of Cultural Identity, London: 
Macmillan, p. 58 
22 Homi Bhabha, The Location of Culture, London: Routledge, 1994, p. 114 
23 Ibid., pp. 113-14 
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originary, where the present is not simply transitory . "24 The third space 
is hence one in 
which real 'newness enters the world' and not simply a space in which prior cultures are 
conjoined: 
For me the importance of hybridity is not to be able to trace two original moments 
from which the third emerges, rather hybridity to me is the 'third space' which 
enables other positions to emerge. This third space displaces the histories that 
constitute it, and sets up new structures of authority, new political initiatives, which 
are inadequately understood through received wisdom.. . The process of cultural 
hybridity gives rise to something different, something new and unrecognisable, a new 
area of negotiation of meaning and representation. 25 
I would want to suggest that such 'third spaces' are often coterminous (in a queer sort of 
terminosity which never quite ends... ) with what I earlier defined as translocal space. 
Furthermore, on entering such spaces we would quite likely find them to be inhabited 
primarily by traveling theories. We can see in this the important link between post-colonial 
hybridity and translocality. My reading of hybridity's post-colonial aspect is, however, 
somewhat different from Bhabha's. Like him, I recognise the power of the hybrid to disrupt 
the hegemony of colonial authority by revealing to it its own contingency. In post-colonial 
theory, the colonial subject is conventionally taken to be equivalent with European or 
Western hegemony. In my deployment of Bhabha's hybridity, however, I wish to insert 
Muslim hegemony in place of Western hegemony or colonialism. In other words, I am using 
hybridity as a way to read difference and disjuncture within Islam. By 'Muslim hegemony' I 
am referring to those sources of social authority in Islam which seek to represent themselves 
as the privileged readers of tradition or the bearers of 'true' Islam. Their identity can vary 
from context to context but they will often be either traditional ulama or 'new' Islamist 
intellectuals of a more extreme tendency - two groups which, ironically, often find 
themselves at odds with each other. Hybridity emerges as a tool that can be used against 
them by 'other' Muslims seeking to speak for Islam, or, in other words, seeking to enter the 
same discursive space. The methodology is again similar to that of post-colonial hybridity, 
namely to demonstrate to the ulama and the hardline intellectuals that their supposedly 
'correct' readings of Islam are nothing more than the product of particular historical 
contingencies. We will see examples of this process at work in the next chapter. 
Another understanding of hybridity which emphasises its ability to give voice to the 
marginalised but which is not explicitly tied to post-colonial discourse is to be found in the 
work of Ulf Hannerz, an anthropologist whose work we briefly examined in the first chapter. 
In place of hybridity, however, he speaks of 'creolization'. Language is the chief metaphor 
evoked by Hannerz in explaining this idiom of mongrelization which is seen to involve the 
pushing and pulling of hegemonic forces between traditions and the exercise of meaning 
within specific structures of social organisation under varying spatio-temporal conditions. 
The defining feature of creolisation for Hannerz is the confluence of widely disparate 
cultures which interact in the context of a centre-periphery relationship. However, he also 
argues that 
[t]he cultural processes of creolization are not simply a matter of constant pressure 
from the center toward the periphery, but a much more creative interplay. As 
languages have different dimensions such as grammar, phonology, and lexicon, and 
as creole languages are formed as unique combinations and creations out of the 
interaction between languages in these various dimensions, so creole cultures come 
24Ibid., p. 219 
25 "The Third Space: Interview with Homi Bhabha, " in Jonathan Rutherford (ed. ), Identity: Community, 
Culture, Difference, London: Laurence and Wishart, 1990, p. 211 
78 
out of multidimensional cultural encounters and can put things together in new 
ways 26 
Thus the periphery in creolisation is invested with a new ability to "talk back" to the core as 
it increasingly adopts the organisational forms and commodity models of the latter. Hannerz's 
idiom of hybridity is useful for conceptualising at least one aspect of Muslim translocality, 
that of language. In the chapters to come we will be referring on several occasions to the 
emergence of something like an 'Islamic English. ' This dialect represents a fusion of, for 
example, American street slang with Islamic terminology. Muslims in translocal spaces will 
often use the noun dhikr (the praising of Allah through ritual recitation) as a verb. One 
American Muslim, for instance, complains that "we cannot sit and dhikr for like three hours 
and expect to help the community. " n Other American Muslims speak of 'giving shahadas, ' 
the testimony or creed affirming one's belief in the uniqueness of God and Muhammad's 
Prophethood. Here is the periphery seeping into the core. While Hannerz's model of 
hybridisation effectively counters the unidirectional globalisation-as-homogenisation 
paradigm, it does possess its limitations. His concentration on creolisation processes which 
occur between 'highly differentiated' cultures and traditions limits the applicability of his 
approach because as translocality evolves it becomes more and more difficult to determine 
exactly where the boundaries between "significantly disparate cultures" lie. Hence Hannerz's 
creolisation theory does not provide a framework for understanding the processes by which 
hybridisation occurs within a particular tradition when various interpretations of that culture 
come face to face with each other in the context of translocal space. 
Another idiom of hybridity can be found in William Rowe and Vivian Schelling's work on 
popular culture in Latin America. Here hybridisation is seen as "the ways in which forms 
become separated from existing practices and recombine with new forms in new practices. s28 
The distinctive feature of this model is its emphasis on the encounter between `existing' and 
`new' practices: the old meets the innovative, memory meets modernity. A second theme in 
their approach, and one which is particularly pertinent in the present context, is that of 
deterritorialisation. This focuses on the changing set of meanings which are mapped on to 
objects as they move between cultural spaces. "With the transition, " they write, "symbols 
become detached from their previous contexts... handicraft objects [become] ornaments in 
cities instead of being used for eating, cooking and so on .,, 
29 We see a similar phenomenon 
in the changing meanings attached to Muslim rituals in diaspora such as the daily prayer. In 
the context of the 'point of origin' or homeland for example, prayer might have been 
performed almost mechanically with little soul-searching or introspection. In diaspora, 
however, the Muslim encounters discourses which stress the importance of Islam as a 
spiritual and moral force in the context of a wider society (i. e. the West) which is perceived 
to be lacking in these respects. When the'theory' of devoutness meets the 'practice' of prayer 
in diaspora, the meanings assigned to the latter are transformed such that it comes to be seen 
as a new form of self-awareness and identity. 
The final set of ideas regarding hybridity that I want to look at before moving on to my 
critique of the theory brings us quite firmly into the realm of translocal space. These ideas 
represent a macro world view which seeks to problematise the 'globalisation as 
homogenisation' thesis and which quite explicitly figures itself as a rewording of 
26 Ulf Hannerz, Cultural Complexity: Studies in the Social Organization of Meaning, New York: 
Columbia University Press, 1992, p. 265 
27 Michael M. J. Fischer and Mehdi Abedi, Debating Muslims: Cultural Dialogues in Postmodernity 
and Tradition, Madison: University of Wisconsin Press, 1990, p. 317 
28 William Rowe and Vivian Schelling, Memory and Modernity: Popular Culture in Latin America, 




globalisation as hybridisation. Jan Nederveen Pieterse rejects those versions of the 
globalisation thesis which claim an increasing synchronisation of world cultures, especially 
those which reduce the trajectory of cultural flow to the universalisation of Western modes. 
As he argues: 
[The globalisation-as-homogenisation] approach overlooks the countercurrents - the 
impact non-Western have been making on the West. It plays down the ambivalence 
of the globalising momentum and ignores the role of the local reception of Western 
culture; for example, the indigenisation of Western elements. It fails to see the 
influence non-Western cultures have been exercising on one another... It overrates the 
homogeneity of Western culture and overlooks the fact that many of the standards 
exported by the West and its cultural industries themselves turn out to be of 
culturally mixed character if we examine their cultural lineages. 30 
In examining the nexus of globalisation and hybridity, Nederveen Pieterse identifies two key 
forms of this phenomenon: (1) structural hybridity, which is seen to involve the emergence of 
new forms of social organisation in the wake of weakening nation-states (e. g. transmigrant 
communities); and (2) cultural hybridity, characterised by increasingly intensified encounters 
between cultural forces and systems of meanings in which the boundaries of these practices 
are readjusted so as to include material from the others: "the doors of erstwhile imagined 
communities opening up... 531 
The first emphasises a new plurality in the available modes of social organisation, all of 
which are seen to exist and to operate simultaneously depending on which model of 
community is most relevant to a given sphere of interaction. "What matters, " argues 
Nederveen Pieterse, "is that no single mode has a necessary overall priority or monopoly. "32 
Examples of the modes of organisation mentioned in this regard include the transnational, 
international, macro-regional, national, micro-regional, municipal, and local. The 
institutional frameworks at work here are seen to bridge and crisscross various functional 
levels, with footholds in more than just one of these areas - often in several. The cultural 
aspect of globalised hybridity is seen to involve the blurring of boundaries, cultural cross- 
over, and - perhaps most importantly - interculturalism as opposed to multicultural ism. 33 
Nederveen Pieterse makes mention of a feature common to many migrant groups, the 
appearance of mixed-culture patterns in the second-generation which combine both elements 
of "home culture" (often only within the domain of the private, but increasingly in the case of 
Islam also within a new 'Muslim public sphere' - see below) and "outdoor culture", that is, 
the practices of the culture of residence. 3a 
These two areas of globalised hybridity are seen by Nederveen Pieterse to be intrinsically 
inter-related: "Structural hybridisation, or the emergence of new practices of social 
cooperation and competition, and cultural hybridisation, or new translocal cultural 
expressions, are interdependent: new forms of cooperation require and evoke new cultural 
imaginaries. i35 This thinking leads him to draw a distinction between two different types of 
culture which he terms `Territorial' and `Translocal', respectively. The former understands 
the content and substance of culture to be primarily the product of a distinct territorialised 
locality while the latter category stresses the roles of diffusion and boundary crossing as 
determinants of cultural form. What makes discussions of transcultural relations difficult, 
30 Nederveen Pieterse, "Globalization as Hybridization, " p. 169. Emphasis added. 
31 Ibid., p. 179 
32 Ibid., p. 168 
33 Ibid., p. 171 
34 Ibid., p. 172 
33 Ibid., p. 180 
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argues Nederveen Pieterse, is that these two very different notions of culture tend to be used 
interchangeably without any recognition of the importance not only of distinguishing 
between them, but also of viewing transcultural relations itself as an encounter between these 
two understandings of meanings - one static, the other `traveling'. Like Nederveen Pieterse, 
my interests lie more with understanding hybridity in relation to those cultures that travel. 
His understanding of globalisation is also similar to my own, although I have elected to use 
the term translocality because it focuses on the spatial framing of moving culture. 
One way to imagine this spatial framing in the context of translocality is to picture the 
emergence of'gaps' in the global architecture, a "liminal space that cuts across inside/outside, 
a space that is neither within the state nor an aspect of the international state system but 
animates both. 06 Many writers from a variety of disciplinary projects are writing about 
'gaps' (my own colloquialism) using an equally diverse range of terminologies and theoretical 
rubrics. James Rosenau has his 'Frontier; 37 Michael Kearney and Renato Rosaldo write 
about ethnographies in the 'borderzones; 38 Homi Bhabha finds hybrid identities in the 
interstices of a 'third spacei39 - and this is then echoed in Smadar Lavie and Ted 
Swedenburg's proposition of a 'third time-space. i40 Susanne Hoeber Rudolph analyses non- 
state identities as a form of 'transnational civil societyi41 and Arjun Appadurai looks to 
'translocalities' to find the contours of a post-national geography. 42 Each of these tropes is of 
course a world unto itself, and it would do them (and their authors) great discursive violence 
to simply conflate them. There is however a sense in which all of these theorists are writing 
about very similar phenomena, but with the obvious caveat that each does so within his or her 
own normative and (usually) disciplinary context. 
These new identity spaces are not by any means replacements for the state system as we 
know it. They do not provide structures for global governance, nor systems for the 
application of transnational justice. Gaps are not regimes. Rather, they contribute to plurality 
and hybridity in the world polity. 43 We can also see them as trenches, the bunkers from 
which marginal identities combat the rigidities of institutionalised hegemony. Fluid creatures 
leak openly from their dilapidated habitats, mixing and matching as they encounter each 
other in travel. Bhabha is worth quoting at length here, recognising as he does 
... the 
dilemma of projecting an international space on the trace of a decentred, 
fragmented subject. Cultural globality is figured in the in-between spaces of double- 
frames: its historical originality marked by a cognitive obscurity; its decentred 
'subject' signified in the nervous temporality of the transitional, or the emergent 
provisionality of the 'present'... What must be mapped as a new international space of 
discontinuous historical realities is, in fact, the problem of signifying the interstitial 
36 Susanne Hoeber Rudolph, "Introduction: Religion, States, and Transnational Civil Society" in 
Susanne Hoeber Rudolph and James Piscatori (eds. ), Transnational Religion and Fading States, 
Boulder: Westview Press, 1997, p. 1 
37 James Rosenau, Along the Domestic-Foreign Frontier: Exploring Governance in a Turbulent World, 
Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1997. 
38 Michael Kearney, "Borders and Boundaries of State and Self at the End of Empire, " Journal of 
Historical Sociology, Vol. 4, No. 1,1991; and Renato Rosaldo, Culture and Truth: The Remaking of 
Social Analysis, London: Routledge, 1993. 
39 Homi Bhabha, The Location of Culture, pp. 36-9 
40 Smadar Lavie and Ted Swedenburg, "Introduction: Displacement, Diaspora, and Geographies of 
Identity" in Smadar Lavie and Ted Swedenburg, Displacement, Diaspora, and Geographies of Identity, 
Durham: Duke University Press, 1996. 
4` Rudolph, op. cit. 
42 Arjun Appadurai, Modernity at Large: Cultural Dimensions of Globalization, Minneapolis: 
University of Minnesota Press, 1996. 
43 Rudolph, p. 2 
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passages and processes of cultural difference that are inscribed in the 'in-between', in 
the temporal break-up that weaves the 'global' text... [A] willingness to descend into 
that alien territory... may reveal that the theoretical recognition of the split-space of 
enunciation may open the way to conceptualizing an international culture, based not 
on the exoticism of multiculturalism or the diversity of cultures, but on the 
inscription and articulation of culture's hybridity. To that end we should remember 
that it is the 'inter' - the cutting edge of translation and negotiation, the in-between 
space - that carries the burden of the meaning of culture. It makes it possible to 
begin envisaging national, anti-nationalist histories of the 'people'. And by exploring 
this Third Space, we may elude the politics of polarity and emerge as the others of 
our selves. 44 
Bhabha's concern with the 'anti-national' allows us to bring in Arjun Appadurai's conception 
of translocality as a space in which the hegemony of nationalist politics is challenged by 
forms of life which refuse to recognise the limits of the state as the limits of its politics. The 
translocal is the space that bridges place, a 'dwelling-in-travelling. ' In one sense we are 
speaking of an empowering distanciation, the ability to defy by not staying put, by not 
allowing the state to render one 'static. ' At the same time, however, translocality is also 
dislocation and displacement. It is about being neither here nor there, neither one nor the 
other. "Living in the border, " write Lavie and Swedenburg, "is frequently to experience the 
feeling of being trapped in an impossible in-between... "45 To inhabit the borderzone is thus 
to threaten the hegemony of an International Relations with a very limited capacity to 'see' 
other forms of politics outside its statist framework. 
The various approaches summarised above form a representative selection of hybridity 
theories. Each, of course, is specially formulated to serve the particular purposes of its 
author. My aim has been to give some indication of the many diverse notions of cultural 
hybridity to be found in the literature and to show how they can be related to the core themes 
of this thesis. Inevitably, of course, hybridity theory also has its shortcomings. I propose 
now to offer some possible critiques of the hybridity approach and then to use these as a tool 
for producing my own idiom of hybridity. 
Nederveen Pieterse raises the important question of whether there is anywhere any such thing 
as an unhybridised culture. That is, since any and every cultural tradition can be said to have 
been formed from divergent origins, does the analytical category `hybrid culture' actually 
possess any analytical utility? "[I]f we accept that cultures have been hybrid all along, 
hybridisation is in effect a tautology: contemporary accelerated globalisation means the 
hybridisation of hybrid cultures. "46 As the anthropologist Talal Asad puts it: 
Let us be clear: to speak of cultural syncretism or cultural hybrids presupposes a 
conceptual distinction between preexisting ("pure") cultures. Of course, all apparent 
cultural unities are the outcomes of diverse origins, and it is misleading to think of an 
identifiable cultural unity as having neutrally traceable boundaries. But the term 
hybridity (like amalgam or composite) does not seem to me very useful in thinking 
about this problem. 47 
Lavie and Swedenburg allude to the same issue when they write that "hybridities which result 
from the interminglings of disparate cultures necessarily implicate cultures that themselves 
44 Bhabha, The Location of Culture, pp. 216-7,38-9 
45 Lavie and Swedenburg, p. 15 
46 Nederveen Pieterse, "Globalization as Hybridization, " p. 178 
47 Talal Asad, Genealogies of Religion: discipline and reasons of power in Christianity and Islam, 
Baltimore: The Johns Hopkins University Press, 1993, p. 263-4 
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are already syncretized, always in the process of transformation. All cultures turn out to be, 
in various ways, hybrid. i48 According to Jonathan Friedman, any analysis which tries to 
understand hybridity as a coming together of'distinct' cultures is therefore engaging in a form 
of "confused essentialism. i49 This problem seems to occur even in post-colonial accounts of 
hybridity. There seems to be little explicit recognition amongst many post-colonial writers of 
the vast heterogeneity within their own cultures - indeed, that their societies are themselves 
the products of creolised histories and hybrid encounters. The need to hold up a culturally 
authentic alternative to the `hegemonic imagination' (be it a form of political community or 
moral system) leads them to gloss over their own diversity and to invest their culture with 
misplaced purity. They also seem to ignore the fact that any such alternative must itself have 
been produced and maintained by an indigenous system of hegemony. In short, the post- 
colonial position tends to forget the myriad of power relations which obtain within its own 
society, be they caste systems or religio-juridical hierarchies. It would seem, then, that an 
obsession with the nature of hegemony between coloniser and colonised blinds many of these 
writers to the multiple histories, forms, and hence the tensions of actual cultural performance 
within themselves and the very societies they seek to critique. 
It is here that we return to Bakhtin's original formulation of linguistic hybridity. We will 
recall his assertion that within a hybrid utterance one is able to identify two different, that is 
one and an other, cultures. If he is able to say that there are two languages in any given 
hybridity then there must be some (essentialist) criteria by which he differentiates between or 
draws boundaries around these cultures. Bakhtin, however, is most adamant to deny this: 
[T]here is no formal - compositional and syntactic - boundary between these 
utterances, styles, languages, belief systems; the division of voices and languages 
takes place within the limits of a single syntactic whole, often within the limits of a 
simple sentence. It frequently happens that even one and the same word will belong 
simultaneously to two languages, two belief systems that intersect in a hybrid 
construction - and, consequently, the word has two contradictory meanings, two 
accents. so 
This statement would seem to be somewhat contradictory. Bakhtin denies the existence of 
any boundary between the two languages, but in speaking about two "different" languages, 
that is, the one and its other, he is necessarily implying the existence of a boundary between 
them. Although he does not explicitly address this apparent inconsistency at any length, I do 
believe that there is a reading of Bakhtin which allows us to work around the problem and it 
hinges on the nature of the dividing boundary. Bakhtin claims that there is no formal border 
between the two languages of a hybrid, that is to say no announcements or signs in the road, 
nothing to tell us that we are passing from one language to another. This does not mean 
however that there is not some other kind of boundary here. Somehow we still know how to 
recognise the internal differentiation within an utterance that signals the presence of 
hybridity. This is possible, I want to argue, only by virtue of our own hybridity. I mean by 
this that we must already be familiar with the two languages of the hybrid utterance - and 
hence somehow hybrid ourselves - in order to even recognise them as two languages. This 
does not necessarily imply a given, formal boundary between the languages, but rather a 
cultural situatedness which permits us to assign double-meanings. Our cultural vocabularies 
must therefore be broad enough to identify the interplay between "different" signifying codes 
within a single discursive space. The boundary between the two languages is therefore 
culturally contingent, for without prior cultural competence the hybrid cannot emerge. I 
48 Lavie and Swdenburg, p. 10 
49 Jonathan Friedman, "Global System, Globalization and the Parameters of Modernity, " in 
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hence want to relate hybridity to what I said earlier about culture and politics. In the 'third 
space' of hybridity, where multifarious cultural forms come into contact with one another, 
politics is bound to occur; a set of hegemonic relations thus emerges within each specific 
instance of hybridity. The intermingling of symbols and practices is not the end of the story 
by any means, but rather should pose another set of questions with regard to the nature, 
structure, and hierarchy of power relations within a given hybridity. Nederveen Pieterse 
seems to be one of the few hybridity theorists to explicitly recognise this: 
Relations of power and hegemony are inscribed and reproduced within hybridity, for 
wherever we look closely enough we find the traces of asymmetry in culture, place, 
descent. Hence hybridity raises the question of the terms of mixture, the conditions 
of mixing and melange. At the same times it is important to note the ways in which 
hegemony is not merely reproduced but refigured in the process of hybridisation. 51 
Again, for all its concern with relations of power, the post-colonial idiom seems to lose all 
interest in hegemony at the very moment of hybridity. Do the cultures which meet in this 
space stand on an equal footing? Are power relations reproduced as they obtain `outside' the 
hybrid space? Is hegemony inverted? What are the determinants of power asymmetry within 
creolisation? These are the questions which any theory of hybridised politics must seek to 
answer. 
The criticisms rehearsed above, I believe, seriously discredit the utility of the concept of 
hybridity when deployed in the context of what is often called 'cross-cultural' analysis. 
Because all cultures are already hybridised to one extent or another it becomes meaningless 
to refer to this ongoing process as anything new or distinctive. And while translocality may 
indeed serve to intensify the encounters which lead to hybridisation, is there anything further 
to say once this point is made? If we want to think of hybridity as something that involves 
the intermingling of discrete, bounded, originally "pure" cultural entities then the answer is a 
most resounding no. I believe, however, that the limitations we have uncovered actually 
serve to show us a route to where hybridity may be of some use, namely for the study of 
encounters and exchanges within a particular cultural space as they are experienced in 
translocality. I have already alluded to this in my explanation above of how I want to read 
Bhabha's post-colonial hybridity as a means to conceptualise difference and disjuncture 
within Islam. This approach allows us to bypass the trap in which all (essentialised) cultural 
systems are hybrid. This is achieved by concentrating not on syncretisms between 
supposedly distinct (and somehow "pure") traditions, but rather on the convergence of 
differing interpretations within a single discursive space (e. g. Islam). The concomitant of 
such an approach would be a shift in the focus of our analysis such that we look more at the 
nature and distribution of authority and hegemony within the hybridised scheme itself. In the 
case of Muslim transnationalism, as we will see, a politics of authenticity and authority 
becomes a key motif when the canon of Islam is increasingly forced to account for and 
reconcile itself with any number of competing self-interpretations within translocal spaces. 
So what do the politics of hybridity within traveling cultures look like? Having posited a 
politics of cultural anti-essentialism, outlined the qualities of traveling theory and then 
advanced a particular interpretation of hybridity, I want in the final section of this chapter to 
say something about how these concepts can be best contextualised in the translocal 
communities that are the objects of this inquiry. I will be arguing that in their conventional 
critical guise, the metaphors of migrancy, diaspora, rootlessness and hybridity are easily 
over-celebrated. The freedom they imply in one particular reading can and often is perceived 
as a loss elsewhere. I also want to suggest that in certain cultural contexts the notion of 
" Nederveen Pieterse, "Globalization as Hybridization, " p. 173 
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hybridity is itself politically charged. In translocalities marked by a prominent dialogue and 
politics between 'host' and 'diasporic' cultures, hybridity is often a complicating factor 
because subjectivities are forced to converse not only with Others outside their culture but 
also with the Others within. 
Diasporic conversations 
A limbo of national or cultural identity -a defining characteristic of the translocality mapped 
in Chapter i- is becoming increasingly common in a global society which possesses the 
infrastructure to import, export, shift, modify, and exchange peoples and their bodies of 
knowledge on an unprecedented scale. Edward Said makes an eloquent allusion to this 
condition: 
I think culture has to be seen as not only excluding but also exported; there is this 
tradition which you are required to understand and learn and so on, but you cannot 
really be of it... and then of course the whole problematic of exile and immigration 
enters into it, the people who simply don't belong in any culture; that is the great 
sz modern or, if you like, postmodern fact, the standing outside of cultures. 
Faced with this situation, can the only answer be an appeal for the imagination of new forms 
of political space which will appreciate community's discontents? Or, in so far as this 
condition can only be represented as a community of non-community, would any new form of 
polity (even at its most tolerant) not necessarily somehow deprive society's `in-betweens' of 
a condition that is simultaneously treasured and maligned? Historically it would seem that 
the answer has been to syncretise, that is, to develop from fresh (or to borrow from outside) 
models of community which can be grafted onto a prior body of cultural material so as to 
preserve its `authenticity. ' At face value this might seem like just another rendition of 
hybridity, yet there is a crucial distinction: 
Syncretism and hybridity are similar in some respects but not the same by any means. 
Syncretism involves impregnating one culture with the contents of another in order to 
create a third, stable culture while hybridity involves an ambivalence about both of 
the original cultures, thereby leading to creation of a slipzone of indeterminacy and 
shifting positionalities. This is a state of unbelonging, in effect a form of freedom, 
nomadism, homelessness, or vagrancy-even opportunism-because it settles on 
nothing but difference itself. 53 
Much is often made of the postmodern qualities of displacement and alienation: the subject is 
split, de-centred, in flux. Identities are fractured, reality is elsewhere. "One [does] not have 
to belong, one [can] simply float, effortlessly, through a supermarket of packaged and 
commodified cultures, ready to be consumed. "" It as if, in the wake of global capitalism and 
the technologies of travel and communication, the whole notion of belonging has become 
passe, an antiquated relic of a modernity which sought to classify, name and place peoples 
whenever and wherever possible. Aijaz Ahmad renders this condition instead as an excess of 
belonging: "not only does the writer have all cultures available to him or her as resource, for 
52 "Media, Margins and Modernity, " Edward Said in conversation with Raymond Williams in R. 
Williams, The Politics of Modernity. 
53 Hamid Naficy, The Making of Exile Cultures: Iranian Television in Los Angeles, Minneapolis: 
University of Minnesota Press, 1993, p. 127 
54 Aijaz Ahmad, In Theory: Classes, Nations, Literatures, London: Verso, 1994, p. 128. Emphasis 
added. 
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consumption, but he or she actually belongs in all of them, by virtue of belonging properly in 
none. "55 
There are, I believe, two key problems with the ways in which some postcolonial and 
metropolitan discourses celebrate the empowering qualities of migrancy. The first relates to 
the fact that postcolonial discourses tend to be marked by an abstracted literariness which 
often elides the concrete, material contexts in which subjects - and even neo-hegemonic 
subjects - find themselves today. Pheng Cheah, for example, refers to the post-colonial 
idiom of hybridity as "a theory of resistance that reduces the complex giveness of material 
reality to its symbolic dimensions and underplays the material institution of neocolonial 
oppression at a global-systemic level. 06 The second problem, which is related to the 
metropolitan celebration of the liberating qualities of migrancy, travel and hybridity, might 
be seen as more epistemological in nature. It relates to the disparity between those traveling 
subjectivities which posit what they "know" as the core of their identities and those which 
question even the possibility of "knowing. " Many "postmodern" theorists of travel tend to 
write in sympathy with the latter; that is, with a certain cosmopolitan irony, an ambivalence 
towards identity, belief and belonging. Are all traveling theories required to take up this 
same ironic stance, though? Certainly in order to travel a theory needs to give up on its 
rootedness to some degree; but must it also give up on itself? As Homi Bhabha notes, there 
are those for whom hybridity is tantamount to heresy: 
The fundamentialist charge [against Salman Rushdie's The Satanic Verses] has not 
focused on the misinterpretation of the Koran, as much as on the offence of the 
'misnaming' of Islam: Mohamed referred to as Mahound; the prostitutes named after 
the wives of the Prophet. It is the formal complaint of the fundamentalists that the 
transposition of these sacred names into profane spaces - brothels of magical realist 
novels - is not simply sacrilegious, but destructive of the very cement of community. 
To violate the system of naming is to make contingent and indeterminate.. . the shared 
standpoint of the community, its traditions of belief and enquiry. 57 
There exist vast numbers of migrant subjectivities who find it difficult to simply relativise 
their identities. In many cases the politics is just too strong. Ironically, Salman Rushdie 
alludes to this himself when he writes that: 
The effect of mass migrations has been the creation of radically new types of human 
being: people who route themselves in ideas rather than places, in memories as much 
as in material things; people who define themselves-because they are so defined by 
others-by their otherness; people in whose deepest selves strange fusions occur, 
unprecedented unions between what they were and where they find themselves. 58 
Giving up on belonging is not so easy when constantly confronted with an antagonism which 
labels one as 'other, ' thus continually forcing the politicisation of identity. In the absence of 
this antagonism hybridity is more easily celebrated. Once the political enters the picture, 
however, forcing one to define oneself (or doing so on one's behalf... ), it becomes much 
more difficult to retreat behind a negative, ironic sense of identity, or 'violate the system of 
naming. ' What is engendered is the need to speak oneself in terms which transcend the 
55 Ibid., p. 130. Emphasis added. 
56 Pheng Cheah, "Given Culture: Rethinking Cosmopolitical Freedom in Transnationalism, " in Pheng 
Cheah and Bruce Robbins (eds. ), Cosmopolitics: Thinking and Feeling beyond the Nation, 
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(trans)locality of migrant dwelling, to posit something that is not of (and hence cannot be 
domesticated by) the nation-state. As James Clifford puts it: 
Positive articulations of diaspora identity reach outside the normative territory and 
temporality (myth/history) of the nation-state... Resistance to assimilation can take 
the form of reclaiming another nation that has been lost, elsewhere in space and time, 
but that is powerful as a political formation here and now. 59 
I will be arguing in the next chapter that in many respects the umma concept in Islam 
functions as a similar form of nostalgia. There is a need to find a centre beyond the 
metropolis - one which is closed to the 'other, ' a space he is unable to enter. It must not, 
however, be a 'place' because: 
If this centre becomes associated with an actual "national" territory-rather than with 
a reinvented "tradition, " a "book, " a portable eschatology-it may devalue what I 
called the lateral axes of diaspora... The empowering paradox of diaspora is that 
dwelling here assumes a solidarity and connection there. But there is not necessarily 
a single place or an exclusivist nation. 60 
For many Muslims the Qur'an functions as that portable eschatology, an identity bearer in the 
form of a book which passes easily across boundaries. Diasporic hybridity thus possesses a 
language which can transcend the nation-state - but in a sense this is the easy part. There are 
always multiple hybrid polities within territorial spaces, ones which cannot always slip so 
easily through institutional gaps. This brings us back to the point just made above about 
hybridity and otherness. Politics, as a mode of antagonism based on ethical claims and which 
seeks to separate insiders from outsiders, does not take too kindly to the ambiguities of 
hybridity. The political requires hybrid subjects to enunciate themselves from a position of 
identity, that is, to align their hybridity. Radhakrishnan alludes to this when he speaks about 
the semantic insufficiency of hybridity in the Rushdie case: 
In other words, Rushdie was being asked: In what identitarian mode or "as who" are 
you a hybrid? Obviously, the self-styling of hybridity from its own point of view left 
too much unexplained. Was Rushdie hybrid as a Muslim, or as an Indian, or as a 
Westerner, or as a Londoner, or as a metropolitan intellectual-artiste? And even if 
one were to hyphenate all of these identities, one still has to face the question of 
unequal mediation. Among the many selves that constitute one's identity, there 
exists a relationship of uneveness and asymmetry, since each of these selves stems 
from a history that is transcendent of individual intentionality. 61 
It is thus only when a hybrid is called upon to represent itself that we gain some insight into 
the negotiations of uneveness and asymmetry that constitute politics within hybridity. This is 
why when we witness the articulation of any political identity we need to ask questions about 
the politics through which this identity has been able to emerge. Political identity must be 
seen as a product of the constitutive relationships with both internal and external 'others. ' It 
is therefore an assertion of belonging to one group and not to another, but one which can be 
made only after an internal negotiation about what it means to belong. Our task, then, is not 
one of dissolving all positive identities in a grand celebration of postmodern unboundedness. 
But neither is it one of naming, identifying or "fitting-into-little-boxes. " Belonging and 
39 James Clifford, Routes: Travel and Translation in the Late Twentieth Century, Cambridge, MA: 
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identity are both clearly still with us and will continue to be so for the foreseeable future. We 
should therefore be devoting ourselves to the task of understanding the contexts in which 
particular political identities come into being and the circumstances which mediate 
boundaries of inclusion/exclusion. We should not be asking an identity what it is, but rather 
why and how it is. I have argued that certain readings of tropes such as traveling theory and 
hybridity can help us to do this - especially where we are dealing with instances of translocal 
space. As I have argued in Chapter II, and will emphasise again in later chapters, a Muslim's 
sense of 'belonging' to Islam often functions as a crucial form of anti-hegemonic discourse 
and therefore cannot always simply be relativised through irony. This is particularly true of 
those seeking to politicise their Muslim identities in diaspora. Ziauddin Sardar, writing from 
a Muslim standpoint, alludes to Islam's scepticism toward ironic postmodernism in a recent 
12 book. 
There is also a third problem which most discourses on hybridity and diaspora suffer from: a 
tendency towards Eurocentrism. There is often disproportionate attention given to translocal 
traffic from the 'periphery' to the 'centre, ' the Rest to the West. It as if there are not 
significant flows of people moving around within the Rest. Unsurprisingly, it is often these 
people whose experiences of migrancy are the most traumatic. The pitiful condition of 
migrant workers from South Asia working in the Arab Gulf states - regarded as little more 
than cheap labour and possessing no meaningful political representation - is a case in point. 
"Their dehumanized condition, " argues Revathi Krishnaswamy, "casts an inescapable shadow 
upon the exuberance that characterizes metropolitan perceptions of migrancy. Clearly the 
grim realities of migrant labour inflect the notion of migrancy in ways that make it difficult to 
link consistently freedom and liberation with movement and displacement. "63 Living as a 
Muslim in diaspora is therefore not always about celebrating a new vitality in religion. For 
the first generation of migrants, especially, constitutive recognition of Islam from the non- 
Muslim majority societies in which they settled was not easy to obtain. For them being a 
Muslim was a struggle rather than a form of liberation. While the younger generation has 
generally displayed a greater willingness to reassess and renew its Islam, this process has 
often brought about conflict both with the older generation (whose Islam is viewed as 
'conservative' and/or 'culturally tainted') and with wider societies in which Islam is still seen 
as very much 'the other. ' Translocal Islam is hence a form of 'third space' or interstitial 
political identity in which the political community of the host society is not accepted or 
embraced (in terms of configuring one's political identity) but, crucially, neither is that of the 
cultural 'point of origin' or its Islam. We might do well here to recall Lavie and Swedenburg's 
characterisation of diasporic identity as a borderzone or'impossible in-between. ' 
Conclusion: The cultural politics of translocal identity 
Theory has done its fair share of traveling in this chapter. I first addressed the question of 
how meanings change through movement from one social context to another. Here I 
examined a set of ideas surrounding the notion of'traveling theory. ' This trope showed itself 
to be useful in understanding the transformation of ideas and cultures in translocal spaces, 
and also in helping to explain the existence of competing interpretations and idioms within a 
culture. The potentialities and limitations of hybridity theory were then assessed. It emerged 
that a focus on hybridity is perhaps most meaningful when discussing encounters between 
variations of an ostensibly homogenous cultural system under translocal conditions. Within 
62 Ziauddin Sardar, Postmodernism and the Other: The New Imperialism of Western Culture, London: 
Pluto Press, 1998. 
63 Revathi Krishnaswamy, "Mythologies of Migrancy: Postcolonialism, Postmodernism and the Politics 
of (Dis)location, " Ariel: A Review of International English Literature, Vol. 26, No. 1, January 1995, p. 
132 
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the margins of pure locality which, as we have seen, is becoming a virtually nonexistent state 
of affairs, hybridity can endure unproblematised. Indeed, in such circumstances hybridity is 
usually not even recognised as such by its practitioners because, in the absence of any 
competing claims to the tradition, it appears to be a wholly natural condition. Cultural 
hybridity only really becomes an issue when translocality enters the picture. An encounter 
with the translocal can often throw up alternative interpretations of cultural authority and 
authenticity which suddenly bring the hybridity of 'local traditions' into sharp relief as they 
are brought face to face with their own contingency. Travel, migrancy, and hybridity, I went 
on to argue, should not be celebrated as part of a postmodern carnival, or as an ontological 
fad. Diaspora is not our new'natural state. ' Mike Featherstone puts it well: 
To be aware of the construction of local communities, societies and nation-states as 
sedentary homelands does not mean that we should switch to the opposite assumption 
that the normal condition beings is, or should be, one in which everyone is a 'nomad' 
or a 'traveller'... The challenge to theorizing today is how to construct theories of 
communal living in localities which do not merely represent sedentariness as the 
norm, but seek to consider its various modalities, including displacements into 
images of imaginary homes/homelands. Such theories also need to take into account 
the ways in which those inhabitants who engage in various modes of travel manage 
to construct and live out their various affiliations and identities. 
The key point which arises from this - and one which will figure heavily in my later 
treatment of Muslim political community - is the fact that within any given culture or 
community we find various and often competing conceptions of what that identity is and 
what it means. The politics of identity is therefore not based only on the presence of an 
external other against which communities and cultures may define themselves, but also on 
the process of negotiation and debate taking place within a given community. In this regard 
we might want to speak about the presence of an 'internal other. ' We should also note that it 
becomes all the more difficult here to speak of any such thing as a 'given' culture or 
community since culture is actually the product of a dialogue involving both internal and 
external others. Within what I have termed translocal space this dialogue is all the more 
complex. The sheer multiplicity of subject positions and its concomitant cultural politics 
ensure that the production and representation of identity in these spaces will be intricate. 
This is especially the case when we are dealing with a cultural form such as Islam whose 
global sociocultural jurisdiction is extremely wide. For example, in the migratory or global 
city, Islam is forced to contend not only with a vast array of non-Islamic others but also with 
an enormous diversity of Muslim opinion as to the nature and meaning of Islam. In such 
spaces Muslims will encounter and be forced to converse with interpretations of their religion 
which they have either been taught to regard as heretical, or which they perhaps did not even 
know existed. 
In this connection it should be noted that what primarily interests me in the case of Islam, and 
what consequently will constitute my focus in the following chapters, are the ways in which 
translocal encounters modify how "authoritative" and "authentic" meanings are found in 
transnational religion - that is, the ways in which a system of symbols and laws are made 
relevant or acculturated to groups of people in particular places and times. Translocal spaces 
and the travelling theories and hybridities which inhabit them, I have argued, are the forums 
in which complex negotiations of Muslim identity take place today. In these spaces difficult 
questions about the viability of various Islamic political discourses become increasingly 
prominent, traditional sources of authority and authenticity are fragmented and Islam, as a 
travelling theory, comes face to face with its own otherness. Questions are being asked about 
`ý Mike Featherstone, Undoing Culture, London: SAGE, 1995, p. 144-5 
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who speaks for Islam today, and the classical sources of 'Islamic' knowledge, along with their 
traditional agents, are facing new challenges from Muslims increasingly confident about 
taking religion into their own hands. In the chapters to follow I will delve into the "real 
world" of contemporary Muslim life in order to witness some of these changes. I outline the 
key features of Muslim diasporic politics and seek to understand the interplay between 
notions of authenticity and authority as they move between trans localities. In other words, I 
ask questions about how Islam travels. In what senses can we speak today of the changing 
boundaries of Muslim political community, and how are Muslims in translocal spaces 
reimagining their umma? By focusing on these questions I hope to provide a set of 
representative images which might give some indication as to how globalisation is lived in 
specific albeit sometimes heavily distanciated sociopolitical settings. In the chapters to 
follow we will see that the idioms of political community developed in Medina and during 
the colonial era both still possess significant discursive purchase in the translocal Muslim 
political imaginary today. What does `Islam' mean to Muslims in the face of continuing 
Western hegemony? How do the politics of authority and authenticity figure in Islam's 




The New Political Communities of the Muslim Diaspora 
Can one be a foreigner and be happy? The foreigner calls forth a new idea of happiness... Posited, 
present, sometimes certain, that happiness knows nevertheless that it is passing by, like fire that shines 
only because it consumes. The strange happiness of the foreigner consists in maintaining that fleeting 
eternity or that perpetual transience. 
- Julia Kristeva, Strangers to Ourselves 
This stronger difference, this sense of being a "people" with historical roots and destinies outside the 
time/space of the host nation, is not separatist. (Rather, separatist desires are just one of its moments. ) 
Whatever their eschatological longings, diaspora communities are "not-here to stay. " Diaspora cultures 
thus mediate, in a lived tension, the experiences of separation and entanglement, of living here and 
remembering/desiring another place. 
- James Clifford, Routes 
Now that we have an understanding of what is meant both by translocality and by Islam, we 
can go on to explore translocal Islam. The notion of diaspora and more specifically of a 
'Muslim diaspora' will be a recurrent trope throughout the discussions to follow. This term 
has been making increasingly frequent appearances in various literatures of late, but there is 
little consensus as to its exact connotations. ' Despite this definitional plurality, diaspora does 
seem to possess something like a core dynamic, one that is perhaps best summarised by 
looking at the idea embodied by its Greek root: "a dispersal or scattering of seeds" 
(Staazropa). The notion of travel is hence intrinsic to diaspora. It is about people moving 
from one place to another - but remembering where they came from, perhaps even desiring to 
return. Diaspora is also about how that place travels with them, how it changes in travel. As 
Eickelman and Piscatori write: "What seems clear is that travel and home - motion and place 
- constitute one process, and that in travelling beyond one's local time and space, one enters a 
mythical realm where home, the 'fixed point' of departure and return, is re-imagined and 
further travel inspired i2 'Travelling theory, ' as examined in the previous chapter, is hence 
central to any understanding of diasporic identity. 
In the various cases which we will encounter throughout this chapter, the notion of 'travel' 
fulfils several functions. Often it will refer quite directly to a particular Muslim people 
leaving a specific national context, entering a new one and coming to terms with that 
experience - watching (and making) their Islam change with them. Sometimes it will refer to 
something more akin to a state of mind, a space in which old ways of knowing are relativised, 
questions asked and new forms of knowledge generated. In this sense travel is about how 
Islam flows through translocalities and what happens when it meets challenging 'non-Islamic' 
ideas as well as unfamiliar versions of itself. There is also a third form of travel at work here, 
one which runs through many contemporary Muslim discourses. For the most part this third 
sense is just another rendering of the standard diasporic idiom, a story of absence and desire, 
of home and away. This 'home, ' however, is not a place in the spatial sense of the nation- 
state, but rather an imagined nexus of past and future, something that once was and which 
could be again. We are speaking here of how ideas also travel through time. In this regard, 
' See e. g. Robin Cohen, Global Diasporas, London: UCL Press, 1997; William Safran, "Diasporas in 
modern societies: myths of homeland and return, " Diaspora, Vol. 1, No. 1,1991, pp. 83-99; and James 
Clifford, "Diasporas, " Current Anthropology, Vol. 9, No. 3, pp. 302-38 
2 Dale F. Eickelman and James Piscatori (eds. ), Muslim Travellers: Pilgrimage, Migration, and the 
Religious Imagination, Berkeley: University of California Press, 1990, p. xiii 
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James Clifford speaks of "articulations of diaspora identity [which] reach outside the 
normative territory and temporality (myth/history) of the nation-state... [taking] the form of 
reclaiming another nation that has been lost, elsewhere in space and time, but that is powerful 
as a political formation here and now. 113 For many Muslims there is a diasporic yearning 
beyond national geography: the umma of Medina in the first half of the seventh century. 
They remember Islam's very first journey, the hijra (see Chapter II), the migration from 
ignorance (jahiliya) to unity in God (tawhid). Fatima Mernissi suggests that Muslims today 
suffer from a form of mal du present experienced "as a desire for death, a desire to be 
elsewhere, to be absent, and to flee to the past as a way of being absent. A suicidal absence. ,4 
It is more than just a desire to return to the past, however, for there is also an aspiration here 
to remake Medina, a hope that this past might be achieved in the future. It is in this sense that 
Muslims see the umma as an object of diasporic desire. Although their Islam may have 
stopped to rest at many places along the way - such as the Indian town of Deoband where in 
1867 a religious school (madrasa) to which many of today's Asian migrants in the UK adhere 
was founded, or Cairo, 1928 where Hassan al-Banna was forming the now transnational 
Muslim Brotherhood (al-Ikhwan Muslimun) - there is still a sense in which all Muslims 
today are part of a diaspora whose 'home' is the umma of The Prophet's Medina. It is here 
that we find a potent reminder of the fact that theories travel not only across space but also 
across time. 
In this chapter I want to explore some of the more tangible aspects of the contemporary 
Muslim diaspora. What happens to Islam, I will be asking, when it travels, migrates or 
becomes otherwise "transplanted"? 5 How does this travelling affect ideas about politics in 
Islam and how does it cause Muslims to rethink their theories of political community as I 
defined it in Chapter I. In this sense I am viewing the condition of diaspora as one in which 
profound changes can occur, and where new ideas are formed. Vertovec and Peach note that 
"[o]ne mode of modifying meanings occurs through a particular kind of self-consciousness 
which the condition of 'borderlands'... or minority status stimulates. ,6I am particularly 
interested in how the latter condition - that of minority status - affects Muslim thinking in 
diaspora. In some cases, as we will see, this predicament has led Muslims to re-read, re- 
interpret and re-assert the many of the core textual sources of Islam (such as the Qur'an, 
hadith and usül al-filth) in new contexts and in light of unfamiliar situations, often to quite 
dramatic effect. One example of this which I will explore below is the way in which new 
interpretations of the classic texts are used to encourage and legitimise a more prominent 
position for women in the public sphere. My point, then, is to demonstrate that when Islam 
travels there are engendered not only conversations with the societies into which it enters, but 
also important dialogues within Islam itself - in other words, engagement with the Muslim 
'other. ' This constitutes a politics of cultural negotiation in which different conceptions of 
Islam are mediated and new critical capacities emerge. Although the majority of the case 
study material on which I draw pertains to Muslims living in the West, I do not wish to imply 
that it is only through contact with the West that Muslims come to practice self-critique. As 
we will see below (and more comprehensively in Chapter VI) Islam already possesses a rich 
conceptual language for engaging in critical modes of theorising in the sense of asking 
questions about the hegemony of particular Muslim narratives and the political implications 
of particular interpretations of Islam. And although the West - as we shall see - does at 
3 James Clifford: Routes: Travel and Translation in the Late Twentieth Century, Cambridge, 
Massachusetts: Harvard University Press, 1997, pp. 250-1 
Fatima Mernissi, Women and Islam: An Historical and Theological Enquiry, Oxford: Blackwell, 
1991, p. 15 
' F. Dassetto and A. Bastenier, L'lslam transplants, Antwerp: Editions EPO, 1984. 
6 Steven Vertovec and Ceri Peach, "Introduction: Islam in Europe and the Politics of Religion and 
Community" in Steve Vertovec and Ceri Peach (eds. ), Islam in Europe: The Politics of Religion and 
Community, London: Macmillan, 1997, p. 38 
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times play an important role in encouraging such critical thinking in Islam, I wish to 
concentrate primarily on the ways in which translocality, as a space in which encounters with 
myriad peoples, ideas and theories takes place, modifies Muslim political thought. 
A number of writers have undertaken studies of specific Muslim communities in diaspora, or 
of Islam in particular cultural contexts. ' There has not yet, however, been any attempt to 
produce a general study of travelling Islam or to fit these Muslim communities into a wider 
translocal or global framework. 8 This might be seen as the task of the present thesis. Rather 
than offering a comprehensive study of a single Muslim diaspora, I wish to draw on examples 
from many such communities in order to produce a more general picture of how Islamic 
thought changes in translocal spaces. My methodology involves re-reading the secondary 
literature into the translocal context and then supplementing it with a series of my own 
interviews with diasporic Muslims. It might do well at this point to briefly clarify what it is I 
mean when I speak of a 'diasporic Muslim. ' This can best be accomplished by breaking the 
designation down into its constituent elements. By 'diasporic' I am referring simply to those 
Muslims whose families have moved between sociocultural contexts separated by 
considerable distance during the past two or three generations or those Muslims who have 
spent significant periods of time outside their countries of origin, be it for reasons of 
education, labour or political exile. Both of these rubrics can be related to the global 
transformations which I identified as the defining features of translocality in Chapter I. The 
notion of 'Muslim' is, however, somewhat more difficult. For example, although there are 
approximately seven million Muslims currently living in Western Europe, many of them are 
only 'nominally' Muslim, belonging to a category which some writers call the 'culturalist' 
Muslim. This term refers to those people whose ethno-historical roots qualify them as 
Muslims, but who do not regularly practice their religion. These are people, then, whose 
sense of identity is not usually strongly informed by Islam. Felice Dassetto has recently 
estimated that up to 60% of Europe's Muslims fall into this category? Following our 
discussion in the previous chapters, though, I am well aware of the dangers involved in trying 
to label or fix these identities. Because it often changes from context to context, political 
identity is never an immutable category. Identity always needs to be situated and therefore 
also understood as a product of particular sociopolitical circumstances. Viewing identity in 
this way helps us to understand how in Bradford at the height of the Rushdie Affair in 1989 
thousands of people who might otherwise have been regarded merely as 'culturalist' Muslims 
could take to the streets in protest against what they perceived as a grave insult to Islam. It is 
hence only by placing forms of behaviour within specific political contexts - i. e. as related to 
the negotiation of normative boundaries (see Chapter 1) - that we can understand the 
politicisation of Islam. In order to simplify matters somewhat I will be concentrating here not 
on people of Muslim 'background, ' but rather primarily on individuals whose self- 
descriptions and identities do involve Islam (however defined) as a key (and often primary) 
component. These then are people who conscientiously try to live their lives as 'good' 
Muslims, seeking whenever possible to make their religion relevant to daily experience. 
The chapter will proceed as follows. After some brief comments on religion and travel in the 
Muslim context (with a few historical examples) I will make some general observations on 
' An excellent bibliographic essay reviewing many country studies of Muslims in Europe can be found 
in Jergen Nielsen, Muslims in Western Europe, Edinburgh: Edinburgh University Press, 2"d Edition, 
1995, pp. 172-84; for the American context a useful introductory reader is Yvonne Yazbeck Haddad 
(ed. ), The Muslims of America, Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1991. 
' Katy Gardner's work on Bangladeshi transmigrants has come perhaps the closest to the kind of 
analysis I am proposing; see Katy Gardner, Global Migrants, Local Lives: Travel and Transformation 
in Rural Bangladesh, Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1995. 
' Felice Dassetto, "Islam and Europe, " paper presented at the International Conference on Muslim 
Minorities in Post-Bipolar Europe: Skopje, Macedonia, 1993. 
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the condition of contemporary Muslim diasporas, paying particular attention to issues related 
to minority status. I will also look at how their identification with 'Islam' can prompt 
ambivalent or even openly hostile receptions in certain societal contexts while at the same 
time rendering Muslims and their needs almost invisible to wider society. I then turn to a 
number of broad themes and debates in order to illustrate how Islam and Muslims change 
through travel. The various aspects of translocality outlined in the previous chapter - 
travelling theory, hybridity and diasporic 'third space' - should all be kept in mind as we 
progress through these various themes. The areas I will be looking at are encounters and 
debates with the Muslim 'other' (a rich source of hybrid discourse - see Chapter III), the 
critical renewal of Muslim thinking on politics, community and gender, and, finally, the 
translocal aspects of diasporic Islam. The chapter concludes by briefly explicating some of 
the broader themes related to travelling Islam and Muslim diasporas in the wider context of 
translocality and globalisation. 
Islam, Religion and Travel 
The notion of travel is central to many religions. It may take the form of pilgrimage (to 
shrines, saints, temples and cities), or perhaps a spiritual journey, but the general idea here is 
the same: movement from one place to another becomes vested with meaning. Quite often 
the significance of travel relates to some form of transformation such as a shift from 
ignorance to enlightenment, or from profane to sacred space. The underlying theme is again 
similar, that movement induces change or produces some form of difference. But there is 
more than only travel in religion, for religions travel themselves. They move and settle, then 
become displaced and migrate again, a process repeated across space and through time. 
Inevitably, religions change. As Stuart Hall puts it, "I view this as a constant process of 
breaks, interruptions and reorganizations, in which the religious formation is reordered, 
rearranged, dislocated and repositioned, so as to provide new religious languages and 
practices within which to articulate new historical realities. i10 As people migrate and 
disperse, their religions travel with them. "These obviously constitute physical movement[s] 
from one place to another, " write Eickelman and Piscatori, "but owing to the power of the 
religious imagination they involve spiritual or temporal movement as well. "" Religions often 
enter new and unfamiliar contexts where they undergo subtle changes - or even, depending 
on their reception, quite dramatic ones. Much, however, stays the same. Religious symbols 
and languages may become invested with new meanings, but they still function to provide a 
framework of familiarity and a sense of identity. Indeed, some of the more difficult 
experiences - as we shall see below - come about precisely when a religion does not appear 
to be making the changes required of it by a new sociocultural setting. 
Islam possesses its own rich vocabulary of travel. In many ways the hijra, the emigration of 
the Prophet and his Companions from Mecca to Medina in 622 is Islam's most enduring 
symbol. There is also the pilgrimage to Mecca, the hajj, which every Muslim is obliged to 
perform at least once during his or her lifetime. Other relevant tropes include rihla (travel for 
education), isrd' (the Prophet's nocturnal journey to Jerusalem), and ziydra (the visitation of 
saintly shrines and graves). Many of these terms have enormous metaphoric purchase 
beyond the actual physical act of movement. '2 We have already remarked on the importance 
of the hijra. Its significance lies in the notion of moving from paganism, tribalism and, above 
all, unbelief, into a community of monotheistic faith. It is a symbol whose resonance can still 
be heard in the name of Islamist groups today such as al-Tarr Wal-HUra 
10 Stuart Hall, "Religious cults and social movements in Jamaica" in R. Bocock and K. Thompson 
(eds. ), Religion and Ideology, Manchester: Manchester University Press, 1985, p. 272 it Eickelman and Piscatori, Muslim Travellers, p. xii 
12 Ibid. 
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("Excommunication and Migration") in Egypt or the diasporic al-Muhajirun ("The 
Emigrants") in London. The call for Muslims to quit 'un-Islamic' lands still finds adherents 
today and often figures heavily in the rhetoric of those religious leaders who seek to 
discourage Muslims from living in the West. But connotations of the hijra have themselves 
been subject to diasporic mediation. The late Ismail Faruqi, an archetype of the modem 
Muslim migrant, sought to reverse the rhetoric by calling on Muslims in the West (of which 
he was one) to regard themselves as having made a hijra to the West. Faruqi, a scholar- 
activist trained at the famed al-Azhar in Cairo as well as at a number of secular institutions, 
encouraged his fellow Muslims in diaspora to live their lives as companions of the Prophet, 
as if they had just arrived in Medina: "Now that you are in Madinah, what is your 
task? ... 
Your task... is the saving, the salvation of life, the realization of the values of dignity, 
of purity, of chastity, all the nobility of which humans are capable. " 13 We can also look to 
the recent response of a religious scholar ('alim) in Mecca who when approached by several 
Algerian students enquiring what Islam had to say about Muslims staying in Europe or 
America, produced a treatise which argued that in some senses travel to these countries is 
actually obligatory for Muslims. He cites the importance of education and the acquisition of 
advanced science and technology, without which the Muslim world would be dependent on 
the West. Also noted is the fact that circumstances in the West are such that the proper 
practice of Islam is in some senses easier there. 14 "Islam explicitly encourages and even 
enjoins certain forms of travel, " write Ahmed and Donnan. "[T]he movement of Muslims 
from one part of the world to another, whatever the purpose, resonated with the historical 
foundations of their religion. "" 
Islam has of course been travelling for centuries. The Muslim world, stretching from the 
West coast of Africa to the Indonesian archipelago - and more recently into Europe and 
North America - has known countless examples of movement and migration both within and 
across its borders. "The expansion of Islam, " argues Ross Dunn, "was a cultural process, but 
it was also a social movement, a complex migration of people who were driven to seek new 
experiences from all sorts of personal and public motives. " 16 Conquering caliphs, itinerant 
scholars and mobile merchants are hence very much the stuff of Islamic history. " 
At some level, Islamic civilisation worked as an eminently international system of 
social links and cultural communication. We might ask, for example, to what extent 
Muslim commercial diasporas, sufi brotherhoods, and perhaps even 'old boy 
networks' of urban scholars and craftsmen linked Islamic frontier lands not only with 
the metropolitan centres but with each other... [This fact] requires us to break out of 
scholarly specialities rigidly defined in space and take the trans-hemispheric view. '8 
13 Ismail R. Faruqi, "The Path of Dawah in the West, " The Muslim World League Journal, Vol. 14, No. 
7-8, March-April, 1987, p. 56, quoted in John O. Voll, "Islamic Issues for Muslims in the United 
States" in Yvonne Yazbeck Haddad (ed. ), The Muslims ofAmerica, Oxford: Oxford University Press, 
1991. 
14 Muhammad Khalid Masud, "The obligation to migrate: the doctrine of hyra in Islamic law" in 
Eickelman and Piscatori, Muslim Travellers, pp. 42-3 
15 Akbar S. Ahmed and Hastings Donnan, "Islam in the age of postmodernity" in Akbar S. Ahmed and 
Hastings Donnan (eds. ), Islam, Globalization and Postmodernity, London: Routledge, 1994, pp. 4-5 
16 Ross Dunn, "International Migrations of Literate Muslims in the Later Middle Period: The Case of 
Ibn Battuta" in Ian Richard Netton (ed. ), Golden Roads: Migration, Pilgrimage, and Travel in 
Mediaeval and Modern Islam, London: Curzon Press, 1993, p. 79. Emphasis added. 
17 See e. g. the various chapters in Eickelman and Piscatori, Muslim Travellers, Netton, op. cit.; and 
also Patricia Risso, Merchants and Faith: Muslim Commerce and Culture in the Indian Ocean, 
Boulder: Westview Press, 1995. 
18 Dunn, p. 83 
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Far from being simply a medieval phenomenon, Muslim travel must also be seen as a key 
component of the history of modernity. "Cosmopolitan Islam, " as Nederveen Pieterse notes, 
"extending through caravan and maritime trade, through diasporas and settlements, through 
knowledge networks and through military expansion, has given shape to the historical 
dynamics of globalization, of which world capitalism is one manifestation. " 19 This is another 
reason why, as Bobby Sayyid observed in Chapter II, it is impossible to simply separate Islam 
from modernity. 
Islam has produced its fair share of famous 'wanderers, ' of whom the most celebrated is 
probably the fourteenth century traveller Ibn Battuta. He and those like him have bequeathed 
to us a rich literature of travelogue, a genre known as rihla. 20 We find here a veritable 
tapestry of Muslim life across the continents, with the great diversity of religious practice 
recorded in high detail. Such travel had an interesting effect on those who undertook it, one 
which I will be drawing our attention to below. Abderrahmane El Moudden argues that 
"rihla [travel] is ambivalent: through it the traveller becomes more closely linked to the idea 
of the Muslim community as a whole, but at the same time learns what is specific to his own 
people and culture. i21 Travel is hence a condition in which 'local' knowledge becomes 
relativised and subject to transformation through entering translocality. We have already 
touched upon one example of this in the contemporary context, that of 'Ali Shariati in Paris 
(see p. 69). 1 pointed out that Shariati's Islam became eclectic in Paris, having been 
disembedded from the Iranian context in which it was originally elaborated. The intellectual 
idioms which Shariati encountered in Paris also had a profound effect on his religious 
consciousness: 
Shariati's western education... opened his eyes to the scholarly works and 
interpretations of non-Shi'ites on Shi'ism. Subsequently, his Shi'ism became very 
different from that of its official custodians in Iran. He was more concerned with the 
socio-political content, message and implications of what was being written on 
Islamic issues than the Shi'ite credentials of those who were writing them ... Shariati's 
unabashed preference for the works of non-Shi'ite, and especially non-Muslim, 
scholars on Islamic issues infuriated the Iranian clergy. To them Shariati was 
suggesting that they ought to learn their Islam not only from non-Shi'ites, but from 
non-Muslims. 22 
Shariati came to be influenced by a number of Western thinkers in Paris, among them the 
celebrated Orientalist Louis Massignon, the sociologists George Gurvitch and Jacques 
Berque, and the philosophers Jean-Paul Sartre and Jean Cocteau - not to mention Frantz 
Fanon, with whom he exchanged several letters discussing issues related to colonialism and 
the developing world. 3 This is a useful first glimpse of contemporary Islam in diaspora. 
Much of what Shariati and his religion experienced is typical of travelling Islam and many 
more similar examples will be provided below. Before moving on to look at these cases let 
me say something about the more general aspects of the contemporary Muslim diaspora. 
"Jan Nederveen Pieterse, "Travelling Islam: mosques without minarets" in Ayse Öncü and Petra 
Wayland (eds. ), Space, Culture and Power: New identities in globalizing cities, London: Zed Books, 
1997, p. 181 
20 See Abderrahmane El Moudden, "The ambivalence of rihia: community integration and self- 
definition in Moroccan travel accounts, 1300-1800" in Eickelman and Piscatori, Muslim Travellers, pp. 
69-84 
'-I Ibid., p. 69 
22 Ali Rahnema, "Ali Shariati: Teacher, Preacher, Rebel" in Ali Rahnema (ed. ), Pioneers of Islamic 
Revival, London: Zed Books, 1994, p. 220 
23 Ibid., pp. 220-222 
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Living (and revising) Islam in diaspora 
The contemporary movements and migrations of Muslim peoples can be seen as part and 
parcel of the global sociocultural transformations outlined in Chapter I. Global labour 
divisions, decolonisation and 'disorganised capitalism'24 have all been contributing factors. 
Some of the countries most affected by these forces - most notably the Indian subcontinent, 
which has recently seen large waves of migration departing for Europe, North America, the 
Arab Gulf and Africa - have significant Muslim populations. Some of these are sojourners, 
labour migrants who move fairly regularly between their 'home' and countries of 
employment. Others have settled permanently in new societies, in this case often in Europe 
and North America. Many millions of Muslims have been on the move in recent generations 
as a result of these transnational processes. They have provided passage for much of the 
travelling Islam examined below. 
Islam, by its very nature, travels well. It can be, and often is, elaborated in many different 
ways in an equally diverse range of settings. 25 What happens, though, when Islam moves 
beyond contexts in which Muslims are a majority? What tools does Islam possess to 
communicate and negotiate across cultures? Nederveen Pieterse argues that there is a tension 
within Islam, "a global project organized in local structures, " that becomes particularly 
pronounced in diaspora. 26 Surveying the textual sources of Islam, Omar Khalidi remarks that 
"what is baffling is the serious deficiency in the Islamic ideology of a theoretical framework 
that would be the guiding principle for Muslims in minority situations. "2' This theoretical gap 
becomes a chasm once we realise that up to forty percent of today's Muslims live in minority 
situations. 28 This status, as we will see, involves a number of advantages and disadvantages. 
It means coming to terms with an unfamiliar set of circumstances, a requirement to engage 
with new cultures and an ability to adjust to inevitable changes in one's own tradition. "We 
cannot assume, " argues Barbara Metcalf however, "that the old and new cultures are fixed, 
and that change results from pieces being added and subtracted. Instead, new cultural and 
institutional expressions are being created using the symbols and institutions of the received 
tradition. "29 We are therefore not talking about cases of loss and gain, or of aspects of Islam 
simply "disappearing" in diaspora. What we see is a far more complex hybrid condition, one 
in which Islamic meanings shift, change and transmutate, where things become something 
else. Likewise Islam becomes represented in new forms and via new media -a phenomenon 
which will be explored in depth in the next chapter. Television, the Internet and "secular" 
24 See S. Lash and J. Urry, The End of Organized Capitalism, Oxford: Polity Press, 1987, cited in 
Akbar S. Ahmed and Hastings Donnan, "Islam in the age of postmodernity" in Akbar S. Ahmed and 
Hastings Donnan (eds. ), Islam, Globalization and Postmodernity, London: Routledge, 1994, p. 5 25 Several anthropologists have undertaken studies of Islam in these 'local' contexts. See e. g. John R. 
Bowen, "Salat in Indonesia: The Social Meanings of an Islamic Ritual, " Man, Vol. 24, pp. 600-19; 
Michael Lambek, "Certain Knowledge, Contestable Authority: Power and Practice on the Islamic 
Periphery, " American Ethnologist, Vol. 17, No. 1, February 1990, pp. 23-40; Robert W. Hefner and 
Patricia Horvatich (eds. ), Islam in an Era ofNation-States: Politics and Religious Renewal in Muslim 
Southeast Asia, Honolulu: University of Hawai'i Press, 1997; and David Westerlund and Eva Evers 
Rosander (eds. ), African Islam and Islam in Africa: Encounters between Sufis and Islamists, London: 
Hurst & Company, 1997. A useful overview can be found in Dale F. Eickelman, "The Study of Islam 
in Local Contexts, " Contributions to Asian Studies, Vol. 17,1982. 26 Nederveen Pieterse, "Travelling Islam, " p. 197 27 Omar Khalidi, "Muslim Minorities: Theory and Experience of Muslim Interaction in Non-Muslim 
Societies, " Journal of the Institute of Muslim Minority Affairs, Vol. 10, No. 2, July 1989, p. 425 2s Ibid. 
29 Barbara D. Metcalf, "Introduction: Sacred Words, Sanctioned Practice, New Communities" in 
Barbara Daly Metcalf (ed. ), Making Muslim Space in North America and Europe, Berkeley: University 
of California Press, 1996, p. 7 
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literature now suddenly all become sources of Islamic knowledge. The Muslim subjectivity 
also often becomes more aware of its religion in minority situations. In the'homeland' Islam 
was an instrinsic aspect of that context's lifeworld, one which was taken for granted. In 
diaspora, however, Islam becomes yet another stigma of foreignness, a sign of the other. 
This causes the Muslim to objectify her religion and to engage in a self-examination or 
critique of Islam and its meanings. 30 Migration is hence a rupture, an important break which 
can lead to changes in the significance of Islam and of being Muslim. 31 My argument is thus 
that we need to focus on the dynamic qualities of travelling Islam, to draw greater attention to 
the ways in which things change when they migrate. It must be understood that Islam's 
passage into diaspora constitutes but a single stage of its journey; this transition in turn enacts 
a form of internal peregrination: travelling Islam becomes travel within Islam. In order to 
appreciate this dynamic we need to re-orient our analysis of Islam to focus on flux and 
disjunction rather than on stability and continuity. As will become clear, the translocal 
spaces of diasporic Islam seem to provide fertile venues for the rethinking and reformulation 
of tradition and the construction of an Islam for generations to come. 
Let us move on now to examine some examples of how Islam has travelled in diaspora, 
acquired new meanings and re-interpreted old ones. Our discussion will be divided into three 
theme areas: encounters and debates within Muslim communities; rethinking and 
reformulating Islamic thought (politics, community, gender); and the influence of 
transnational forces. A few qualifiers and caveats before we begin, however. It will soon 
become apparent that the vast majority of the examples I use relate to Muslims living in 'the 
West' (Europe and North America). As I have already mentioned above, I do not wish to 
imply that Islam changes only in the West. I have chosen to focus on Muslims living in these 
regions for three reasons. First, there is a growing literature on Islam in the West, providing a 
good range of case study material; second, the sociopolitical environment of the West is 
particularly conducive to engaging in public debate; and third, we find very high 
concentrations of translocal space in the West - especially in migratory and global cities such 
as London, Paris, Bradford and Berlin. Obviously Islam also travels in other parts of the 
world, often encountering significantly different cultural dynamics and new sets of problems. 
I hope to investigate these extra-Western translocal processes in a subsequent study. 
As will also soon become clear, this case study draws on examples and illustrations from a 
diverse range of Muslim diasporic contexts. There are however several specific Muslim 
movements whose discourses crop up throughout the text. All of them are most prevalent in 
the British context (where the bulk of my research was focused), and constitute a useful 
snapshot of the Muslim political spectrum. They are: (1) Hizb ut-Tahrir/al-Muhajirun, a 
movement which originally emerged in the Middle East in the early 1950s. Strict advocates 
of the re-establishment of khilafa (the political system of the Caliphate), Hizb ut-Tahrir found 
little support in the Arab countries. The group then became notorious around British 
university campuses in the 1990s for promulgating anti-semitic sentiment. Al-Muharijun 
emerged out of a split which occurred in 1996 over the question of co-operation with other 
Muslim movements. The fundamentals of its political agenda, however, are essentially the 
same as Hizb ut-Tahrir's; (2) Young Muslims UK, a group established in the UK in 1984 as a 
successor organisation to the Islamic Youth Movement which had originally been set up by a 
group of diasporic intellectuals sympathetic to Pakistan's Jama'at-i Islami party. Young 
Muslims UK, however, has expended considerable effort to distance itself from Abul Ala 
Mawdudi, the Jama'at-i Islami's idealogue, and to concentrate instead on creating an Islam 
whose teachings resonate with the needs and circumstances of the new generation of 
diasporic Muslim in the West. The pursuit of an Islamic political order in the UK, for 
30 Ibid. 
31 T. Sunier, "Islam and Ethnicity Among Turks" in W. A. R. Shadid and P. S. van Koningsveld (eds. ), 
Islam in Dutch Society, Kampen: Kok Pharos, 1992, p. 145 
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example, is not part of the Young Muslim UK's agenda, as it is in the case of Hizb ut-Tahrir; 
(3) the Tablighi Jama'at, a quiescent movement founded in 1927 in India, which claims not to 
be interested in (statist) politics. The group's activities focus almost exclusively on travelling 
'missionary' work among Muslim communities worldwide, emphasising the importance of 
personal spiritual purity and collective harmony. 
Because people and meanings migrate together, a new sociocultural environment often means 
a new Islam. In diaspora many Muslims find that their religion has assumed new 
significance, or that its symbolic connotations have somehow shifted. Much of this is 
related to the transition from majority to minority status, the act of moving from an 
environment in which Islam is an integral component of the cultural landscape to one in 
which the wider resonance of its language finds no echo. For many there is a heightened 
awareness of Islam as what was once taken for granted is discovered anew. Islam becomes a 
memory-aid, something with which to remember who one is. Fellow Muslims also take on 
greater significance. In Muslim-majority homelands, one rarely thought to make the 
distinction between Muslim and non-Muslim; 'Muslimness' was natural and self-reproducing 
-a part of everyone. 
2 The diasporic Muslim, ever aware of his 'otherness, ' comes to see 
other Muslims in a special light, as participants in a similar predicament. "Back home I could 
relate Islamic thinking in a religious manner, " one Muslim told me, "but in diaspora I gained 
a greater sense of Islam's social relevance. "33 Even in travel, however, many things stay the 
same, or refuse to travel beyond a certain point. I want to focus, however, on that which 
changes, and particularly on its relationship with that which stays the same, because it is 
often on the border between these two forces - inertia and dynamism - that politics emerges. 
A number of writers have commented on the ways in which the passage into diaspora 
transforms Muslims symbols and spaces. These changes usually take one of three forms: an 
alteration in the significance assigned to particular ideas and practices; the 'translation' of 
Muslim symbolic language and thought into a translocal dialect; or the construction of new 
forms of religious expression. I will briefly deal with each of these in turn. 
The spatiality of the mosque in The Netherlands provides an interesting example of how the 
role and significance of 'religious' institutions changes in diaspora. Several writers have 
emphasised the extended sociopolitical functions which the mosque fulfils for Muslim 
migrants. More than simply places for prayer, mosques become spaces which mediate 
between diasporic communities and the wider society. They often offer Dutch language 
instruction, financial aid, shops and a whole host of other social services geared towards 
serving the needs of diasporic Muslims. In this sense they operate as a point of interface 
between Islam and Dutch society, a window through which the former views (and 
constitutes) the latter. "As such, " writes Sunier, "they are organizations which initially 
provided private goods (i. e. religious services) only, but which developed into organizations 
which seek to obtain public goods (related to the position of group members in society). "34 
The diasporic mosque hence operates as an effective example of the blurring between public 
and private which occurs in translocality. Hamid Naficy makes a similar point with regard to 
the Iranian exile media in Los Angeles. Although many of the Iranians currently living in 
exile left their homeland in order to escape Khomeini's Iranian Revolution, Naficy finds that 
32 Although there are clearly situations in which religious politics in the homeland have played a key 
role in the constitution of identity (e. g. Arab-Israeli conflict, Kashmir, Lebanon), my primary focus in 
this study is on the ways in which religion becomes politicised in diaspora. 
33 A. K. Barkatulla, Director of the Islamic Computing Centre and 'alim, Personal Interview, 21 July 
1998. 
34 Sunier, p. 155; H. van Ooijen, "Religion and Emancipation: A Study of the Development of 
Moroccan Islamic Organizations in a Dutch Town" in Shadid and Koningsveld (eds. ), Islam in Dutch 
Society, corroborates this. 
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after time religious symbols lose their negative connotations and become instead associated 
with a nostalgia for Iran. "The twin ambivalence of exile and nationalism, " he writes, 
"served to gradually attenuate and destabilisze the anti-Islamist idea of an exilic nation. " 35 
This creates a new hybrid discourse in which the Islamist politics of Khomeini can be 
viciously attacked in one television programme, followed by a focus on the beauty of the 
azan (the call to prayer) in the next. 
A second type of shifting meaning relates to the translation of Muslim symbols and language 
into relevant or analogous diasporic dialects. This involves finding expressions of Islam 
which resonate in the new sociocultural environments which they enter, making'Muslim' life 
applicable to diasporic life. In previous sections we have looked at the important roles which 
language and popular culture can play here - the expression of Islam in sport, for example, or 
in Western dress; also the availability of Islam in English via the modern media. Other 
changes relate to the symbolic languages used by Muslims to express their religion's 
significance. Fischer and Abedi relate how Iranian students studying in the United States just 
prior to Khomeini's revolution encountered various discourses of Islamic liberation. The 
symbology of Islam was translated into the contemporary political context with the Shah 
depicted as Pharoah, and Khomeini as the Shi'a martyr Husain. The challenge of communism 
was countered with claims that Islam was more egalitarian, more concerned with the plight of 
the people. The heroes of Shi'a mythology became religious leftists fighting on behalf of the 
downtrodden -a hybridised image borrowed from the writings of Ali Shariati 
36 The same 
two authors also offer us an account of the meanings ascribed to Islam by a young African- 
American Muslim woman. Her position as a woman and as a racial minority heavily informs 
the significance she find in Islam - and also the significance she does not find, the areas 
where she believes Islam fails. In her view, Islam needs to deepen its analysis of class 
differences and pay more attention to how the abuse of women is often legitimised in its 
name. 37 
Systems of thought and political agendas also undergo significant changes when they travel, 
inevitably translated into new idioms by those who carry and receive them in unfamiliar 
contexts. Much of this has to do with translocal disembedding processes which remove ideas 
from the sociopolitical environment in which they were initially established, and rearticulate 
them in new settings - the classic 'travelling theory' (see Chapter III). This effect can be 
illustrated by looking at what happens to some of the more radical breeds of Sunni Islam 
when they enter translocality. Many groups espousing these ideologies have been banned 
from countries in the Middle East or, in the ironic case of the Committee for the Defence of 
Legitimate Rights in Saudi Arabia, persecuted for setting up an Islamic opposition in a state 
that was already supposedly Islamic! Hizb ut-Tahrir is one such organisation. Although 
originally founded in Syria in the 1950s, Hizb ut-Tahrir has enjoyed little political success in 
the Middle East. Many Arabs find their Islamist programme far too simplistic. They thrive 
in diaspora precisely because of the generally low level of Islamic knowledge that exists 
among many migrants. "They are able to impress people in the UK by throwing around a few 
Arabic words, " one interviewee told me, "but that doesn't get them very far in the Middle 
East where people know better. 08 Clearly some political ideologies have no choice but to 
travel. Other Muslim groups have also benefited from the journey into diaspora. Many of 
them are sectarian minorities - such as the Alevis of Turkey or the Ahmadiyya of Pakistan - 
ss Hamid Naficy, The Making of Exile Cultures: Iranian Television in Los Angeles, Minneapolis: 
University of Minnesota Press, 1993, p. 173 
36 Michael M. J. Fischer and Mehdi Abedi, Debating Muslims: Cultural Dialogues in Postinodernity 
and Tradition, Madison: University of Wisconsin Press, 1990, p. 88 
37 Ibid., p. 318-32 
38 Dilwar Hussain, ex-member of the executive board of Young Muslims UK, Personal Interview, 
Leicester, July 28 1998. 
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who face intense persecution in their own countries. Certain Sufi brotherhoods, banned or 
circumscribed in their places of origin, have also found "a new lease of life" in countries such 
as The Netherlands. 39 These groups' flourishing can be seen as the result of three factors. 
First, they enter into a society in which they have no 'history' and where the negative 
connotations associated with them in the wider societies of their original homelands are 
largely absent. Second, the fact that Islam is usually in a minority situation in diaspora often 
means that differences between Muslims are de-emphasised. Similarities between these sects 
and other forms of Islam are hence accentuated. Third, some of these groups adhere to 
beliefs and practices perceived by many as closer to Western norms. Several writers mention 
this fact in relation to the Alevis. Their practices regarding women's dress and public 
behaviour, often read as 'libertine' in Turkey are seen as 'liberal' in the Europe. 40 
A third form of shifting meaning pertains to the creation of 'new' expressions of Islam, or 
substitutes for those which have been lost in travel. Some writers have pointed to the 
"portability of Islamic ritual, i41 the fact that Islam is not spatially confined: "When Islam 
leaves its original landscape, what travels are not the marabout shrines not the rural folk 
practices and brotherhoods, but the Qur'an and Qur'anic teachings: the Qur'an is portable 
Islam. 102 This is fine and well for those orthodox Muslims who require little more than 
books and a place to pray (which, in theory, can be almost anywhere), but what about those 
forms of Islam which depend on very specific places (e. g. the graves and shrines of various 
saints) or on particular configurations of social relations in order to sustain their religion? 
Think of the Alevis mentioned above and the difficulties they have in sustaining their notions 
of religious community in diaspora. Clearly not all forms of Islam travel well. "[If] the 
religious symbols and rituals are no longer affirmed by the social environment... they [will] 
lose the character of certainty which underpinned their existence... "43 In many cases the 
religious rituals and personnel of the homeland provide particular services and fulfil certain 
needs specific to time and place; in diaspora these become redundant. The women who 
visited marabout saints in Morocco appear to have little need for them in diaspora 44 The 
social services provided by Sufi orders in the countries of origin are superfluous in The 
Netherlands. 45 Contrast this with the way the mosque has managed to re-invent itself as a 
form of diasporic community centre. 
Muslim political theories also sometimes have trouble travelling, or retaining their cutting 
edge in diaspora. The role of many thinkers thus changes in diaspora. Dr. Ataullah Siddiqui 
of the Islamic foundation mentioned that Abu] Ala Mawdudi's thought is now often little 
more than a "starting point" for young, educated, highly literate Muslims. "Mawdudi gives 
important confidence to young Muslims, " he says, "and they can then go on to find something 
else. i46 We have already seen the ways in which Mawdudi's thought is often combined with 
that of other (and sometimes antithetical) tendencies in diaspora. Imam Khomeini and the 
Islamic Revolution often find themselves in a similar predicament. One African-American 
Muslim, for example, finds Khomeini's message empowering in the face of anti-hegemonic 
struggle, but berates him for a lack of thorough class analysis and also takes issue with some 
39 Dassetto and Nonneman, p. 194 
40 Metcalf, Making Muslim Space, p. 10; also Wilpert, p. 92 
41 Metcalf, Making Muslim Space, p. 6 
42 Nederveen Pieterse, "Travelling Islam, " p. 180 
43 Thomd-Venske, p. 79 
44 Landman, p. 35 
45 Ibid., p. 38 
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of his ideas about non-Muslims. 47 Some analysts suggest that the apparent limited export 
potential of the Iranian revolution is connected to its particular national and sectarian context: 
While in the early days of the revolution the adjective "Islamic" was taken literally, 
in practice the revolution took the form of an Iranian/Shii populist movement. For 
example, when Hujjatiyeh Seminary began to train jurisconsults in the Jafari (Shii) 
school of jurisprudence, the school lost a great number of Sunni students. One 
student from an African country told me, "Had I been trained well in my own Sunni 
school of jurisprudence in Qum, I would have been the best agent for the export of 
the revolution for you. But instead, I simply have to leave because I did not come 
here to train as a Shii. i48 
Ideas often carry the marks of their own specificity within them. These, once activated, can 
sometimes render a theory inert. Thus the difficulties some reform-minded theologians 
encounter when trying to introduce innovative forms of thinking into Islam. Too often they 
are accused of being 'Western' or 'secular' - two terms often viewed as synonymous 
49 The 
West, or at least the idea of something called 'the West, ' lurks in the background of diasporic 
Muslim discourses. For many Muslims living in Europe or North America 'the West' is 
simply part of life, the infrastructure of daily existence. For others, however, it is a haunting 
force, something to be reckoned with, a spectral 'other. ' Thus questions arise as to whether 
new forms of diasporic religious practice constitute 'authentic' Islam. 50 This is where the 
boundary drawing (and the politics) begins. Islam begins to be seen as something that needs 
to be protected and steps are taken to guard against the encroachment of Western influences. 
So, as we see, sometimes Islam can only travel so far. Fortunately, the younger generation of 
diasporic Muslims seems more willing to engage in active exchange with the West. This 
does not mean, however, that they simply 'accept' the West or conform to its requirements; 
young Muslims are far from uncritical in this regard. Rather, there seems to have occurred a 
shift in the way they view the West. One interviewee told me that the West is now regarded 
less as an intrusion and more as a challenge. "Muslims want to make sense of their own 
tradition in light of this challenge, " he explained. 51 Today's diasporic Muslims understand 
the foundations of modem political theory and practice. Recent arrivals in diaspora, many of 
whom are political exiles, find that being in the West affords them a better perspective from 
which to view the predicament of the modern Muslim movement. "When you're in Kashmir 
or wherever, out of touch with the wider movement and other Muslim tendencies, " one recent 
arrival told me, "you realise only the need for change, but not the dire need that exists. By 
looking at Islamic movements from the West one is able to identify those areas and 
imperatives which have not been discussed. "52 
Encounters and debates with the Muslim other 
The numbers bode well for Europe's next generation of young Muslims. Britons of Pakistani 
and Bangladeshi descent, for example, almost doubled between 1981 and 1991, with nearly 
4' Fischer and Abedi, pp. 321-2 
49 Farhang Rajaee, "Iranian Ideology and Worldview: The Cultural Export of the Revolution" in John L. 
Esposito (ed. ), The Iranian Revolution: Its Global Impact, Miami: Florida International University 
Press, 1990, pp. 76-7 
49 Thomä-Venske, p. 79 
so Yalcin-Heckmann, p. 183 
51 Siddiqui, interview. 
52 Dr. S. M. I. Andrabi, exiled Kashmiri intellectual and activist, Personal Interview, London, 20 July 
1998. 
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half of them now born in the UK. The age dispersion compared with that of white Britain is 
also striking. There are almost twice as many under-16s among the subcontinental 
population, and only 2 per cent of this community is over the age of 65 compared with 17 per 
cent among Britain's while population. 53 Within a decade this generation will be ready for 
participation in Muslim public life, but whether they will be able to do so is another question. 
As Jergen Nielsen points out, many mosque organisation are "firmly in the control of the 
immigrant generation, their parents, and only the most perceptive of these [are] beginning to 
co-opt their children into the power structures. "54 It is not just a matter of parents keeping 
children out of mosques, however. Young Muslims, as we will see, are largely dissatisfied 
with the Islam of their parents. The generational divide is hence one of the defining features 
of the Muslim diaspora today. But what are the terms of this debate? 
Notions of identity are undergoing some major changes for the current generation of young 
Muslims in Europe. They are aware that the Islam of their parents was learned in a different 
sociocultural setting and in a different era. This older generation received both direct and 
indirect socialisation into their religion at home, school and in the wider Muslim majority 
societies which constitute their homelands. 55 The parents of many young Turkish migrants, 
for example, will have studied Islam in primary school in Turkey for at least two years. 
Furthermore, Islam here was part of a wider lifeworld which provided a continuing 
infrastructure for the reproduction of religion and belief. This system, however, does not 
travel well into diaspora. 56 Some writers note that when Islam is transplanted, "the religious 
symbols and rituals of Islam are no longer affirmed by the social environment, and they thus 
lose [the] character of certainty which underpinned their existence [in the homeland]. 07 
There arises therefore a question as to the continued relevance of Islam as it was traditionally 
practised at various 'points of origin. ' The responses of the new generation to this 
ambivalence generally take one of two forms. Some young 'Muslims' turn away from their 
religion, regarding it as an unwanted vestige which serves no purpose in diaspora other than 
to mark them out as different. These people often go the secular route, voiding Islam from 
their lives and doing their very best to integrate into their new cultural environments; in other 
words, becoming as British or German or American as possible. For this group, issues 
concerning race and ethnicity sometimes become the new obstacles; Islam is usually only an 
i58 issue here when it is projected on to them by virtue of their'Muslim background. 
Other young Muslims, however, choose to reaffirm their Islam. By doing so they remain in 
diaspora, but the object of their migrant desire - the place to which they seek to return - 
changes. Pakistan or Morocco ceases to be an imaginary homeland and instead that role falls 
to Islam. As Elizabeth Scantlebury notes, "[a] significant number of young Muslims are 
rejecting a religio-ethnic identity in favour of a search for 'True Islam. ii59 This also often 
involves questioning their parents' lifestyles and Islamic credentials. Much of what the older 
generation sees as Islam is dismissed by the younger generation as tainted, or as mere 
'cultural' practice. This "takes the form of trying to strip away the varying cultural traditions 
53 Phillip Lewis, Islamic Britain: Religion, Politics and Identity among British Muslims, London: I. B. 
Tauris, 1994, p. 15 
54 Jorgen Nielsen, "A Muslim agenda for Britain: some reflections, " New Community, Vol. 17, No. 3, 
April 1991, p. 467 
55 Late Yalpin-Heckman, "Are fireworks Islamic?: Towards an understanding of Turkish migrants and 
Islam in Germany" in Charles Stewart and Rosalind Shaw (eds. ), Syncretism/Anti-syncretism: The 
politics of religious synthesis, London: Routledge, 1994, p. 188 
56 Ibid. 
57 Thomä-Venske, p. 79 
58 Elizabeth Scantlebury, "Muslims in Manchester: the depiction of a religious community, " New 
Community, Vol. 21, No. 3, July 1995. 
59 Ibid., p. 430 
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that first generation migrants have, rightly or wrongly, assumed to be Islamic, from the 
'essential core' of the religion. "60 Hanif Kureishi's short story and subsequent film My Son 
the Fanatic depicts exactly this kind of situation from the point of view of a father whose son 
has apparently 'returned' to Islam. This is often explained as a search for identity, a response 
by diaspora's discontents to their disenfranchisement and loss of self in a minority context. 
Some young Muslims have been led to join radical organisations such as the aforementioned 
Hizb ut-Tahrir which states as its goal the establishment of an Islamic state in Britain. Many 
of these activists attempt to 'hijack' mosques, using them as pulpits for noisy propaganda. For 
the most part mosque administrators are tolerant of such behaviour. "[They] have nowhere 
else to go to let off steam. 'We tolerate them because they are lonely in London and angry at 
the wrongs in their own countries... [But] there is no discipline. Every boy is a leader. i61 The 
older generation is often quite ambivalent about these self-appointed imams. "They do not 
like the young firebrands shouting at the mosques, " one informant told me, "but at the same 
time they are also happy that their children still see Islam as an important part of their 
lives. "62 
Many young Muslims, however, are not so tolerant of their parents. They complain that the 
older generation still tries to live as it did in its societies of origin, that is, as if Muslims were 
still in the majority: "They would talk Pakistani politics constantly, but never neighbourhood 
politics... they didn't want to engage with non-Muslims. 03 The sectarian conflicts and 
divisions between religious schools of thought are also seen by the younger generation as a 
negative aspect of their parents' Islam. Many young Muslims view these ethno-theological 
debates as pointless time-wasting that only generates dissent. As Dilwar Hussain, a former 
member of Young Muslims UK's executive board, told me, "[W]e dealt with this by deciding 
that it would not be a public issue for us. We saw the madhhab debate as something that was 
important for our parents' generation and we didn't want to fall into or continue their debates 
since we realised that this would be a source of disunity. "64 Some Muslim community 
leaders have taken this into consideration when formulating their platforms. For example, 
when the Manchester Council of Mosques was set up in 1989, one of its stated aims was "to 
provide the younger generation with pure Islam - quite untainted with sectarianism. "65 But 
the real source of dissatisfaction for young Muslims relates to a much broader issue, the 
question of whether the older generation is able to engage with Western society and to 
produce an Islam for this particular habitat. The religious leaders - imams, ulama and 
sheikhs - are viewed as particularly problematic in this regard: 
These ulama often seem to be living in a different world; they have very little sense 
of the important issues of the day. They have fixed minds and are very fixed in their 
views. In terms of politics they have created their own internal politics concerning 
different institutions and traditions, but they aren't dealing with the larger political 
issues. No questions are being asked and there is no reasoning. 66 
Most of all, these religious leaders do not enter into dialogue with the West. It is therefore 
difficult for them to advise younger Muslims on how best to make Islam relevant to European 
or North American settings, and how to relate to the issues faced by young people today. 
Phillip Lewis refers to the interesting case of two father and son imams in Bradford. While 
60 Ibid. 
61 Akbar Ahmed, "Mutiny in the mosque, " The Guardian, March 10,1994. 
62 Siddiqui, interview. 
63 Ibid. 
64 Hussain, interview. He is referring to debates between different schools of theological and 
jurisprudential interpretation. 
65 Scantlebury, p. 431 
66 Siddiqui, interview. 
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both teachers use the same basic materials, the bilingual son is able to ensure that a lesson 
has been understood in both and English and Urdu and also to pepper his lectures with 
references to the objects and imagery of contemporary British popular culture. Also, with 
regard to particularly sensitive issues such as contraception, it is usually the son who is 
approached for advice and not the father 67 The question of religious leadership is hence a 
vexed one, and is closely related to ideas of 'dispersed authority' discussed in Chapter II. 
That is, clear sources of leadership and guidance are not always forthcoming; rather, 'Islamic 
knowledge' is to be found spread amongst a variety of disparate sources. Many young 
Muslims also find the intellectual quality of their elders to be inferior. As one prominent 
imam remarked, "most of the imams in this country lack the basic training required to lead 
the prayer in a village mosque, not to mention in a place of worship in a more sophisticated 
and intellectually superior society. , 68 Much of this dissent stems from the fact that what we 
are dealing with here, as Tariq Modood reminds us, is "a semi-industrialised, newly 
urbanised working class community only one generation away from rural peasantry. , 69 It is 
therefore not surprising that the older generation feels more comfortable having Islam taught 
and read to them by an imam from their own village and in a language that they understand. 70 
The phenomenon of 'transnational ulama' - religious scholars (or 'travelling theorists') who 
move frequently between diasporic communities and their countries of origin - is largely a 
consequence of this preference for religious leaders from more familiar environs. Such 
'imported Islam' does not, however, meet with either the approval or the needs of the younger 
generation. It has been noted that because this Islam is taught by individuals with little 
knowledge of daily life in the West, it often only serves to alienate young Muslims. " 
The employing of imams from the countries of origin of the migrants is seen as 
ignoring the needs of the British-born members of the community. This may be in 
the area of language since very few of these imams speak English fluently. Qur'an 
schools held in the mosques are then perceived as being very unattractive to children 
who are used to the variety of teaching methods in state schools. Very few mosques 
'Z are seen as providing a programme specifically aimed at the younger generation. 
Many of these imported teachers, however extensively trained in religion they may be, 
possess little first-hand experience of life in the diasporic environment. 
73 They therefore find 
it difficult to accommodate the needs of young Muslims. Many writers point to the necessity 
of developing new, effective leadership structures for the next generations. Parents and 
imported imams are finding that their Islam has less and less resonance for their children. 
Dassetto and Nonneman argue that one of the major questions facing diasporic Muslim 
communities today is how the transition 'from the Islam of the fathers to the Islam of the sons' 
(and increasingly, as we shall see, the daughters) will take place. 74 As the reliance on 
transnational ulama decreases, 75 yet another question arises as to where the next generation of 
67 Lewis, Islamic Britain, pp. 117-19 
68 S. M. Darsh, Muslims in Europe, London: Ta-Ha, 1980, p. 89, quoted in Pieterse, "Travelling Islam, " 
p. 189 
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No. 2, April-June 1990, p. 145 
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72 Scantlebury, pp. 430-31 
73 Gary Bunt, "Decision-Making Concerns in British Islamic Environments, " Islam and Christian- 
Muslim Relations, Vol. 9, No. 1,1998, p. 104 
74 Dassetto and Nonneman, p. 216 
75 Fred Halliday notes for example that after the leading religious figure of the Yemeni community in 
the UK returned permanently to Yemen, the younger generation began to question traditional authority. 
This eventually led to the establishment of a number of secular nationalist organisations. Landman 
reports the problems for Sufi orders in The Netherlands accruing from their reliance on a religious 
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imams will be educated. 76 Young Muslims who write on Islam in English without a 
knowledge of Arabic are often not taken seriously by the more traditional ulama - who then 
find themselves counter-accused of being narrow-minded and out of touch with their 
surroundings. 77 As Phillip Lewis argues, "the task confronting Muslims in developing the 
Islamic tradition in English is thus considerable. It is by no means clear which institutions 
are equipped for such a task. It is difficult to envisage the 'ulama and their centres of 
learning as equal to such an undertaking. 08 Such developments are, however, imperative. 
Recently we have seen some encouraging signs in this regard. The establishment of 
organisations such as Young Muslims UK is a step in the right direction, offering as they do 
resources for Muslims seeking to make Islam relevant to their own hybrid condition. Dilwar 
Hussain is a good example of someone who has been affected positively by this trend. Islam 
was not a particularly large part of his life as he grew up. In fact, he was quite suspicious of 
any form of organised religion. In his late teens he attended several meetings of Young 
Muslims UK on the advice of his friends and liked what he saw. 
I began to feel more comfortable with Islam because it was being articulated in a 
language I could understand by my own peer group; in English rather than Urdu or 
Arabic. Everyone was in Western dress. I began to think that maybe I'd 
misunderstood Islam.. . 
So I began to read widely about the religion, entering into a 
period of inquiry. I didn't just accept Islam. I had a lot of questions that I wanted 
answered first, about the treatment of women for example. After I had received 
satisfactory answers I then felt ready to make a commitment to Islam. I got my 
answers from the leadership of the Young Muslims rather than from the mosque; the 
imams there are quite fixed in their views and don't like it when people ask too many 
questions. ' 
What is crucial here is the rendering of Islam in an idiom comprehensible to those diasporic 
Muslims who have grown up in Western society and who possess certain Western norms in 
addition to Islam. Indeed, this process is in many ways about emphasising the areas in which 
these value systems are co-extensive or highly similar. It is also, as I will argue later, about 
setting both vocabularies, Islam and the West, in motion - helping them to travel towards 
each other. 
Much of this will involve bringing Islam into the forums of popular culture and making it 
available via a wide variety of media (see Chapter V). Religion has to be seen to offer 
something to those young Muslims who find themselves unemployed, alienated or lost in the 
majority society. Some argue that this can be accomplished by attempting to relate aspects of 
wider popular culture in, say, the United Kingdom to a Muslim identity. Aurangzeb Iqbal, a 
Bradford solicitor, has suggested that sport might be one route by which this could be done. 80 
To this end he has organised a number of football matches for young Muslims in the UK. 
Igbal emphasises the need for Muslim role models and the importance of prominent Muslims 
showing the younger generation that Islam can be compatible with success in the West. In 
this regard he outlines his own version of'upwardly-mobile Islam': 
leadership based in the home country. See Fred Halliday, Arabs in Exile, London: I. B. Tauris, 1992, p. 
38 and Landman, p. 38 
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79 Hussain, interview. 
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Islam tells you to dress smartly, to spend upon yourself, you are not supposed to 
hoard money. It's wrong to have a big bank balance or build a massive house in 
Pakistan that no one lives in. That's wrong. Spend that money on your kids, on 
private education, don't hoard it. Have a nice house, invite your neighbours in 
regularly. Set yourself high standards, so that other people think, "I like that, I would 
like to be like that. i81 
Others emphasise the importance of language which, as we have seen, is one of the issues 
which most divides the generations. There is hence a need to make Islam widely available to 
those young Muslims whose first (and sometimes only) language is English. The importance 
of publications such as Q-News and The Muslim News (see Chapter V) is therefore difficult 
to underestimate. Q-News "appeals to young, educated Muslims, impatient of sectarianism, 
and is able through an international language, English, to access innovative and relevant 
Islamic scholarship. 02 This publication has also contributed enormously towards the 
availability of sound religious advice through a column by the late Dr. Syed Mutawalli ad- 
Darsh, a prominent religious scholar in the UK. Every fortnight in Q-News he would 
dispense fatdwd (juridical opinions; singular fatwä) on a vast range of issues relevant to 
Islam in modem society. Many of these were answers to questions sent in by readers on 
marriage, sexuality and contraception - topics which young Muslims often find it difficult to 
raise with traditional ulama in local mosques. Several Islamic publishing houses in the UK 
have also dedicated themselves to producing useful materials for English-speaking Muslims. 
Among them are Ta-Ha in London and the publishing wing of the Islamic Foundation in 
Leicester. This latter organisation generates a wide range of literature ranging from 
children's books to treatises on Islamic economics and the translated works of Abu] Ala 
Mawdudi (the prominent Pakistani Islamist whose political thought we briefly examined in 
Chapter II). "We try to make our coverage general, " they say, "so that any tendency or 
movement - and especially their children - can use our books. "83 The Foundation also 
produces literature targeted at non-Muslims in public life in order to help them understand 
the beliefs and circumstances of their Muslim employees, colleagues, constituents and 
pupils. 84 Another writer mentions the emergence of what she terms 'Islamic English' among 
some certain Muslim communities. She mentions, for example, the Islamically-inflected 
phraseologies specific to African-American Muslims in the United States. 85 
The imperatives, then, are clear. Today's young diasporic Muslims are trying to build their 
lives in a highly urbanised and often cosmopolitan environment. They require an Islam to 
match this setting. The traditional frameworks of their parents and the associated institutions 
of religious scholarship are perceived as being in desperate need of transformation. In this 
regard, publications such as Q-News have provided important forums for debating intra- 
Islamic politics and the future of Muslims in diaspora. 86 Yet doubts still remain as to the 
viability of 'reformed' ulama within the stagnant religious structures of the older generation. 
As Lewis notes, "Even where an able student... becomes an 'alim, it is an open question 
whether mosque committees will be able or willing to offer him the salary and job security he 
deserves. There is a real danger that there will be a haemorrhaging of the most able into the 
81 Ibid., p. 154 
82 Lewis, Islamic Britain, p. 207 
53 Siddiqui, interview. 
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85 Metcalf, Making Muslim Space, pp. xv-xix 
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state educational system. "87 Islam's diasporic scholars need to transcend the ghettos into 
which they are perceived to have confined themselves. They need to re-invent themselves as 
the role models for a diasporic Islam that knows where it is: "The future of Islamic living will 
depend on ulama with vision, ulama who are in touch with the problems of today and who 
08 can show how Islam is relevant to contemporary life. 
Intergenerational issues have not been the only source of conflict in the Muslim diaspora. 
There are other debates going on within these communities, many of which pertain to 
questions about the boundaries of who and what Islam is. These conversations are intensified 
in translocal spaces due to the sheer volume of human traffic that flows through them. 
Muslims in diaspora come face to face with the myriad shapes and colours of global Islam, 
forcing their religion to hold a mirror up to its own diversity. These encounters often play an 
important role in processes of identity formation, prompting Muslims to relativise and 
compare their self-understandings of Islam. Eickelman and Piscatori point out that in 
translocal spaces: 
[Muslims have] direct contact with the real differences of language, sect, race, and 
customs that unavoidably make up the ummah. Contrary to the conventional wisdom 
of western social scientists, therefore, the encounter with the Muslim "other" has 
been at least as important for self-definition as the confrontations with the European 
"other. "" 
Other writers point out that before this century's migrational waves interaction between 
different kinds of Muslims was often minimal. These groups tended to live in fairly closed 
communities, often with only limited knowledge and contact with other understandings of 
Islam. Their arrival in migratory and global cities, however, has required them to interact 
with each other to a far greater degree, and hence also to become more aware of their 
religion's internal variety and vicissitudes. 90 "With globalisation, " one diasporic Islamist told 
me, "we are forced to confront different interpretations of Islam, you can't hide away from 
them. i91 One also finds groups or movements whose Islam has been deemed heterodox or 
even outlawed in their homelands - minority 'sects' such as the Ahmadis or Alevis - with 
whom contact may have previously been proscribed. 
What, then, has been the effect of this new intra-Islamic melange? Many community leaders 
had hoped that the circumstances of diaspora would lead Muslims from different parts of the 
world and cultural backgrounds to focus on that which is common to them all, as prescribed 
by scriptural norms. 92 In other words, they have been anticipating the emergence of a new 
form of cosmopolitan Islam devoid of'ethnic' or 'local' distortions. In this sense it was hoped 
that diaspora might provide the opportunity for greater Muslim unity. Too often, though, it 
seems as if the call for greater unity has been viewed by many Muslims as a call for more 
uniformity -a political manoeuvre by one school or tendency trying to force its own 
particular brand of Islam on the entire Muslim community. The consequences of diasporic 
diversity have therefore been a mixed blessing. In the early period of settlement sectarian 
differences were rife, and many of these still endure. In addition, as we will see, there are a 
number of ongoing debates about orthodoxy/orthopraxy, 'modernism' and the political 
agenda. The situation is not, however, only one of strife. I will also be arguing that there are 
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a number of important ways in which these encounters with the Muslim other are 
contributing towards the development of a more tolerant and progressive climate. By holding 
a mirror up to its 'hybrid self (see Chapter III), Islam is able to better gauge what needs to be 
changed. 
Sectarian conflict has been a constant feature of the Muslim diaspora in its modern history. 
Sometimes this has manifested itself in the form of ethnic factionalism. Coventry, for 
example, saw Deobandi and Barelwi (the two most common sectarian schools in British 
Islam) dissent take the form of a confrontation between Pakistanis and Gujeratis, with each 
side in turn accusing the other of being 'Wahhabis. i93 At other times theological orthopraxy 
has been a key source of disagreement. In Manchester the same two schools had another 
falling out when the Deobandi imam of the Central Mosque refused to attend festivals 
associated with saints, a practice of which his tradition does not approve. 94 This incident 
hints at another common divide within diasporic Islam, that between 'puritanical' movements 
such as the Wahhabis and Muslim Brotherhood and those Muslims more inclined towards a 
'popular' Islam centred on saints and festivals, such as the various Sufi orders. 95 One writer 
demonstrates the ways in which the discourses of a Naqshbandi Sufi community in London 
use the Wahhabis as a form of "internal other" to create a politics of inclusion and exclusion 
which differentiates strongly between good and bad forms of Islam. 96 
In other settings we find a similar (but perhaps inverse) form of politics involving those 
Muslim sects whose interpretations of Islam are considered taboo in various home societies. 
Among the migrant Turkish community in Berlin, for example, 'orthodox' Sunnis often 
condemn fellow Turkish Alevi Muslims as heretics. 97 And in The Netherlands the debate 
over government licensing for the ritual slaughtering of meat heated up when it was 
discovered that the authorities had initially sought religious advice from an imam of the 
Ahmadiyya -a group outlawed by the Pakistani state - who, it was claimed by a consultant 
specialist on Islam, are "considered to be heterodox by probably more than 95 percent of the 
Muslims in Holland. i98 The issue of which sects receive 'official' state approval is thus the 
source of some particularly interesting politics within diasporic Muslim organisations, many 
of which are sponsored by prominent Muslim states such as Saudi Arabia, Pakistan and Iran. 
The combination of sectarian divisions and this transnational patronage has meant that 
Muslim organisations have often been of a very fragmentary nature. 99 In the early days of 
Muslim settlement in Europe this severely hampered campaigns for the provision of halal 
('permissible'; in this case, slaughtered in accordance with religious regulaions) meat and 
Islamic education. The politics surrounding associations in the UK such as the Union of 
Muslim Organisations, the Council of Mosques of the UK and Eire and the Muslim 
Parliament have often wasted time that could have been spent on more pressing issues faced 
by Muslims in diaspora. Other Islamic organisations in Europe have had similar problems. 
For example, the Diyanet movement - which constitutes the voice of 'official' Turkish state 
Islam abroad - has refused to participate in the Higher Council of Belgian Muslims because 
93 Jean Ellis, "Local government and community needs: a case study of Muslims in Coventry, " New 
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adherents of the Milli Görüs group, an anti-Kemalist movement associated with the Refah 
party in Turkey, were also involved. 100 
Another form of debate, one which is often coextensive with the intergenerational conflicts 
examined in the previous section, relates to the divisions between so-called 'modernising' and 
'traditional' tendencies in diasporic Islam. This antagonism can take many forms in daily life, 
and often comes into play when questions related to issues such as gender relations and the 
permissibility of certain 'Western' practices arise. One writer gives the example of a 
'modernising' religious leader in London who was consulted by two young women over the 
question of whether, according to Islam, women are allowed to initiate divorce. These 
women had already asked the same question of other 'culture-centred' - and therefore 
'traditional' - scholars and had been told that in Islam women do not have the choice to 
separate from their husbands. From the modernising scholar, however, the women heard a 
different opinion. 
[He] told them that, according to his interpretation of Islam, women had the choice of 
initiating divorce too. This calmed the situation, through providing them with 
empowerment. They were able to inform their husbands and families of the'correct' 
authoritative Islamic position within this particular belief framework... . 
[The 
'moderniser'] was able to prove, through, his interpretation, that he was 'correct. ' It 
demonstrated to [him] that in his view, many Muslims lack understanding of basic 
principles regarding Islam. He reflected, however, that the erroneous 'traditional' 
perspective often prevailed in similar cases - and that he was in a'minority. i101 
Many young Muslims today are part of this broadly modern disposition. However, even 
within this tendency there is conflict, some of which has received considerable media 
attention even in the wider majority society. Much of the debate here is over the question of 
what the younger generation of diasporic Muslims should regard as its political imperatives, 
and, more specifically, how it should deal with the West. 102 The modernist tendency 
subspeciates into two broad camps, usually identified as 'moderates' and 'radicals. ' Most 
prominent among the latter in the UK has been the Islamist organisation Hizb ut-Tahrir, a 
movement we have examined briefly in other contexts above. This group's stated goal is the 
establishment of an Islamic state and khilafa, governance according to principles outlined by 
the Qur'an and the example of the Prophet. 103 Although many may see this as an eminently 
'traditional' agenda, Hizb ut-Tahrir's methods are distinctly modern. 
Hizb ut-Tahrir's radical Islamic theology is the very antithesis of Marxist atheism, but 
it operates on classical Leninist lines. Core activists... travel the country, setting up 
closed cells in towns and universities, whose members are indoctrinated in the party's 
beliefs and worldview. The activists move on, but the new cadre-members are left 
behind to infiltrate the Muslim establishment, such as established student Islamic 
Societies and try to take them over. For many young British Muslims Hizb ut-Tahrir 
provides a set of ready-made answers to both political issues and the questions of 
personal identity that often draw alienated individuals to extremist organisations. 104 
Hizb ut-Tahrir has undoubtedly forced young Muslims to deal with questions and issues 
which they might have otherwise avoided, its noisy tactics effectively allowing it to define 
the political agenda for the younger generation. "I would be dishonest if I said I hadn't been 
100 Dassetto and Nonneman, p. 215 
1°1 Bunt, pp. 105-6 
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influenced by them, " reported one interviewee. "The rise of Hizb ut-Tahrir had a strong 
impact on the other movements. Until then many other groups had been politically apathetic. 
They were forced to react and relate to the issues - such as khilafa - that Hizb ut-Tahrir had 
put on the agenda. " 105 Many began to switch camps, abandoning groups such as Tablighi 
Jama'at which some view as limited in transformative potential. Even such traditionally 
'quietist' movements were forced to politicise to some degree in order to answer Hizb ut- 
Tahrir's challenge. Some see the latter's disruptive strategies as marking them out as a form 
of modern day khawarij, an early puritanical sect which broke away from mainstream Islam 
in the years following the death of Prophet. Other Muslims believe that groups such as Hizb 
ut-Tahrir and its offshoot al-Muhajirun fulfil a useful polemical function by provoking the 
more quiescent movements, and are willing to mute their own objections so long as the more 
radical groups stay within the boundaries of what is halal. 106 The very definition of these 
boundaries is, however, a large part of the ongoing debate. 
Strangely enough, the rise of Hizb ut-Tahrir has also had a unifying effect among young 
Muslims. Opposition to the 'radicals' has, for example, brought together previously 
antagonistic groups such as the Deobandi-influenced Tablighi Jama'at and the Barelwis. 
Even other Islamists seeking to implement an Islamic political order have expressed 
dissatisfaction with Hizb ut-Tahrir's methods. They are well aware that global spaces are 
firmly under the gaze of the world's media, and that one therefore has to be careful of what 
one says. "If you have slogan that make you look funny - for example, the claim that you're 
going to implement khilafa, a programme that needs many more elements and perhaps several 
hundred years - then you'll never be taken seriously. i107 By unifying these various 
tendencies in opposition, Hizb ut-Tahrir has, in the words of one observer, "played a positive 
role in a negative way. 008 A similar phenomenon was observed during the height of the 
controversy surrounding Salman Rushdie's novel The Satanic Verses. This episode "revealed 
the need for broader organizational frameworks, as well as setting new agendas for common 
action. i109 Other writers have also highlighted the role of crisis situations and perceived 
threats (such as the Gulf War of 1991) in uniting the Muslim diaspora. 10 
There is now a more general trend towards communication and interaction across sectarian 
divisions. Much of this is linked to the younger generation's distaste for such differences, as 
discussed in the previous section. Until the 1990s, many mosques and their leaderships 
remained introverted, rarely seeking contact with other schools and tendencies. In contrast, 
the present decade has seen significantly increased interaction between different Muslim 
movements, particularly in the translocal spaces of more urban and cosmopolitan areas such 
as London. " Mosques have emerged as a particularly salient form of Muslim public sphere 
in this regard, forming the sites of a growing number of intra-Muslim conversations This is 
also reflected in the way some mosque associations now organise their leaderships. The 
Bradford Council of Mosques, for example, has consciously avoided having religious 
scholars associated with its administration in order to minimise sectarian issues. ' 12 
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There are ways in which diaspora provides an environment highly conducive to dialogue and 
exchange between the multitude of different schools of thought in travelling Islam. It seems 
to be the case that many ideologies lose their specificity when they travel. The processes of 
becoming disembedded from the sociocultural contexts in which they were originally 
elaborated also loosens their fixedness. It becomes easier to adapt them to new contexts, or 
to combine them with ideas previously viewed as incompatible. One of my informants, for 
example, remembers being particularly struck by a speech he heard in London about the need 
to remove the Islamic Revolution in Iran from its national and Shi'a context, and to make it 
relevant to entire umma. 13 These transplantations can also give rise to new hybrid 
formulations which cater for the specific needs of migrant Muslims. Thus in diaspora we 
often find curious syntheses of thinkers and systems of thought. Fischer and Abedi, for 
instance, refer to an African-American Muslim woman who described herself as 
simultaneously having been a follower of Abul Ala Mawdudi and the Tablighi Jama'at 
movement. ' 14 This is interesting because the Tablighis usually do their best to avoid politics, 
while Mawdudi's thought emphasises the need for Muslims to be politically active. In 
diaspora, however, these ideas combine with little difficulty, each fulfilling a different aspect 
of an individual's sociopolitical and identity needs. Some Muslims also find it easier in 
diaspora to engage with other schools of thought without losing sight of their own Islam. 
"You learn to adjust to other tendencies, " says Dr. Ataullah Siddiqui, "and to be at ease with 
other interpretations of Islam without feeling that you are diluting your own beliefs. "' 15 He 
recalls meeting significant numbers of Shi'a Muslims for the first time in the UK, and also 
being struck by how easy it seemed to be for many Arab Muslims to talk across and combine 
different schools of thought. Others note that in diaspora, religious thought often takes on a 
new dimension. "I have become more tolerant, " says one Deobandi mufti, "and my 
knowledge has become 'live. ' You see, knowing something about a school of thought and 
actually coming into contact with someone from that school are two very different things. " 
This comment usefully reflects the fact that it is often very difficult to tellranything about an 
individual's personal religious belief or behaviour by looking at what m vement or tendency 
he or she supposedly belongs to. "[The] individual opinions of m bers of a specific 
organization do not always concur with the ideological contents of the organization, " notes 
one analyst. 16 Obviously such groups can play an important role in political situations, but 
we need to bear in mind the dangers of conflating unity and uniformity. In any case, there are 
a great number of issues whose salience cuts right across the wide range of Muslim 
discourse, generating, at times, a "convergence in public rhetoric. "117 This is often the case, 
as we have seen, when Muslims perceive themselves to be facing a common threat such as 
during the Rushdie Affair or the Gulf War of 1991.118 There are also occasions when 
different tendencies will borrow each other's ideologies in order to compensate for aspects 
missing from their own programmes. Thus, Sufi and Deobandis in Britain have at times 
adopted the political agenda of the Jama'at-i Islami. Werbner notes that as such "discourses 
'travel' across the sectarian divide.. . they come to 
be imbued with new meanings. "119 Groups 
who share broadly similar principles also co-operate in various ways. Muhammad al- 
Mass'ari of the Committee for the Defence of Legitimate Rights explained that his 'radical' 
movement did its best to avoid being publicly associated with other, more 'moderate' Gulf 
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Islamists such as the Bahrain Freedom Movement. During his group's first year in exile they 
also did not attend mosques which received Saudi money so as not to jeopardise those 
institutions' sources of funding. 120 Intra-Muslim political discourse is also enriched by this 
interaction. "In London I have contact with the whole spectrum of the Islamist movement, " 
says Dr. Sa'ad al-Faqih, "and I am forced to communicate politically. Dialogue is very 
important, especially with those with whom you disagree. "121 The dialogue to which he 
refers is wide-ranging, covering issues from Islamic conceptions of democracy and the 
participation of Islamists in 'non-Muslim' elections to questions of gender roles and intra- 
Muslim co-operation within diaspora. 
It would be dangerous, however, to get carried away by these apparent trans-sectarian trends 
for there are still significant forces militating against intra-Muslim discourse. Many Muslims 
still know that the pressures for greater 'unity' are - as we have already mentioned - often 
nothing more than demands for greater 'uniformity. ' Ever wary of this predicament, 
independent-thinking Muslims often have difficulty finding like-minded peers, preferring 
instead to go it alone. 122 For them, safety in individuality is more important than safety in 
numbers. And there are always those schools of thought and mosques which simply refuse to 
come out of their shells. But many Muslims are reconciling themselves to Islam's 
heterogeneity and seeking dialogue with other traditions. They realise that this internal 
diversity can only be a good thing, and that it in no way threatens the integrity of Islam; 
rather, they see it as an intrinsic aspect of their religion. A conversation recently overheard in 
a mosque demonstrates this: "Look, Islam is the hand, and every finger is a part of that hand. 
But every finger is different. It wouldn't be a hand if it didn't have five fingers, all different. " 
There is a hadith in which the Prophet reassures his followers that ikhtiläf al-umma rahma: 
"differences of opinion in the community are a blessing. " An appreciation of this ikhtilaf 
(diversity) is crucial for the development of diasporic Islam. The signs are that many 
Muslims are realising its importance. As the leadership of the diaspora passes to the next 
generation, all signs are that a greater sense of unity will emerge among young Muslims; 123 
but this will be a unity based on difference, an awareness that it is only through recognising 
plurality within that Islam can adapt to life in diaspora. Encounters and debates with the 
Muslim other have hence played a central role in defining Islam's political agenda. In this 
sense the condition of diaspora can actually contribute towards the development of critical 
thinking in Islam. Critiques not only of the West, but also - and more importantly - of Islam 
itself. In diaspora Muslims face new questions, and these require new answers. There is 
hence an intrinsic link between the shifting meanings of travelling Islam, the rise of a new 
generation, intra-Islamic debate and the renewal of Muslim theories on religion, politics and 
community. 
Rethinking Islam: politics, community, gender 
In this section I want to review a series of Muslim discourses related to the nature of politics, 
the boundaries of community and constructions of gender. I will argue that the renewal and 
reformulation of such notions is contributing to the emergence of something like a 'Muslim 
public sphere. ' I also want to demonstrate that the condition of diaspora has provided the 
120 Dr. Muhammad al-Mass'ari, Committee for the Defence of Legitimate Rights (CDLR), Personal 
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primary impetus for this innovative thinking. Increasingly today, translocal spaces are 
enabling and encouraging the articulation of a new critical Islam. 
Towards a critical Islam 
A new breed of Islamic intellectual, often schooled and living in the West, is staking strong 
claims to the Muslim's right to reflect upon tradition, and to make moral choices based on 
responsible and rational readings of Islam's textual sources. Shabbir Akhtar, for example, 
quotes Qur'anic verses forbidding compulsion in religion and enjoining confessional 
tolerance. For him these suggest "a specifically Islamic manifesto on freedom of conscience 
and conviction. i124 For such thinkers, one's life in the West is therefore not to be lamented 
but rather embraced, offering as it does the opportunity to reread, reassess and reassert the 
validity of Qur'anic teaching in new contexts. 125 In this regard we might recall al-Faruqi's 
celebration of hijra'to the West, ' or the Meccan'alim who pointed to the obligation a Muslim 
has to seek knowledge and religion wherever it might take him. Indeed there are those, such 
as Zaki Badawi, who firmly believe that it is from Muslim contexts in the West that the most 
radical and innovative Islamic thought will emerge. 126 He sees France as potentially very 
fertile in this regard because it is there that Muslims face the greatest difficulties. These 
challenges, he hypothesises, will produce the most creative solutions. 127 
Another phenomenon closely related to life in diaspora is the way in which the traditional 
ulama are increasingly finding themselves bypassed in favour of, for instance, Muslim youth 
workers, in the search for religious knowledge. We saw this in the case of Dilwar Hussain, 
who explained that by asking questions in the mosque he only seemed to inflame the tempers 
of impatient, doctrinally rigid imams. In the Young Muslims UK, however, he found a 
leadership willing to devote the time and effort necessary to answering questions and 
showing young Muslims how their religion is relevant to contemporary life in the West. ' 28 
Some writers have depicted the traditional religious scholars as purveyors of an internal 
hegemony, an ahistorical reading of the sources which seeks to posit an essential, immutable 
Islam. "They all profess to be upholding the essence of Islam, " argues James Piscatori, "yet 
in fact all are reinterpreting doctrine. They establish new, supposedly fixed points while 
denying that shifts of emphasis, nuance or meaning also occur. " 129 Thus we find Slhabbir 
Akhtar arguing for an explicit 'critical Qur'anic scholarship' and also for "a new theology, 
responsive to the intellectual pressures and assumptions of a sceptical age. " 130 
Many contemporary thinkers urge Muslims to go back to the sources and read for themselves, 
exercising good judgement and trusting in their own personal opinions as to what the texts 
mean for Islam today. Faziur Rahman, for example, argues that Muslims should read the 
Qur'an and the Hadith without relying on bulky, medieval commentaries. His claim is that 
these sources "were misconstrued by Muslim scholars in medieval times, made into rigid and 
inflexible guides - for all time, as it were - and not recognised as the products of their own 
124 Shabbir Akhtar, Be Careful with Muhammad!, London: 1989, pp. 76-7. Quoted in Lewis, Islamic 
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times and circumstances. i131 Another prominent religious scholar urges young Muslims in 
the West to undertake "a fresh study of the Qur'an... not with the aid of commentaries but 
with the depths of your hearts and minds.. . You should read 
it as if it were not an old 
scripture but one sent down for the present age, or, rather, one that is being revealed to you 
directly. " 132 Young Muslims are hence told to imagine themselves as Muhammad (a 
controversial proposition in itself), and to recognise that just as the Qur'an was revealed to 
the Prophet in a particular setting in space and time, so must its message be made to speak to 
the particular circumstances of diasporic life. 
There are indications that this call is being heeded. Young Muslims in the West often meet 
informally to discuss the Qur'an and other textual sources, attempting to read them anew and 
"without the intervention of centuries of Islamic scholarship. " Schooled in a tradition that 
teaches them not just to blindly accept but to ask questions, young Muslims are deploying 
this inquisitiveness on the early texts in order to find in them the contours of an Islam for the 
here and now. "' There is hence no reluctance to delve into the usul al-fiqh, but there has 
been a shift as to what Muslims are hoping to find there. Gone is the obsession with the 
somatics of prayer and correct bodily practice. The emphasis now is on wider questions 
concerning Muslim identity and relations between Muslims and non-Muslims. 134 Also less 
frequent now are intersectarian debates on points of fiqh. Some organisations, such as Young 
Muslims UK, have decided that one's choice of madhhab or school of thought should be a 
personal choice. Where the organisation needs to take a public position on some issue, 
however, this is decided by a process of shura (consultation) in which the views of various 
madhähib (plural of madhhab) are considered. Again, this ethos reflects the style of 
education which many young diasporic Muslims have received. Reflection and comparison 
allows them to develop their own responses to the situations and challenges of life in the 
West; through this activity they are able to develop an emancipatory theology that "allow[s] 
them to be European without breaking with Islam . 
03s This amounts to a strong reassertion of 
the principle and practice of ijtihad ("free thinking") 136 as a competence possessed by all 
Muslims and not simply an elite (albeit socially detached) group of ulama. For many young 
Muslims today, a legitimate promulgator of ijtihad is anyone who speaks to a particular 
question or cause with morality, perspicacity and insight. The status of 'alim is hence no 
longer a prerequisite for being recognised as a valid source of Islamic authority. One 
interviewee, for example, told me that he regarded someone like the Tunisian Islamist Rashid 
Ghannoushi - who has recently written extensively on the compatibility of Islam with 
Western doctrines of democracy and civil society - as far more qualified to practice ijtihad 
on the topic of politics than, say, an Azhar-trained'alim. 13' Pnina Werbner notes how: 
For a younger generation of [Muslims] growing up in Britain the definition of what is 
Islam is and means may well come to be increasingly constituted not by the Qur'an 
and Hadith, but by dissenting political ideologies... [Their] texts increasingly fuse a 
131 Frederick Mathewson Denny, "The Legacy of Fazlur Rahman" in Haddad, op. cit., p. 104. See 
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multicultural rhetoric of antiracism and equal opportunity with the ethical edicts of 
the Qur'an and Hadith. 138 
Fischer and Abcdi's conversation with an American Muslim confirms this point in a more 
lucid vernacular: 
I don't go out and say, "Everybody come to the mosque. " I don't do that anymore, 
because the mosque is not what people need. People need to know how to feed 
themselves. People need to know how to survive. People need to know their class 
interests. And the application of Islam as something that comes out of the mouths of 
the imams is not doing that. 1'9 
Young Muslims today are hence seeking to create an Islam that addresses the social 
predicaments and daily experience of life in the modern West. They have neither the time 
nor the patience for South Asian idioms of Islam from the last century. These traditions, as 
Phillip Lewis notes, were "honed in conflict with British hegemony, ranging from 
accommodation to isolation and defiance. The need now is for a critical and constructive 
exchange both within these traditions and with the majority society. "10 
It is in the cosmopolitan, translocal spaces of cities such as London and Bradford that this 
kind of exchange is taking place. The myriad range of cultures, ideas and people that flow 
through these spaces produce rich sites of hybridised intellectual activity. The syncretisms 
and interminglings which inhabit these cities also constitute the cutting edge of critical Islam 
- and also, occasionally, the edge that cuts too deep. It is no coincidence that Salman 
Rushdie's now infamous novel of translocal hybridity, The Satanic Verses, is set in the British 
capital. London's status today as a global city - in many ways even a gateway to the world or 
nodal point for cross-cultural transit - ensures constant cultural intercourse on an 
unprecedented scale. It is also an environment in which such conversations can be openly 
expressed. assessed and reformulated. In this sense, Western translocal space stands in stark 
contrast to the situation in many Muslim majority states where the capacity to stray publicly 
from officially-prescribed doctrine is heavily circumscribed. Western trans localities, on the 
other hand, offer the aspiring Muslim intellectual the opportunity both to express and 
encounter alternative readings of Islam. It is no wonder, therefore, that so many exiled and 
diasporic Muslim activist-intellectuals choose to make their homes in the global city. 
"" This 
fact stands in stark opposition to a statement by Dominique Schnapper to the effect that 
"Muslim intellectuals in Europe are faced with the task of setting the terms of necessary 
compromise between faith and participation in communal life. " 42 On the contrary, it is often 
more likely that a Muslim would have to live with such a compromise in Saudi Arabia than in 
London. Schnapper also invokes the concept of tfar7ira ("imperative need") to explain how 
medieval scholars used to find it possible "by learned and subtle argument" to legitimise 
transgressing the boundaries of doctrinal prescription under circumstances of absolute need, 
and these were often associated with a Muslim's presence in a non-Muslim state. 13 Her 
implication seems to be that Muslims in Western Europe may need to resurrect that principle 
today. (Perhaps she is even suggesting that such drastic measures constitute the only means 
by which the Qur'an can 'travel"? ) I would want to argue, however, that the evocation of 
darura by many of today's diasporic Muslims took place well before their 'hijra to the West. ' 
Werhner, "'The Making of Muslim Dissent, " p. 115 
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Indeed, I would suggest that for them, the departure from their societies of origin was itself 
seen as an act of darura because in many cases the West provides them with the best 
possibility of fulfiling the Qur'anic injunction against compulsion in religion. Not only are 
they able to speak their religion more freely in diaspora, but it is also here that they come to 
know the Muslim 'other. ' Dialogue, self-reflection and, gradually, critique all flow from this 
process. As a collective exercise, we are witnessing the deconstruction of Islam by Muslims 
themselves: 
The old way has to be analysed into discrete parts so that Islam can be 
identified.... one [then] proceeds to 'reassemble' these Islamic components together 
with the components arising out of the migration and settlement experience into a 
new complex whole which functions more successfully in European, urban, 
industrial life. 144 
A new perspective emerges in which a Muslim is able to see his religion in relation to both 
the norms and structures of the majority society and in relation to other idioms and 
interpretations of Islam. It is as a result of this wider breadth of vision that a critical renewal 
of Islam is now beginning to emerge. It is therefore not simply a case of bringing one's Islam 
into translocality, for the very act of doing so necessarily involves a relativisation of Islam - 
an act which, by questioning the parameters of normativity in Islam, becomes inherently 
political. 
Reformulating politics and community 
Not only is this new Muslim discourse political in nature, but one of its chief concerns is 
explicitly to rethink Islamic conceptions of politics and political community. A major 
impetus for much of this thinking has been the minority status of Muslims in diaspora. This 
condition has led Muslims to enquire as to the nature of the Islamic self - especially as 
regards its position vis ä vis non-Muslims. In the early years of migratory settlement, Islam 
was very much about drawing an 'othering' line, about marking oneself off as different and 
also somehow 'apart' or disengaged - almost as if the Muslim was blind to the non-Muslim 
other. The new generation of Muslims also wants to represent difference, but most certainly 
does not want to advocate any form of exclusion. In this sense, diasporic Islam is very much 
about the reformulation of Muslim political identity. The social reality of large numbers of 
Muslims living within non-Muslim majority societies has prompted some theorists to rethink 
the categories through which identity and community are represented in Islam. "The whole 
notion of 'the other' in Islamic theology is changing, " says Dilwar Hussain, "We live side by 
side now, in each other's domains. Islam is in the West and the West is in Islam. " 145 
Classical Islamic thought created an essential dichotomy between two ontological spheres: 
dar al-islam (the domain of Islam) and dar al-barb (the domain of strife or war). 
Traditionally, the former refers to those regions in which the principles of Islam are upheld 
under the rule of a Muslim sovereign. The latter, on the other hand, "is that which is not 
[under Muslim rule], but which, actually or potentially, is a seat of war for Muslims until by 
conquest it is turned into [dar al-islam]"146 Hence there is an essential element of 
antagonism between these two abodes, for dar al-barb represents a space in which Muslims, 
at least in theory, are at conflict with non-Muslims. Dar al-harb therefore does not represent 
a country or people to which Muslims are simply indifferent, but rather one which Islam is 
actively seeking to steer towards the Straight Path. There are also some madhahib which 
144 Nielsen, Muslims in Western Europe, pp. 116-17 los Hussain, interview. 
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recognise a third such classification, that of dar a! - `ahd (the domain of treaty). This 
represents a region in which Muslims and non-Muslims have entered into some form of 
agreement as regards the conduct of relations between them, usually to the greater benefit of 
the Muslims by way of a tributary tax exacted from non-Muslim communities. This latter 
category, however, has never appeared in Muslim writing with anything like the same 
frequency of the first two. 
It is not surprising that these terms have been deployed most frequently during times of 
perceived conflict between Muslims and non-Muslims. The colonial era marked one such 
period. The notion that the West was somehow a land of unbelief which might one day be 
brought under Islamic rule found particular resonance in the colonised imaginations of the 
Middle East, India and Southeast Asia. At that time it was perhaps one of the clearest 
Manichean expressions of the global situation. There was clearly an 'us' (those Muslims 
ruled by colonial Europe) and also a'them' (the colonising powers who would themselves one 
day be subject to Muslim rule), dar al-islam, dar al-harb. Such notions also exercised the 
minds of Muslim political theorists in the early years of decolonisation, forming the basis of 
programmes - such as Sayyid Qutb's (see Chapter 
II) - seeking to depict the depravity and 
corruption of the West. 
Although many of the more radical Islamist tendencies today (such as Hizb ut-Tahrir and al- 
Muhajiroun) still use this vocabulary in its traditional idiom, there is also a sense in which we 
can argue that concepts such as dar al-harb and dar al-islam are currently undergoing certain 
transformations. Broadly, this rethinking of political community is taking two forms. First, 
there are those Muslim thinkers seeking to apply the label dar al-harb to their own Muslim 
majority states. The argument here is that none of these governments is 'truly Islamic' and 
hence cannot be seen as dar al-islam. Classical Islamic law requires Muslims to depart from 
any Islamic state which lapses into dar al-harb; hence the connection with diaspora. Many of 
the political activists who criticise their governments in this manner end up as exiles in 
London or Paris. The Islamic opposition in the Arabian Peninsula is a prime example of this 
trend. The second way in which these categories are changing relates to the reformulation of 
dar al-islam. There are those theorists who wish to claim that the only requirement for a 
country to qualify as dar al-islam is that Muslims must be allowed to practise their religion 
with complete freedom. Some writers also emphasise the extent to which Muslims are 
actually more often able to fulfil the scriptural obligations of their religion in the West than 
they are in their own countries. 147 There have even been those who have suggested that 
because there is no such thing as a true dar al-islam then there is also no such thing as dar al- 
harb because they are necessarily always defined in opposition to each other; without one, the 
other does not exist. 148 Admittedly, those thinkers willing to view the West as dar al-islam 
are still a very small (but growing) minority; often they are accused by both the more 
extremist tendencies and the mainstream of having become too 'Westernised. ' There is 
evidence, however, that even the adherents of mainstream orthodoxy are starting to rethink 
political community in Islam. 
At a recent seminar in France a group of ulama came together to discuss the problems faced 
by Muslims living in Europe. Many of them had had first hand experience of life in the 
West, and were also well regarded in the Muslim world. 
The seminar discussed several issues, one being the issue of nationality and 
citizenship. They found that Muslims living in a non-Muslim majority country could 
no longer be classified as living in the House of War or Dar al-Harb. These terms, 
147 See Sayyid 'Abd al-'Aziz b. Muhammad al-Siddiq, Hukm al-igama bi-bilad al-kufr wa-bayan 
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they decided, do not convey the contemporary realities... The Ulama made it clear 
that in the contemporary situation, "we cannot classify non-Muslim nations as the 
abode of war. " They are, in their view, Dar al-Ahad or the "Abode of Treaties. 
" 149 
So although the West has not been deemed a domain of Islam, it has at least 
been 'officially' 
upgraded to dar al-'ahd. If we elaborate this shift in thinking, however, we can see that 
it has 
some very serious implications for the ways in which diasporic Muslims go about their 
politics. Jacques Waardenburg refers to a New Islamic Discourse' emphasising active 
participation in community life rather than the political introversion which characterised the 
early phase of Muslim immigration and settlement. Muslims will no longer hold themselves 
apart from the majority society but will continue to distinguish themselves from it by offering 
an alternative order, Islam. These claims are to be seen as addressed both to state authorities 
and to society at large. 150 "The Muslim community in Europe is searching for a new idiom 
through which to express itself, " says Ataullah Siddiqui. 
151 This takes the form of seeking a 
recognised and legitimate place in the public sphere. We can best understand this shift in 
Muslim political thought by viewing it as a response to the condition of diaspora, and as an 
inversion of yet another category of classical Islamic political thought, that of the dhimma. 
This terms refers to non-Muslims (and usually ahl al-kitab: "people of the book, " meaning 
Christian and Jews) living under the protection of a Muslim ruler in a Muslim majority state. 
In the European Muslim diaspora, however, the situation is reversed. Muslims are now in 
some sense the dhimma. I want to argue that the emphasis on 'community building' and 
'political conscience' that marks the new Islamic discourse must be seen in the context of this 
new minority position. 
Muslims are hence constructing new frameworks for the practice of Islamic politics in 
reponse to the condition of diaspora. These constitute new strategies and are not simply 
replicas of community in the societies of origin. 112 But what do these new strategies imply? 
What do they mean in the context of the transition from Europe as dar al-harb to Europe as 
dar al-'ahd? My claim is that this shift represents a new Muslim disposition towards political 
engagement and the emergence of an 'active' approach to the theory and practice of Muslim 
politics in the public sphere. The difference also affects, as Ataullah Siddiqui points out, 
one's "whole perception of living. Dar al-Harb suggests temporality, otherness, and a sense 
of compulsion. Dar al-Ahad suggests participation, belonging and responsibility. "153 This is 
also therefore a new discourse on Muslim political community (see Chapter I). Some, such 
as Jocelyn Cesari, argue that through the new associations formed by young Muslims in 
France, "a new form of citizenship is emerging, [one that refers] to concrete and local action 
rather than voting or involvement with political parties. In other words, the civil dimension 
seems to be more relevant than the civic one. " 154 
We also find here a blurring of the distinction between public and private, as discussed in 
Chapter I. These forms of Muslim political activism can, in some senses, be seen to 
constitute a movement of religion from the private into the public sphere. "Islam, " as Cesari 
argues, "cannot be confined to the mosque and to the realm of the private as Catholicism has 
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been. i155 There is hence a confusion, she claims, on the frontier between public and private. 
Mosques can be seen as an institution on the border between these two realms, as attempts to 
"set up small sections of Islamic civil society which overflow into urban [public] space. "' 56 
As Pnina Werbner notes: 
[U]rban mosques in Britain are centres of communal affairs, drawing labour 
migrants-turned-immigrants and sojourners into communal activities. The mosque is 
the base for teaching collective discipline, organization, and internal fund raising, the 
springboard for regional and national political alliances, and a training ground in 
polemics and adversary politics. Mosques link town and country and constitute 
public arenas for political debate. Many of the lay speakers are self-employed 
businessmen who, as recent immigrants, are excluded from other public spheres. 157 
She also points out that the various discourses heard in these mosques - including those of 
the Sufi orders - do not confine themselves to "religious" (i. e. private) issues. Contemporary 
political issues of the day, such as racism and the distortion of Islam by the media, are hotly 
debated, responses planned and action co-ordinated. '58 In many ways this has been the case 
with the mosque down through the ages, even to the time of the Prophet where the mosque 
delineated a space in which Muhammad's nascent umma - the first Muslim diaspora - could 
assess and respond to the predicaments of minority life in Medina. 
Many young Muslims would hence like to see Islam as something political (i. e. as a mode of 
contesting authority - see Chapter I), but not necessarily as 'Political Islam, ' in the sense of 
extremism or fundamentalism. For them, an Islam confined to the realm of private ritual is 
irrelevant in the modem West. "This is not reality, " says one young Muslim, "we cannot sit 
and dhikr [the praising of Allah through ritual recitation] for like three hours and expect to 
help the community. i159 Well aware of this fact, Dilwar Hussain is trying to reassert aspects 
of Islamic thought in a contemporary light. His research focuses on the notion of maslaha 
("public interest"), seeking to reframe this concept as an important feature of contemporary 
Muslim life. The great medieval theologian al-Ghazali once claimed that maslaha was the 
end goal of the entire body of shari'a (holy law); Hussain believes this to be particularly true 
today. For him an emphasis on public interest means that the question of whether a particular 
practice should or should not be permitted needs to be viewed in the context of its effect on 
the entire community rather than simply deemed halal or Karam ('forbidden') by an'alim with 
his nose buried in a collection of fatawa (religious edicts) from the tenth century. "This is 
particularly relevant in cases where Muslims are living in circumstances where the situations 
of daily life are not covered clearly by the texts, " he argues. "When things are changing so 
quickly, one cannot rely exclusively on analogical deduction (qiyas) from the sources... [so] 
we need to find a new flexibility when dealing with juridical issues. i160 Hussain wants to 
invert the classical conception of maslaha, which sees it primarily as a means of 'closing the 
gates to evil, ' and concentrate instead on maslaha refigured as 'opening the gates to good. ' 
"For example, " he says, "there's the idea of opening the gates for women to play a role in 
public, and seeing this as a 'good, ' as something in the public interest: maslaha. " The 
question arises, however, as to who holds the keys to these gates -a question to which 
Hussain, as yet, has no answer. "That's what I'm working on now, " he says optimistically. 
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We see, then, the importance that Muslims today are laying on rereading and reassessing the 
textual sources of Islam in new contexts. There is a particular imperative here in realm of 
political theory and community. Plurality is of the essence, according to many thinkers 
today. They highlight the need for Muslims to increase their'umma consciousness, ' and are 
developing "a more open understanding of the notion of the global community of Muslims 
than many commentators - Muslim and non-Muslim alike - have heretofore proposed. " 
161 In 
the Qur'an, Allah reminds Muslims that had he wanted to he could have made them one, but 
instead created many nations and peoples so that they might get to know each other. 162 This 
injunction to'know the other' is at the root of much of the contemporary thought on cultural 
pluralism in the umma. As Anwar Ibrahim, one of the most progressive thinkers in this area, 
argues: 
Recapturing the meaning of [the umma] would necessitate that Muslims engage with 
other people, nations, worldviews, religions and ideologies to work for a set of moral 
objectives that we can and must define together. But it takes us much further. It 
requires that we respect the Umma of other people... the history of the Umma has 
shown exemplary, almost unique models of multiracial, multicultural, multireligious, 
pluralist societies. If ever we had the need of recovering such an imperative, it is 
now. 163 
In this regard there would appear to be some degree of discursive overlap between a new 
umma consciousness and recent thinking in Western critical theory. The notion of dialogue 
and some form of 'communicative action' (informed by tradition) within a 'public sphere' 
seem to be intrinsic to both. ' Several Muslim writers have already embarked on this kind of 
dialogue, offering theoretically sophisticated treatments of postmodernity and its relationship 
to Islam. 165 
Gender, Islam and diaspora 
Another common concern for modern Muslim and Western social theory is gender. In Islam, 
gender represents yet another area where the influence and efficacy of traditional authority 
and practice appear to be waning. Today more Muslim women than ever before are to be 
found in the public spheres of diaspora - in places of work and in higher education. "Most 
Muslim women are educated in a Western tradition which makes few concessions to Islam, 
and increasing numbers are working outside the home, exposed to non-related males and 
thereby transgressing gender norms. "166 To some extent this is a reflection of a 
socioeconomic environment in which families have found it increasingly necessary to have 
wives and daughters enter employment in order to supplement their incomes. Some local 
authorities in the UK and other countries have responded to this changing climate by offering 
single-sex job training schemes. Even some distinctly 'Muslim' forums, such as the 
innovative magazine Q-News, now have a mainly female staff. In other cases, modifications 
to immigration policies have worked to the benefit of young women. Phillip Lewis explains, 
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for example, how a woman with a regular income and house in her name finds it more easy to 
'import' a fiance into the UK from South Asia - and this provides a rationale for 'unwomanly' 
behaviour that her parents' generation will find satisfactory. 167 
More and more Muslim women, another analyst suggests, seem to be taking Islam into their 
own hands. They are not hesitating to question, criticise and even reject the Islam of their 
parents. Often this takes the form of drawing distinctions between culture, understood as the 
oppressive tendencies which derive from the parents' ethnosocial background, and religion, a 
'true' Islam untainted by either culture or gender discrimination. 168 Young Muslim women 
are hence often more religiously self-conscious than their mothers or grandmothers, seeing in 
Islam a 'progressive' force which allows them to move away from their increasingly 
unfamiliar South Asian roots, but at the same to also avoid submission to Western cultural 
norms. "Dress codes, methods of arranging marriages, gender-roles are, in these 
circumstances, losing their importance as symbols of Islam, " argues Jurgen Nielsen. "The 
emphasis appears to be changing towards the underlying values of ethical and spiritual 
principles. 069 In this sense Muslim women in diaspora are starting to formulate their own 
Islam. 
Members of the Al-Nisa women's group in London and grassroots organisations in 
Bradford, Birmingham and other places, spend hours every week analysing the kind 
of Islam that would help to empower them instead of limiting their capacities. They 
talk openly and passionately about contraception, abortion, adoption, rape, the 
education of their children, how men can be better fathers and husbands, geopolitical 
changes and ecological problems. 10 
In some cases diasporic Muslim women are engaging in such discussions in spaces with an 
even higher public profile. Nico Landman notes how the presence of an Islamic broadcasting 
organisation in The Netherlands has been a major influence in raising the visibility of 
"headscarved and very self-confident and emancipated Muslim women in the Dutch media" 
in recent years. "' 
Women are also being taught Islam in school. Here they are equipped with the intellectual 
tools necessary for critiquing Islam and all those who speak in its name. "This poses 
uncomfortable questions for the custodians of the Islamic tradition" writes Phillip Lewis. 
The ulama, an all-male institution, are now facing large numbers of young Muslim women no 
longer prepared to have Islam dictated to them. Many feel that for too long women have 
followed Islam blindly, never daring to ask questions; reading and theorising, certainly, but 
never articulating. This, however, is changing. 
You're allowed to ask questions. [Allah] made us with the ability to be curious about 
things, so we should. But that fear [of asking] - and I had that fear, too - will keep 
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your mouth closed. You'll just do it. And I grew out of that. I started asking 
questions, because, logically, you know, Allah knows what's in your heart. He knows 
what's in your mind, so why be a hypocrite? ". 
More than simply questioning, many Muslim women in the West - or at least those that have 
passed through its places of learning - are seeking to reinterpret Islam for themselves. 
Beyond just doubting, they are actively going to the sources, especially the Qur'an and the 
Hadith, in order to discover the 'Muslim woman' for themselves. It has been suggested by a 
number of writers - Muslim and non-Muslim, male and female - that the Medina of the 
Prophet Muhammad was actually an environment in which the women of Arabia could 
flourish as never before, enjoying unprecedented freedoms and rights. It is the codification 
of Islamic law, after the death of the Prophet, that most likely put an end to this liberal 
climate. 173 Today's Muslim feminists therefore return to the earliest sources in order to read 
back into Islamic history a veritable women's revolution that has so conveniently been 
forgotten. Such effort has produced one of the most fascinating pieces of Islamic 
historiography to be published in recent years, Fatima Mernissi's Women and Islam. In this 
book Mernissi, a Moroccan sociologist, undertakes a rereading of several volumes of hadith, 
qur'anic commentary (tafsir) and the biographies of Muhammad (sira) in order to piece 
together an image of early Medina, "when women had their place as unquestioned partners in 
a revolution that made the mosque an open place and the household a temple of debate. i174 
In another disruption of established Islamic order, the Pakistani academic Riffat Hassan has 
sought to question the very methodologies which underpin the collection, classification and 
confirmation of the Prophet's hadith. 
She concludes that traditional Hadith criticism, which focused on a study of the 
reliability of the transmitters and the chain of transmission to establish their 
authenticity and reliability - isnad criticism - needs to be supplemented with by 
criticism of their content, matn, to ascertain whether such are in conformity with 
Qur'anic teachings. 15 
Furthermore, it is not only the medieval scholastic tradition which has come in for criticism 
by Muslim feminists. Self-avowedly "modern" movements such as the Jama'at-i Islam have 
recently been reproached for their 'un-Islamic chauvinism. '" The Jama'at often promulgates 
a very stereotypical ideal of feminine virtue in which the woman is assigned a particular 
space, the domestic realm, and her role therein glorified. The politics so central to their 
Islamist programme is still very much only within the purview of men. 
A modern movement which does not seem to make so strong a distinction between the roles 
and competence of men and women is the Tablighi Jama'at -a group we touched upon very 
briefly in the first chapter. The Tabligh movement is a transnational, 'apolitical' network for 
religious propagation whose core mode of operation involves despatching 'missionary tours' 
to travel to wherever Muslims are to be found in order to encourage greater religious 
devotion and observance. Associated with the Deobandi school of thought, it is a group that 
works almost exclusively within the Muslim community. The conversion of non-Muslims is 
hence not its aim. Although its origins lie in the Indian subcontinent, the Tablighi Jama'at is 
globally active with a large European headquarters complex in Dewsbury, Yorkshire. 
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The Tablighi Jama'at attitude towards women, suggests Barbara Metcalf, may be somehow 
tied to they way in which it conceives - or, rather does not conceive - its ideas about politics: 
I would argue that the reason political Islamic movements (such as the Jama'at-i 
Islami in Pakistan) emphasize women's domestic roles, in contrast to the Tablighi 
Jama'at, is due to the distinctive status accorded to women's roles and feminine 
nature in the discourse of modem nationalist politics and its accompanying notions of 
the private and public realms. Jama'at-i Islami is a movement forged in the context of 
the institutions of the nation-state, which examines and reconfigures Islam to adapt to 
the principles of a social order mandated by modern national politics. "' 
The Tablighi Jama'at, on the other hand, stands largely outside the order imposed by the 
nation-state system. Through its focus on missionary travel, the movement primarily inhabits 
translocal space. "The Tablighis, in terms of rhetoric and cosmpolitan membership, " write 
Eickelman and Piscatori, "direct followers toward the pan-Islamic umma. "178 It has no 
interest in participating in or even heeding national politics. For Tablighis, one does not 
reform society through political activity, but rather through concentrating on producing moral 
individuals. For the Tablighi Jama'at, "political inclinations are not entombed in the Qur'an 
but are rather daily reshaped by judgements about who is most likely to provide justice and 
development. " 179 Although the group shuns political activity of any kind, its fervent 
apoliticism becomes, in a sense, a form of (anti)politics. As Dassetto observes: 
[T]he very radicalism of their faith and their methods of reference are powerful 
elements in a critique of political systems, particularly those defining themselves as 
Islamic. Everything suggests that the Tablighs, far removed from power by virtue of 
their position in society, instead of attaching themselves to it engage in challenging 
its legitimacy. They go to the heart of the problem of power in 'Muslim' countries 
without touching it. 180 
In this regard other modern Muslim movements, particularly those who are politically active, 
have difficulty making sense of the Tablighi Jama'at. Their quietism is often dismissed as 
devotional obsession - an other-worldly disengagement with the world. Indeed, many young 
Muslims in the West question the group's staying power given its seeming reluctance to 
engage with the political imperatives facing young diasporic Muslims today. However, I 
want to argue that there are senses in which the Tablighi Jama'at can be read as a movement 
or tendency whose practices challenge received notions of space and power in Islam - 
particularly as regards gender. These innovations, however, relate not so much to new things 
that women do, but rather to what Tablighi men do that most other Muslim men do not do. 
Although Tablighi women do occasionally travel, the vast majority of the group's da'wä 
('missionary') activities are undertaken by men. There a number of interesting points to be 
made about the nature and style of this travelling. First of all, Tablighi men "devalue the 
public realm" by pointedly avoiding politics. They hence do not claim any particular position 
or space of masculine power or virtue. At times Tablighi men have come in for criticism 
from other Muslims because their frequent sojourning is seen as a neglect of the masculine 
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duty to protect and care for the family. The Tablighi style of discourse and inter-personal 
communication is also very simple and humble. While travelling the men are all expected to 
acquire a strong set of domestic skills. They wash clothes, cook, clean and maintain the 
integrity of the group - roles usually associated with women. Other aspects of Tablighi 
Jama'at discourse also seem to contribute to a reconfiguration of gender roles: 
A talk given at an annual Tabligh meeting, for example, reminded men that women 
also had a responsibility to Tabligh, and that men should not only refrain from 
objecting but should actively facilitate women's participation by providing child care. 
The speaker reminded his audience that since the Prophet had said that women have 
the right to refuse to nurse should they want to, women certainly could decline to 
provide child care for a task so important as Tabligh. '8' 
There does therefore appear to be certain ways in which Tablighi practices contribute to a 
reconfiguration of gender roles in Islam. At the same time, however, the group's reluctance 
to bring its views into the public sphere mitigates against their wider propagation. Similarly, 
Tablighi Jama'at's translocal character does much to widen the boundaries of political 
community in Islam, yet their refusal to speak this translocality in political terms raises 
questions as to the group's continued efficacy. Its numbers, though, continue to grow. 
Perhaps there is in this model of the 'mobile madrasa" 82 a new idiom of (anti)politics or a 
discrepant translocality - one in which the gendered notions of public and private are 
gradually being eroded. 
'Long distance' Islam 
In this final section I want to briefly examine some of the translocal aspects of diasporic 
Islam. Travelling Islam, as I understand it, does not simply depart from a 'point of origin, ' 
arrive in diaspora and then settle permanently, but rather continues to flow across a range of 
transnational networks. It is also mediated by various 'distanciated' political actors seeking to 
establish translocal constituencies for the furthering of their own aims and interests. Finally, 
we will also need to say something about the 'trip home' - that is, about what happens when 
expatriot Muslims bring reformulated idioms of Islam back to their societies of origin. 
We can meaningfully speak today about the existence of something like a global 
infrastructure for the maintenance, reproduction and dissemination of Islam. This 'regime' 
possesses no central authority and there is very little co-ordination between its various 
constituitive elements. Nevertheless, through a diverse range of organisations, technologies 
and transnational structures the contours of a translocal Islam are beginning to emerge. We 
have already mentioned several of the institutions which collectively form this infrastructure 
such as the 'imported imams' who travel back and forth between homeland and diaspora, and 
the myriad regional and transregional Muslim organisations which mediate daily life for 
believers in a variety of national settings. In addition, we can also point to the role played by 
various communication and information technologies, from the circulation of a wide range of 
English-language books on Islam via international publishing networks linking Washington, 
D. C. with Durban, London and Karachi, 183 to cyberspace debates between Muslims and 
madhahib in Internet chat rooms. Diaspora television programmes also play a role in the 
sustenance of long distance communal and religious ties, 184 as does the live broadcast of the 
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hajj in many Muslim countries and its subsequent availability on video. 185 A more in-depth 
analysis of some of these media forms will be undertaken in Chapter V. 
Migratory spaces and global cities also figure heavily in translocal Islam. With their 
culturally diverse and highly mobile populations, cities such as London are important nodal 
points for travelling theories and often serve as factories for the production and import/export 
of (reformulated) ideology. As Adam Lebor puts it, "Positioned halfway between the Middle 
East and the United States, with easy access to Europe, the hub of a global communications 
network, and with decade-old ties to Islam's lands, London has now become the de facto 
intellectual capital of the Middle East. " 186 It is therefore not surprising that a number of 
transnational movements have chosen to set up shop in diaspora. We can think here of the 
Tablighi Jama'at, an eminently translocal organisation, whose European 'headquarters' in 
Dewsbury co-ordinates and despatches missionary tours to destinations all around the world. 
Travelling Tablighis of many ethno-national backgrounds - although mainly from the Indian 
subcontinent - pass through the centre on their way to Canada, Malaysia, South Africa and 
Mecca. As Barbara Metcalf observes, "Dewsbury ... 
looks more like Pakistan than does 
Pakistan itself. In Tabligh participants are part of this contemporary world of movement 
even as they transcend cultural pluralism by the re-lived Medina their actions create. i187 It is 
in groups such as the Tablighi Jama'at -a movement both translocal and postnational - that 
the umma, in the sense of a community of believers unhindered by geographical or national 
boundaries, finds its truest expression in Islam today. In terms of politics, the Tablighis 
dwell in a translocality that challenges the spatial confines of political community. More 
crucially, however, they advocate an understanding of the political which in many ways 
seems to resonate with Warren Magnusson's vision of'global popular politics' (see Chapter 1). 
Theirs is, in essence, an inverse normative model in which the good does not emanate from 
an ethical institution (i. e. the state) but rather from an emphasis on the collective power of the 
ethical 'self. ' 
There are also many Muslim organisations with more familiar institutional frameworks, such 
as the transnational Muslim World League (MWL); many of them have their own state 
sponsors such as Saudi Arabia, and often maintain offices in a number of regions with large 
Muslim populations, including Europe. We also find innumerable 'local' or country-specific 
associations devoted to providing services for Muslims in particular national settings. These 
various types of Muslim organisation engage in a range of activities from securing the 
provision of halal meat at the neighbourhood level to the encouragement of high national 
standards in the teaching and practice of Islam. The 'normative' character of many of these 
groups often gives rise to a politics of authenticity centred around debates about who and 
what constitutes 'real' Islam. Van Bommel reports an incident that took place in Belgium in 
1974 when a delegation of Muslims from The Netherlands arrived in Brussels at the Benelux 
offices of the Muslim World League in order to invite a speaker from the League to address 
Muslims in Holland. The imam-director of the centre, however, had been under the 
impression that all Muslims in the Netherlands were somehow connected to the Ahmadiyya 
sect, a group viewed as heretical by many Sunni Muslims. "Even though the delegation 
explained all about the true composition of the Muslim population in The Netherlands, " 
writes van Bommel, "both the centre in Brussels and the head office in Mecca remained blind 
to the needs of Muslims in Holland for several years more. i188 
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Certain state and state-run organisations have also played a 'watchdog' role over diasporic 
Islam. During the first attempt to establish a supranational mosque in The Netherlands, for 
example, several Middle Eastern governments balked at providing financial support because 
they were unsure "if the migrant communities were able to give a true representation of 
Islam. i189 In a more 'proactive' approach, the Turkish state seeks to export its strict regulation 
of religious practice through an institution in Europe called the Turkish-Islamic Union for 
Religion (Diyanat Islerli Türk Islam Birligi). The Diyanat attempts to standardise and 
control Islamic education and also to administer various mosques. Although its stated aim is 
simply "to care for the Turkish community... in all affairs related to the Islamic religion, " the 
Diyanat can also be seen as an extension of the state's security apparatus in that it seeks to 
provide a buffer against Islamism in Turkey by mitigating some of the more radical 
tendencies abroad. 190 It is therefore not surpising that on a number of occasions and over a 
range of issues the Diyanat has locked horns with another Muslim organisation, Milli Görüs, 
the diasporic representatives of Turkey's Islamist Refah party (now defunct). This case 
provides a useful example of some of the ways in which states are being forced to respond to 
the non-territorial nature of translocal politics. 
Governments are also wary of other transnational Islamist movements, many of whom have 
offices or operations in London. Indeed, there has been so much emphasis on radical Islam in 
the British capital of late that some "[have] even been prompted to talk of London being the 
base for a new 'Fundamentalist International', a sort of Muslim Comintern... "191 The Al- 
Mass'ari affair, during which the British government sought to deport a dissident Saudi 
Islamist in order to protect its trade interests in the Kingdom, was a particularly high-profile 
manifestation of this trend. Other attention has focused on 'charity groups' in the UK, such as 
Interpal, which have been accused of raising funds for Harnas and other militant groups 
abroad. 192 Muslim opposition leaders from Bahrain, Syria, Pakistan and Tunisia are all based 
in London. The most famous of these, Rashid Ghannoushi, the exiled leader of Tunisia's 
banned Nahdha (Renaissance) movement, is a key theoretical reference for many 
contemporary Muslim political thinkers. Positioned within translocality, Ghannoushi has 
made a number of key interventions in the debate on Islam and democracy and, through the 
relatively intense media interest in his situation, managed to set the tenor of Islam's political 
agenda in diaspora and beyond. 
On some occasions, Muslim states have actually sought to use translocal Islam to further their 
own political goals. The Rushdie Affair was a prime example of this. There is a sense in 
which this incident can be read as an instance of Saudi-Iranian rivalry, with each state 
engaging in a rhetoric of 'holier-than-thou. ' Riyadh and Tehran have been competing for the 
religious high ground ever since Iran's Islamic Revolution in 1979. In this light, Khomeini's 
fatwa might be viewed as Iran's trump card, allowing Tehran to claim the strongest 'Islamic' 
response to Rushdie's novel. Saudi Arabia's reaction to The Satanic verses, tempered by its 
close ties to the West, had mostly consisted of support for demonstrations and other protest 
activities in the UK channelled through Jama'at-i Islami. Indeed, the initial impetus which 
eventually led to the Bradford protests and burning of the book did not come from Britain. 
Rather, the Leceister-based Islamic Foundation had contacted all of the UK's leading Muslim 
organisations only after the novel was brought to their attention by contacts in South Asia. 
"The fervour of the British Muslim reponse, " notes one analyst, "can thus be explained in 
part, though certainly not wholly, by this competition between groups - Saudi, Iranian, and 
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South Asian in inspiration - for the high ground. 
093 There is therefore a geopolitical 
dimension to the Rushdie Affair, a sense in which it has to be understood - at least to some 
degree - as the appropriation of translocal Islam (and its various networks) by political actors 
pursuing wider agendas. Yet this is not the geopolitics of neo-realist international relations. 
There is no clear'level of analysis' here. The backstreets of Bradford, Khomeini's Tehran and 
various sub-, inter- and transregional Muslim organisations were all mutually constitutive of 
this episode. "If the Rushdie affair has demonstrated anything, " writes James Piscatori, "it is 
that 'international', while obviously not incorrect, is inadequate to explain the interconnected 
networks that are at work. " 194 
Finally, we come to the question of what happens when travelling Islam returns home. The 
'repatriation' of Muslims, either temporarily during holidays or family visits, or more 
permanently after the expiration of short-term labour contracts or reverse immigration, 
constitutes a key dynamic of Islam's translocal infrastructure. Once again, perceptions of 
religion shift. There are those who bring back with them a new conviction, the belief that the 
experience of diaspora has allowed them to discover'real Islam. ' For some this new certainty 
is the product of an extensive examination of both Islam and self in diaspora, an Islam 
reformulated through encounters with new ideas and conversations with the Muslim other. 
For others the, conviction is the result of a negative diasporic experience, one that has 
allowed the migrant to relativise his or her opinion of both Western culture and the society of 
origin. As one Turkish migrant in Turkey put it: "I think that we, as Muslims in Europe, will 
in the end bring real Islam to Turkey. Only we as migrants have experienced into what kind 
of society the present leaders of Turkey are trying to change our homeland. " 195 But there are 
also those returning Muslims reassured at finding once again the familiar religious idioms of 
their home. This is particularly true for those forms of Islam which rely on symbols and sites 
that do not travel well. Landman has noticed this phenomenon in Holland's Moroccan 
migrants. 
During their holidays in Morocco they will attend the annual memorial days 
(mawsim) of deceased saints and visit their graves in order to obtain a blessing. Also 
they will visit living holy men in their country of origin, e. g. when they suffer from 
illness and have more faith in the baraka [holy force] of a saint than in the skill of 
Dutch doctors. 196 
Thus migrants still look to their homelands and often, in some ways, understand their Islam 
best in relation to these societies. And what of these societies into which they re-enter? What 
do those who have remained at home think of their culture "being defined and practised in 
novel and sometimes disturbing ways"? 19' They are undoubtedly told many stories; of 
strange places and strange Muslims, of new festivals and different madhahib, of other ways 
of reading and knowing Islam. Debates about authenticity inevitably ensue, and perhaps also 
arguments about the 'Westernisation' of Islam. For their own part, the returning migrants may 
see their home societies as backward - although they would be wrong in this, for all cultures 
travel even when they stay in the same place. Whether there is agreement or disagreement 
does not matter. Whatever the outcome, new ideas are digested and gradually incorporated 
into the discursive fields of the home society. "The very elasticity of the diasporic tie, " write 
Ahmed and Donnan, "ensures the reciprocal redefinition of identity at both ends of the 
migratory chain as elements of culture rebound first this way and then that. 098 
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Other translocal Muslims see themselves as playing a role within the context of a much wider 
picture. For those who have developed something like Ibrahim's 'Umma consciousness, ' 
travelling in Islam also means helping Islam to travel. "Muslims in diaspora have a more 
global sense of Islam, " says one 'alim, "and hence have a role to play in the globalisation of 
the religion. "99 This means articulating Islam in terms that non-Muslims can understand, but 
it also means re-articulating Islam to Muslims in new ways. In Indonesia, for example, the 
father of one of the most prominent female preachers (muballigha) Ibu Alfiyah Muhadie, 
spent twelve years in Mecca where he undoubtedly came into contact with modernist 
interpretations of Islam. Upon his return he began to disseminate these ideas in the local 
Islamic school, and was an important influence on his daughter who now works on projects 
which "strive to empower women by preaching Islam in such a way that it can be turned into 
a motivational force toward economic development. "200 Diaspora offers a unique context for 
the reassessment of theories, beliefs and traditions, while translocality enables these new 
reformulations to travel the world. For some Muslims this offers the greatest hope for 
rethinking Islam: 
In order to have i tihad [independent judgement] you need freedom of thought. This 
does not exist in most Muslim countries. We Muslims in the West should debate, 
discuss and disseminate our ideas because this will encourage Muslims living where 
there is not freedom to do the same, or at least to make use of the materials and ideas 
we produce. 201 
In the time of translocality the Muslims of the diaspora thus have a vital role to play. It is 
they who are in the best position to engage in a sustained critical renewal of their religion; 
and it is also they who can most effectively speak this new Islam to the world. 
Conclusion: fission and fusion in Muslim translocality 
This chapter has covered considerable ground. In it, I have sought to provide something like 
a'case study' of what happens to Islam when it travels - and particularly when it enters into 
and settles amongst non-Muslim societies in the West. My portrait of diasporic Islam has 
been created up by combining three component themes, each of which illustrates a different 
aspect of the greater translocal whole: debates within the Muslim community revealed the 
nature of the Muslim other; politics, community and gender provided useful indications of 
some of the ways in which Muslims are rethinking Islam; and the section on Muslim 
transnationalism reminded us that these translocal diasporic reformulations can never be 
viewed in isolation from the rest of the world. 
I realise that many of the apparent generalisations I have made throughout this chapter are 
quite specific to the particular Muslim contexts they inhabit. Nevertheless, I still believe 
them to be usefully illustrative of some wider trends. One consequence of translocality is 
that we become increasingly aware - if we were not already - that it is meaningless to speak 
of Islam in the sense of a single, monolithic, entity. By understanding how Islam travels we 
are also able to comprehend how those Muslim discourses labelled as 'fundamentalist' are, at 
least in part, a product of politics within Islam itself. Translocal and hybridising forces only 
serve to intensify these politics. "But rather than being the manifestation of inherent 
199 Barkatulla, interview. 
200 Nelly van Doom, "Portrait of a female preacher, " Inside Indonesia, No. 52, October-December 
1997, pp. 8-9 
201 Siddiqui, interview. 
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tendencies within Islam, " writes one pair of authors, "such dispositions may instead be seen 
as the intersection of hegemonic Islamic discourses with common global processes, in 
relation to which processes many Islamic communities are similarly situated. i202 This 
politics is the result of a tension within Islam. Muslims are having difficulty deciding 
whether globalising processes are culturally neutral - that is, something to which they can 
subscribe (and perhaps even produce themselves) without seeing their norms and traditions 
diminished; or do they need to be wary of another agenda, of a set of global processes 
seeking ultimately to suppress and subvert their claims to difference? 
The Muslims are very confused; they don't know which way to go on this one. On 
the one hand globalisation seems to be opening up the possibility of the umma - 
previously a utopic category of political thought - becoming a social reality. 
Globalisation seems to resonate with the Qur'anic injunction to "get to know one 
another. " Muslims like the technologies as well. But on the other hand, some 
203 aspects of it seem to be just another form of Western imperialism... 
Thus within the umma we see translocality producing two seemingly contrary effects. On the 
one hand a heavily dispersed community of believers is brought closer together, 
communication between them enabled, and dwelling within what might be imagined as a 
single space - the notion of'globality' discussed in Chapter I- becomes realisable. Yet at the 
same time the same forces which bring Muslims together are also working to separate them: 
fission within fusion. Translocality makes Islam more aware of its own internal difference; it 
highlights the Muslim other by making him/her visible and thus forcing confrontation. This 
in its turn is giving rise to a new breed of diasporic Muslim, "[a] people in whose deepest 
selves strange fusions occur, unprecedented unions between what they were and where they 
find themselves. 004 The umma is affirmed and realised in diaspora while simultaneously 
fragmented, broken down into subunits which generate novel combinations. 205 
Within the spaces of diasporic Islam there is also emerging a new form of interstitial identity 
-a 'third space' to use Homi Bhabha's terminology - in which the politics of the majority 
society is not embraced, but neither is that of the 'homeland, ' especially among the younger 
generation. This creates forms of hybridised political identity which, as we pointed out in 
Chapter III, are have to be conceptualised as somehow 'in between. ' When viewed in the 
context of translocality, or when these identities travel, there is also enacted a new mode of 
'relating internationally' - one in which the boundaries of political community are constantly 
open to negotiation and renegotiation. Thus we must agree with Eickelman and Piscatori 
when they argue that traditional dichotomisations of 'inside/outside' and 'internal/external' are 
unhelpful in understanding the dynamics of these Muslim politics. 206 Many see in this Islam 
the seeds of a new idiom of political community as 'authentic' as it is modern, one that 
perhaps even moves beyond modernity. "Viewed in this perspective, " suggests James 
Clifford, "the diaspora discourse and history currently in the air would be about recovering 
non-Western, or not-only-Western, models for cosmopolitan life, non-aligned 
transnationalities struggling within and against nation-states, global technologies, and market 
- resources for a fraught co-existence. i20' In the next chapter, I will go on to explore some of 
the ways in which these debates over authenticity, authority and (post)modernity play 
202 Rosalind Shaw and Charles Stewart, "Introduction: problematizing syncretism" in Shaw and Stewart, 
p. 12 
203 Hussain, interview. 
204 Salman Rushdie, Imaginary Homelands, London: Granta, 1991, pp. 124-5 
205 Pieterse, "Travelling Islam, " p. 186,198 
206 Eickelman and Piscatori, Muslim Politics, p. 153 
207 Clifford, Routes, p. 277 
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themselves out in the context of the increasingly widespread use of communications and 
information technology in Muslim translocal politics. 
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Chapter V 
Media and Information Technology in the Muslim World: Enlarging the Muslim 
Public Sphere 
First, there is the polysemy of the word "communication, " torn as it is between the domains of leisure 
and work, between the spectacular and the ordinary, between culturalist and technicist versions, or 
tossed about between a meaning confined to the area of media activity and a totalizing meaning that 
elevates it into one of the basic organizing principles of modern society. 
- Armand Mattelart, Mapping World Communication: War, Progress, Culture 
The impulse to write is clearly related to the changes engendered by British domination and western 
technology, including the printing press, which permitted easy dissemination of writings, and new 
modes of transport, which permitted easy travel. [Muslims] were discovering new worlds as they were 
discovering, or creating, new ways of thinking about themselves. 
- Barbara Metcalf, The pilgrimage remembered 
As has become clear from our discussion thus far, Islam means different things to different 
people at different times. Whether one chooses to speak of a multiplicity of 'Islams' I or of 
being `Muslims through discourse'2 the underlying point is the same: within the religious 
tradition we call Islam there exist any number of interpretations as to what Islam is, what it 
means, and who possesses the authority to speak on its behalf. ' This internal diversity is the 
result of the myriad cultural, ethnic, and national influences which have mediated Islam as it 
spread across much of the Middle East, Africa, Asia and - more recently - into Western 
Europe and North America. The resulting syncretisms and interminglings have bequeathed 
to Islam a rich body of cultural material replete with difference, hybridity and, at times, 
contradiction. As is the case with any other major religion, the history of Islam has been a 
history of heterogeneity. As Dale Eickelman notes: 
Even eternal truths are necessarily revealed in a specific language and setting. 
Revelation 'in Arabic, that ye may be understood' (Qur'an 12: 2) has significantly 
different implications for a seventh-century Arabian merchant, a nineteenth-century 
Bengali peasant, a Turkish Gastarbeiter in Bonn, and a twentieth-century Malaysian 
university student. 4 
What happens, then, when this complex world discourse comes into contact with a force that 
can claim an equally broad geographic reach, the socially transformative effects of 
communications, media and information technology (IT)? 5 Islam, and political Islam in 
particular, has exhibited a wide variety of responses to this aspect of translocality. Certain 
' Abdel Hamid el-Zein, "Beyond ideology and theology: the search for an anthropology of Islam, " 
Annual Review ofAnthropology, Vol. 6,1977, pp. 227-54; Aziz al-Azmeh, Islams and Modernities, 
London: Verso, 2"d Edition, 1997. 
2 John Richard Bowen, Muslims Through Discourse, Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1993. 
3 William R. Roff (ed. ), Islam and the Political Economy of Meaning, London: Croom Helm, 1987. 
' Dale F. Eickelman, "Changing Intepretations of Islamic Movements" in Roff, p. 18 S In my usage of the term 'information technology' (IT), I am casting the net widely to include all 
electronic media from the telegraph and radio through to the Internet. There is also a sense in which 
sources of 'populist' Islamic literature (see below) and desktop publishing should also be considered an 
aspect of this phenomenon since they rely heavily on advances in design and print technology for their 
wide dissemination. 
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features have been eagerly appropriated while others have been vociferously rejected. 
Indeed, as we will see, there have been occasions where IT has been mobilised by Muslims 
explicitly in response to aspects of the 'globalised' media (e. g. the spread of American 
culture) which they seek to repudiate. The themes which I have developed in previous 
chapters will be further elaborated here through a survey of Muslim political discourse in the 
context of translocal information technology. How, I ask, have the technological trappings 
of translocality affected both normative practice in Islam and the lived experience of `being 
Muslim'? My purpose in this chapter, then, is to examine the ways in which the impact of 
globalised communications and information technology on various forms of one particular 
tradition, Islam, has led both to the imagination of new political communities and to the re- 
imagination of traditional categories of social authority. 
The chapter will begin with some general comments on Islam, the media and IT followed by 
a brief examination of how early forms of print technology led to a decline in the efficacy of 
traditional sources of Muslim authority and an opening up of the discursive space of 
'authentic' Islam to competition from a multitude of newly literate, educated voices. The 
digitisation and mediatisation of Islam via more recent technologies is then surveyed, and 
some speculation is offered as to how these processes will lead to further changes in the 
structures and hierarchies of religious knowledge in Islam. I go on to look at how such 
transformations have become particularly pronounced at the 'peripheries' of the Muslim 
world (e. g. Southeast Asia and Africa) and also within the Muslim diasporas of Europe and 
North America. Diasporic uses of the Internet are then examined as an example of new 
forms of translocal, distanciated community. I go on to analyse the politics surrounding the 
Internet in the Arab Gulf countries as a contrasting form of 're-localising the translocal. ' In 
conclusion, I argue that media and information technologies have played a large role in the 
emergence of a new breed of translocal Islamist intellectual whose activities - often 
explicitly anti-statist in nature - represent a form of hybridised, counter-hegemonic 
'globalisation from below. ' 
Communications, the media and Islam 
In a recent book, David Morley and Kevin Robins provide a useful summary of the 
transformative capacity of modern media and communications technology: 
We are seeing the restructuring of information and image spaces and the production 
of a new communications geography, characterised by global networks and an 
international space of information flows; by an increasing crisis of the national 
sphere; and by new forms of regional and local activity. Our senses of space and 
place are all being significantly reconfigured. Patterns of movement and flows of 
people, culture, goods and information mean that it is now not so much physical 
boundaries - the geographical distances, the seas or mountain ranges - that define a 
community or nation's 'natural limits'. Increasingly we must think in terms of 
communications and transport networks and of the symbolic boundaries of language 
and culture - the 'spaces of transmission' defined by satellite footprints or radio 
signals - as providing the crucial, and permeable boundaries of our age. 
The presence, or rather the ubiquity, of media is a dominant theme of our age. Everything 
and everyone is to some extent the subject or object of mediatising processes; 
communications and information technology have hence become dominant forces both in 
terms of how we represent ourselves and in how the 'other' is represented to us. Given that 
6 David Morley and Kevin Robins, Spaces of Identity: Global Media, Electronic Landscapes and 
Cultural Boundaries, London: Routledge, 1995, p. 1 
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Islam is often seen today as one of our most 'significant others, ' we would expect to find a 
great deal written on Islam and the media. Unfortunately, the theme of 'othering' tends to 
dominate most treatments of Islam and the media. This is largely because images of Islam as 
'the other' tend to feature quite heavily in treatments of Islam by the media. The uses and 
abuses of Islam by the mass media in the West have hence been the subject of a number of 
studies. 7 A number of writers, however, have examined the ways in which media and 
communications technologies have affected the particular Muslim societies into which they have entered, such as Davis and Davis' work on Moroccan youth culture and its exposure to Western media; Lila Abu-Lughod's studies of bedouin culture on audio cassettes and the Muslim politics of television in Egypt; ' and Steven Barraclough's survey of Islamist responses to satellite television in Pakistan, Iran and Egypt. 10 Until recently, though, very little work had been done on the ways in which Muslims and Islamists were themselves 
making use of the new communication and information technologies. " Much of what did 
appear along these lines tended to be scaremongering about how Islamic 'fundamentalists' 
were using communication and information technology to plot the destruction of the Western 
world. 12 What has been missing until recently is any serious, sustained attempt to understand 
the role of information technology in the context of the sociology of knowledge in Islam. 
How have these technologies transformed Muslim concepts of what Islam is and who 
possesses the authority to speak on its behalf? How are they changing the ways in which 
Muslims imagine the boundaries of the umma? In order to begin answering these questions 
we need to briefly examine the first modern 'information technology' revolutions in Islam, the 
arrival of the printing press and mass education. 
'Print Islam': subverting genealogies of religious knowledge 
The salience of technology in bringing about religious change in Islam has been well 
documented. 13 In early Islam, oral transmission was the preferred mode for disseminating 
religious knowledge with each'alim granting his student an ijäza ("license") which permitted 
him to pass on the texts of his teacher. Literacy among wider populations, even in urban 
centres, was very low. This state of affairs allowed the ulama and their associates (scribes, 
calligraphers, etc. ) to maintain a virtual monopoly over the production of authoritative 
religious knowledge. We should note here that in a sense it is almost mistaken to speak of 
See Edward Said, Covering Islam: How the Media and the Experts Determine How We See the Rest 
of the World, London: Vintage, Revised Edition, 1997; and Akbar Ahmed, Postmodernism and Islam: 
Predicament and promise, London: Routledge, 1992 (see especially Chapter 6). 
8 Susan S. Davis and Douglas A. Davis, "The mosque and the satellite': Media and adolescence in a 
Moroccan town, " Journal of Youth and Adolescence, Vol. 24, No. 5,1995, pp. 577-593 
9 Lila Abu-Lughod, "Bedouins, Cassettes and Technologies of Public Culture, " Middle East Report, 
July-August 1989, pp. 7-11, continued p. 47; "Finding a Place for Islam: Egyptian Television and the 
National Interest, " Public Culture, Vol. 5, No. 3, pp. 493-513 
10 Steven Barraclough, "Satellite Television and Islamists in Pakistan, Iran and Egypt, " Paper presented 
at the British Society for Middle East Studies Conference on'Re-thinking Islam, ' Oxford, July 1997. 
"A notable exception is the special issue of Media, Culture and Society on 'Islam and communication' 
(Vol. 15, No. 1,1993). This is a collection of essays of varied quality; an excellent critique of this 
special issue was offered by Annabelle Sreberny-Mohammadi in the same journal later that year (Vol. 
15, No. 4,1993, pp. 661-68 
12 See e. g. Richard Cole, "Islamic terrorists organize, raise funds in U. S. while plotting attacks, " 
Associated Press, May 24,1997; "Intelligence battle in cyberspace, " Intelligence Newsletter, April 27, 
1995; and Mike Mokrzycki, "Battleground of bits and bytes, " The Jerusalem Post, April 19,1995. 
13 See Francis Robinson, "Islam and the Impact of Print, " Modern Asian Studies, Vol. 27, No. 1, pp. 
229-51; the various chapters in George N. Atiyeh (ed. ), The Book in the Islamic World. - The Written 
Word and Communication in the Middle East, Albany: SUNY Press, 1995; and Dale F. Eickelman and 
James Piscatori, Muslim Politics, Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1996, pp. 1224 
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Islam's holy book as a form of `scripture. ' The Qur'an is, quite literally, a recitation' 4- the 
literal word of God as revealed to Muhammad via the archangel Gabriel. It is a collection of 
words whose message resonates most strongly when read aloud or given voice. Even to this 
day, the process of learning the Qur'an is first and foremost an exercise in memorisation and 
oral repetition. This goes some way to explaining why the Muslim world hesitated to 
embrace the technologies of `print-capitalism' for almost three centuries. It was the 
experience of European colonialism and the concomitant perceived decline in Muslim 
civilisation which paved the way for the rise of print technology in the nineteenth century. 
The book, pamphlet, and newsletter were taken up with urgency in order to counter the threat 
which Europe was posing to the Muslim umma. This process heralded the final stage in the 
transition from an oral to a print-based culture in the context of religious knowledge. 15 The 
ulama were initially at the forefront of this revolution, using a newly expanded and more 
widely distributed literature base to create a much broader constituency. An inevitable side- 
effect of this phenomenon, however, was that the religious scholars' stranglehold over 
religious knowledge was broken. Gradually Muslims found it easier and easier to bypass the 
ulama in the search for authentic Islam and for new ways of thinking about their religion. As 
Eickelman notes, "[e]ven when persons in authority [e. g. the ulama] thought they were using 
new technologies to preserve the old, new elements and patterns of thought were introduced 
with the telegraph, newspapers, magazines and an expanded (even if not mass) educational 
system. " 16 The texts were in principle now available to anyone who could read them; and to 
read is, of course, to interpret. 
Books-could now be consulted by any Ahmad, Mahmud or Muhammad, who could 
make what they [would] of them. Increasingly from now on any Ahmad, Malimud or 
Muhammad could claim to speak for Islam. No longer was a sheaf of impeccable 
ijazas the buttress of authority; strong Islamic commitment would be enough. " 
The new media opened up new spaces of religious contestation where traditional sources of 
authority could be challenged by the wider public. As literacy rates began to climb almost 
exponentially in the twentieth century, this effect was amplified even further. The move to 
print technology meant not only a new method for transmitting texts, but also a new idiom of 
selecting, writing and presenting works to cater for new kind of reader. '8 
Those who can interpret what Islam "really" is [could] now be of more variable 
social status than was the case when mnemonics were an essential element in the 
legitimacy of knowledge. The carriers of religious knowledge [would] increasingly 
be anyone who can claim a strong Islamic commitment, as [was] the case among 
many of the educated urban youth. Freed from mnemonic domination, religious 
knowledge [could] be delineated and interpreted in a more abstract and flexible 
fashion. A long apprenticeship under an established man of learning [was] no longer 
a necessary prerequisite to legitimizing one's own religious knowledge. 19 
14 al-qur'än = "the recitation" 
15 See Brinkley Messick, The Calligraphic State: Textual Domination and History in a Muslim Society, 
Berkeley: University of California Press, 1993. 
16 Dale F. Eickelman, "The Study of Islam in Local Contexts, " Contributions to Asian Studies, Vol. 17, 
1982, p. 10 
" Robinson, "Islam and the Impact of Print, " p. 245 
18 Geoffrey Roper, "Faris al-Shidyaq and the Transition from Scribal to Print Culture in the Middle 
East" in Atiyeh, p. 210 
19 Dale F. Eickelman, Knowledge and Power in Morocco: The Education of a Twentieth Century 
Notable, Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1985, pp. 168-9; see also Eickelman, "The Art of 
Memory: Islamic Education and its Social Reproduction, " Comparative Studies in Society and Histoy, 
Vol. 20, No. 4, October 1978, pp. 485-516 
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Through this revolution, religious knowledge was "objectified. " That is to say, it became a 
subject open to debate within the public sphere. Islam was something which could be 
represented; its identity was now open to negotiation by a constituency previously prohibited 
from speaking on its behalf. 20 The fragmentation of traditional sources of authority is hence 
a key theme with regard to the nexus of Islam and translocality. These transformations in the 
status and provenance of religious knowledge have, in the contemporary era, helped to give 
rise to what Olivier Roy has termed the 'Islamist new intellectuals'21 
The new intellectual has an autodidactic relationship to knowledge. Knowledge is 
acquired in a fragmented (manuals, excerpts, popular brochures), encyclopedic, and 
immediate manner: everything is discussed without the mediation of an 
apprenticeship, a method, or a professor... The new media, such as radio, television, 
cassettes, and inexpensive offset brochures, make snatches of this content available. 
The new intellectual is a tinkerer; he creates a montage, as his personal itinerary 
guides him, of segments of knowledge, using methods that come from a different 
conceptual universe than the segments he recombines, creating a totality that is more 
imaginary then theoretical. 22 
The rise of what we might call `media Islam' or `soundbite Islam' has thus been a major by- 
product of translocal information technology. A new class of 'hybrid' Muslim intellectual 
(e. g. "using methods that come from a different conceptual universe than the segments he 
recombines... ") has been the chief agent of dissemination for mediatised Islam. With the 
current world communications infrastructure, ideas and messages now possess the capability 
to bridge time and space almost effortlessly, and the political implications of this new 
capacity are not easily overestimated. "Modern Muslim revitalization movements have been 
linked with an early stage of global modernisation, " writes Serif Mardin, "and one can follow 
this link through the effect on the revitalization of modern communications. 03 
These transformations have been particularly wide-reaching on the 'peripheries' of the 
Muslim world. In these areas, such as Southeast Asia and certain parts of Africa, the lack of 
communication with the 'centre' of the Muslim world - the Middle East - had meant that 
local cultures had developed idioms of Islamic practice largely in isolation from mainstream, 
scripturalist Islam. 24 As Victoria Bernal notes: 
Throughout much of their history, Muslims in different communities were cut off 
from each other to a considerable extent. Communication between the centers of 
religious learning and believers in the hinterlands was much more difficult than it is 
today, and the holy texts have been inaccessible to the many illiterate and semi- 
literate Muslims. Local history and culture thus contribute to the religious practices 
20 Dale F. Eickelman, "National Identity and Religious Discourse in Contemporary Islam, " 
International Journal of Islamic and Arabic Studies, Vol. 6, No. 1, pp. 1-20 
21 Olivier Roy, The Failure of Political Islam, London: I. B. Tauris, 1994, pp. 89-106 
22 Ibid., pp. 96-7 
23 Serif Mardin, Religion and Social Change in Modern Turkey: The Case of Bediiüzzaman Said Nursi, 
Albany: State University of New York Press, 1989, p. 24 
24 Several anthropologists have undertaken studies of Islam in these 'local' contexts. See e. g. John R. 
Bowen, "Salat in Indonesia: The Social Meanings of an Islamic Ritual, " Man, Vol. 24, pp. 600-19; 
Michael Lambek, "Certain Knowledge, Contestable Authority: Power and Practice on the Islamic 
Periphery, " American Ethnologist, Vol. 17, No. 1, February 1990, pp. 23-40; Robert W. Hefner and 
Patricia Horvatich (eds. ), Islam in an Era ofNation-States: Politics and Religious Renewal in Muslim 
Southeast Asia, Honolulu: University of Hawai'i Press, 1997; and David Westerlund and Eva Evers 
Rosander (eds. ), African Islam and Islam in Africa: Encounters between Sufis and Islamists, London: 
Hurst & Company, 1997. 
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and beliefs of Muslims around the world. The line between custom and Islam often 
is ambiguous. 25 
However, as large numbers of students from the peripheries started to travel abroad for 
further education, things began to change. In Barbara Metcalfs words, Muslims 
"[discovered] new worlds as they were discovering, or creating, new ways of thinking about 
themselves. i26 Horvatich has observed a'politics of authenticity' emerging between itinerant 
students critical of the oral traditions in their villages and those local religious leaders who 
insist on the correctness of their 'Islam ., 
27 The students, often labelled 'Ahmadii28 complain 
that through the oral tradition, religious leaders in their village keep Islam almost as a'secret, ' 
arguing that religious knowledge should be widely available to everyone in textual form. For 
their own part, the orthodox village leaders maintain that they do not need to engage with 
other interpretations of Islam available through books and pamphlets because "we know 
better than they. "29 This dynamic leads Horvatich to argue: 
There is, thus, a dialectical relationship between public education and international 
movements of Islamic reform. Because many modernist discourses share "ways of 
knowing Islam, " and communication can take place in a common language in 
published texts distributed throughout the Muslim world, the [Muslims of the 
periphery] are receptive to and can engage in dialogue with other Muslim discourses. 
Knowledge of English and access to a somewhat reliable international postal system 
enable [these remote communities] to communicate with perceived Muslim centers 
of knowledge. 30 
More recently, increased access to various media networks from the Muslim centre have had 
an important effect on religious discourse in the periphery. The enormous media arm of the 
Saudi regime, for example, has managed to reach into Southeast Asia very effectively. 
Muslims in this region are hence often encouraged to emulate Saudi practices and to view the 
Muslim world from a Saudi perspective. 31 Some writers, however, have bemoaned the 
stifling effect of Saudi control over the Muslim media. 2 They argue that this monopoly has 
been a major obstacle to the development of more open and progressive forms of political 
debate in the Muslim world. Disillusionment with the authoritative powers-that-be (both on 
the periphery and in the centre) has increasingly led many Muslims towards the Islamist new 
intellectuals in their search for religious knowledge. That most of these new ideologues do 
not have a formal religious education does not seem to deter eager young Muslims, nor does 
the fact that the 'Islamic' information they dispense is often derived from Western academic 
methodologies. 33 If anything, the latter fact has helped to make the Islam of the new 
intellectuals even more appealing to the younger generation of contemporary Muslims since 
most of them are themselves the product of Western-style educational systems. For these 
students - many of whom are trained in the natural sciences and engineering - modem IT is a 
familiar idiom. For them it is only natural, therefore, that the future of Islam should lie with 
23 Victoria Bernal, "Gender, Culture, and Capitalism: Women and the Remaking of Islamic 'Tradition' 
in a Sudanese Village, " Comparative Studies of Society and History, Vol. 36,1994, p. 40 
26 Barbara Metcalf, "The pilgrimage remembered: South Asian accounts of the hajj" in Eickelman and 
Piscatori (eds. ), Muslim Travellers, p. 87 
27 Patricia Horvatich, "Ways of Knowing Islam, " American Ethnologist, Vol. 21, No. 4,1994, p. 817 
28 Although these students usually neither have any formal connection to the Ahmaddiya movement nor 
subscribe to their beliefs, this is still a fitting testimony to the translocal nature of derogatory labels! 




31 Bernal, p. 41 
32 Abdelwahab El-Affendi, "Eclipse of reason: The media in the Muslim world, " Journal of 
International Affairs, Vol. 47, Summer 1993, pp. 163-93 
33 Richard Bulliet, Islam: the view from the edge, New York: Columbia University Press, 1994, p. 200 
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communications and information technology. What, though, is the nature of the nexus 
between Islam and IT? How have Muslims been making use of these technologies? 
Digitising Islam 
Muslims have been speculating about the utility of information technology in the 
organisation of religious knowledge for some time now. A first spate of books appeared in 
the late 1980s, speculating about, for example, the development of "a science of Tawhid 
Cybernetics" involving the creation of a giant computerised library for the storage of all 
aspects of religious knowledge with the aim to use such a system as the database for an 
artificial intelligence platform capable of generating a prolific number of fatwas. 34 "Upon 
completion of such a databank, " writes Larry Poston, "one would in effect have a 
computerized majlis al-shura ('consultative council') or a supranational, supercultural ulama 
capable of providing solutions to problems faced by modern Muslims. i35 It was primarily 
through its potential as an organisational and storage tool that other Muslims were also 
introduced to IT. Abdul Kadir Barkatulla, Director of London's Islamic Computing Centre, 
explains that he first became attracted to computer-mediated data storage in his capacity as a 
scholar of Hadith, a field which involves the archiving and retrieval of thousands upon 
thousands of sayings attributed to the Prophet and his Companions. 36 
However, the Anglo-centric nature of electronic media was for a long time a serious barrier 
to working with anything but the most well-known and oft-translated religious texts such as 
the Qur'an and those hadith collections available in English or other European languages. 
The rise of the Graphic User Interface (GUI) in the mid 1980s - typified by the Apple 
Macintosh operating system and Microsoft's Windows - served to rectify this problem to 
some extent. The graphical nature of the interface allowed computer operators to readily 
make use of non-Latin scripts which had previously been difficult to render in the old 
command-line format. Operating systems and word processors began to became available in 
various non-English languages - most notably for our purposes, in Arabic. Another 
important development here was the exponential increase in the storage capacity of the 
various magnetic media used by computers. This situation was again transformed with the 
advent of optical media such as the compact disc in the mid to late 1980s. Computers 
graduated from storing programmes and data on regular audio cassettes (very low capacity) 
to floppy discs (between just over 100kB to 1.4MB), to hard drives (20MB to several 
gigabytes), to the phenomenal array-based servers which chain together several high-capacity 
hard drives and provide enough capacity to store the complete contents of a small library. It 
is the read-only compact disc (CD-ROM), however, which has most transformed the 
consumer market in recent years with its ability to easily transport chunks of data as large as 
650 MB between many computers. This provides enough capacity to comfortably store 
several multi-volume encyclopedias, hours of high-quality sound, or even a full-length video 
film. 
What does this mean for Islam? Given the size of most Islamic texts, the CD-ROM has 
provided a medium which can contain the full text of several works. This means that the 
entire Qur'an, several collections of hadith, tafsir, and various fiqhi works can easily fit on a 
34 Robert D. Crane, "Premise and Promise in the Islamization of Knowledge: A Contribution Toward 
Unity in Diversity" in Robert D. Crane (ed. ), Preparing to Islamize America, Reston, Virginia: 
International Institute of Islamic Thought, 1987; Ziauddin Sardar, Information and the Muslim World, 
London: Mansell, 1988. 
35 Larry A. Poston, "Da'wa in the West" in Yvonne Yazbeck Haddad (ed. ), The Muslims ofAmerica, 
New York: Oxford University Press, 1991, p. 133 
36 A. K. Barkatulla, personal interview, London, 21 July, 1998. 
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single disc. Barkatulla sees this development as having the greatest relevance for those 
Muslims who live in circumstances where access to religious scholars is limited, such as in 
the West. For him, such CD-ROM selections offer a useful alternative. "IT doesn't change 
the individual's relationship with his religion, " he says, "but rather it provides knowledge 
supplements and clarifies the sources of information such that Muslims can verify the things 
they hear for themselves. 07 Barkatulla sees IT as a useful tool for systematising religious 
knowledge, but only those juridical opinions which have already been reached. In his terms, 
IT is only for working with knowledge that has already been 'cooked, ' not for making new 
judgements. To engage in the latter, he believes, one requires certain formal training and 
knowledge of specific methodologies. 
These resources are not intended to replace the religious scholars or commentators, 
but it means that they will not be able to get away with saying just anything. They 
will be held to account. They will have to check their sources twice because people 
will be able to go to the sources themselves and check to see if what was said in the 
pulpit corresponds with what is in the books... but IT is not for generating one's own 
fatwas. 38 
There are, however, those who disagree with Barkatulla. Sa'ad al-Faqih, for example, the 
leader of the Movement for Islamic Reform in Arabia and another keen advocate of 
information technology, believes that the average Muslim can now revolutionalise Islam with 
just a basic understanding of Islamic methodology and a CD-ROM. In his view, the 
technology goes a long way to bridging the 'knowledge gap' between an 'alim and a lay 
Muslim by placing all of the relevant texts at the fingertips of the latter. "I am not an 'alim, " 
he says, "but with these tools I can put together something very close to what they would 
produce when asked for a fatwa. "39 
The availability of such CD-ROM collections, all hyper-linked and cross-referenced, has 
created a new constituency for religious texts. Where Muslims would have previously had to 
rely on the expertise of the ulama when dealing with these books, they are now all available 
in a single medium which can easily be searched by any computer user. According to 
Ziauddin Sardar: 
Instead of ploughing through bulky texts, that require a certain expertise to read, a 
plethora of databases on the Qur'an and hadith now open up these texts and make 
them accessible to average, non-expert, users. Increasingly, the ulama are being 
confronted by non-professional theologians who can cite chapter and verse from the 
fundamental sources, undermining not just their arguments but also the very basis of 
their authority. 40 
Sardar then goes on to speculate about how all the usul al-figh might be placed on a single 
compact disc, along with an expert-system41 that would guide the user through the literature 
and, in effect, allow him to generate his own fatwas 42 This sort of ijtihad toolkit would 
amount to a `virtual 'alim', and hence pose a further challenge to the authority of the 
371bid. 
38 Ibid. 
39 Dr. Sa'ad al-Faqih, personal interview, London, 14 August, 1998. 
40 Ziauddin Sardar, "Paper, printing and compact disks: the making and unmaking of Islamic culture, " 
Media, Culture and Society, Vol. 15, No. 1, January 1993, pp. 55-6 
4i This is a programme which contains rules and guidelines which tell a computer how to process, 
"think" and make decisions with particular sets of data. It is usually written in an artificial intelligence 
language such as PROLOG. 
42 Sardar, "Paper, printing and compact disks, " p. 56 
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traditional religious scholars. "With this technology I think we are beginning to see a 
breaking of the monopoly over religious knowledge, " says Sa'ad al-Fagih. 43 It is unlikely, 
however, that such a system will replace the ulama any time soon. They still command 
enormous respect in many communities and would, in any case, surely challenge the claim 
that their methodologies - the product of centuries of study and exhaustive research - can be 
reduced to a set of coded computer instructions. According to Barkatulla, an 'alim himself, 
many ulama see the utility of information technology for the organisation of religious 
knowledge but believe that by becoming over-dependent on such 'gadgets, ' the capacity to 
internalise and think for oneself decreases. 4 At the same time, however, there is still an 
important sense in which the availability of religious texts on CD-ROM actually increases 
one's capacity to think for oneself- perhaps even hailing a new form of individual ijtihad. 
The existence of such collections on CD-ROM has quickly become a reality in the past few 
years. The Islamic Computing Centre in London has been at the forefront of producing and 
distributing Arabic and Islamic materials in electronic format, and one only needs to glance 
at their product catalogue to confirm the enthusiasm with which Muslims have taken up this 
technology. In addition to several electronic Qur'ans (with full Arabic text, several English 
translations, and complete oral recitation on a single disc) the Centre also sells titles such as 
WinHadith, WinBukhari, and WinSeera. Also available are several products which begin to 
approach the system which Sardar has envisaged. The Islamic Law Base, Islamic Scholar, 
and 'Alim Multimedia 4.5 are all vast collections of religious texts such as the Qur'an, 
hadith, several volumes of fiqh covering all four schools of Sunni jurisprudence, biographies 
of the Prophet and his Companions, and more recent writing by figures such as Abu `Ala 
Mawdudi. All of these databases can be kept open simultaneously and material between 
them is cross-referenced and fully searchable. In the United States, the Aramedia Group 
offers a library of Islamic CD-ROM resources with a choice of Arabic, English or Malay 
interface. Also available are software packages such as SalatBase, a multimedia guide to 
prayer which covers proper bodily practices, ritual somatics, and the particular problems 
associated with, for example, prayer during travel. Barkatulla also mentions an expert 
system under development in Kuwait called al-Mawarith. This package enables a user to 
determine how the assets of a deceased relative should be allocated to his or her heirs 
according to Islamic law. It can be adjusted to reflect the opinions of the various Sunni legal 
schools, and will also provide textual evidence from the Qur'an and hadith in order to 
'authorise' its output. 45 Also widely available on the Internet are utilities for calculating 
prayer times, the beginning and ending of the fasting day during Ramadhan at any 
geographic point in the world and for converting dates between the Hijri and other calendar 
systems. 
That is certainly not to say that the ulama have been marginalised: the moon must still be 
visible to the human eye for Ramadhan to begin, regardless of whether or not the 'science' of 
an astronomical programme on the computer insists that it is there. In fact, some religious 
scholars have become quite enthusiastic about computer technology themselves. "Traditional 
centres of Islamic learning [such as al-Azhar in Cairo and Qum in Iran] did not respond to 
the opportunities offered by IT for about ten years, " Barkatulla observes, "but now they have 
to. i46 Because the modern religious universities have developed comprehensive information 
systems, the more conservative, traditional institutions are now forced to respond in kind in 
order to keep up with the times. Barkatulla alludes to something like a 'race to digitise Islam' 
among leading centres of religious learning around the world. At the Center for Islamic 
43 al-Fagih, interview. 
44 Barkatulla, interview. 
45 Abdul Kadir Barkatulla, "Information Technology and Islamic Studies, " Unpublished MPhil Thesis, 
University of Wales at Lampeter, 1992. 
46 Barkatulla, interview. 
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jurisprudence in Qom, for example, several thousand texts, both Sunni and Shi'ite, have been 
converted to electronic form. 47 This would confirm Barkatulla's observation that while Sunni 
institutions tend to ignore Shi'ite texts, the Shi'a centres are digitising large numbers of Sunni 
texts in order to produce databases which appeal to the Muslim mainstream, and hence 
capture a larger share of the market for digital Islam. 
Related technologies have also allowed for the emergence of what one author has called 
'print Islam. r48 Just as 'print-capitalism' facilitated the early nationalist projects of Benedict 
Anderson's imagined communities, 49 so have new technologies of mass printing and 
circulation provided Islamist movements with a new grass-roots base and important sources 
of popular mobilisation. As early as the late nineteenth century, Muslim reformers such as 
Jamal al-Din al-Afghani were printing and distributing leaflets in political protest. 50 Serif 
Mardin's study of the early twentieth-century Turkish religious leader Said Nursi emphasises 
the role of print technology and the communications revolution in propagating his ideas. 51 In 
the contemporary context, writers have pointed to phenomenon such as the rise of 'Islamic 
books' (les livres islamiques), a populist genre which employs simple, vernacular language 
and colourful, eye-catching covers to tap into the newly-literate working classes of Egypt and 
Lebanon. 52 In another example, David Edwards indicates the importance of newspapers, 
pamphlets and magazines for the development and mobilisation of competing Islamic 
political ideologies in Afghanistan. 53 An important point to note in relation to the electronic 
publication of Islamic texts is that this medium allows for a new flexibilitity in the handling, 
transmission and, most importantly, the renewal of textual sources. This is not to say that the 
early sources can and should now be modified (i. e. tampered with), but rather it is now 
possible to 'cut and paste' between them, creating novel combinations of references and 
textual evidence which can be made to appeal to a wider range of audiences. As Mahdi 
notes: 
In some respects, the book in electronic, machine-readable form will mean a return to 
one of the main features of the manuscript age: copies can be made and subjected to 
continuous change and improvement, free of the fixed form introduced by printing 
and movable type. With the use of various means of communication, it will be 
possible to make what is initially a single copy available immediately across the 
globe... with the possibility that, from one copy, an infinite number of copies can be 
made, used, and disposed of. 54 
Neither has the rise of electronic `print Islam' eradicated the saliency of the oral tradition. 
Electronic media are as adept with sound as they are with the written word. Audio cassettes, 
widely available and portable as they are, may well serve to give the oral a tradition a "new 
lease of life. i55 Certainly we have heard much about the role of audio cassettes in Iran's 
Islamic revolution, where recordings of Khomeini's sermons were smuggled over from his 
Neauphle-le-Chateau headquarters near Paris and, much to the Shah's dismay, widely 
4' Neil MacFarquhar, "With Mixed Feelings, Iran Tiptoes to the Internet, " New York Times, 8 October 
1996. 
48 Dale Eickelman, "National Identity and Religious Discourse in Contemporary Islam" 
49 Benedict Anderson, Imagined Communities, London: Verson, Revised Edition, 1991. 
50 Eickelman and Piscatori, Muslim Politics, p. 122 
51 Mardin, op. cit. 
52 Yves Gonzalez-Quijano, "Les Livres Islamiques: Histoires ou Mythes? " Peuples mediterraneens, No. 
56-57, July-December 1991, pp. 283-292. 
53 David Edwards, "Print Islam: Media and religious revolution in Afghanistan, " Anthropological 
Quarterly, Vol. 68, July 1995, pp. 171-84. 
54 Muhsin Mahdi, "From the Manuscript Age to the Age of Printed Books" in Atiyeh, p. 13 
55 Robinson, "Islam and the Impact of Print, " p. 250; cf. Eickelman and Piscatori, Muslim Politics, p. 
125 
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distributed in Iran. The newspapers, pamphlets and magazines of Afghanistan's religious 
upheaval are increasingly giving way to the audio cassette. 56 The Friday sermon, or khutba, 
is today recorded at many mosques throughout the Muslim world and the distribution of 
these recordings along with addresses by imams consciously emulating the rhetoric of 
prominent ideologues such as Sayyid Qutb, Ali Shariati, and Mawdudi, serves to politicise 
Islam before a vast audience. Recordings of sermons by dissident Saudi ulama such as Safar 
al-Hawaii and Salman al-'Awda also circulate widely both inside and outside the Kingdom, 
and this marks the first time that material openly critical of the Saudi regime has been heard 
by relatively large sections of that country's population. The website of a London-based 
Saudi opposition group has also made Salman al-'Awda's sermons available over the Internet 
using the latest audio streaming technology. 57 "Now that media technology is increasingly 
able to deal with other symbolic modes, " notes Ulf Hannerz, "we may wonder whether 
imagined communities are increasingly moving beyond words. "58 
Communicating Islam 
"It is in their use as distributive and decentralized networks, " writes one author, "that 
[information technology's] greatest potential lies for Muslim societies and cultures. "59 He is 
undoubtedly correct insofar as political impact is obviously strongest when these media are 
distributed, broadcast, or otherwise made available to a wider audience. By 1890, al-Afghani 
was making use of the telegraph to maintain rapid communications with opposition 
movements across the Middle East. 60 Today, "[t]elevision, radios, cassettes, videos, personal 
computers, photocopiers, facsimile machines, and electronic mail are frequently, if not 
routinely, found in the homes and offices of Muslim activists, ulama, and Sufi shaykhs as 
well as those of government officials, " note Eickelman and Piscatori. 6' Technologies such as 
telecommunications, television (both terrestrial and satellite), and, finally, the Internet - all 
of which serve to politicise Islam through their global reach - have led some authors to argue 
that "[w]e are witnessing the 'deterritorialisation' of audiovisual production and the 
elaboration of transnational systems of delivery. "62 
Telecommunications is undergoing something of a mini-boom in the Middle East, and 
sophisticated systems are already in place or planned for the urban areas of many Asian 
countries such as Malaysia, Indonesia, and Pakistan. The latest GSM mobile technology is 
also available in many countries of the Gulf, Jordan, Lebanon, Pakistan, and is planned for 
Syria. 63 It is in the West, however, that Muslims have made the most widespread use of 
telecommunications technology for religious purposes. The Islamic Assembly of North 
America (IANA), for examples, operates a Fatwa Centre which can be reached via a toll-free 
telephone number. The ulama of the centre will dispense edicts on virtually any subject to 
members of the Muslim community in North America. 64 In the Middle East, activists in 
groups such as Harnas have made use of Israeli cellular networks to stay in touch while 
moving around the West Bank and Gaza. Ironically, in one case this technology proved to be 
their downfall. The Hamas master-bomber Yahya Ayash ("The Engineer") was assassinated 
by Israeli security agents using a booby-trapped cell phone packed with explosives. 
56 Edwards, p. 13; also Eickelman and Piscatori, Muslim Politics, p. 125 
5' See http: //www. miraserve. com/ 
58 Ulf Hannerz, Transnational Connections: Culture, People, Places, London: Routledge, 1996, p. 21 
59 Sardar, "Paper, printing and compact disks, " p. 55 
60 Eickelman and Piscatori, Muslim Politics, p. 122 
61 Ibid., pp. 121-2 
62 Morley and Robins, pp. 1-2 
63 Various authors, "Region joins the global revolution, " MEED Special Report, I March 1996. 
64 See http: //www. IANAnet. org/fatwa/ 
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An off-shoot of telecommunications, the fax, has also been widely used by Muslims in the 
Middle East - and especially by Islamist groups seeking to question the legitimacy of various 
regimes. Organisations in Algeria and Egypt have made use of the fax machine in voicing 
protest to their respective governments, and the `fax cascade' tactics of Saudi dissidents in 
London have become notorious. At the height of its activity, for example, the Committee for 
the Defence of Legitimate Rights (CDLR) was sending several thousand faxes per week to 
the Kingdom where offices were forced to turn off fax machines at night in an effort to stem 
the flow. These faxes were reportedly photocopied and then distributed widely within the 
Kingdom. 65 The organisation's efforts have certainly caught the attention of the ruling 
regime and its "official" clergy. The government was even forced to take the unprecedented 
step of urging Saudis (via a state-owned newspaper) to ignore the CDLR's faxes. 66 
Television, which in the Middle East is often state-owned and censored, is not a forum which 
has been extensively co-opted by Muslims for political purposes. We do find references, 
however, to instances of interface between politicised Islam and television. Abu-Lughod 
speculates about the impact of militant Islamist groups in Egypt on the standards of dress and 
appearance of television presenters, and Eickelman discusses officially-sanctioned religious 
presentation on television as a form of national discourse. 7 Television, and satellite 
television in particular, certainly have been the objects of protests by both official religious 
voices and various Islamist movements, however. 68 In Algeria, for example, soldiers of the 
Armed Islamic Group (GIA) have in the past threatened the owners of satellite dishes. 69 
Several Arab Gulf states and Iran have official bans in effect on the private ownership of the 
dishes. In practice, however, these bans are very difficult to enforce and the countries in 
question have in some cases been forced to provide rival satellite programming in an attempt 
to lure viewers away from "sinful" and "poisoning" Western programmes. 70 Saudi Arabia 
owns a vast media empire and controls much of the premier Arabic-language satellite 
programming via its Middle East Broadcasting (MBC) network. In 1996, an Italian-based 
satellite relay company with significant Saudi investment interests was forced to terminate its 
contract with the BBC after its Arabic-language television service gave air time to the Saudi 
dissident Muhammad al-Mass'ari and also showed a programme critical of Saudi Arabia's 
human rights record. 71 In at least one case Islamists have also turned to satellite television as 
a potential political tool. The Movement for Islamic Reform (MIRA), an off-shoot of the 
CDLR in London, has rented a broadcasting slot on a satellite and is planning to begin 
transmitting propaganda programmes which question the legitimacy of the Saudi regime 
according to religious criteria. The group is hoping to take advantage of the several hundred 
thousand satellite dishes currently in use in the Kingdom (see below). 72 
Diasporic Muslims and IT: new translocal communities? 
"Academically, media studies and migration studies tend to function as separate fields, " Ulf 
Hannerz writes, "[y]et in real life migration and mediatization run parallel, not to say that 
65 Prof. Muhammad al-Massari, personal interviews, London: June 1995 and March 1997. 
66 "Bin Baz calls on Muslims to ignore bulletins seeking to split their ranks, " Saudi Gazette, 12 
November 1994. 
67 Lila Abu-Lughod, "Dramatic Reversals: Political Islam and Egyptian Television" in Joel Beinin and 
Joe Stark (eds. ), Political Islam, London: I. B. Tauris, 1997; Eickelman, op. cit. 
68 See Barraclough, "Satellite Television and Islamists" 
69 Malise Ruthven, "The West's secret weapon against Islam, " The Sunday Times, 1 January 1995. 
70 Andrew Rathmell, "Netwar in the Gulf, " Jane's Intelligence Review, January 1997, pp. 29-32. 
71 Reuters (Rome), 04-09-96 
72 Dr. Sa'ad al-Faqih, personal interview, London: March 1997. 
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they are continuously intertwined . 
03 His observation holds particularly true for diasporic 
Muslims, as they are currently both the subject and the object of considerable mediatisation. 
In what follows, I will be mainly concerned with the ways in which Islam makes use of or is 
rendered in various media for the consumption of other Muslims; in other words, I am 
interested in how Muslims use IT to talk to other Muslims. 
We have already mentioned the development of something like an 'Islamic English, ' and this 
often constitutes the vernacular in which Islam is published and distributed in diaspora. 
Many young Muslims, as has been noted in the previous chapter, are bypassing the ulama 
and the imams in order to learn their Islam from pamphlets and books published in English. 
Diasporic magazines such as The Muslim News and Q-News are also important in this 
regard. 74 Beyond the various printed literatures, we also find a variety of audiovisual and 
multimedia material which cater for the specific needs of diasporic Muslims. Many of these 
are aimed at children, seeking to teach them Islam using imagery and language similar to the 
Western entertainment genres with which they are already familiar. Thus we find a Disney- 
style animated adventure video, Fatih - Sultan Muhammad, which claims to be the world's 
first Islamic feature animation production. "In this inspirational adventure, " the 
advertisement reads, "your family will see how the Muslims used not only their faith - but 
also strategic and technological superiority - to be successful. " Another company offers a 
children's educational series with a format and style similar to the muppets of Sesame Street. 
Adam's World "introduces children to Islamic morals, values, and culture in a manner that's 
both entertaining and educational... By adopting such a universal approach to video-based 
education, Adam's World has found its niche among children of over forty different ethnic 
backgrounds. " The various episodes have titles such as "Happy to be a Muslim, " "Take me 
to the Kaba, " "Kindness in Islam, " and "Ramadan Mubarak. " A wide variety of Arabic- 
language learning aids and Islamic quiz games for children on both video-tape and CD-ROM 
are also available. We have already mentioned the SalatBase prayer guide. The same 
company also offers a series of videotapes featuring interviews with prominent Muslims in 
the West such as the NBA basketball star Hakeem Olajuwon and Yusuf Islam, formerly the 
pop singer Cat Stevens. One title, 'Holiday Myths' offers advice on how Muslims should 
approach and deal with Western holidays such as Christmas, Halloween, Valentine's Day and 
Easter. 
What about the Internet? It is perhaps here that some of the most interesting things are 
happening. We should begin by noting, however, that while many countries in the Middle 
East and Asia are starting to provide Internet access to their populations, the vast majority of 
Muslim users of the Internet are in Europe and North America. 75 If translocal information 
technologies are having a discernible effect on the imagination of political community in 
Islam, then it is to the various Muslim diaspora groups in the West - Arab, Iranian, South 
Asian - that we must turn to find it. In this sense the use of the Internet by Muslim diaspora 
groups provides us with one of the best example of how localities become translocalities. As 
Arjun Appadurai observes: 
New forms of electronically mediated communication are beginning to create virtual 
neighborhoods, no longer bounded by territory, passports, taxes, elections, and other 
conventional political diacritics, but by access to both the software and hardware that 
are required to connect to these large international computer networks... Unlike the 
largely negative pressures that the nation-state places on the production of context by 
73 Hannerz, Transnational Connections, p. 101 
74 Phillip Lewis, Islamic Britain: Religion, Politics and Identity among British Muslims, London: I. B. 
Tauris, 1994, pp. 206-7 
75 A brief survey of diasporic Muslim uses of the Internet in Europe was been undertaken by Felice 
Dassetto. See his La Construction de L'Islam Europeen, Paris: L'Harmattan, 1996, pp. 291-94 
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local subjects, the electronic mediation of community in the diasporic world creates 
a more complicated, disjunct, hybrid sense of local subjectivity. 76 
What then are the implications of this media revolution for those Muslim communities which 
inhabit global spaces? Can we meaningfully speak today about the emergence of new forms 
of Islamic virtual community? Where one much-cited author pointed to the pioneering 
efforts of New World "creoles" in the formation of imagined communities, " Jon Anderson 
now speaks of the "new creoles" of the information superhighway - political actors whose 
strength lies in their adoption of the enabling technologies of electronic print and information 
transfer. 78 We should not be too quick, though, to declare that the Internet is suddenly going 
to radically transform Muslim understandings of political community. We need to look 
realistically at the number of Muslims who actually have access to this forum, and we need 
to take careful note of each socio-political setting which receives information via this 
network: 
Transnational theories, fixated on media and forms of alienated consciousness 
distinctive of late modernity, tend to overlook the social organization into which new 
media are brought in a rush to the new in expression. Impressed by what Simmel 
much earlier called "cosmopolitanism, " we overlook measures of social organization 
in pursuit of media effects. 79 
In addition, we need to make sure that we have a more nuanced understanding of those 
Muslim identities which use the Internet. We cannot start talking about new forms of 
diasporic Muslim community simply because many users of the Internet happen to be 
Muslims. Noting that in many instances Muslim uses of the Internet seem to represent little 
more than the migration of existing messages and ideas into a new context, Anderson warns 
that "[n]ew talk has to be distinguished from new people talking about old topics in new 
settings. i80 Yet we also have to acknowledge the possibility that the hybrid discursive spaces 
of the Muslim Internet can give rise, even inadvertently, to new formulations and critical 
perspectives on Islam, religious knowledge and community. But in order to comprehend the 
processes by which community is created, we also need to understand the circumstances 
under which these Muslim identities became diasporic. That is, how do other aspects of 
identity influence the terms of religious discourse on the Internet? Issues such as culture and 
religion, for example, are often discussed using methods of reasoning and debate which 
derive from the natural and technical sciences, rather than using the "traditional" terms of 
discourse which one might find `back home. ' This reflects the nature of the 
professional/student life of many diaspora Muslims who are often technicians, engineers, or 
research scientists. 81 
As regards notions of community in Islam, there is also the Internet's impact on 'centre- 
periphery' relations in the Muslim world to be examined. A country such as Malaysia, 
usually considered to be on the margins of Islam both in terms of geography and religious 
76 Arjun Appadurai, Modernity at Large: Cultural Dimensions of Globalization, Minneapolis: 
University of Minnesota Press, 1996, pp. 195,197 
77 Anderson, Imagined Communities. 
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79 Jon Anderson, "Cybernauts of the Arab Diaspora: Electronic Mediation in Transnational Cultural 
Identities, " Paper presented at the Couch-Stone Symposium on `Postmodern Culture, Global Capitalism 
and Democratic Action, " University of Maryland, April 1997. 
80 Jon Anderson, "Islam & the Globalization of Politics, " Paper presented to the Council on Foreign 
Relations Muslim Politics Study Group, New York City, June 25,1996, p. 1 
81 Ibid. 
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influence, has invested heavily in information and networking technologies. As a result, 
when searching on the Internet for descriptions of programmes which offer formal religious 
training one is far more likely to encounter the comprehensive course outlines provided by 
the International Islamic University of Malaysia than to find any information on the 
venerable institutions of Cairo, Medina, or Mashhad. Government officials in Indonesia 
have recently begun to explore the potential of the Internet for raising the profile of 
Indonesian Islam. 82 The Ayatollahs of Iran have also jumped on the information bandwagon. 
Eager to propagate Shi'ite teachings, the scholars of Qom have digitised thousands of 
religious texts which they plan to make available over the Internet. An e-mail fatwa service 
is also planned. 83 
Recalling Appadurai's point that the key obstacle to participation in new forms of electronic 
community is a lack of the necessary software and hardware resources, we have to remind 
ourselves that the vast majority of Muslims cannot afford to pay for Internet access. When 
available in the Middle East and Asia, Internet accounts are usually prohibitively expensive 
and hence subscriptions tend to be limited to elite groups who are often more sympathetic to 
Western bourgeois values in any case. As noted above, it is usually amongst the diaspora 
Muslims of the Western world that we find the Internet being appropriated for political 
purposes. The American media, for example, has recently been full of scare-mongering 
about "radical fundamentalists" who use the United States as a fundraising base for their 
overseas operations. Reports often cite the Internet as a primary tool for the dissemination of 
propaganda by Islamic militants. We are told, for example, that Islamist websites distribute 
the communiques of Algerian militant groups and provide a forum for the teachings of 
Sheikh Omar Abdel-Rahman, the Egyptian cleric accused of masterminding the World Trade 
Center bombing. 85 In a recent piece, even Benedict Anderson seemed to sensationalise the 
advent of diaspora activists: 
[They] create a serious politics that is at the same time radically unaccountable. The 
participant rarely pays taxes in the country in which he does his politics; he is not 
answerable to its judicial system; he probably does not cast even an absentee ballot 
in its elections because he is a citizen in a different place; he need not fear prison, 
torture, or death, nor need his immediate family. But, well and safely positioned in 
the First World, he can send money and guns, circulate propaganda, and build 
intercontinental computer information circuits [sic], all of which can have 
incalculable consequences in the zones of their ultimate destinations. 86 
A more sober examination of the situation, however, would most likely reveal that very few 
of the Muslim groups who have a presence on the Internet are involved in this sort of 
activity. To be sure, there do exist several prominent sites which advertise information on 
"digital jihad" and "on-line activism, " or which claim to provide resources for Islamist 
politicians, 87 but it is unlikely that any of these - which are often run by students or part-time 
volunteers - actually have the capacity to engage in the sort of international intrigues alluded 
to above. Recent events, such as the Oklahoma bombing, indicate that a country such as the 
82 Margot Cohen, "Modern Times: Islam on the information highway, " Far Eastern Economic Review, 
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Press, May 24 1997; "Intelligence Battle in Cyberspace, " Intelligence Newsletter, April 27 1995. 
86 Benedict Anderson, "Exodus, " Critical Inquiry, Vol. 20, Winter 1994, p. 327 
87 See, for example, http: //www. ou. edu/cyertnuslim/cy_jihad. html 
146 
United States probably has more to fear from disillusioned sections of its own population or 
various cult and millenarian movements than it does from the Muslim diaspora. There are 
also those who argue that the Internet has had a moderating effect on Islamist discourse. 
Sa'ad al-Faqih, for example, believes that Internet chat rooms and discussion forums devoted 
to the debate of Islam and politics serve to encourage greater tolerance. He believes that in 
these new arenas one sees a greater convergence in the centre of the Islamist political 
spectrum and a weakening of the extremes: 
In these forums it is very important now for the leaders of various tendencies to 
make strong, reasoned arguments that stand up in debate because their followers are 
also there and they are listening. Not only that, but the followers are now able to go 
to the sources themselves in order to verify what their leaders have been saying. 
Sometimes you get extremists who argue only out of emotion or sensationalism, but 
do not present arguments with any reasonable methodology or evidence from the 
sources. Leaders are becoming sensitive to this need. They know that they have to 
conduct debate according to certain reasonable rules in order to maintain their 
credibility with the followers.... Not just on the Internet, but also on satellite TV and 
in other media forums. The ulama come on and they take questions from people who 
corner them and force them to defend themselves. 'The people' force them to come 
up with stronger arguments... It's like one huge public debate that thousands of 
people are listening to. " 
Nico Landman has argues that such television discussion programmes are also permitting 
Muslim women greater access to the public sphere, noting that "[t]he visibility of 
headscarved and very self-confident and emancipated Muslim women in the Dutch media has 
been greatly increased in recent years .,, 
89 This can be seen as part and parcel of the wider 
evolution of gender politics in Islam covered in Chapter IV. 
Thus for the overwhelming majority of Muslims in the West the Internet is mainly a forum 
for the conduct of politics within Islam. "Internet forums permit bypassing traditional 
gatekeepers and abjudicators of interpretive rights, procedures and adequacy, " writes Jon 
Anderson9° Because very few "official" Muslim organs such as the Organisation of the 
Islamic Conference, the Muslim World League or the various eminent religious schools 
actually have any presence on the Internet, we can characterise many of the Muslim sites 
which do exist as "alternatives. "91 That is, in the absence of sanctioned information from 
recognised institutions, Muslims are increasingly taking religion into their own hands. The 
Internet provides them with an extremely useful medium for distributing information about 
Islam and about the behaviour required of a `good Muslim. ' Through various newsgroups 
and e-mail discussion lists, Muslims - many of whom are new converts - can solicit 
information about what 'Islam' says about any particular problem. Responses will be 
received from, recalling Francis Robinson's phrase, "any Ahmad, Mahmud or Muhammad" 
on the Internet and this represents a further decline in the authority of the ulama. Not only 
that, notes Sa'ad al-Faqih, "but someone will be given information about what 'Islam' says 
about such and such and then others will write in to correct or comment on this 
opinion/interpretation. i92 In this sense, the Internet resembles a publishing forum far more 
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than it does a broadcasting forum because here "users are producers, or may be producers. "93 
Given that most of this discourse involves diaspora Muslims, much of the conversation on 
these information networks tends to be about how Muslims should deal with various 'cultural' 
phenomena which they encounter in, say, Los Angeles, Manchester, or The Hague. Dozens 
of 'meta-sites' have sprung up in recent years, offering hundreds or sometimes thousands of 
links to other areas of the Internet containing information and resources on Islam. 94 The 
Muslim Students Association network, for example, posts daily collections of news stories 
on Muslims and Islamic issues from around the world. 
There has also been a great effort to make the classic works of religious learning as widely 
available as possible. Numerous websites offer various translations of the Qur'an and the 
hadith, and also articles by prominent contemporary Muslim thinkers. Various Internet 
forums co-ordinated by the Muslim Student Associations of North America allow Muslims 
to discuss and debate the merits of different tendencies within the modern Muslim 
movement. 95 A recent example of this has been a wide-ranging debate on the merits of the 
Jama'at al-Tabligh movement 96 Just as the more marginalised sects of Islam have often 
found life to be easier in diaspora (see Chapter IV), so have they also found a new lease on 
life on the Internet. Power asymmetries are often evened out on-line, and the World Wide 
Web allows the Ahmaddiya movement to appear as 'mainstream' as any Sunni site. More 
traditional Islamic spaces such as the mosque have also not gone untouched by IT. In 1996, 
for example, the Muslim Parliament of Great Britain recommended that all mosques in the 
UK be wired up to the network in order to provide "porn-free access to the Internet and [to] 
establish places where Muslims can socialise in a halal (permissible) environment. "97 
The Internet has also served to reinforce and reify the impact of print-capitalism on 
traditional structures and forms of authority. Instead of having to go down to the mosque in 
order to elicit the advice of the local mullah, Muslims can now receive `authoritative' 
religious pronouncements via the various e-mail fatwa services which have sprung up in 
recent months. The Sheikhs of al-Azhar are totally absent, but the enterprising young 'alim 
who sets himself up with a colourful website in Alabama suddenly becomes a high-profile 
representative of Islam for a particular, disseminated and distanciated constituency. Due to 
the largely anonymous nature of the Internet, one can also never be sure whether the 
`authoritative' advice received via these services is coming from a classically-trained 
religious scholar or a hydraulic engineer moonlighting as an amateur 'alim. As we noted 
above, however, the authority of the traditional scholars is not easily undermined. Many of 
them, especially in the Middle East, command a loyal following based on personal charisma 
which cannot easily be poached away by an anonymous computer personality. Barkatulla 
points out that judgements and rulings associated with IT such as e-mail fatwas are not yet 
considered permissible evidence in shari'a courts because no reliable system for the 
generation of 'digital signatures' that can verify the identity and credentials of religious 
scholars as yet exists. And again, the impact of these services must be measured realistically 
based on the number of Muslims who actually make use of them. However, we can perhaps 
say that they are having a fairly significant effect with regard to those questions which 
concern the details of daily life for a Muslim in the West. Diaspora Muslims are likely to 
find it convenient to be able to turn to one of their own, someone who has also lived Western 
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culture, so as to receive a hearing that is more sympathetic and more in tune with local 
affairs. 
More than anything else the Internet and other information technologies provide spaces 
where Muslims, who often find themselves to be a marginalised or extreme minority group in 
many Western communities, can go in order to find others `like them. ' It is in this sense that 
we can speak of the Internet as allowing Muslims to create a new form of imagined 
community, or a re-imagined umma: "It is imagined because the members... will never know 
most of their fellow-members, meet them, or even hear of them, yet in the minds [and on the 
screens] of each lies the image of their communion. "98 The various Islams of the Internet 
hence offer a reassuring set of symbols and terminology which attempt to reproduce familiar 
settings and terms of discourse in locations far remote from those in which they were 
originally embedded. We might recall the hybridised media discourses of diasporic Iranian 
television as described by Hamid Naficy. 99 Here, Islam functions simultaneously as a hated 
symbol of Khomeini's regime and as the object of a nostalgic longing, the desire for a lost 
culture and homeland. It is inevitable when such traditions travel that various processes of 
cultural translation are set in motion. The resulting syncretisms then give rise to new forms 
of Islam, each of which is redrawn to suit the unique set of socio-cultural contingencies into 
which it enters. This is what is meant by the notion of 'globalising the local'; or to be more 
precise, the globalisation of cultural material which is then re-localised in new and distant 
translocalities. 
The Internet in the Gulf: re-localising the translocal? 
This Internet issue has made everything else pale into insignificance. These 
networks are accessible to everyone; people can find political, security and 
pornographic materials, songs, films, and scenery there. Unfortunately, some of our 
officials do not pay attention to these things. I do not understand why they are so 
confused; why there is no logic to what they do; they are expanding these things. 
They should explain themselves. 
- Ayatollah Ahmad Jannati 
What happens, though, when the Internet begins to spread into a region of the world 
populated by societies whose normative orientation takes strong issue with some of its 
content? What happens when IT-based discourses 'travel back' from diaspora to 'homeland'? 
The question of how translocality affects cultural dynamics in the Arab Gulf countries is 
extremely salient here. We need first to note that the Gulf does not by any means represent a 
parochial, primitive backwater. Rather it provides a fascinating case for understanding how 
rapid influxes of technology and industry impact upon traditional socio-cultural patterns and 
practices. Gulf society is itself already something of a hybrid, a merger between 'traditional' 
norms and forms of social organisation and the very latest in modem technology. The 
region's affluence is the result of its crucial role in world energy provision, and both of these 
factors have allowed (if not forced) the Gulf to undergo rapid processes of industrialisation 
and modernisation - processes which in other regions of the world usually occur over the 
space of many generations rather than in just over half a century. Given these circumstances 
it is inevitable that tensions emerge between the traditional and the modern. For the most 
part Gulf societies have demonstrated extreme flexibility and a willingness to exploit both 
98 Anderson, Imagined Communities, p. 6 
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the latest trends in technology and the global division of labour. The presence of an 
enormous Asian migrant labour force is well-known, and this phenomenon is prevalent at 
every level of social structure in the Gulf. Among bedouin tribes in Saudi Arabia, for 
example, it is not uncommon to find camels being herded by a Pakistanis rather than by 
Arabs. Likewise with the trappings of modern technology. Bedouin in the UAE make 
extensive use of that country's GSM mobile telephone network; globalisation, it would seem, 
has even found its way into the desert. 
The arrival of the Internet in the Gulf has been a complex affair. There is a distinction to be 
drawn here between the availability of Internet access for a limited number of specialised 
research institutes, and the availability of accounts to the wider public. Various universities 
and hospitals in the Gulf have had Internet gateways (often via Europe) since the early 
1990s, but it is only since about 1995 that private accounts have started to appear in a few 
locations. The reasons for this are obvious. These countries are all ruled by conservative 
dynastic regimes which - to varying degrees - wield overwhelming editorial control over 
their respective media forums (all of which are nationalised). This has meant that local 
political issues receive virtually no coverage except via the occasional heavily veiled 
wording in a newspaper. All magazines, television programmes, films and videos from 
abroad are censored, with any references to the Gulf and its various regimes removed unless 
unequivocally laudatory. Bare skin and alcohol advertising are also banned, as are sexually 
explicit or other religiously questionable materials. Several Gulf states, such as Kuwait and 
Qatar, have been experimenting with a certain modicum of free press and participatory 
politics. Even here, however, there are tacit parameters which are not to be transgressed. 
For the most part, Gulf Arab society remains closed. 
What then happens with the advent of the Internet, a medium which by its very nature is 
heavily resistant to any attempt at control, censorship, or regulation? Governments in the 
Gulf find themselves in something of a quandary. On the one hand they are as anxious to 
take advantage of the Internet as they have been to make use of every other new technology. 
Its scientific and educational potential have certainly not gone unnoticed in the Gulf. On the 
other hand they are worried about the perceived threat to their relatively closed societies. 
Pornography, sex, religious and political debate - all these things would suddenly be 
available to Gulf citizens. In addition, countries such as Saudi Arabia and Bahrain feel 
themselves under threat from exiled religious opposition groups who make use of the latest 
information technology to question the legitimacy of the regimes. The Internet services 
offered by groups such as the Movement for Islamic Reform in Arabia (MIRA) and the 
Bahrain Freedom Movement (BFM) in London have in the past been aimed primarily at 
fellow countrymen abroad such as students and traveling businessmen. Internet access in the 
Gulf would provide these groups with a much-desired constituency which had previously 
been reachable only via the fax. 100 The challenge, then, has been to reconcile these two 
concerns - that is, to use the Internet as everyone else seems to be doing while at the same 
finding some sort of means to prevent citizens from accessing `undesirable' information and 
images. 
This latter problem has been circumvented by two methods. The first, as noted above, has 
been to severely limit the amount of Internet access available in the country. Initially only 
specialised scientific and medical universities and research institutes were allowed onto the 
Internet, and all material accessed was noted. This parallels the experience in Iran where 
until early 1996 only higher education establishments could tap into the Internet, and then 
only over a clogged, high-traffic route via Vienna. The second approach to Internet control, 
known as the 'proxy server system, ' involves the installation of hardware and software 
100 al-Faqih, interview 
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safeguards which prevent users from accessing specific sites known to be `bad. ' The system 
operators keep a list of all banned locations on the central server and any request for one of 
these sites by a user is refused. The websites of the various Gulf dissident organisations 
would, one might assume, be among the first on the list. The size of the Internet is a primary 
foil of this method, however. Sites divide, multiply, and mirror themselves on a daily basis 
and it becomes impossible to keep track of where data is migrating on the Internet - and 
hence also impossible to restrict access to all possible sites. "The proxy-server system would 
be useless against us, " says the exiled owner of an anti-Saudi web site, "we would mirror 
[duplicate] the site so often that the authorities would never be able to keep up with us. i101 
Another method of censorship involves the computer searching all downloaded data, looking 
for references to banned keywords and scanning for graphic patterns that, for example, match 
those of naked bodies. This method, however, severely slows down one's connection to the 
Internet and is just as liable to fail in its efforts as it is to succeed. 
A combination of these methods has been used in those Gulf countries which do allow public 
access to the Internet. The UAE's sole service provider Etisalat, for example, has installed a 
proxy-server system which allows it to select the sites available to its users at any one time. 
They are also negotiating with a British security company for the installation of an elaborate 
system which would allow police to monitor all requests for data sent by UAE Internet 
accounts and would alert them whenever banned materials were requested by users. 102 
Indeed it is the availability of such systems which has convinced many Gulf countries to 
gradually phase in the availability of private Internet access. Kuwait was first, followed by 
the UAE, Bahrain, and Qatar. Oman went on-line in early 1997 but Saudi Arabia, the largest 
and most conservative of the Gulf states, continues to hesitate, with its advertised dates for 
providing private Internet service pushed back one after another. The authorities in Saudi 
Arabia have announced that private Internet accounts will only be widely issued once a 
suitable 'moral gateway' has been installed. Effectively, this will mean routing all of the 
country's Internet traffic through a single system - most likely the King Abdul Aziz City for 
Science and Technology (KACST) - for'ethical filtering' before sending it on to a variety of 
local servers operated by service providers. ' 03 
At this point it is too early to tell what the long-term impact of the Internet will be on Gulf 
society. Its presence has, however, already provoked a number of telling incidents. Dubai's 
chief of police, Major General Dhahi Khalfan Tamim has been vocal in emphasising the 
need to control access to the Internet and has even found himself embroiled in a public feud 
with the service provider Etisalat, a rare occurrence in the Emirates. The conflict centred 
around the question of who possesses jurisdiction to issue licenses for Internet access. Major 
General Dhahi claimed that the police and security forces were ultimately responsible for 
monitoring the flow of information in and out of the emirate, while the 60% state-owned 
Etisalat insisted that its own expertise should have the deciding hand. 104 In other comments 
the Major General has expressed fears about Israel trying to disrupt Arab countries using the 
Internet and has also recommended that the UAE follow the lead of Singapore in placing 
tight restrictions on Internet access. 105 So it is difficult to read the politics behind an event 
such as the opening of the region's first Internet cafes in Dubai. This enterprise, which brings 
the Internet out into the open, can be understood in a number of ways. We might choose to 
see it as the populisation of the Internet, as an indication that the Internet has well and truly 
arrived in the Gulf. In this case its installation in a very public space -a shopping centre - 
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represents a victory of consumer demand over state authority. Alternatively, however, we 
might just as easily read the situation as one of government intervention. This rendition 
would hold that state authorities sanctioned the establishment of an Internet cafe precisely so 
that the network would be brought into the open. Instead of accessing the Internet from the 
privacy of their own homes where government monitoring is nearly impossible, the cafe 
encourages potential users to go on-line in a very public setting. According to this logic 
people would be less likely to attempt to access questionable material under circumstances 
where they are easily scrutinised. 
The religious sector has also reacted to the arrival of the Internet. Islamist deputies in 
Kuwait, for example, submitted a bill to that country's parliament which called on the 
government to be wary of `sin-inducing' material on the Internet which "[does] not suit our 
social values. "106 The proposal also recommended that the government act swiftly to put 
control mechanisms in place. Two months later the Kuwaiti Ministry of Communications 
announced that it would regulate the country's main Internet connection point. "This 
operation, " they announced, "will give us full control of the Internet in Kuwait, as well as 
full control of the necessary equipment. Anyone who wants to be an [Internet service] 
provider will have to do so under certain conditions which we are currently drafting. i107 It is 
difficult to determine whether or not this new policy was prompted by the protests of the 
Islamist parliamentarians. Their publicisation of the issue, however, must certainly have 
been a factor. 
In Iran users have been told that their e-mail has to comply with Islamic laws and 
traditions, 108 and in the Arab Gulf countries the various regimes have worked to ensure that 
Internet feeds entering their societies are devoid of controversial and sinful materials. By 
effectively reducing the content of the Internet in this way and by heavily promoting their 
own Arabic-language sites, these countries can indeed manage to `localise the translocal' to 
some degree. Recent plans to expand the region-specific GulfNet project is another pointer 
in this direction, an indication of how technologies from the `outside' can be appropriated for 
purely local use. But this is only one side of the story. The arrival of networked forums such 
as the Internet in the Gulf offers the possibility of something for which Arab Gulf society is 
becoming increasingly impatient: a minimal public sphere. "We have agreed to ban sex, 
religion and politics on the Internet to respect local laws, " notes one user, "but when 
someone downloads from North America and they discuss God, for example, the chatting 
continues and you learn something. The authorities can't do anything about this. i109 
Another potential source of annoyance for the various regimes is satellite television. The 
Movement for Islamic Reform in Arabia (MIRA) is planning to tap into the estimated one 
million 'illegal' satellite in Saudi Arabia in order to beam its message of Islamic reform 
straight to the Saudi masses. Sa'ad al-Faqih, the co-ordinator of the project, doubts that such 
activities will prompt a new crackdown on satellite dishes in the country. He notes that there 
are simply too many of them and also that the decreasing size of the dishes means they are 
often difficult to find. Ironically, it can also be argued that the regime actually wants Saudis 
to have access to satellite television so as to offer counter-propaganda via its own vast media 
arm that includes the European-based Middle East Broadcasting Corporation (MBC), ART 
and Orbit, the premier providers of Arabic-language satellite television. The sale of satellite 
dishes in the Kingdom also provides lucrative income for those members of the royal family 
who traffic in them. MIRA is planning to rent time on a commercial satellite well outside 
Saudi jurisdiction. "After all, " says al-Faqih, "the Saudis can't buy the whole sky. " He 
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believes that satellite television will start to have a major impact in Saudi Arabia once he 
begins a series of phone-in programmes during which Saudis will be able to place an 
anonymous, untraceable call to the studio and will be able to express their criticisms of the 
government live on air, beyond the reach of the regime. Al-Faqih believes that once other 
Saudis see their fellow citizens standing up to publicly criticise the al-Sa'ud, then they will 
gain the confidence to do so themselves. In his mind, the greatest imperative is to make 
Saudis aware that public criticism and debate about the politics and problems of their country 
is possible. Everything else, he believes, will follow from that. "Once we have this up and 
running, " al-Faqih insists, "it will do much more damage to the regime that any bomb ever 
could. i110 
Spaces of public debate are few and far between in the Gulf, with a few of the countries only 
just cautiously easing back on their tight control of the media. The socio-economic situation 
in the region - and especially in Saudi Arabia - is such that the citizens of these countries are 
increasingly coming to demand that they be treated as citizens; that is, that they be granted a 
certain degree of political rights. High levels of unemployment among recent university 
graduates - who previously were guaranteed a government job upon completion of their 
degrees - has spawned a generation which is largely disillusioned with the al-Sa'ud regime. 
Substantial numbers of young Saudis suddenly find themselves needing to criticise the 
government, but without any effective forum in which to do so. Inspired by exiled groups 
such as CDLR and MIRA and also by charismatic local ulama, Islamist discourse is 
increasingly becoming their chosen language of protest. The regime is well aware of this 
potential instability and is hence very hesitant to permit the Saudi population access to 
computer mediated communication. Preventing users from downloading pornography and 
sinful texts from `Out There' is one thing. How, though, can governments prevent their 
citizens from talking to each other? There exist large sections of these populations which 
have no interest in Western nasties: problems closer to home are much more pressing. For 
them, computer networks in the Gulf provide a means by which local political issues can be 
discussed and debated, responses planned, and actions coordinated. For them the Internet 
offers a semblance of political civility, albeit somewhat different in form from the model of 
'civil society' which we derive from Western liberal theory. If we contextualise the socio- 
political implications of Gulf Internet use in this way, then the sense in which it represents a 
localisation of the translocal starts to become clear. 
In the case of the Arab Gulf countries, therefore, a translocal force such as the Internet is 
'made local' in two key fashions. (i) Official censorship tries to reduce its content such that it 
fits within the normative constraints of Gulf Muslim society; while at the same time, (ii) 
various religio-political communities in the Gulf may attempt to appropriate it as a form of 
civil society - perhaps explicitly in opposition to the various ruling regimes. Although the 
example of the Gulf was initially framed to serve as a contrast to the experience of the 
Internet in the Muslim diaspora ('re-localising' the translocal vs. a shift from locality to 
translocality), we have to recognise in the end that any dichotomy between these two 
identities, the translocal diaspora Muslim and the local Gulf Muslim is false. Translocality 
means that individuals can move fluidly between these roles - picking and choosing as 
convenient, emphasising and de-emphasising as the situation demands. Translocal 
information technology has undoubtedly had a strong impact on Muslim politics wherever 
they emerge; it has provided Islamists with effective new tools with which to network, 
disseminate information and raise their profiles. Increased interaction between various 
`local' conceptions of Islam (as mediated by cultural, regional, and national traditions) also 
serves to emphasise the heterogeneity within the religion. Finally, globalised information 
technology has provided new forums for the politicisation of Muslim discourses and the 
110 al-Faqih, interview. 
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basis of a new framework within which Muslims might re-imagine the umma. However, as 
Appadurai reminds us, the virtual umma feeds back into highly-localised political discourses 
and nascent public spheres, such as the Islamist struggle against the Saudi regime. " In this 
sense, information technologies reveal the dialectical nature of locality and translocality. 
Conclusions: new Islamist intellectuals and 'globalisation from below' 
It has become apparent that the encounter between Islam and the translocal technologies of 
communication is as multifaceted as the religion itself. The rise of IT has led to considerable 
intermingling and dialogue between disparate interpretations of what it means to be 
`Islamic. ' The politics of authenticity which inevitably ensue from this also serve to further 
fragment traditional sources of authority such that the locus of `real' Islam and the identity of 
those who are permitted to speak on its behalf become ambiguous. It is in this context that 
we have witnessed the emergence of a new breed of Islamist intellectual. "For the new 
intellectuals, " writes Olivier Roy, "neither the transmission of knowledge nor the place of 
this transmission is institutionalised. Everyone is 'authorised. "'112 We can hear this latter 
point echoed in the writings of two Islamists who fit the 'new intellectual' profile well. 
Hassan al-Turabi, the ideologue of Sudan's self-styled 'Islamic experiment' suggests a broad 
answer to the question of who can be regarded as part of the ulama. "Because all knowledge 
is divine and religious, " he argues, "a chemist, an engineer, an economist, or a jurist are all 
ulama. "113 Likewise, Muhammad al-Mass'ari claims that "[e]very single Muslim, man or 
woman, is empowered to ijtihad. You do not need an ordination from any ruler or 
scholar. "' 14 This language can be read as part of a discourse urging Muslims to turn away 
from jaded sources of traditional scripturalism and established authorities, and encouraging 
them instead to use their own faculties to assess the merits of various religious arguments. 115 
This, in many ways, is an Islam with a distinctly modern, or perhaps even postmodern ring to 
it. The vocabulary here is electic, combining 'soundbites' of religious knowledge into novel 
combinations suited for complex, translocal contexts. "What we see in the spaces that focus 
on the identities of the participants are mixed discourses, crossover talk between domains 
(notably science, religious, social and cultural issues), borrowing and trafficking in 
alternative forms and bases of authority and legitimacy, " notes Jon Anderson. 
116 
Furthermore, the discourse of the new Islamist intellectual is usually explicitly anti- 
establishment in nature. It seeks to question the legitimacy of the state, the institution and 
even society. "' Neither the mosque nor the state is to be trusted as a source of authentic 
Islam, and this fact allows us to understand the popularity of cassette-based sermons and 
pamphlets on Islam which originate from outside these institutions. ' 18 The new Islam hence 
exists in spaces which institutionalised forms of politics cannot reach. 
The state has no means by which it can control the new Islamist intellectual in his 
social function. His thought does not correspond to his social position, he does not 
live from his profession, the networks of activities are on the fringe of institutions, 
when they are not entirely clandestine. He operates in remote places (meeting 
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houses, sites of worships, educational centers, [transnational diasporas]) and in 
spaces outside of the traditional society that the state has not resocialized. 119 
The new Islamist intellectual thus represents an interstitial political identity, one which 
inhabits the gaps between institutional forms. His rhetoric challenges the legitimacy of the 
state, and - insofar as translocal information technologies question the integrity of state 
boundaries - his practices challenge its spatiality. 
120 As James Clifford writes, "[s]uch 
visions and counterhistories can support strategies for nontotalizing 'globalisation from 
below. ' [This] phrase... is proposed to name transregional social movements that both resist 
and use hegemonizing technologies and communications. " 121 It is through information 
technology that we are able to read the hybridity of the new Islamist project. The 
communications medium serves as a form of authority (modern, post-traditional) through 
which an authentic message (Islam, ethicality) is transmitted. In this chapter we have seen 
some of the ways in which information technologies have mediated (and mediatised) Muslim 
notions of authority. We have also investigated the role played by IT in helping Muslims to 
create and sustain translocal communities reminiscent of the umma concept. To what extent, 
though, are the changing connotations of Islamic authority and authenticity in translocal 
spaces leading to a critical re-imagination of the boundaries of Muslim politics? This is the 
question to be taken up in the Conclusion. 
19 Roy, p. 95. Emphasis added. 
120 For an account of how diasporic movements are using information technology to challenge state 
borders see Amir Hassanpour, "Satellite Footprints as National Borders: MED-TV and the 
Extraterritoriality of State Sovereignty, " Journal of Muslim Minority Affairs, Vol. 18, No. 1,1998, pp. 
53-72 
'21 James Clifford, Routes: Travel and Translation in the Late Twentieth Century, Cambridge, MA: 
Harvard University Press, 1997, p. 276 
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Chapter VI 
Conclusion: Reimagining the Umma 
Knowledge is to foresee, in order to obtain power. However, to be powerful, one should start by 
knowledge, and one cannot know without the condition of liberating oneself from the obsession of 
power. 
- Mohammed Arkoun, Pour une critique de la raison Islamique 
[T]he networks and circuits in which transnational migrants and refugees are implicated constitute 
fluidly bounded transnational or globalized spaces in which new transnational forms of political 
organization, mobilization, and practice are coming into being. 
- Michael Peter Smith, "Can You Imagine? " 
In this Conclusion I want to work towards a closer weave of the two narrative strands running 
through this thesis. Ong the one hand we have an account of translocality, non-statist forms 
of community and the emergence of new 'distanciated' political spaces. On the other, a story 
about transformation within 'travelling Islam' and the diasporic Muslims whose lives it 
shapes. Although my text is peppered with numerous references (some more explicit than 
others) to the linkages I see between the politics of translocality and the reimagination of the 
umma, I want in this Conclusion to make their relationship more clear. 
In a recent essay, Dale Eickelman alludes to a nascent 'Islamic Reformation. ' Eickelman 
himself would be the first to admit the difficulties involved in trying to draw any hard and 
fast comparisons with the Christian Reformation. As he points out, Islam does not possess a 
clergical hierarchy or'centre' against which one can rebel. This essay is also not in any way 
an attempt to 'push the other back in time' by suggesting that Islam is only now experiencing 
the upheavals which Christianity went through four hundred years ago. Rather, by referring 
to contemporary changes in Islam as a 'Reformation; Eickelman is indicating a trend in much 
of the Muslim world towards a greater critical awareness of religion. Muslims are 
increasingly willing to take Islam into their own hands, relying on their own readings and 
interpretations of the classical sources or following 'reformist' intellectuals who question 
traditional dogmas and challenge the claims of the ulama to be privileged sources of religious 
knowledge. Much of this is related, as we have seen in the previous chapter, to massive rises 
in literacy rates and the increased presence of religious issues in the public sphere as a result 
of globalised communications and media technologies. The authority of the written Word is 
no longer the sole reserve of a select few, and the religious elite cannot compete with the 
myriad range of Muslim voices reading, debating and, effectively, reformulating Islam on the 
Internet, on satellite television and in a plethora of widely-distributed books and pamphlets. 
Thus, 'media Islam, ' the new intellectuals and popular religious discourse, I want to argue, are 
all contributing towards the emergence of what we might call a new 'Muslim public sphere. ' 
Furthermore, I also want to suggest that translocality should be seen as that which both 
enables this reformist discourse and provides the spaces in which much of it is elaborated. In 
this Conclusion, therefore, we will first examine several aspects of the latter influence, that of 
1 Dale F. Eickelman, "Inside the Islamic Reformation, " Wilson Quarterly, Vol. 22, No. 1, Winter 1998, 
pp. 80-89. 
156 
translocality on Islam, before going on to assess the ways in which the Muslim reimagination 
of political community can be seen to constitute a new form of translocal politics. 
Critical Islam and changing boundaries 
Translocality has contributed significantly to the development of a critical Islamic discourse. 
In addition to the'structural' factors mentioned above (e. g. increased literacy and the role of 
information technology), the objectification of religion which occurs as Muslims move 
through and dwell in translocal space (i. e. their capability to externalise and critique Islam) 
has opened up new avenues for rethinking and reformulating Islamic thought. Many authors 
have emphasised that diasporic Muslims live in the constant shadow of the West, and that 
their discourse is consequently over-determined by the struggle against Western hegemony. I 
want to suggest, however, that translocality actually enables Muslims to focus on a different 
type of hegemony - namely, power asymmetries within 
Islam. I mean by this that in the 
process of displacing Islam from a particular national context and reconstituting it as a 
'travelled' object in diaspora, Muslims develop an increased capacity to recognise, account 
for, and debate the difference within their religion. The relativisation of Islam which 
naturally occurs through travel allows Muslims to see internal hegemony, and translocality 
provides them with the intellectual environment in which to develop counter-hegemonic 
discourses. Talal Asad has argued that "[t]o secure its unity-to make its own history- 
dominant power has worked best through differentiating and classifying practices. "2 The 
'dominant power' to which he refers is usually taken to be a colonial or neo-imperial form - 
or at least something emanating from the West. I want to argue, however, that in 
translocality we often find hybridising manoeuvres which also seek to disclose the dominant 
powers within Islam. How, though, can we conceptualise such a thing as 'dominant power' in 
relation to Islam? We do so by looking for totalising discourses which claim the authority to 
represent the 'real' Islam and which also seek to label and classify 'deviant' Muslims. In the 
same way that the West reproduces its exceptionalism by repudiating any ethical claims 
which do not derive from its own tradition of modernity, so Islamic hegemonies (e. g. the 
Sunni majority) label and differentiate those readings of Islam which diverge from its 
orthodoxy (e. g. Shi'ism). This internal 'othering' is not, however, limited to theological 
debates. We see it also in the diasporic political arena, where groups such as Hizb ut-Tahrir 
portray themselves as the only movement pursuing a 'truly Islamic' political agenda, and in 
doing so are able to set the terms of the political debate (see Chapter IV). Competing 
tendencies are hence constantly forced to respond to Hizb ut-Tahrir's ethical claims, rather 
than advancing their own vision of political community. 
One of the chief obstacles to critical thinking in Islam during recent years has been the fact 
that Islamist discourse is usually constructed around a set of claims represented as non- or 
even anti-Western in nature. To critique this discourse, therefore, would be to betray and 
weaken its anti-Western potential. Another component of the same discourse has been a 
drive to depict criticism itself as a Western, and hence anti-Islamic, practice. Unsurprisingly, 
therefore, one of the main strategies deployed by hegemonic Muslim political discourse (such 
as Hizb ut-Tahrir's) is to portray any Muslim advocating a critical approach towards Islam as 
a 'closet Westerner. ' A zero-sum game is constructed in which Muslims are either 'truly' 
Islamic (i. e. sympathetic to Hizb ut-Tahrir) or Western collaborators (i. e. critical of Hizb ut- 
Tahrir's political discourse). Muslim modernists who seek to combine Islamic political 
concepts with Western analytic methodologies are similarly condemned by fundamentalists 
2 Talal Asad, Genealogies of Religion: discipline and reasons ofpower in Christianity and Islam, 
Baltimore: The Johns Hopkins University Press, 1993, p. 17 
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and conservatives alike as 'Westernised. i3 It seems the slightest hint of Western thought in a 
Muslim discourse immediately corrupts and invalidates any ideas which might emerge from 
it. The hybridity is not tolerated. In other words, the hegemonic discourse is basing itself on 
a claim to 'purity' and 'authenticity, ' what in Islam is sometimes referred to by the term asdla. 
Dismantling this hegemony requires two theoretical moves. The first, as Shaw and Stewart 
note, is to point out that authenticity and originality do not necessarily depend on purity and 
that both 'pure' and 'mixed' (i. e. hybrid) traditions can be unique. 'Authenticity, ' rather, must 
be seen as a construct rendered by rhetorics of power and persuasion. "[C]laims of 
authenticity, " argue Shaw and Stewart, "depend on the political acumen and persuasiveness 
of cultural 'spin doctors' who convert given historical particularities and contingencies to 
valued cultural resources. "5 It is therefore necessary to open up a discursive space in which 
Muslim subjectivities can enunciate asdla in the plural; that is, to combat totalising 
discourses by articulating discrepant conceptions of Islam and without being accused of 
having'violated the system of naming. ' Radhakrishnan alludes to this when he speaks of an 
authenticity based on 'multiple rootedness. ' He envisages this as an interstitial site at which 
discourses of tradition and innovation can be creatively negotiated: 
What I mean by "authenticity" here is that critical search for a third space that is 
complicitous neither with the deracinating imperatives of Westernization nor with 
theories of a static, natural, and single-minded autochthony... [T]here need be no 
theoretical or epistemological opposition between authenticity and historical 
contingency, between authenticity and hybridity, between authenticity and 
invention. 6 
I want to argue that translocal spaces provide discursive environments conducive to such 
alternative articulations. As we have seen in Chapter IV, Muslims encounter a diverse range 
of interpretations and schools of thought in diaspora. As dialogue is enabled between these 
different tendencies, the differences between them are often attenuated. This diminution of 
difference, I believe, results from particular conceptions of Islam becoming disembedded 
from the 'lifeworlds' that sustain them in countries of origin, and, via translocality, resettled 
into circumstances in which they are in a minority. This process of relativisation allows 
Muslims to partake in a discourse of particularity, one in which their conception of religion is 
no longer universal. Crucially, however, and unlike hegemonic discourse, this is also a space 
in which no particular conception of Islam is negated. Difference is negotiated, rather than 
eradicated. As one observer puts it, "You learn to adjust to other tendencies and be at ease 
with other interpretations of Islam without feeling that you are diluting your own beliefs. "' 
That is not to say, however, that translocal Islam is a model of sectarian harmony. There are 
always forces working to narrow the boundaries of political community and seeking to 
monopolise the discourse of political legitimacy. What does one do, for example, about 
those extremists, such as Hizb ut-Tahrir, who refuse to engage with pluralistic conceptions of 
asdla? This problem requires another set of theoretical manoeuvres. So far we have only 
dealt with the problem of opening up space for multiple articulations of Islam, a problem 
which, as I have argued, is largely solved by the condition of translocality. What we have not 
3 Fazlur Rahman, Islam and Modernity: Transformation of an Intellectual Tradition, Chicago: 
University of Chicago Press, 1982, p. 141 
4 Rosalind Shaw and Charles Stewart, "Introduction: problematizing syncretism" in Charles Stewart and 
Rosalind Shaw (eds. ), Syncretism/Anti-syncretism: The politics of religious synthesis, London: 
Routledge, 1994, p. 7 
51bid., p. 8 
6 R. Radhakrishnan, Diasporic mediations: between home and location, Minneapolis: University of 
Minnesota Press, 1996, p. 162 
Dr. Ataullah Siddiqui, personal interview, Leicester, 29 July, 1998. 
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dealt with is the question of how one can engage in a critique of Islam without, according to 
the accusations of those such as Hizb ut-Tahrir, falling prey to Westernisation. One possible 
strategy is to turn the tables on the extremists and to construct a discourse in which they 
become the unwitting victims of Western hegemony. This is accomplished by observing that 
a large proportion of their own discourse is devoted to anti-Western rhetoric; so much so, in 
fact, that they end up neglecting to address the problems which most Muslims face on a day- 
to-day basis. That is to say, they are so obsessed with denouncing Western hegemony - and, 
in fact, have managed by and large to define the political field in relation to this very issue - 
that they do not engage with the substantive issues facing their constituency. Some Muslims 
thinkers, more notably in the West, have started to problematise the methodology of the 
extremists by pointing out that in many ways it simply serves to reproduce Western 
hegemony. "As long as Islamic political thinkers are locked in a (one-sided) conversation 
with western political thought, " writes Bobby Sayyid, "they remain locked in a logic in which 
there is no space for anything other than the West. " 8 This sentiment is echoed by Akeel 
Bilgrami, who argues that "[a] failure to come out of the neurotic obsession with the Western 
and colonial determination of their present condition will only prove [to Muslims] that that 
determination was utterly comprehensive in the destruction it wrought. "9 
This obsession with the West, it can be argued, has created an impasse whose logic runs 
something like this: "If a critique of Islam is enacted then we Muslims are falling right into 
the hands of the West because this kind of (ironic) critique is a Western mode and hence will 
inevitably weaken Islam. If, on the other hand, we do not engage in a critical renewal of our 
religion then Muslims will never make any progress in the modern world. " To escape from 
this dilemma, two further moves are required. The first is to dismantle the assumption that 
critique is an exclusively 'Western' concept. This is accomplished by pointing out that 
because there is no historical necessity to Western hegemony then there is therefore also no 
legitimate Western totalisation of discursive modes. 10 This first move enables hybridity by 
permitting the intermingling of Islamic and Western modes within a single discursive space. 
Many Muslim thinkers in diaspora are happy to engage in this sort of hybridity today, seeing 
in it the power of Bhabha's postcolonial political hybrid - or, in other words, a method for 
undermining the coherence of Western hegemony. " I want to argue, however, that a far 
more radical methodology can emerge from this disjuncture, one that is particularly suited to 
the 'multiple rootedness' of translocal space: an Islamic critique of Islam. 'Critiquing [slam 
from within' is a notion that has gained particular currency in recent years among diasporic 
Muslim intellectuals in the West. The late Fazlur Rahman, for example, was a keen advocate 
of such a methodology. 12 For him, a Muslim critique of Islam does not mean questioning the 
authenticity of the Qur'an or Hadith. Rather, what needs to be unmasked are the dogmas developed over the centuries (e. g. the various madhahib and their subsequent corruptions) 
which were not specifically authorised by the Prophet. For Rahman, Islam has been bloated 
by intransigent theologies which have little or nothing to do with the ethical core of Muhammad's message. These dogmas, he believes, are often treated as if they, like the Qur'an, are somehow the untouchable word of God. There is thus a need to distinguish between what Rahman terms 'normative Islam' (Muhammad's 'true' message) and 'historical 
s Bobby S. Sayyid, A Fundamental Fear: Eurocentrism and the Emergence of Islamism, London: Zed Books, 1997, p. 114 
9 Akeel Bilgrami, "What Is a Muslim? Fundamental Commitment and Cultural Identity" in Kwama 
Anthony Appiah and Henry Louis Gates (eds. ), Identities, Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1995, 
p. 218 
10 Sayyid, p. 118 
11 Pnina Werbner, "The Making of Muslim Dissent: hybridized discourses, lay preachers, and radical rhetoric among British Pakistanis, " American Ethnologist, Vol. 23, No. 1,1996, p. 116 12 Rahman, op. cit. 
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Islam' (the codification of these norms by various political hegemonies). " Too often, he 
argues, modern Muslims display a tendency to conflate these two. The juridical opinions 
(fatwas) of Islamic scholars, regardless of their renown, are nothing more than historically- 
situated opinion and therefore open to debate and, more crucially, abrogation. 
Furthermore, Islam already possesses a rich critical vocabulary. In the twin concepts of 
istihsän and istisläh, for example, we find the foundations of a form of critical reasoning. 
Istihsan is a method for deriving legal principles which contradict the conventional methods 
of analogical deduction. It has also been used by some classical scholars to describe the 
process of arriving at legal decisions for which no authority can be found in the traditions. 
Istislah is even more interesting because it possesses an inherent normative component. It 
refers to a methodology which seeks specifically to produce juridical decisions which are in 
the 'public interest' (maslaha - see Chapter IV). It is therefore intrinsically tied to notions of 
human welfare and finding 'the good. ' Its ethical strength has even allowed some scholars to 
use istislah to question the validity of legal principles derived directly from the Qur'an and 
sunna. 14 There is also the concept of ijtihad, which refers to the exercise of independent 
judgement in determining one's opinion. This is, effectively, Muslim 'free thinking, ' and 
often figures heavily in situations, such as those faced by diasporic Muslims, where the 
classical sources provide little guidance in determining a correct course of action. Finally, 
there is also a sense in which a multiplicity of asala has already been institutionalised in 
Islam. We find this in the notion of ikhtilaf, which refers to differences of opinion among 
religious scholars. In order to deal with this plurality, Islamic orthodoxy has traditionally 
held that each opinion is of equal value, and therefore equally 'authentic. i15 There is also a 
saying attributed to several of the early caliphs and sometimes even to Muhammad himself to 
the effect that differences of opinion within the umma should be seen as a sign of divine 
favour. 
So what form is this critical thinking in Islam taking today? Not surprisingly, some of the 
most innovative ideas are coming from those thinkers who have either travelled abroad to 
study or who have had sustained contact with translocal critical theories. Rashid 
Ghannoushi, for example, the exiled leader of the Tunisian Islamist movement, has recently 
argued that ikhtilaf should be politically institutionalised. He means by this that a political 
community should possess the right to vote for or against the political implications of any 
given textual interpretation, and also to change its mind later if it so desires. 16 The 
implication here is that an opinion is not somehow inherently 'true' simply by virtue of having 
emanated from the ulama; rather, these opinions simply enter the 'public sphere' - that is to 
say, they become contestable and open to reinterpretation. Other Muslim scholars, from 
Egypt's Hassan Hanafi17 to Harun Nasution in Indonesia, have attempted to reread the 
traditional theological texts (kaläm) so that they speak to the political imperatives of 
contemporary Islam. 18 There are also those, such as Fazlur Rahman, who have sought to 
critique some of Islam's orthodox political formulations. This is part of his broader project, 
outlined above, to remove interpretive agency from the hands of traditional scholars - and, 
more importantly for our context, from the state - and place it in the hands of Muslims. He 
argues, for example, that the slogan'al-islam din wa dawla' (Islam is both religion and state - 
see Chapter II) is often "employed to dupe the common man into accepting that, instead of 
13 Ibid., p. 141 
14 Shorter Encyclopaedia of Islam, Leiden: E. J. Brill, 1991, p. 185 
15 Ibid., p. 160 
16 Talal Asad, "Modern Power and the Reconfiguration of Religious Traditions, " Stanford Electronic 
Humanities Review, Vol. 5, Issue 1: Contested Politics, 1996, p. 5 
17 Hassan Hanafi, Min al-'agida ila 1-thawra, Cairo: Maktaba Mabduli, 5 Vols., n. d. 
18 See Richard C. Martin and Mark R. Woodward with Dwi S. Atmaja, Defenders of Reason in Islam: 
Mu'tazilism from Medieval School to Modern Symbol, Oxford: Oneworld, 1997. 
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politics or the state serving the long-range objectives of Islam, Islam should come to serve the 
immediate and myopic objectives of party politics. i19 The Iranian philosopher Abdolkarim 
Soroush has recently made similar arguments with regard to the situation in contemporary 
Iran. His message is particularly radical in that context because governance in Iran is, in 
theory, based on Imam Khomeini's principle of wilayat al-faqih ("governorship of the legal 
scholars"). 20 This doctrine states that leadership of the Islamic community should be vested 
in the religious scholars because of their superior religious knowledge. Soroush, on the other 
hand, argues that no single interpretation of Islam is ever final and that therefore a religious 
state can never be ruled according to an 'official' political ideology. 21 It is not surprising that 
such a position has made him a controversial figure in Iran. He has been forced by the 
pressures of conservative Islam to take up a more translocal existence, and currently spends 
considerable time lecturing abroad. 
One of the most radical projects of Islamic critique can be found in the work of Mohammed 
Arkoun, an Algerian-Berber whose academic career has been spent almost entirely in Paris. 
Arkoun has sought to deploy post-structural methodology as a critical tool in his 
investigations of the history of ideas in Islam. His genealogies of Islamic reason and 
authority, for example, are highly original contributions to the growing discourse on critical 
Islam. 22 Arkoun reads the hegemony of the early Muslim dynasties, for example, as a 
delinking of political action and symbolic creativity: 
Instead, there triumphed an inverse process whereby the symbolic capital carried by 
the Qur'an was utilized for the construction and imposition of an official, orthodox 
Islam: official because it resulted from political choices of the state, which physically 
eliminated opponents who stood for any other interpretations (the Shi'ite and 
Kharijite protesters, most notably); orthodox because the experts accredited by the 
political authorities gave credence to the idea that it is possible to read the Word of 
God correctl 23 
By revealing the historical situatedness of these supposedly 'correct, ' readings Arkoun is able 
to deconstruct layer upon layer of supposedly immutable theology. His is a theoretically 
sophisticated methodology which provides crucial support for the more general task of 
restating the nature and sources of Islamic authority -a task which, as we have seen, is most 
actively enjoined in the Muslim translocality. Many of the writers I have mentioned, such as 
Rahman, Hanaf and Arkoun, have at one time or another been 'travelling Muslims' and these 
translocal experiences have significantly influenced the development of their thinking by 
bringing them into contact with new peoples and bodies of theory, Muslim and non-Muslim 
alike. 
How though has the combination of these critical ideas and translocality been transforming 
popular Muslim political discourse? As we have seen in Chapter 1, a number of writers have 
been emphasising the ways in which globalising processes increasingly disembed peoples 
'9 Rahman, p. 140 
20 Ruhallah Khomeini, Islam and Revolution. Translated by Hamid Algar, Berkeley: Mizan, 1981. For 
a critique of wilayat al-faqih see Sami Zubaida, Islam, the People and the State: Essays on Political 
Ideas and Movements in the Middle East, London: 1. B. Tauris, Revised edition, 1993. 
21 See Valla Vakili, "Debating Religion and Politics in Iran: The Political Thought of Abdolkarim 
Soroush, " Council on Foreign Relations Studies Department Occasional Paper No. 2,1996. 
22 See e. g. Mohammad Arkoun, Pour une critique de la raison islamique, Paris: Maisonneuve et 
Larose, 1984; Essays sur la pensee islamique, Paris: Maisonneuve et Larose, 3`d edition, 1984; and 
"The Concept of Authority in Islamic Thought" in Klaus Ferdinand and Mehdi Mozaffari (eds. ), Islam: 
State and Society, London: Curzon Press, 1988. 
23 Mohammed Arkoun, Rethinking Islam, Boulder: Westview Press, 1994, p. 22 
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and their political identities from the context of the nation-state. I want to argue that one of 
the most tangible manifestations of this phenomenon can be found in what I have termed 
translocal Islam. To some degree, as we have already seen, this is a product of the 
transformations occurring within Islam related to the sociology of knowledge and the 
question of who is 'authorised' to speak (and 'act') on behalf of Islam. Muslims are turning 
away from the traditional religious scholars of their 'local' communities and creating 
'translocal' political spaces in which the authority of disparate Muslim voices is recognised. 
Often, as we have seen, the intellectuals to whom young Muslims turn for inspiration live in 
(and between) distant lands. We have noted, for example, the transnational relevance of 
thinkers such as Mawdudi and Khomeini. We can also recall travelling Indonesian students 
challenging village tradition by using ideas from Pakistan and Saudi Arabia. The national 
identity (or state affiliation) of these thinkers is not important. What matters is that they are 
able to articulate a Muslim (and thus 'authentic') normativity well-suited to the circumstances 
and problems of contemporary life. "One of the most basic consequences of the new 
relationship between the religious community and society, " argues Schiffauer, "is that one no 
longer automatically belongs to a given community. 
04 The ability to publicly contest, debate 
and rearticulate ethical claims allows those who were formerly subjected to the hegemony of 
a particular ethical vision to now politicise their Muslim identities. A religious community 
becomes a political community, hence changing the boundaries which have traditionally 
constituted the latter in Islam. 
Consequently, we have seen marked differences in the ways some Muslim movements 
organise themselves in diaspora. 'Lay' Muslims sometimes feel more inclined to become 
involved in Muslim associations in translocality because debates about political 
interpretations often take on a greater significance here. 25 We also see a tendency towards 
more open and dispersed forms of leadership, such as the phenomenon of elected imams in 
the United States. 26 As we have noted above, the leaders or ideologues of a diasporic Muslim 
community might actually be based in settings far removed from those of their constituencies. 
The cases of the Sufi saint Zindapir (Pakistan) and the Naqshbandi Sheikh Nazim (Cyprus), 
both of whom possess sizeable numbers of adherents in the UK, illustrate this point well (see 
Chapter IV). It is not only the more conservative Sufi cults that have been affected by these 
translocal upheavals. The rise of the 'Islamist new intellectuals' (see Chapter V) is also 
linked to the transnational circulation of books, pamphlets and media technologies. Indeed, 
the new intellectuals' versatility with these technologies, when contrasted with the relative 
'backwardness' of traditional sources of religious authority, goes a long way towards 
explaining their popularity - especially among the younger generation of Muslims. Even the 
icons of traditionalism have been forced at times to pay credence to the efficacy of the new 
intellectuals. For example, echoes of popular ideologues such as Ali Shariati can be heard in 
the speeches of Imam Khomeini. 27 And the eminent faculty at al-Azhar has had to adjust to 
the fact that many young Muslims today are more willing to take their political theory from 
Rashid Ghannoushi than from a venerable'alim. 
The critical reform of Islam is an ongoing project. It is by no means the dominant tendency 
in contemporary Islam, but it is growing rapidly and its results can be seen to some degree in 
24 Werner Schiffauer, "Migration and Religiousness" in Tomas Gerholm and Yngve Georg Lithman, 
The New Islamic Presence in Western Europe, London: Mansell Publishing, 1988, p. 154. Emphasis 
added. 
2s Hanns Thoma-Venske, "The Religious Life of Muslims in Berlin" in Gerholm and Lithman, p. 80 
26 Barbara D. Metcalf, "Introduction: Sacred Words, Sanctioned Practice, New Communities" in 
Barbara Daly Metcalf (ed. ), Making Muslim Space in North America and Europe, Berkeley: University 
of California Press, 1996, p. II 
27 James Piscatori, "The Rushdie Affair and the politics of ambiguity, " International A, JJairs, Vol. 66, 
No. 4,1990, p. 775 
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every corner of the Muslim world, whether it be an Indonesian university student questioning 
the authority of his village imam, a British Asian Muslim castigating the 'un-Islamic' 
practices of her parents, or Abdolkarim Soroush challenging the political legitimacy of the 
Iranian state. Critical Islam is also a gradual process. It is a slow (r)evolution, one working 
away quietly (but with occasional high-profile soundbites) at the grassroots of Muslim 
society. Obviously there is still considerable work to be done. As Talal Asad points out, 
Muslims still have a lot of thinking to do before they can claim to possess a distinctive vision 
of polity. All too often, claims about an Islamic political theory turn out to be little more than 
anti-Western polemics, or else reaffirmations of the nation-state with a few 'Islamic' terms 
thrown in for good measure. 28 What can safely be said to be changing, however, are the 
boundaries of Muslim political community. In summary, then, I want to review the 
arguments I have made as to why translocality must be seen as a large part of these changes. 
The first sense in which translocal space changes the boundaries of Muslim political 
community is related to the fact that in many of the cases we have dealt with community is 
constituted not in accordance with ethno-national identity, but rather in terms of one's 
identification with and, more crucially, rearticulation of a particular set of ethical claims (e. g. 
Islam as a 'good'). Muslims are disembedded from national contexts and resettled in 
interstitial spaces (i. e. 'in' a society but not 'of it) such that Islam becomes invested with a 
new political relevance. 'The religious' rather than 'the national' becomes the focus of 
political identity. A second change relates to how the boundaries of political community are 
transformed in translocal spaces when 'other' cultures and new structural contexts are 
encountered. A good example of this is the recasting of classical concepts such as dar al- 
islam, dar al-harb, and dar al-ahd (see Chapter IV), which was instigated by Islam's 
cognisance of its minority status in diaspora. Muslim notions of 'inside' and 'outside' have 
suddenly been inverted and traditional forms hegemony (e. g. those seeking to label some 
Muslims as deviants or heretics) are forced to redraw the contours of their identity to account 
for the Muslim 'other. ' A third and closely related change concerns the widening of the 
parameters which determine who is permitted to speak on behalf of Islam. What was 
religious becomes 'political' as soon as Muslims begin to question the authority of those who 
have previously been recognised as legitimate sources of knowledge (e. g. the ulama). New 
intellectuals, university students and lay Muslims - men and women - can to some degree all 
be seen as sources of ijtihad and purveyors of authentic Islam. Their debates and critiques, I 
want to argue, constitute a dramatic widening of the Muslim public sphere. Furthermore, its 
emergence can be explained to a large extent as a consequence of translocality - in other 
words, the travelling theories, hybrid/diasporic identities and media technologies which 
Muslims are increasingly embracing. This public sphere also fulfils a crucial political 
function insofar as it offers a discursive space in which Muslims can articulate their 
normative claims (i. e. 'Islam') from a multiplicity of subject positions. As we have seen, 
though, this is not a space devoid of hegemony. There are still those forces seeking to 
monopolise the political agenda and to denounce any Muslims who deviate from their vision. 
The nature of this arena is such, however, that dissenting voices will always be heard. And 
as we have seen above, there are those who are doing much more than arguing for a greater 
toleration of different opinions. A number of Muslim thinkers have been undertaking 
ambitious critiques of their religion's traditional conceptual lexicon and producing innovative 
reformulations which help to construct an Islam for contemporary, translocal life. 
Therefore, in seeking to answer the question of how Muslims today are reimagining the 
umma, we can identity two broad, and, in some senses, seemingly contradictory trends. I 
want to argue however that the apparent incompatibility of these tendencies is only an 
28 One representative example of this genre is Kalim Siddiqui, "Beyond the Muslim Nation-States" in 
Ismail R. Al-Faruqi and Abdullah Omar Nasseef (eds. ), Social and Natural Sciences: The Islamic 
Perspective, Sevenoaks: Hodder and Stoughton, 1981. 
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illusion because, in reality, they are both aspects of the same process. On the one hand, 
translocality brings together Muslims of diverse sociocultural, sectarian and theological 
backgrounds. By forcing Islam to hold a mirror up to itself, it makes it aware of the many 
differences (and disunities) within. On the other hand, though, translocality and globalisation 
are providing Muslims with a greater capacity to communicate, interact, and otherwise bridge 
the distances between them. In this sense, translocality resonates with the Qur'anic injunction 
to Muslims of different nations to get to know one another (Qur'an 49: 13). It promises that 
the umma could become a social reality. Although these two forces are seemingly 
contradictory - one a drive to differentiate, the other a call to unity - they are both 
constitutive of a single process leading Muslims towards greater 'global ity' (see Chapter I) in 
the sense of a new consciousness of the world as a single space. The Muslim urge to 'relate 
internationally' thus becomes an impetus to negotiate difference, and to reformulate Islam in 
the face of globality. I am not in any way arguing that the first tendency, that towards 'unity, ' 
will triumph. When I speak of reimagining the umma, I am talking about more than Muslims 
simply stressing their similarities, de-emphasising their differences and living together in a 
single global community. Rather, I am speaking about Muslims reconceptualising the umma; 
that is, revising their ideas about who, what and where political community can be. 
Understood in this way - as possessing a critical edge - the idiom of 'reimagination' 
potentially has far more radical consequences. 
A new politics of translocal space? 
Rob Walker has noted that most attempts to explore the conjunction of social movements and 
world politics have tended to operate within the normative codes of conventional statist 
politics. He goes on to make the following suggestion: 
An empirical exploration of this conjunction would more usefully begin by 
examining whether particular movements do or do not express these codes, in their 
explicit aspirations or their collective practices. It would ask about the articulations 
of identity and difference, self and other, space and time that constrain and inform 
their capacity to rearticulate their understanding of the political under contemporary 
conditions. It would ask about the connections between such rearticulations in 
different structural locations. 9 
My exploration of Muslim political community has been an attempt to do exactly this. I 
began by arguing that global sociocultural transformations are giving rise to new forms of 
transnational politics which conventional readings of the political - and especially the Realist 
tradition in International Relations - are incapable of accounting for. The nation-state model, 
I suggested, is under threat from a number of 'distanciating' processes which disembed 
peoples and cultures from particular territorial locales and spread their social relations across 
space and time. As a result, political identities no longer inhabit the exclusive container of 
the nation-state and must be seen as configured in and between multiple political spaces -a 
condition I termed translocality. I went on to argue that disciplinary projects outside 
International Relations - namely, postcolonial studies, cultural studies and critical 
anthropology - have developed far more sophisticated ways of thinking about 'the 
international' in the present context, emphasising as they do the fact that'locality' is now an 
increasingly difficult concept to apprehend given the volume of movement, travel and 
communication between spaces and places. "[T]he spatial extension of households and 
ethnic communities across national borders, " writes Michael Peter Smith, "is producing new 
patterns of cultural and political appropriation and resistance by transnational migrants and 
29 Rob Walker, "Social Movements/World Politics, " Millennium, Vol. 23, No. 3,1994, p. 700 
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refugees who in some ways partake of two nation-states but in other ways move beyond 
them. 00 The declining efficacy of the nation-state means therefore that 'the national' no 
longer possesses a monopoly over descriptions of political identity. This fact has allowed 
non- or post-national formulations of political organisation to enter the picture. As a result of 
this, some writers have been led to speculate about new forms of post-national cosmopolitan 
identity, 31 while others have followed Walker's suggestion and undertaken studies of 
particular movements whose discourses imagine non-statist forms of political community. 
The present study can be seen as an example of the latter. I chose to focus on Islam because 
it represents a prominent non-statist, non-national identity discourse which today claims 
widespread - in fact, one would almost be justified in saying truly 'global' - validity as an 
ethical construct. Furthermore, there exist today significant translocal Muslim communities 
which have been constituted by a variety of migratory and postcolonial flows. My claim is 
that many of the movements which have arisen out of these communities can be seen as a 
form of what Smith has called 'transnational grassroots politics. ' 
I began my portrayal of the Muslim translocality by arguing for a non-essentialist definition 
of Islam, focusing more on Muslim subjectivity and less on some objectified entity called 
Islam. This was necessary in order to allow for the multiple definitions, interpretations and 
articulations of Islam to be found in translocal space. I went on to examine the nature of 
Muslim discourse in relation to the debates on modernity, postmodernity and the West. I 
accepted Bobby Sayyid's thesis that the decentring of the West has eroded its totalisation of 
the discourse of political modernity, but argued that the same forces which have relativised 
Western hegemony are having the same effect on Muslim hegemony. The result of this is 
that we find multiple and varied articulations of Islam; a consequence of this is that we have 
to concentrate not only on the debate between Islam and the West, but also on conversations 
and contestations occurring within Islam. Next I examined two particular sociohistorical 
contexts in which the Muslim concept of the umma has been articulated as a political project. 
Both of them, I argued, are important in that they represent key points of reference for 
contemporary Muslim discourse. The first was the Prophet's community in Medina during 
the first years of Islam. I explained how this polity, born of travel (the hijra), represented a 
new idiom of political community in the context of seventh-century Arabia -a shift from 
tribal, kin-based relations to a confessional community based on a common religious faith. 
During this period, Muhammad maintained a total monopoly over the articulation of Islam, 
representing as he did the medium through which the religion was revealed. With his death, 
however, Muslim politics, in the sense of debates over who was authorised to speak for Islam 
began. I then examined the use of a Pan-Islamic umma discourse by the anti-colonial 
reformers of the nineteenth and early twentieth century. I noted that the concept of the umma 
took on a particular resonance at that time because the vast majority of the Muslim world, 
from North Africa to Southeast Asia, was subject to the same Western hegemony. This 
represented the first time since Islam's enormous transnational expansion that virtually all 
Muslims were able to perceive a common'other. ' The processes arising from decolonisation, 
which I see as an important component of translocality, have given rise to new forms of post- 
colonial Islam, and I suggested that this is perhaps the best context in which to understand 
contemporary Islamist discourse. 
I then returned to the concept of translocality which I had introduced in the first chapter. I 
outlined several qualities of translocal space - travelling theory, hybridity and diasporic 
identity - which I see as crucial for understanding the dynamics of cultural politics in 
translocality. I first examined a set of ideas surrounding the notion of 'traveling theory ' as a 
30 Michael Peter Smith, "Can You Imagine? Transnational Migration and the Globalization of 
Grassroots Politics, " Social Text, No. 39, Summer 1994, p. 15. Emphasis added. 
31 See e. g. Pheng Cheah and Bruce Robbins (ed. ), Cosmopolitics: Thinking and Feeling Beyond the 
Nation, Minneapolis: University of Minnesota Press, 1998. 
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means by which to understand how meanings change through movement from one social 
context to another. I then went on to look at various theoretical formulations of hybridity. 
This trope, I argued, can be useful in accounting for the transformation of ideas and cultures 
in translocal spaces, and also in understanding the interplay of competing interpretations and 
idioms within a culture. I suggested that a focus on hybridity is perhaps most meaningful 
when discussing encounters between variations of an ostensibly homogenous cultural system 
(e. g. Islam) within translocality. I then examined some of the discourses on migrant and 
diasporic identity and took issue with those metropolitan post-colonial theorists who 
celebrate the 'free-floating' nature of diasporic identity. I pointed out that such a perspective 
requires that adoption of an ironic stance which not all identities - and particularly not 
politicised identities (such as Islam) - possess. Travel, migrancy, and hybridity, I therefore 
concluded, should not be celebrated as part of a postmodern carnival, or as an ontological 
fad. 
Having analysed some of the key theoretical concepts related to translocality, I then began a 
detailed empirical portrait of the Muslim diaspora. In it, I sought to provide something like a 
'case study' of what happens to Islam when it 'travels' into new contexts - and particularly 
when it enters into and settles amongst non-Muslim societies in the West. My discussion here 
was organised according to three themes, each of which illustrated a different aspect of the 
wider Muslim translocality: debates within the Muslim community provided examples of 
encounters and negotiations with the Muslim other; some of the ways in which Muslims are 
rethinking Islam were illustrated by examining contemporary discourses on politics, 
community and gender; and the final section on Muslim transnationalism reminded us of the 
wider global network of sociopolitical relations in which these various discourses are 
embedded. I argued that diasporic Islam represents a form of interstitial identity, or, to use 
Homi Bhabha's terminology, a'third space, ' in which the majority society's conception of the 
political is not embraced, but neither is that of the 'homeland' - especially among the younger 
generation. This gives rise to forms of political identity which are somehow 'in between. ' 
Viewed from a translocal perspective, these travelling identities represent a new mode of 
'relating internationally' in which the boundaries of political community are constantly open 
to rearticulation. 
In the final chapter I used communications, media and information technologies as a 
contextual lens through which to read the hybridity of contemporary Islamist discourse. I first 
examined the historical salience of literacy and modern printing in eroding the traditional 
scholars' monopoly over legitimate articulations of Islam. I went on to argue that information 
technology today is intensifying this process by providing lay Muslims with resources such 
as the Internet and CD-ROM-based textual libraries that allow them to read, interpret and 
produce Islamic knowledge for themselves. I also looked at the ways in which broadcast, 
distributive and networked technologies are helping Muslims to forge and sustain 
distanciated links reminiscent of the umma concept. These forces are also giving voice to 
alternative sources of Islamic authority and contributing to the development of a wider 
Muslim public sphere. The case of the Internet in the Arab Gulf states illustrated the 
transformative potential (and state responses to it) of translocal technologies which become 
'relocalised' in specific sociopolitical contexts. These technologies are often perceived to 
represent a threat to established sources of political legitimacy, and hence the latter then seek 
(often with only mixed success) to circumscribe these new public spheres A related 
development in other parts of the Muslim world, I pointed out, has been the emergence of a 
new breed of Islamist intellectual seeking to encourage and capitalise on this new populist 
spirit (e. g. "a chemist, an engineer, an economist, or a jurist are all ulama"). The discourse of 
the new intellectual often seeks to question the legitimacy of both the state and the mosque (a 
symbol of traditional conservatism) as sources of 'authentic' Islam. In this sense the new 
Islamist positions himself in spaces which institutionalised forms of politics cannot reach. 
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The new Islamist intellectual thus represents yet another form of interstitial political identity, 
inhabiting the borderzones of institutional forms. His anti-statist discourse, articulated via 
various media, serves as a form of authority (modern, post-traditional) through which an 
authentic message (Islam, ethicality) is transmitted. 
As we have seen in this Conclusion, translocality is also contributing to the emergence of 
new forms of'critical Islam, ' by producing thinkers committed to the renewal and reform of 
religious dogma. Within translocality, these debates over authority in Islam constitute a new 
form of Muslim public sphere which, in turn, serves to widen the boundaries of Muslim 
political community. In a broad sense, then, we can conclude that the rethinking of political 
community is largely a result of Muslims living in translocal spaces which are themselves the 
product of wider migratory and globalising processes. The example of translocal Islam is 
therefore only one aspect of a much wider trend. Where Muslims are reimagining the umma, 
other identities have discrepant communal visions - their own forms of 'transnational 
grassroots politics. ' The state and its 'International Relations' are still with us, however, and 
will be for some time to come. The state will never go out with a bang, and IR will never 
spontaneously combust. Our ambivalent inclinations towards their normative visions will, 
however, most likely intensify over time and, eventually, the borders will overflow. That's 













































wilayat al fagih 
Glossary of Arabic Terms 
Religious scholar (singular of ulama) 
Land of Treaty 
Land of War 
Land of Islam 
Missionary activity 
Imperative need 
Religion and state 
Legal scholar or jurist 
Opinion or edict of afaqih (plural: fatawa) 
Islamic legal science 
Reported saying of the Prophet Muhammad 




License to transmit/teach religious knowledge (esp. hadith) 
Consensus 
Independent reasoning or judgement 
Differences of opinion as regards figh 
The Prophet's night journey to Jerusalem 
Legal methodology employed in the absence of textual precedent 
Reasoning based on a "search for the good" (or for inaslaha) 
Pre- or non-Islamic ignorance 
Scholastic theology 
The institution of rule by the Caliph 
The sermon given at a Friday congregational prayer 








Biographical literature about the Prophet. 
"Orthodox" traditions of the Prophet 
Qur'anic exegesis 
Unity of God 
Religious scholars (singular: alim) 
The world community of Muslims 
Principles of legal science 
Sovereignty or guardianship of the legal scholar (a Shi'ite doctrine) 
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